BANDITS, PIRATES, MERCHANTS AND FINANCIERS Bandits and Pirates Tosa Harbor was the base of the powerful Andô uji on the Tsugaru peninsula. As I discussed briefly in my “maritime” survey of Japanese history, the city reached the height of its prosperity in the fourteenth century, rivalling the prosperity of Hakata in northern Kyûshû. Tosa Harbor’s once lively downtown district has yielded to archaeologists large numbers of Chinese coins and porcelain as well as Koguryo (Korean) celadon. Indeed, from the fourteenth to the fifteenth centuries, Tosa Harbor may well have been the international hub of the north. To the far south, the city of Bônotsu on southern-most tip of Kyûshû welcomed many ships from the Asian continent from the twelfth century, and excavations in Kanzaki on the Ariake Bay have also uncovered large numbers of Chinese porcelains. But coastal towns are not the only places where Chinese porcelains have turned up. They have also been found in Niimi, up in the mountains of Okayama, demonstrating its close links to East Asia. But lurking beneath all these traces of trade lies a major problem for historians: what kind of political power guaranteed the flow of goods and bills of exchange? When “checks bounced,” or exchanges were deemed invalid, or when there was a dispute over bills, who could offer the guarantees that would resolve the disputes? The government at this time did not fulfill this function. The Imperial government in Kyôto, the military government in Kamakura, the managers of shôen and government lands focused their attention on the resolution of land disputes, 128 establishing procedures to handle such problems. Without a doubt, disputes over land and fiefs were among the most serious social problems of the time. In particular, the Kamakura shogunate’s power was dependent upon its vassals’ well-being, and the vassals’ livelihoods, in turn, were dependent on their fiefs. So the shogunate was extremely meticulous when it came to litigation over titles to fiefs. In contrast to lawsuits relating to land disputes, which the shogunate called its “property affairs” (shomu sata), litigation relating to loans, commerce or distribution were designated “miscellaneous.”1 As the category implies, these lawsuits were not taken as seriously. This had been true since the archaic Ritsuryô state, once again revealing the State’s agrarian fundamentalist ideology. However, as I mentioned above, the imperial and shrine purveyors who were outside the State land system had organized their own financial and distribution networks by the eleventh century. These same groups held their own trials in matters related to commerce and had the power to enforce their decisions. Of course, the Imperial government did not find this alternative authority acceptable. From the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Imperial government strove to strengthen its control over the activities of imperial and shrine purveyors, designing an official system that could incorporate them. However, as the cash economy continued to grow from the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries, commercial and financial organizations and shipping networks also expanded, and grew ever more complex. At the same time, the organizations for imperial and shrine purveryors continued to expand beyond the framework previously provided by the State, becoming ever more independent. In particular, the activities of new groups who managed the traffic and transportation routes became quite prominent during this period. 1The Kamakura shogunate recognized three classes of lawsuits: land, criminal and miscellaneous. 129 As far as the government was concerned, these people were bandits (akutô) and pirates (kaizoku). For example, the picture scroll depicting the travels of Ippen, the founder of the Buddhist Ji sect, relates the famous story of Ippen’s service at the temple of Jimokuji in Owari.2 In the story, Ippen’s followers ran out of food during an especially long ceremony. Just as they began to show signs of fatigue, two wealthy “virtuous men” (tokujin) in nearby Kayatsu had a dream in which the Buddhist deity Bishamon ordered them to give alms to Ippen and his monks. In the scroll, these men are shown in unusual attire, with long loose hair, wearing tall geta and holding folding fans. According to the text accompanying this scene, the bandits of Owari and Mino had erected an edict board warning that anyone who attempted to interfere with Ippen’s evangelical work would be executed.3 As a result, Ippen’s group was able to preach in that region for three years without any interference from bandits in the mountains or pirates on the seas. In Ippen’s time, the ocean reached far inland at Owari and Mino, quite different from the way it is today, and the “outlaws” of that area included groups of “pirates” who worked the ocean and rivers. Even though these groups had no relation to the public authorities, they were able to raise their own edict boards and guarantee the safety of Ippen’s passage themselves. In fact, it might be more accurate to call these armed groups “Masters of the Sea” (umi no ryôshu) or “Lords of the Mountains” (yama no ryôshu), rather than pirates and bandits. Their power derived from their relation to roads and waterways. Many of them were also mountain aescetics or monks from the Tendai monastery on Mt. Hiei who engaged in commercial and financial enterprises. Thus, the circulation of bills of exchange 2See “Fear and Loathing” for a more complete discussion of this scene. 