A Thesis entitled Difference Over Identity: Overturning the Paradigm of Identity With Gilles Deleuze’s Differential Ontology by Matthew G. Eckel Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy Dr. Ammon Allred, Committee Chair Dr. Benjamin Grazzini, Committee Member Dr. Benjamin Pryor, Committee Member Dr. Patricia R. Komuniecki, Dean College of Graduate Studies The University of Toledo May 2014 An Abstract of Difference Over Identity: Overturning the Paradigm of Identity With Gilles Deleuze’s Differential Ontology by Matthew G. Eckel Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy The University of Toledo May 2014 Taking Gilles Deleuze to be a philosopher who is most concerned with articulating a ‘philosophy of difference’, Deleuze’s thought represents a fundamental shift in the history of philosophy, a shift which asserts ontological difference as independent of any prior ontological identity, even going as far as suggesting that identity is only possible when grounded by difference. Deleuze reconstructs a ‘minor’ history of philosophy, mobilizing thinkers from Spinoza and Nietzsche to Duns Scotus and Bergson, in his attempt to assert that philosophy has always been, underneath its canonical manifestations, a project concerned with ontology, and that ontological difference deserves the kind of philosophical attention, and privilege, which ontological identity has been given since Aristotle. This thesis will (1) briefly characterize the history of philosophy as one which can be described as resting on an identitarian ontology, focusing on the contribution of Plato and Aristotle in particular; (2) describe the contribution of Heidegger as providing a way past ontological identity to ontological difference in asserting the event in place of ousia as the fundamental ontological principle; (3) assert that Deleuze’s philosophy ultimately provides the best framework for thinking of ontological difference independent of a principle or concept of identity. iii Table of Contents Abstract iii Table of Contents iv Preface vi 1 Identity 1 1.1 Overview............................................................................................................2 1.2 The Philosophy of Identity.................................................................................7 1.2.1 Pre-Socratic Thought and the Beginning of Western Philosophy............8 1.2.1.1 Monism.........................................................................................11 1.2.1.2 Pythagoreanism.............................................................................13 1.2.1.3 Heraclitus......................................................................................15 1.2.1.4 Parmenides....................................................................................17 1.2.1.5 Pluralism and Atomism.................................................................20 1.2.1.6 Pre-Socratic Thought as the Departure of Identity........................23 1.2.2 Platonism................................................................................................26 1.2.3 Aristotle..................................................................................................36 1.2.3.1 Physics...........................................................................................38 1.2.3.2 Metaphysics...................................................................................48 1.3 Identity and Indications of an Aristotelian Heritage.......................................60 iv 2 From Identity to Difference 70 2.1 From Substance to Event: Heidegger..............................................................71 2.2 Dasein..............................................................................................................76 2.3 Metaphysics, Truth, Art and Technology........................................................79 2.4 Identity and Difference as Ontological Difference..........................................86 2.5 The Limits of Difference in Heidegger............................................................94 3 Difference 99 3.1 The Minor Difference Internal to Major Identity..........................................101 3.2 Deleuze Contra Aristotle...............................................................................102 3.2.1 Out of Representation, Past Specific Difference............................105 3.2.2 Univocal Being...............................................................................109 3.2.3 Overturning Platonism....................................................................119 3.3 Transcendental Empiricism...........................................................................125 3.4 Virtual Multiplicity........................................................................................129 References 137 v Preface This thesis represents, first, a critique of metaphysical identity, and, second, an assertion of a philosophy of difference. Overturning the paradigm of identity over difference means initially explicating the metaphysical presupposition of identity as central to history of philosophy. This requires tracing the history of philosophy as one which operates on this very presupposition, only to show that this presupposition is not necessary, and is, in fact, aporetic. Thus, to overturn the paradigm of identity over difference truly means to present a philosophy of difference that, in its turn, accounts for identity as a derivative of difference itself. In doing so, the task does not utilize the methodology of the history of philosophy. Rather, the methodology is a rereading of the history of philosophy in a minor key, seeing the history of philosophy anew, as a history that is permeated by difference, even though identity always has the privilege of centrality. In order to carry out this overturning, I trace the canonical sense of the philosophical history as identitarian, only to present Heidegger and Deleuze as two moments in that history, two moments in which difference finally takes priority and centrality over identity. This coupling of Heidegger and Deleuze is unique in the sense that it is not commonplace to consider the respective projects of the two philosophers as coextensive. vi However, I suggest that both Heidegger and Deleuze share a common sentiment: that the presupposition of identity is one that ought to be rethought, and that difference should take on a more formative, central, productive, and privileged position than it has traditionally found itself in, as a derivative of identity, in the history of philosophy. This coupling presents something new in philosophy in that, taking identity to be a problem, taking identity to be presupposed, but never fully explicated, is an aporetic exercise throughout the history of philosophy, one which leaves both identity and difference in an inadequate conceptual state, never fully disclosed. To overturn the paradigm of identity over difference, then, is taken to present the possibility of a philosophy which thinks both identity and difference in a fully disclosed manner, each adequately, and at the same time. A philosophy of difference, fully articulated, presents a philosophical path from the impasse of inadequate identity and difference to a totally operational and explanatory philosophy of generation, corruption, change, movement, ideas, material, difference and identity. It is in this project that I follow Miguel de Beistegui’s Truth and Genesis. De Beistegui’s work parallels the work undertaken in this thesis in that there is a shared sentiment between them: the sentiment that difference ought to be considered, for the first time, in itself, outside of the purview of prior, presupposed identity. This is precisely the value of the thought of Gilles Deleuze, which provides the touchstone for both Truth and Genesis and the current thesis. This constitutes a revitalization of ontology as metaphysics, of a discourse on being in general and first principles, albeit in a radically new way. Given the status of metaphysics as antiquated and impotent after its fall from occupying the place of the science of all sciences, this return to metaphysics runs against the grain of contemporary vii philosophy, the task of which seems, regardless of the specific motivations of particular domains within philosophy, to critique metaphysical thought at all turns. However, ontological thought seems to be a necessary feature of thought in general, and metaphysical positions cannot be left to chance. The sciences cannot be entrusted with the task of general ontologies, because the scientific method (1) does not take its task to be ontological, and (2) presupposes ontological concepts in order to furnish itself with theoretical potency. Granted, if metaphysics as a concept and method is taken to mean a type of ontological thought which has a history, then this thesis agrees that metaphysics is a moment to be moved past. Following Bergson and Deleuze, contemporary science has not yet found its proper metaphysical position. As such, the requirements of a general ontology, and even contemporary science itself, demand a new metaphysics, and this thesis proposes that this new metaphysics be a metaphysics centered on difference, not identity. Leaving ontological thought itself to chance means irresponsibly neglecting critical thought regarding the types of entities which are taken to be real, in the