Land Redistributions and the Russian Peasant Commune in the Late-Imperial Period Steven Nafziger1 Preliminary and Incomplete Comments welcome and encouraged. Version: December, 2004 1Department of Economics, Yale University, [email protected]. This paper forms part of a larger project on the economics of rural development in Russia between 1861 and 1917. Research for this project was supported in part by the Title VIII Combined Research and Language Training Program, which is funded by the U.S. State Department and admin- istered by the American Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS. The opinions expressed herein are the author’s and do not necessarily express the views of either the State Department or American Councils. Further support from the Economic History Association, the Sasakawa Foundation, Yale’s Economic Growth Center, and the Yale Center for Interna- tional and Area Studies is very much appreciated. The comments and suggestions of Tracy Dennison, Daniel Field, Timothy Guinnane, Mark Harrison, Valery Lazarev, Carol Leonard, Jason Long, Angela Micah, Carolyn Moehling, Benjamin Polak, Christopher Udry, and partic- ipants at the 2004 World Cliometric Congress, the 2004 Economic History Association meet- ings, and seminars at Yale and Harvard Universities were extremely helpful. Errors remain the exclusive property of the author. Abstract This paper investigates the motivations for, and effects of, intra-community land re- distributions by Russian peasants in the 19th century. Scholars such as Alexander Gerschenkron have emphasized that such repartitions of arable land create negative investment and innovation incentives and played a major role in hampering rural de- velopment in the period after serfdom. Utilizing data from household surveys and qualitative information from archival and administrative sources, this paper first studies why peasants repartitioned their land and whether the occurrence of redistri- butions can be credited to a number of different theoretical and historical motivations. The qualitative evidence suggests that perceived imbalances between household la- bor, land resources, and outstanding state and seigniorial obligations sparked repar- titions, and such imbalances were especially apparent in the wake of tax censuses and the land settlements that accompanied the end of serfdom. Econometric results an analysis of land redistributions in Moscow province finds some support for these factors. This study also finds that serfdom was powerfully interlinked with the prac- tice of repartition. This paper then turns to the impact of repartitions on agricultural productivity. Results from an analysis of Moscow data provide no support for the claim that redistributions adversely affected yields, suggesting that such communal land practices provided similar incentives as private property. “Perhaps Russia is the most instructive of all countries for the student of land problems.”1 1 Introduction Understanding the relationship between agricultural productivity and the organiza- tion of property rights in land is a major goal of development economists and eco- nomic historians. R.A Coase famously theorized that a clear delineation of property rights would lead to an efficient allocation of resources when transfers are costless, regardless of who actually held the right (1960). In this view, sharecropping, tenancy arrangements, or wage labor contracts are equally efficient. A large amount of schol- arship has since introduced various information asymmetries and market frictions to account for why certain contractual forms appear at different times and in different places. An implication of many of these models is that the interaction of property own- ership and contractual form may very well have serious repercussions for achieving efficient production levels.2 This paper explores these issues in the historical context of a unique form land management in 19th century Russia: communally-controlled, open fields with occasional repartitions of arable plots. This particular form of peasant property rights deserves attention because of its relevance to arguments about Russian economic “backwardness” in the half-century leading up to World War I. Contemporaries and modern scholars have argued that low Russian agricultural productivity arose from inefficiencies associated with this combination of land practices.3 These inefficiencies can be divided into three types: those of open-field system itself, those connected to aspects of the Russian system of communal governance, and those stemming from the practice of periodically repar- titioning (peredelit’sia) the arable land amongst community members.4 It is the last of these possible sources of inefficiencies that is the particular subject of this paper. We attempt to address two questions: why and how did this particular variant of the open field system function, and did it carry negative implications for agricultural productivity. In the classic case of the English open fields, peasants held their land in open fields subject to various types of community or estate managerial control but with individ- 1Ely (1916, p. 64) 2A good summary of much of this literature is given in Hayami and Otsuka (1993). 3Examples include Robinson (1972 [1932]) and Volin (1970). 4This paper will utilize the words “repartition,” “redivision,” and “redistribution” interchangeably. 2 ualized, alienable, and perpetual control over their own plots of arable land.5 This allowed them to engage in small amounts of investment and soil-improvement activ- ities that a Russian peasant, fearful of losing his plot in the next repartition, sup- posedly could not do. This is the key distinction noted by Alexander Gerschenkron and others who emphasize the costly implications of these periodic redistributions of arable land.6 In Gerschenkron’s framework, this poor incentive structure limited Russian agricultural productivity, undermined rural consumption of industrial goods, and impeded the generation of surpluses for funding investment throughout the econ- omy. Russia was backward in the 19th century because the institutional framework and practices of peasant agriculture were so backward. This paper fills in a gap in the Russian economic history literature by delving into the details of this seemingly inefficient practice of land repartitioning as pre- sented in contemporary and secondary accounts and statistical records.7 In general, most studies of Russian rural economic development in the 19th century have been carried out at the aggregate level. Recently, macroeconomic and regional evidence has cast serious doubt upon Gerschenkron’s picture of a late 19th-century Russia stricken by a deepening agrarian crisis.8 However, relatively little attention has been focussed on the microeconomic foundations of these findings. The small literature on the mechanisms of repartitional land tenure suffers from a lack of rigor concern- ing the economic motivations of repartitions and has not empirically addressed the possible implications for agricultural productivity.9 This paper addresses these short- comings in the literature by drawing on modern economic theories of collective re- source management, risk-sharing amongst rural households, and agricultural invest- ment under uncertain property rights to help explain why Russian peasants repar- titioned. These theoretical insights, in conjunction with a large set of descriptive archival and published materials on the mechanics of repartitions, are used to moti- vate an econometric case study of the determinants and effects of land repartitions in 5Besides England, similar systems existed in many other parts of Europe. See Allen (1992, pp. 14 and 24), McCloskey (1989), Thirsk (1964), and Townsend (1993). In England, Richardson (2003, pp. 311-312) notes that there were often very active markets in strip purchases and rentals. 6“...the general shortcomings of the strip system were further aggravated by the temporary char- acter of land use and the strong disincentive to improve a piece of land that sooner or later was to be transferred to another household (Gerschenkron, 1965, p. 747).” 7As a result, this paper answers the request for such research posed in Gregory (1992, p. 21). 8See especially Gregory (1994) and Wheatcroft (1991). 9Important works that fall into this category include Aleksandrov (1975), Kingston-Mann (1993), Kuchumova (1981), and Zyrianov (1992, Chp. 3). 3 Moscow province in the middle of the 19th century. This empirical work finds some connections between repartitions and demographic change, regional agricultural and economics conditions, the level of external burdens placed on the peasant community, and the institution of serfdom itself. However, little productivity effect is found from repartitions, thereby lending some micro-based support to the recent macroeconomic revisions of Gerschenkron. The sources used in this paper all derive from the last half of the 19th century – a period impossible to study without addressing the effects of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Hence, this paper begins by surveying the basics of communal, open-field tenure, the nature of peasant agriculture under serfdom, and the impact of abolishment on the evolution of this institutional framework. Then we focus more narrowly on repartitions in section three. A wide range of qualitative and quantita- tive sources from across European Russia are used to outline the basic characteristics and variations of the practice with an eye to regional and temporal