Illinois Wesleyan University Digital Commons @ IWU Honors Projects Political Science Department Spring 2000 Elector System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A Rationalist Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe Eric Wesselkamper '00 Illinois Wesleyan University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Wesselkamper '00, Eric, "Elector System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A Rationalist Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe" (2000). Honors Projects. 7. https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/polisci_honproj/7 This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ©Copyright is owned by the author of this document. • Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism A Rationalist Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe Eric Wesselkamper Spring 2000 The resurgence ofnationalism taking place throughout Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union raises important questions with respect to ethnic political mobilization, particularly with respect to the potentialfor ethnic separatism. Moreover, the region provides scholars an excellent setting in which to study the political effects ofconstitutional choices. This article, utilizing a rationalist approach which emphasizes the cost-benefit calculus ofethnic groups, seeks to analyze the impact ofone such constitutional choice, the electoral system. The competing theories regarding the determinants ofethnic separatism are also examined. We find that the most importantfactor in explaining ethnic separatism is the basic geo-political arrangement ofthe group, as measured through spatial distribution. Within the setting ofthe far-reaching ethnic resurgence witnessed throughout post-communist Eastern Europe, several competing explanatory frameworks have been put forth to explain the phenomenon of ethnic separatism. Building on what March and Olson (1988) refer to as the "new institutionalism," numerous studies have sought to empirically demonstrate the link between institutions and the political behavior of ethnic groups (Ishiyama, 1998; Pejovich, 1993; Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1992; 1986; 1974; 1977). This article, operating on the basis of a rationalist approach, tests the effect of one such institution--the electoral system. To what extent does the design of a country's electoral system impact the political and behavioral calculus of an ethnic group with respect to separatism? To what extent is separatism determined by the other calculations about the costs, benefits, and feasibility ofautonomy? Theoretical Analysis of Separatism Separatism (or secession) is a subcategory ofnationalism that refers to an organized attempt to establish a separate sovereign state. Premdas argues that the determinants of ethnic separatism can be divided into two broad categories: primordial • 2 and secondary. Primordial factors include race, religion, values or culture, and territory or homeland. Secondary factors serve as the "triggering mechanism of collective consciousness" and include neglect, exploitation, domination and internal colonialism, repression and discrimination, and forced annexation. Economic, political, and cultural conditions can provide the objective basis in which these often subjective variables are rooted: Group demands are predicated on the empirically demonstrable existence of commonalities in individual life experience. In the case of minority groups this is determined by the constraints society imposes upon individual members.... These structural pre-conditions generate ... demands (Murray, 1983). Thus the social, economic, and political setting within which national groups operate is expected to have a determining impact on the development of separatist orientations. Several theoretical frameworks have been put forth to predict which of these societal conditions is more or less conducive to ethnic separatism. One such approach, the "revised modernization" thesis, argues that separatist movements may in fact be a product of the modernization process (Gould, 1966). According to this approach, with urbanization and increased education, previously disparate groups are brought into contact and competition with one another, creating a situational dynamic that fosters ethnic tension. Moreover, modernization (and the process of industrialization in particular) creates the conditions which facilitate nationalist resurgence by introducing new infrastructure, transforming the political system, and changing the existing distribution ofresources. The importance of resource distribution is particularly salient in the post-communist context, as the consolidation ofthe "dual transition" to democracy and market capitalism is itself a competition for political and economic resources. • 3 An alternative framework discusses the concept of "relative deprivation" as the primary motivating factor behind ethnic political mobilization (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1968). Rooted in a psychological perspective, the relative deprivation theory maintains that ethnic mobilization is a product of feelings of frustration, aggression, and alienation. These feelings, at the most basic level, are a function of a differential distribution of resources which leads to a sharp disparity between "value expectations" (in terms oflife quality) and "value capabilities" (Gurr 1970). Several other theories also emphasize the importance ofthese sorts of perceptions in explaining separatism. The "internal colonial" school, for example, focuses on ethnic claims of oppression and exploitation, which depend more on subjective perceptions of relative deprivation than on empirically demonstrable conditions (Hechter, 1975, 1978). It is important to note that in both the relative deprivation and internal colonial approaches, inequality of economic standing and political power can only lead to separatist sentiment under certain conditions of collective consciousness--that is to say, conditions ofconscious frustration. Some groups are more likely than others to develop and mobilize this consciousness. Important characteristics include the relative size ofthe group versus the size of the dominant cultural pool, the existence of an intellectual and political personnel base, the geopolitical arrangement with respect to the group's proximity to kin-states, and the relative compactness and concentration ofthe group within a given territory (Gellner, 1983; Dutter, 1990). • 4 Empirical and Normative Considerations of Proportional Arrangements Aside from these detenninants of ethnic political mobilization, another set ofkey variables to consider is the institutional structure of the political system. As Mainwaring notes, political institutions do indeed matter. Among other things, they "shape actors' identities" and "create incentives and disincentives for political actors" (Mainwaring, 1993). Indeed the ability ofpolitical institutions to structure incentives is central to our argument regarding the relationship between electoral system design and ethnic separatism. Ultimately this issue of incentive rests on the most basic theoretical debate regarding electoral systems: proportional versus majoritarian system design. The empirical effects of electoral laws have been clearly demonstrated. Duverger proffers a fundamental "law" (Duverger, 1963) which is here presented in a slightly modified fonn as a group oftwo "tendency laws" (Sartori 1994): Tendency Law 1: Plurality fonnulae facilitate a two-party fonnat and, conversely, obstruct multipartyism. Tendency Law 2: PR fonnulae facilitate multipartyism and are, conversely, hardly conducive to two partyism. Essentially, majoritarian systems make it difficult for smaller ethnic parties to gain representation because, barring a geographic concentration of support, they need to win pluralities of the vote in electoral districts (Lijphart, 1994). Such parties are therefore more able to gain representation in PR systems which do not require first-past-the-post showings, but instead allocate seats on a proportional basis. This extremely basic empirical showing has engendered an enonnous amount of literature on the nonnative merits ofelectoral system design with respect to ethnic politics. While there are "neither widely accepted conclusions nor much conclusive 5 evidence on institutional remedies for ethnic conflict," (Cohen, 1997) several important propositions exist within the literature. One such tenet suggests that proportional representation and the promotion of "group rights" are effective mechanisms for ameliorating ethnic conflict in developing countries (see Osaghae, 1996), particularly those countries in the post-communist world (Ishiyama, 1996). The"consociational" school contends that representing groups proportionally fosters the integration of as many subcultures as possible into the political process (Lijphart, 1974; 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; McRae, 1974; Daalder, 1974; Lorwin, 1971). This integration affords the channeling