CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB 128 “RUSSIA FOR RUSSIANS!” SEPTEMBER Ultranationalism and xenophobia 2015 in Russia: from marginality to state promoted philosophy Sergey Sukhankin, Associate Expert, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kiev). Historian, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad. he course of Russian development over the past dec- world far right radicals currently reside on the territory of ade has explicitly shown that both internal milieu the Russian Federation. From my prospective, this poses a and foreign policy grave challenge to both Rus- Tdomain have expressed stag- sian society and European gering signs of radicalization Facing a vital necessity of reforms Russian ruling and inte- peace and security. and growing division be- llectual elites have usually opted for relying on a fuzzy notion tween “us” (ethnic Russians) called “conservatism” that served as the main vehicle of anti- and “them” (non-Russian reformist, reactionary and anti-democratic forces. Ultranationalist citizens and foreigners). ideology and Russian Many combine factors promoted the idea of incompatibility public consciousness: The grim irony of contempo- between liberal-democratic norms and values and Russian iden- looking into the past, rary Russia extensively ap- tity with distinct historical mission. thinking about the pealing to the legacy of the future Great Patriotic War (1941– Derogatory actions against foreigners (especially from coun- 1945) as a pivotal aspect of tries whose appearance differed from the Slavic one) received Lessons drawn from Russian Russian identity is that xen- tacit support from numerous representatives of Russian politi- historical experience have ophobia, racial hatred and cal elite. explicitly pointed out one cu- ultra/far right nationalism rious tendency: facing a vital have by far outgrown the The so-called “Russian Spring” was meant to significantly necessity of reforms Russian level of street radicals and upgrade Putin’s plummeting popularity through “rectifying ruling and intellectual elites in one form or another have historical injustices” and practical steps aimed at creation of the have usually opted for rely- penetrated various layers of “Russian World”. ing on a fuzzy notion called Russian multiethnic and mul- “conservatism” that served ticultural society. Currently Radical forces in Europe admire V. Putin for being able to as the main vehicle of anti- the number of nationalist or- openly challenge the unipolar post-Cold War world dominated reformist, reactionary and ganizations actively operat- by the US. anti-democratic forces. ing in the Russian Federation may have reached 53: 22 of In order “to prevent ‘color revolutions’ in Russia”, the Kremlin The issues of “conservatism” them being ultranationalist has inspired a new project called “Antimaidan”, which assem- extensively promoted dur- and 8 completely prohibited. bles a broad array of forces under the banners of “conserva- ing the Romanov dynasty In addition, according to nu- tism”, “patriotism” and “inadmissibility of Maidan in Russia”. reached its apex when the merous estimates half of the Monarchy encountered with notes internacionals CIDOB 128 . SEPTEMBER 2015 1 a broad array of challenges brought about by urgent neces- society and promoted the idea of incompatibility between sity of modernization and reforms that coincided with hu- liberal-democratic norms and values and Russian identity miliating defeat in Russian - Japanese war (1904-1905) and with distinct historical mission. the First Russian Revolution (1905). This resulted in growing appeal to “conservatism” emanating from the ruling elites It ought to be mentioned that traditions of far right national- that translated into surging xenophobia, anti-Semitism viv- ism in contemporary Russia go back to the times of the So- idly seen in the “Black Hundreds” movement and ethnic viet Union, when in the year 1980 “Pamyat” (Memory) was pogroms that had to a certain extent predetermined Russian formed from a number of smaller groups (though it was not historical development in the beginning of the twentieth cen- very numerous and disintegrated in 1985). Ultranationalist/ tury. As a result, explicit and derogatory discrimination of xenophobic movement in Russia in 1990s and the early 2000th ethnic minorities pushed members of various ethnic groups did not constitute a homogeneous body and was represented onto the road of radicalization and underground revolution- by a patchwork of various forces that varied from under- ary activities. ground militarized organizations, open neo-Nazis (skin- heads), left wing extremists, Orthodox–Christian national- That is why today, when Russia is pursuing Eurasian