Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 32 FILED 2005 Nov-08 PM 04:46 U.S. DISTRICT COURT N.D. OF ALABAMA IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION DEBORAH STANDIFER, ) PLAINTIFF, ) VS. ) 2:04-CV-2359-JHH SONIC-WILLIAMS MOTORS, LLC ) d/b/a TOM WILLIAMS LEXUS, ) DEFENDANT. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The court has before it the September 15, 2005 motion (doc. # 32) of defendant Sonic Williams Motors, LLC d/b/a Tom Williams Lexus for summary judgment. Pursuant to the court’s September 16, 2005 and October 3, 2005 orders, the motion was deemed submitted, without oral argument, on November 1, 2005. I. Procedural History Plaintiff Deborah Standifer commenced this action on July 30, 2004 by filing a complaint in this court alleging gender and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s alleged conduct constitutes (1) disparate treatment Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 2 of 32 regarding pay and promotion under Title VII, (2) constructive discharge under Title VII, (3) a hostile work environment under Title VII, (4) interference with her FMLA rights, and (5) retaliation in violation of the FMLA. Defendant’s September 15, 2005 motion for summary judgment asserts that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima face case for any of plaintiff’s claims, and, in the alternative, that she cannot establish that defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions was pretext. Both parties have filed briefs and submitted evidence in support of their respective positions. Defendant submitted a brief (doc. # 32) and evidence1 (doc. # 33) in support of its motion for summary judgment on September 15, 2005. On October 21, 2005, plaintiff filed a brief (doc. # 43) and evidence2 (doc. # 44) in 1 The defendant submitted the following evidence: deposition of Deborah Standifer; deposition of Jeffrey Wiggins; deposition of Tom Williams, Jr.; deposition of Richard O’Connor; defendant’s second amended objections and responses to plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories; termination check sheet; 12/10/03 payroll/status change; e-mail from Standifer to David Levecchia; Standifer’s pay plan effective 12/01/01; Standifer’s pay plan 08/01/03; 10/31/03 “F&A Pay Plan” memorandum; Standifer’s pay plan 12/01/03; Laura Drake’s pay plan 08/01/03 & 12/01/03; 10/27/03 warning; 09/15/03 letter from Standifer to Wiggins; 12/01/03 letter from Standifer to “gentlemen”; 09/18/03 & 12/15/03 payroll/status change for Joe Paulovich; Paulovich’s pay plan 12/01/03; New Hire Checklist for Chris Jones 02/27/04; Jones’ pay plan 12/01/03; Jones personnel records; New Hire Checklist for Travis Walton 08/09/04; Walton pay plan 08/09/04; New Hire Checklist for Jeffrey Wong 09/03/04; Wong pay plan 09/03/04; New Hire Guarantees for Jones, Walton, and Wong; Standifer’s FMLA paperwork; 07/01/03 payroll/status change; EEOC charge; complaint; declaration of Patsy Humby; Standifer’s Finance and Insurance Summaries for January, February, and August 2003. 2 The plaintiff submitted the following evidence: deposition of Deborah Standifer; deposition of Laura Drake; deposition of Tommy Williams; and deposition of Jeffrey Wiggins. 2 Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 3 of 32 opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On November 1, 2005, defendant filed a brief (doc. # 45) in reply to plaintiff’s opposition.3 II. Standards for Evaluating a Summary Judgment Motion Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate 3 Defendant also filed a motion to strike (doc. #49) with its reply brief. Defendant first asks the court to strike the deposition transcript of Laura Drake. As grounds, defendant argues that the court granted plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of Drake’s pay plans, and “[i]t logically follows that the same parameters should apply” at summary judgment. The court agrees. The portions of the deposition transcript of Laura Drake relating to her pay plan are STRIKEN, and the court will not consider them in deciding the motion for summary judgment. The motion also asks the court to strike “all factual averments contained in Plaintiff’s Opposition brief that are unsupported by evidentiary citations.” As grounds, defendant argues that plaintiff’s statement of facts “is replete with bald argumentative ‘factual’ averments that are unsupported by any evidentiary citations.” Although the court understands defendant’s concern, and agrees that the court is not required to “scour the record,” this portion of the motion to strike is DENIED. The court is able to discern those statements that are not supported by the record, and considers the record evidence, and not merely argument of counsel, in deciding whether a material issue of genuine fact exists. As such, the motion to strike (doc. #49) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 3 Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 4 of 32 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324. The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249. The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge its initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the issue at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17 (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can only meet its initial burden on summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence 4 Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 5 of 32 demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; i.e. facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the non- moving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the non-moving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed verdict at trial. The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record to support a judgment for the non-moving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does not require evidence negating the non-movant’s claim; it simply requires the movant to point out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to 5 Case 2:04-cv-02359-JHH Document 51 Filed 11/08/05 Page 6 of 32 support the non-moving party’s case. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16. If the movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the non-moving party may either point out to the court record evidence, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the non-moving party may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the non-movant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts.