Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1995 Limited Warfare as a Pragmatic Concern: The Bounds of Domestic Consensus, the Controlled Use of Force, and United States Security. Robert Keith Jones Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Jones, Robert Keith, "Limited Warfare as a Pragmatic Concern: The Bounds of Domestic Consensus, the Controlled Use of Force, and United States Security." (1995). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6070. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6070 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 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LIMITED WARFARE AS A PRAGMATIC CONCERN: THE BOUNDS OF DOMESTIC CONSENSUS, THE CONTROLLED USE OF FORCE, AND UNITED STATES SECURITY A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Political Science by Robert Keith Jones B.A., Southwest Texas State University, 1984 M.A. in Political Science, Southwest Texas State University, 1986 December 1995 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9613422 UMI Microform 9613422 Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 4S103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank the members of my committee. Doctor William Clark, Doctor James Stoner, Doctor Keith Boeckelman, Doctor Mitchell Rice. Their kindness and patience are remarkable. To the chairman of my committee, Doctor Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., I owe a debt which cannot be repaid. His supreme equity will not be forgotten. Finally, I thank my parents, Bobby and Mary Jones. As always, words are inadequate to express the strength of our family bond. ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................. ii LIST OF FIGURES................................... v ABSTRACT .......................................... vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................. 1 Two Models of Knowledge....................... 3 Defining Limited War ......................... 8 Limited War D y n a m i c s ....................... 11 Defining Pragmatism ......................... 23 Limited War and Pragmatism................. 26 Research Method.......................... 31 Plan of the Study........................... 34 2 THE DEDUCTIVE THEORY OF LIMITED W A R .......... 35 Historical Background ....................... 37 Basic Framework............................. 38 Critical Variables ......................... 40 General Logic ............................... 43 Strategic U s e ............................... 43 Political Consequences ..................... 45 3 THE KOREAN W A R ............................. 48 Historical Background ....................... 49 U.S. Interests in Korea..................... 57 U.S. Objectives in K o r e a ................... 66 U.S. Mobilization........................... 73 U.S. Public Support......................... 79 Military and Nonmilitary Means ............. 83 Conclusion................................. 85 4 THE VIETNAM W A R ............................. 88 Historical Background ..................... 90 U.S. Interests in Vietnam................... 93 U.S. Objectives in V i e t n a m ................. 106 U.S. Mobilization........................... 114 U.S. Public Support......................... 125 Military and Nonmilitary Means ............. 132 Conclusion ........................... 133 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 U.S. INTERVENTION IN G R E N A D A ............... 136 Historical Background ....................... 136 U.S. Interests in Grenada................... 141 U.S. Objectives in G r e n a d a ................. 146 U.S. Mobilization........................... 147 U.S. Public Support......................... 149 Military and Nonmilitary M e a n s ............. 152 Conclusion................................. 153 6 U.S INTERVENTION IN P A N A M A ................. 156 Historical Background ....................... 157 U.S. Interests in P a n a m a ................... 163 U.S. Objectives in Panama................... 176 U.S. Mobilization........................... 180 U.S. Public Support......................... 183 Military and Nonmilitary Means ............. 186 Conclusion................................. 190 7 THE PERSIAN GULF W A R ....................... 192 Historical Background ....................... 194 U.S. Interests in the Persian G u l f .......... 197 U.S. Objectives in the Persian G u l f .......... 210 U.S. Mobilization........................... 216 U.S. Public Support......................... 221 Military and Nonmilitary Means ............. 226 Conclusion................................. 230 8 CONCLUSION................................. 232 Reassessing the Two M o d e l s ................. 232 On Pragmatism............................. 242 A S t e p .................................... 248 REFERENCES............................ 250 APPENDIX: TEXT OF REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB . 271 VITA .......................................... 289 iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. The spectrum of conflict and mobilization of U.S. conventional forces for combat............ 16 2. The stages of mobilization.................. 19 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT Over forty years since the Korean War, Americans continue to face limited war as a fundamental challenge to their security. In order to help the public to deal more effectively with the problem, this study seeks a pragmatic understanding of limited war (i.e., one in which it is possible to judge in retrospect the cumulative practical results of previous limited wars). In achieving that goal, two other objectives are sought: first, to model and critically evaluate two types of knowledge used by policymakers to wage limited wars; and, second, to detail the development of such knowledge from its historical origins in the Korean War. The first model of knowledge dealt with is the deductive theory of limited war. In order to assess the policymaking impact of the theory, the study addresses the following questions. What framework does the theory provide for limited war strategy? What variables are identified by the theory to which policymakers must give specific strategic content? What logic does the theory associate with the successful employment of limited war vi Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. strategy? What strategic use did policymakers make of the theory? The second model of knowledge dealt with is derived from Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1984 speech to the National Press Club. Reformulated to allow for a comparison of five limited-war case studies, the Weinberger criteria provide five open-ended questions. What interests were used to justify the