inte- ists (the “Black Hundreds”; the Russian National Union; the gration and facing proliferation of non-Russian population, Union of Russian Orthodox People) and national-Imperial historical experience and current level of xenophobia that (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation; the Liberal is acquiring much deeper influence and significantly more Democratic Party; Russian All-People’s Union) groups. sophisticated forms should not be undermined. After all, ap- proximately 53% of Russians are currently supporting the In the early 1990s the most visible and well-organized actor slogan “Russia for Russians!” among Russian far rights was the Russian National Unity (the RNU). Its militarized underground structure (which may have assembled as many as 100,000 active members in both Russian far right movement in 1990s – early 2000: the Russian Federation and other countries of post-Soviet menace on the march area) held attributes and symbols similar to the ones used in the Nazi Germany and slogans such as “Glory to Russia!”. Disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by total Sentiments that defined the conceptual outlook of this group economic impoverishment of wide layers of Russians, politi- did to a significant extent reflect the pervasive moods and feel- ings within Russian society: Russia has become a fertile ground for the most resurging anti-Semitism, ex- plicit anti-Caucasian stance unsophisticated xenophobic ideologies (easily manipulated and anti-Americanism. from above) based on crude violence, ethnic hatred and Another branch, so-called Nazi-skinheads did not have intolerance. a core organization and was mostly represented by a cal degradation and raging separatism. On the other front, wide range of incoherent organizations enjoying various ex- ideological vacuum that emerged after the demise of the tent of popular support. Three main factors contributed to Communism resulted in growing perplexity over the future exponential growth of this type of neo-Nazi groups: trajectory of development. The ruling elites at the time were unable/unwilling to clearly formulate national idea – in a – The First Chechen war (surrounded by aggressive anti- country with historically weak civil society, absence of plu- Caucasian information warfare orchestrated by Russian ralism and clear tilt towards the guidance from above, this mass media) was a dramatic and in many respects fateful episode. This – Economic collapse and plummeting level of education (which ideological void triggered a torrent of ideas and distorted resulted in a staggering growth of youth criminality) historical narratives that swooped on Russian society. That is – Distorted understanding of the Second World War why the process of ideological and spiritual renaissance did not acquire forms commensurate with the task of ideological Coupled together these factors created a fertile ground for and cultural transformation. the most unsophisticated xenophobic ideologies (easily ma- nipulated from above) based on crude violence, ethnic ha- The sense of moral degradation, skyrocketing criminal- tred and intolerance. At certain point major Russian cities got ity, growing economic inequality, the bloody Chechen War submerged under the wave of uncontrollable violence com- (1994-1996), the ensued outbreak of terrorism and growing mitted by neo-Nazis. Foreigners (especially from countries number of migrant workers from the Caucasus and Cen- whose appearance differed from the Slavic one) were afraid tral Asia facilitated further radicalization of wide masses of visiting Russia and embassies of countries whose citizens of Russians engendering emergence of various types of far could be targeted on the first place were instructed how to right and neo-Nazi organizations. On the other hand, the act while being in Russia. Unfortunately, these derogatory war in Yugoslavia (especially the active involvement of the actions received tacit support from numerous representatives NATO forces), growing disenchantment with the West that of Russian political elite. For instance, the Mayor of Moscow was blamed for dismal economic performance and political Yuri Luzhkov (a notorious nationalist) tried to hush down failures resurrected anti-Western sentiments within Russian violent crimes with clear ethnic background. Moreover, 2 notes internacionals CIDOB 128 . SEPTEMBER 2015 notes internacionals CIDOB 128 . SEPTEMBER 2015 in many respects militia and prosecutors as well as certain participation of masses in political process. In this juncture, share of intellectual circles (several noticeable newspapers nationalist forces were perceived as the most convenient ve- were not keen to portray skinheads and their crimes in nega- hicle of communication