SXjra pp: -- Techset Composition Ltd, Salisbury, U.K. // J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. – © Cambridge University Press doi:./SX 1 2 3 The changing religious 4 5 composition of Nigeria: causes 6 7 and implications of 8 9 demographic divergence 10 11 12 MARCIN STONAWSKI 13 University of Oslo, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, 14 P.O. Box Blindern, Oslo, Norway and Cracow University 15 16 of Economics, Department of Demography, Rakowicka , - 17 Cracow, Poland 18 Email: [email protected] 19 ̌ 20 MICHAELA POTANCOKOVÁ 21 22 Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital 23 (IIASA, VID/OAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography, 24 Welthandelsplatz , Vienna, Austria 25 Email: [email protected] 26 27 MATTHEW CANTELE 28 29 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Ecosystems 30 Services and Management, Schlossplatz ,A- Laxenburg, Austria 31 Email: [email protected] 32 33 and 34 Q1 EGARD KIRBEKK 35 V S 36 Columbia University, Columbia Aging Centre, W. th Street, 37 NY , New York, USA 38 39 Email: [email protected] 40 41 42 MARCIN STONAWSKI ET AL. ABSTRACT 43 44 At nearly million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country by 45 twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African 46 nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between fi 47 Christians and Muslims has widened with signi cant political implications for a nascent democracy. Where the DHS survey of revealed a non-significant 48 difference of · children, this figure had increased to · children by .As 49 the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from · to · 50 children per woman between and , the TFR of Muslims increased 51 from · to · children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides 52 with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in . We examine the 53 role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we 54 touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious compos- 55 ition of Nigeria in the coming decades. 56 57 INTRODUCTION 58 59 At nearly million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country 60 in Africa by twofold and is on course to become one of the largest coun- 61 tries in the world. It is also one of the most diverse, with a large number 62 of groups from different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds (Katzner 63 ; Lieberman and McClendon ). Nigeria is also the only state 64 in the world with equal proportions of Christians (·%in), 65 located mainly in the South, and Muslims (·%) (PEW ) who 66 are living mainly in the Northern regions of the country (Figure ). 67 The population balance between the two majority religions, however, 68 is likely to shift in the future as a result of distinctly different trajectories 69 of demographic change. While the Muslim North is currently in an early 70 phase of demographic transition with very high fertility rates, fertility 71 rates of Christians and Muslims in the South are declining as the demo- 72 graphic transition is further underway. These diverging trajectories in 73 demographic behaviour may lead to the end of the current equilibrium 74 between the two religions with significant implications for the future of 75 the country. Within this study we examine possible explanations for di- 76 vergent population trajectories along religious lines as well as the path 77 78 that these trajectories may potentially take into the future. 79 As with several other Western African countries, ethno-regional and 80 religious divides largely overlap in Nigeria and are manifested in a pro- 81 nounced north-south gap (Mancini ). Here, inequalities have 82 emerged along geographic and ethnic divisions as well as along socio- 83 economic lines between nomadic herdsmen and farmers, exacerbated 84 by climate change (e.g. Fasona & Omojola ; Sayne ). While THE CHANGING RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF NIGERIA 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Fig. 1 - B/W online, B/W in print 99 100 Figure . Religious composition by state in Nigeria in . Shading on the 101 map indicates presence of Sharia law in states; pie charts represent religious 102 composition. 103 ethnic divides were of great importance in the past, a religious divide 104 now appears to be becoming more pronounced as religious tensions 105 compound traditional ethnic and geopolitical rivalries, magnifying 106 underlying insecurities and grievances. 