U.S. UNCLASSIFIED REL NATO, GCTF, ISAF, MCFI, ABCA For Official Use Only Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE A digital version of this CALL publication is available to view, download, or reproduce from the CALL restricted website, <http://call.army.mil>. Reproduction of this publication is welcomed and highly encouraged. Common Access Card (CAC) or Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login is required to access the digital version. This publication is located online at: https://call2.army.mil/toc.aspx?document=6698& filename=/docs/doc6698/11-34.pdf IRREGULAR WARFARE: A SOF PERSPECTIVE Irregular Warfare: A SOF Perspective Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1. A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare 3 ADM Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy Chapter 2. Irregular Warfare is Warfare 9 Kenneth Coons and Glenn Harned Chapter 3. Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare 19 LTC Mark Grdovic, U.S. Army Chapter 4. Preparing for Hybrid Threats: Improving Force Preparation for Irregular Warfare 23 William Fleser Chapter 5. Winning Damaged Hearts and Minds: An Irregular Warfare Concept 29 David L. Grange, S. Swanson, and Patrick Christian Chapter 6. The Great UW Debate 35 COL David M. Witty, U.S. Army Chapter 7. Long-Term Counterinsurgency Strategy: Maximizing Special Operations and Airpower 49 CDR John James Patterson VI, U.S. Navy Chapter 8. OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID 61 LTC Brian Petit, U.S. Army Chapter 9. Effective Use of FID Expands SF Influence 71 CPT Stephen Flanagan, U.S. Army Chapter 10. Afghanistan: The Importance of Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency Operations 77 CPT John A. Kendall, U.S. Army iii CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED Center for Army Lessons Learned Director COL Thomas H. Roe Chief of Plans Larry Hollars Senior Military Analyst, SOF Joseph Fox Desk, Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function Branch CALL LNO, USSOCOM Robert Harter Editor Jenny Solon Graphic Artist Eric Eck, CALL Contractor The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended. Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system. iv IRREGULAR WARFARE: A SOF PERSPECTIVE Introduction In this edition of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Special Operations newsletter, we will examine the special operations forces (SOF) perspective of irregular warfare (IW) at the operational and tactical levels through a selection of articles and an academic study by military and civilian authors. IW is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”1 Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) version 2.0 identifies the problem of IW as “adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks as well as states increasingly resort(ing) to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional military powers. Advances in technology and other trends in the environment will render such irregular threats ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter. These threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by astute use of communications, cyberspace, and technology, such that their impact extends regionally and globally. Many of these conflicts are essentially contests for influence and legitimacy over relevant populations.”2 SOF attempt to solve the problem of IW by preventing, deterring, disrupting, or defeating irregular threats, with the primary emphasis on prevention. There are five activities SOF employ to counter the threat: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID),3 counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations. Four out of these activities (CT, UW, FID, COIN) are considered SOF core activities, with SOF also leading the effort in stability operations.4 This newsletter should not be considered all-inclusive. This is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional journals and from the CALL and other joint archives to inform Soldiers on relevant observations, insights, and lessons and provide a historical document for future reference. In many instances, the ideas presented in these articles are personal opinions and in some cases not approved joint or Army doctrine. The recommendations in these articles should always be validated with the latest approved Army and joint doctrine. CALL acknowledges and thanks the professional journals and authors who permitted the reprinting of these articles and in some instances were personally involved in assisting CALL in the formatting process. Note: Minor modifications were made to support the CALL newsletter format. In some instances, pictures not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space. Additionally, biographies were eliminated to avoid release of personal information. 1 CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED Notes 1. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 30 September 2010). 2. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) version 2.0, 17 May 2010. 3. Security force assistance, a term that overlaps with foreign internal defense, is defined as activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. (Department of Defense Draft Instruction). 4. Civil affairs operations, information operations, and military information support operations (formerly known as PSYOP, or psychological operations), three of 12 SOF core activities, are essential components of stability operations. See Michele Malvesti, “To Serve the Nation: U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Center for a New American Security, June 2010. 2 IRREGULAR WARFARE: A SOF PERSPECTIVE A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare ADM Eric T. Olson Reprinted with permission from the Spring 2009 issue of The Journal of International Security Affairs. To successfully deter and confront the global insurgency threatening the world and our nation today, the U.S. military must be able to employ a balanced approach to warfare, carefully blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action to achieve success. It is an approach I refer to as “balanced warfare.” It is the manner in which our nation’s Special Operations Forces are combating terrorism today, and it is the guiding principle behind the Department of Defense’s campaign plan to combat global terrorism. The environment Today, we find ourselves living in a “new normal.” The world is not going to go back to the way it was before 9/11. Our national security is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either unwilling or unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people. Further, sovereignty is not what it used to be; advances in communications, transportation and global networking continue to make borders more transparent, economies more interconnected, and information available on an unprecedented scale. The effects of this globalization create stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and unrest. As a result of our current environment, war is not what it used to be. Traditionally defined forms of warfare such as counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare are now lumped under the umbrella term of “irregular warfare.” We have commonly referred to the current conflict as the Global War on Terrorism, but this term means something else when translated into most other languages. Our current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, identified it best when he wrote recently, “What is dubbed the war on terrorism, in grim reality, is a prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation.”1 Regardless of how the term is defined, one thing remains constant: The type of warfare we fight on the ground is not determined by what forces we have on the ground; it is determined by our adversaries. We need to be responsive enough to adjust rapidly to what the enemy throws at us, and we need to have the agility to transcend the spectrum of conflict. In many cases, fight at various levels of conflict simultaneously. The ability to do this successfully requires a holistic approach to warfare, aimed at both eliminating our most determined adversaries and eroding the conditions which led to their behavior. The strategy The Department of Defense campaign strategy against terrorism is contained in Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500. Crafted at the United States Special Operations Command and approved by the Secretary of Defense—first Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and subsequently Secretary Gates —it serves as both the guiding plan within the Department of Defense and a supporting plan in the interagency environment for combating terrorism. It is supported by regional Global War on Terrorism plans crafted by