1 One system or two? The transformation of values into prices of production versus the transformation problem Ted McGlone and Andrew Kliman 1.1 INTRODUCTION We here defend Marx’s oft-refuted account of the transformation of values into prices of production in two ways. First, we argue that it was appropriate to his purpose, that of showing the transformation to be part of the process by which workers’ subjectivity is transformed into an antagonistic economic ‘objectivity’. To comprehend this process of transformation into opposite, we suggest, values and prices must be retained in one relation, not separated into opposed systems of calculation. Second, we show that, once values and prices are held in a single relation, Marx’s account is logically coherent. Like most contributors to this book, we contend that static equilibrium formalisations distort Marx’s value theory. Our work, however, is not intended to develop an alternative, non-equilibrium political economy. Rather, we conceive our defence of Marx’s account of the value-price transformation as an attempt to combat an ideological attack on his body of ideas and thus to create a place for its renewal, and as contributions to the critique of political economy on the foundations laid by Marx. The difference between political economy and Marx’s critique of it is, in our view, twofold. Firstly, whereas rival schools of economics primarily argue over which gives the best account of the functioning of existing society, Capital does not merely criticize others’ conceptions of reality. It is a philosophical critique of economics, which critiques the existing reality of capitalism itself, including its thought, from the standpoint of an envisioned new, human society, the conditions for which develop through the struggles of revolutionary subjects within existing society. Because its projects and concepts – and not only Marx’s own opinions – are thus inherently critical, Marx’s work becomes subject to distortion when forced into the mould of economic theory. 1 2 Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics Secondly and relatedly, whereas internal critiques within economics focus on others’ inaccuracies, we believe that Capital is primarily a critique of the scientific, disinterested, and (largely) ‘correct’ political economy of the classicals. Following Dunayevskaya (1988:98-102; 1989:76-94; 1991:143-45), we regard Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism as primarily not a critique of illusion and inaccuracy, but as a critique of conceptions that are topsy-turvy because they reflect accurately the inverted relations that characterize capitalism – the reification of persons and the personification of things. Thus it was precisely because the classical economists’ categories did correspond to capitalist reality that Marx considered them to be, at one and the same time, both ‘absurd’ and ‘socially valid’ (Marx 1976a:169) Although this chapter reiterates themes we have addressed earlier (Kliman and McGlone 1988), the dialogue our first paper has generated (see, especially, Naples 1993 and Kliman 1993) has convinced us of the need to sharpen and clarify our arguments. In particular, the present chapter (1) seeks to clarify further how and why the price of the means of production and labour power becomes the value of capital, and (2) illustrates the transformation in a slightly different and, we hope, clearer way. Also, it contains the mathematical Appendix (slightly revised) that accompanied our earlier paper but was not published due to space limitations. Since Bortkiewicz, Marx’s nonseparation of values and prices has been regarded as a logical inconsistency; Marx ‘fails to keep separate rigorously enough the two principles of value- and price-calculation’ (Bortkiewicz 1952:8). What has often been overlooked is that the relation between values and prices is a methodological issue. This was clear to Böhm-Bawerk. At the same time that he complained of a ‘Great contradiction’ between Volumes I and III of Capital, he argued that Marx has not deduced from facts the fundamental principles of his system, either by means of sound empiricism or a solid economical-psychological analysis: he founds it on no firmer ground than a formal dialectic. This is the great radical fault of the Marxian system at its birth: from it all the rest necessarily springs. (Böhm-Bawerk 1984:101) The nondialectical ‘understanding’ (Verstand) perceives each object as isolated, uniquely itself, a whole unto itself (Hegel 1991:126-28). Thus, for instance, separate systems of value- and price-calculation are demanded, systems in which value equals value, and price of production equals price of production. Conversely, dialectical ‘reason’ (Vernunft) comprehends a judgement such as ‘value is price of production’ because this judgement, like every other proposition taken singly, is inadequate. It must continue to be developed until