107 The past decade has seen increasing reports of sectarian violence in 108 Nigeria’s Middle Belt where ethnic and religious communities meet. 109 110 And in an ominous sign of things to come, these attacks are increasingly fl – 111 framed in terms of religious and cultural con ict. In Sharia 112 laws were introduced in states in northern Nigeria (Figure ) 113 leading to religious unrest and an escalation of hostilities that resulted 114 in thousands of deaths in Kaduna state alone (Barker & Ricardo : 115 ; Ostien & Dekker ). This drastic shift is reflected in the Pew 116 Research Center’s Social Hostilities Index which documented a surge 117 from · to · on a -point scale between and – one of 118 the highest scores in the world. As part of efforts to establish an 119 Islamic caliphate, attacks on Christians and moderate Muslims by the 120 militant group Boko Haram, which translates literally to ‘Western 121 Forbidden’, may be orchestrated with the goal of stoking religious ten- 122 sions between the predominately Christian Igbo in the South and 123 Hausa-Fulani Muslims in the North, with the Yoruba in the West repre- 124 senting a mix of Christianity and Islam. 125 Within the context of an ethnically and religiously diverse country 126 such as Nigeria, a newfound emphasis on religious identity coupled MARCIN STONAWSKI ET AL. fi fi 127 with religion-speci c fertility differentials could carry signi cant political fi 128 and economic implications. Indeed, Mazrui ( ) nds that religious fl 129 divisions in sub-Saharan Africa are most likely to lead to con ict when 130 they reinforce underlying ethnic differences, precisely the situation we 131 now observe in Nigeria. It is particularly important to note that the emer- 132 gence of militant Islamic sects and possible spread of Sharia law to add- 133 itional states is potentially a response to the growing north-south gap and 134 perceived political dominance of the South (Isa ). Indeed, while its 135 implementation has ignited hostilities particularly in the border states 136 making up the Middle Belt, Sharia law was being applied to Muslims 137 in most Northern states long before its formal institutionalization 138 (Ostien & Dekker ). 139 In our paper, first, we discuss factors contributing to the widening gap 140 in the fertility differential between Muslims and Christians. Besides the 141 factors such as contraceptive use and demand for family planning and 142 differences in marital behaviour that fall within the proximate determi- 143 nants framework (Bongaarts ), which is a framework highly rele- 144 vant for understanding of fertility change in sub-Saharan African 145 context, we discuss differences in educational improvements among 146 women and changing fertility ideals. We show that religion per se is 147 not the main driver of stalling fertility among Muslims in Sharia states 148 as there is significant heterogeneity in the reproductive behaviour of 149 Muslims in Nigeria. We argue that fertility stalls and high population 150 growth are specific for Muslims in Sharia states. Therefore, it is not 151 152 useful to speak of Nigerian Muslims as a homogeneous group. 153 The second part of the paper demonstrates the consequences of the 154 increased fertility gap on the religious landscape of Nigeria. While the 155 relative similarity in size between Muslims and Christians populations 156 emerged only during the past years, Muslims have never been a 157 clear majority in a united Nigeria (Mi ). This situation may soon 158 change as we identify an ongoing demographic bifurcation that could 159 significantly alter the religious composition of Africa’s most populous 160 nation with substantial implications for future population outcomes. 161 162 163 164 THE INCREASING GAP IN RELIGION- SPECIFIC FERTILITY IN 165 NIGERIA 166 Using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) surveys, in this study we iden- 167 tify religion-based fertility differentials and project potential demo- 168 graphic futures based on a number of scenarios. We find that the total THE CHANGING RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF NIGERIA fi 169 fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased signi cantly from · [CI: – – 170 · · ]to · children [ · · ] per woman between and – 171 while the TFR of Muslims increased from · [ · · ]to · chil- – 172 dren [ · · ](Figure ). However, fertility is not rising among all 173 Nigerian Muslims. Taking a closer look we find that fertility has 174 increased from · to · children per woman between and 175 among Muslims residing in currently Sharia law states (Table I). 176 However, among those residing elsewhere fertility declined from · 177 to · children per woman. Although this is one child more than the 178 average for a Christian woman, we show that fertility change unfolds 179 in a similar way among Christians and Muslims from non-Sharia states. 180 Interestingly enough, the timing of the divergence in fertility trends 181 coincides with the formal introduction of Sharia law over the course 182 of several years following the return to civil rule and subsequent 183 reinstatement of constitutional law (Kendhammer ; for an overview 184 see Oba ; Ostien and Dekker ). This leads to questions regard- 185 ing how Sharia law or culture specific to those regions where Sharia law 186 has been institutionalized fosters high fertility. As discussed in the next 187 section, we hypothesize that the adoption of Sharia and societal norms 188 related to its practice sustains high fertility culture and contributes to in- 189 creasing fertility differentials.