battle 447 specialization and reliance on acknowledged experts. The presence of sev- eral Rhodian commanders among the fleets which were active in the eastern Mediterranean in the early second century is one indication that there was a pool of elite´ naval specialists. For example, Pausistratus and Polyxenidas, who were on opposing sides at Panhormus in 190, were both Rhodians and seem to have known each other quite well (Livy 37.10–11). Accounts of naval warfare demonstrate the importance of identifying the ‘flagship’, which normally carried the commander of a fleet. If this was captured, then the fleet would make the assumption that their leader had been lost, which often badly affected their morale. Cornelius Nepos says that in a battle between the forces of Prusias of Bithynia and Eumenes II of Pergamum in 184, Hannibal, commander of the Bithynian fleet, used a fake message to Eumenes, which the latter assumed would be an offer of peace, in order to find out which vessel the king was sailing on, so that his ships could direct their attacks against it and force the king to withdraw from the battle, to the detriment of his fleet’s morale (Nep. Hann. 10.5–11.4). Signals are often mentioned in accounts of naval battles. They allowed admirals to communicate with all or part of their fleet. Presumably they were by means of flags or pennants and it would have been necessary for someone on each ship to keep an eye on the flagship for them. ii. sieges In a speech delivered to the Athenian assembly in the summer of 341, the Athenian orator and statesman Demosthenes drew a contrast between the old style of warfare that was typical of the Greek city-states in the early classical period and what he saw as the realities of the present day: So archaic were their practices, or rather so citizen-based (politikos), that no-one ever even bribed anyone, but the conduct of war was all open and above board. Yet nowadays, without doubt, you see that most total defeats are due to treachery, and none of them happen as the result of pitched battles. Demosthenes went on to complain that it was no longer phalanxes of heavy infantry that were the dominant factor in Greek warfare, but the mixed forces of Philip II of Macedon: Whenever, with these forces, he attacks those who are at odds with each other, and who, through distrust, do not put any forces in the field, he sets up his engines and besieges them. (Dem. 9.48–50) This was the third of Demosthenes’ celebrated Philippics, a series of political speeches directed against Philip and his supporters. Although treachery is emphasized by Demosthenes as a way of taking cities, the history of the Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008 448 the hellenistic world and roman republic next 200 years shows that the 340s were the beginning of an era in which siege warfare was transformed. By the end of the second century sieges had become commonplace and were probably more typical of the combat experience of Greek and Roman soldiers than pitched battles.168 1. Commanding siege operations The role of the commander in a siege, whether on the defensive or the offensive side, was significantly different from that of the commander on the battlefield. In the context of a siege, the ancient commander could exercise a greater degree of coordination and direction of the efforts of his forces. Indeed, it might be argued that siege warfare offered the greatest and most comprehensive challenges to the military skills of Hellenistic and Roman commanders, because they involved large forces and the many different types of equipment needed careful coordination. The combat conditions of ancient sieges seem to have provided some- thing of a dilemma for commanders in this period. While personal presence and involvement in the action could have a significant morale-boosting effect at key moments, it also exposed them to the possibility of being struck by missiles, whether intentional or lucky shots. Perhaps it is no coin- cidence that Philip II and Alexander were both wounded during sieges. Philip famously lost an eye in the siege of Methone in 354 (Diod. Sic. 16.34.5; Just. Epit. 7.6.14). The arrow that gave him this distinctive disfig- urement might very easily have ended his life. During the siege of Tyre in 332 Alexander personally led an expedition into the Anti-Lebanon region to enforce his authority in an area which supplied much-needed timber for his siege towers and other devices. He also led a naval counterattack against the Tyrian forces after they had raided the Cypriot fleet as it lay at anchor to the north of the city, but Alexander’s bravery and inspirational leadership verged on recklessness, and at Gaza in 332 he was wounded by a catapult bolt shot from the walls (Arr. Anab. 2.27.2). Alexander can be seen as a good example of a successful field commander who found it diffi- cult to adapt to the role of siege coordinator. He seems to have lacked the patience and methodical temperament appropriate to long-duration siege warfare. This is not to say that Alexander was unsuccessful, for he captured many cities and strongholds in his brief but action-filled reign as king of Macedon. Nevertheless his impulsive nature resulted in rash and sometimes very costly decisions, not just for Alexander himself, but for the men under his command.169 His insistence on assaulting those Indians who had taken 168 For a survey of sieges in this period see Kern (1999) chs. 8–11. 169 See the evaluation of Kern (1999) 201. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008 battle 449 refuge on the so-called rock of Heracles in 327 is but one example (Arr. Anab. 4.28–30). In contrast to Alexander, Roman generals like Marcus Claudius Mar- cellus, who took two years over the siege of Syracuse (214–12), can seem models of patience and restraint. Marcellus proceeded in stages, gradu- ally capturing some of the outlying fortifications and gradually penning the defenders up in the old city. He made several attempts to gain entry by negotiation and treachery, and eventually his troops were admitted through a side gate guarded by Spanish mercenaries whose commander had been tempted to change sides (Livy 25.30). Even the young Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus comes across as cautious in comparison with Alexander. When he ventured near to the front lines at New Carthage in 209 he was accompanied by three personal shield-bearers (Livy 26.44.6). Although he needed to capture that city quickly he did not throw everything into a single assault, but probed the defences at several places and used both ships and an ingenious crossing of the lagoon as the tide was receding to find the weakest points in the defences (Livy 26.44–6). We are also told that, when there was a dispute over whether a marine or a legionary soldier should be rewarded with the prestigious honour of a crown for being the very first over the city wall, Scipio diplomatically awarded it to both of them, avoiding a feud between his fleet and army (Livy 26.48). 2. Personnel The conflicting needs of the charismatic battle commander and the methodical siege coordinator may have been partly responsible for the emergence of specialists in siege warfare. We see the appearance of spe- cialized military engineers in the second half of the fourth century. It can reasonably be argued that there was a general trend towards specialization in many walks of life across the Greek world in the fourth century. This trend was particularly marked in warfare and it seems to be a result of the increasing technical complexity of combat. As the requirements of military strategy expanded to include the capture or defence of cities, men like the Thessalians Polyidus, catapult-maker for Philip II, and Diades and Charias, siege engineers of Alexander the Great, rose to prominence. Archimedes is best known today as a scientist, but he spent his last years inventing ways to defend his home city of Syracuse against the Romans. The famous intellectual centre of Ptolemaic Alexandria was home to Ctesibius, a mili- tary engineer who wrote a technical treatise on torsion artillery in the third century. It also seems that the rise of these specialists was closely linked to the rise of what might be called the military monarchs in the fourth cen- tury bc. The unitary authority and autonomy of the king or tyrant was a prerequisite for the type of command structure in which a specialist could Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008 450 the hellenistic world and roman republic operate effectively, building up a corps of well-equipped and technically proficient engineers. The military operations of Philip V of Macedon in Greece in the latter part of the third century show that he could deploy a wide range of siege and assault methods. He took Ambracus and Psophis by storm in 219 and 218 (Polyb. 4.61–3, 70–2), he surrounded Phthiotic Thebes with a double rampart, protected by stone- and bolt-throwing catapults, and then undermined a section of the walls in 217 (Polyb. 5.99–100), undermined both the outer wall and a newly built inner one at Abydus in 201 (Polyb. 16.30–4), and in 198 at Eretria on Euboea he made a surprise attack at night and took the city virtually unopposed (Livy 32.16). This brief survey of the sieges of Philip V includes examples of the three main forms which attacks on cities and fortifications took in this period – assault, blockade and surprise.