the original statement has undergone so much differentiation that we now fully comprehend how value becomes price of production. To comprehend that process, we adopt neither the ‘technological’ nor the ‘social’ value paradigm (de Vroey 1982). The former confer upon technological relations a crucial role in the valuation process; the latter stress the role of money One system or two? 3 1 and the market.0F Our own approach is neither technological determinist nor market oriented, but is informed by the Marxist-Humanism of Raya Dunayevskaya, who restated the centrality of Marx’s humanist philosophy of labour to his critique of political economy (see McGlone 1994). We owe to her the recognition that capitalist technological relations are themselves social relations, class relations of dead to living labour in production. ‘[L]abour is expressed in value’ because ‘the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite’ (Marx 1976a:174-75). Thus Dunayevskaya contended that ‘it is more correct to call the Marxist theory of capital not a labor theory of value, but a value theory of labor’ (Dunayevskaya 1988:138). Neither the technological determinist conception of value, which separates value from price, nor the market centred approach, which holds that price is value, have been able to resolve the value-price problem. Since the early 1980s, however, a variety of authors have advanced the discussion by arguing in different ways that the total value of output equals the value added by living labour plus the price (rather than the value) of the means of production (for example Duménil (1983); Wolff, Roberts and Callari (1984a); Carchedi (1986); Glick and Ehrbar (1987); Kliman and McGlone (1988); Giussani (1991); Moseley (1993b); and several chapters in the present volume). Although we agree with this view, we wish to point out that, by itself, it does not vindicate Marx’s account of the value-price transformation. Indeed, several of the authors who hold this view contend that Marx’s account is incomplete or even self contradictory, precisely because the price of the means of production deviates from its value. To defend Marx against this hoary charge, it is therefore insufficient to assert that the price of means of production is identical to the value of constant capital. One must show how – on the basis of the law of value, that is, the determination of value by labour time – the value of constant capital comes to differ from the value of the means of production. Our earlier paper (Kliman and McGlone 1988) demonstrated this, but failed to make explicit the conceptual basis of the demonstration. We now wish to make explicit that Marx’s concept of embodied labour is the ground of that demonstration. Marx (1976a:128) identifies abstract labour as the ‘social substance’ embodied in commodities’ values. One can twist and turn a use value forever without finding any (concrete) labour lurking within. It is thus fetishistic to regard labour ‘embodiment’ as a suprahistorical technological reality, that is, as the expenditure of labour common to all production. The labour embodied as value is instead a ‘phantom-like objectivity’ that ‘arises from the peculiar social character of the labour that produces [commodities]’ (Marx 1976a:128, 165; emphases added). As Marx (1964:122-23) wrote in ‘Alienated Labour’: The worker puts his life into the object, and his life no longer belongs to himself but to the object … The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside 4 Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force. That which is called ‘embodiment’ in Capital is here referred to as life that ‘belongs … to the object’, labour that ‘exists independently, outside himself’, and life … given to the object’. It should be clear that Marx’s embodied labour theory is a theory of abstract, alienated labour. Because the embodiment of abstract, alienated labour is a peculiar social process, not a technological requirement as such, the abstract labour embodied in a commodity need not equal the amount of (concrete) labour needed to (re)produce it. Although exchange does not alter the quantum of value in existence, it does redistribute it. Because abstract labour is redistributed through exchange, some commodities embody more abstract labour than they would otherwise, some less. On the basis of this notion of labour embodiment, one can comprehend how the capital advanced to production does not cease to be a sum of value merely because it differs from the value of its material elements (means of production and subsistence). The illustration in Section 3 should be read with this in mind. 1.2 THE TRANSFORMATION NON-PROBLEM AND THE NON-TRANSFORMATION PROBLEM Marx’s account of the value-price transformation It is well known that classical political economy adhered to two opposing principles which it was unable to reconcile and that, in Marx’s view, this failure led to its disintegration.