3Edict boards were the standard form of proclaiming new laws and ordinances. That the bandits would erect such a board suggests that they had arrogated to themselves the practices of official government. 130 from the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries that the network of merchants and financiers guaranteed was in turn secured by the control of transportation routes by these “bandits” and “pirates.” These people were originally known as “wanderers” (yûshu fushoku no tomogara) and many of them had been gamblers. By the thirteenth century, however, bandits and pirates possessed an organization covering a wide area. Whenever there was trouble of some kind within their territory, they would take bribes and gratuities, hear lawsuits, and resolve the problems on their own authority. Since they would take up lawsuits refused by the authorities, the disputants would actively seek them out and pay tribute in the hopes of a speedy resolution. A bribe paid before the fact was called “a mountain toll” (yamagoshi)4 while a gratuity paid afterward was called “a contract” (keiyaku). In a well-known incident at the beginning of the fourteenth century, a large group of bandits broke into the border post at Hyôgo. It was reported that a number of women were seen amongst their number. Thus, we know for a fact that there were women were active in these groups, and that many of the merchants and financiers who depended on the bandits’ organization were women. Some among them, in fact, were probably known as “courtesans.” What was “Evil”? Of course, the State could not ignore their activities. Since its power was based on the real estate holdings of its military estate stewards and vassals, the Kamakura shogunate in particular, often found its local authorities entangled with the activities of bandits and pirates. The authorities could not look on quietly when 4“Yamagoshi” means “crossing the mountain” and may originally have referred to a payment of a kind of toll to the local powers to guarantee safe passage across a mountain pass. 131 their order in their domains was thus disrupted. The shogunate insistently issued order after order calling for the suppression of bandits and pirates throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Such domestic disturbances were particularly disadvantageous to the shogunate when the Mongols were threatening to invade from the Asian mainland. Having labelled the “rulers” of the ocean, mountains and roads “bandits and pirates,” the shogunate used military means to suppress and pacify these independent organizations. Within the shogunate, the harshest opponents of the bandits were those who advocated what was called “beneficent government” based on the principles of “agrarian fundamentalism,” the ideology of military landed power. From the perspective of agrarian fundamentalists, “evil” was represented by people who were attracted by the magical powers of coinage and currency—the merchants and financiers who pursued profit and interest—and those who inhabited the roadways of the mountains and rivers, who enjoyed the taking of life in hunting and fishing and engaged in gambling. The word “evil” in those days was applied to phenomena that disrupted everyday peace, to that which exceeded the power of ordinary people. The taking of profit or interest in and of itself and, by extension, commerce and finance were seen as “evil” in this sense. Such activities as gambling—which decided matters by the roll of the dice—and sex, as well as the condition of pollution (kegare) were all seen as related to “evil” powers which exceeded the power of ordinary humans. Those who were seen as possessing such an extraordinary power were often actually officially called “evil,” referred to in documents as “Evil Shichibei,” “Evil Genta” or “Evil Safu.” It was this view of evil that labelled organizations of financiers, merchants and rulers of the ocean and mountains “evil bands.” But while the Kamakura shogunate’s attacks on “evil bands” was part of an 132 attempt to suppress the non-official networks of merchants, financiers and distributers, we may also discern an aggressive attempt within the shogunate not to suppress, but to acquire control of these groups’ activities. Based as it was on lord and vassal relations in which fiefs were divided among one’s own family vassals, the shogunate approached the task of controling the “bandits” in an essentially “agrarian fundamentalist” mode.