ADVANCES IN INFORMATION SCIENCE Beyond Distributions and Primary Goods: Assessing Applications of Rawls in Information Science and Technology Literature since 1990 Anna Lauren Hoffmann School of Information, University of California, Berkeley, 102 South Hall, Berkeley, CA 94702. E-mail: [email protected] This article reviews the ways in which the work and of justice through which to assess various features of con- ideas of political philosopher John Rawls have been temporary social, political, and economic life. In particular, appropriated or applied by scholars of information sci- appealing to Rawls to address moral and political challenges ence, technology, and related areas since 1990. The arti- cle begins with an overview of Rawls’s work, paying of the development and use of advanced information and particular attention to its foundations and methods. communication technologies (ICTs) has scholarly prece- Subsequently, a 2-phase discussion of the literature is dent—notable efforts include Bell’s (1973) discussion of presented. The first phase reviews engagements with “post-industrial society,” Benkler’s (2006) liberal political Rawls from more than 150 scholarly articles from databases and journals dedicated to information and economic analyses of networked production, van Dijk’s technology ethics, information/technology studies, phi- (2005) account of the “digital divide,” and Sclove’s (1992) losophy of technology, and technology and human val- work on democracy and technological design. Rawls has ues. The second phase focuses on scholars who have also been employed extensively in conversations of moral- demonstrated a significant commitment to Rawlsian ity, ethics, and ICTs. This work represents an important con- theory in these areas. Overall, the review demonstrates that most significant applications of Rawls are oriented tribution to ethical analyses of ICTs by bringing together toward unequal distributions of informational goods and critically assessing the application of a particular—and exacerbated by advanced information and communica- particularly prominent—moral framework. tion technologies (ICTs). Critically, however, scholars in The article begins with an overview of Rawls’s theory of this area have overlooked the relevance of Rawls’s foun- dations for the sorts of complex networked relation- justice, paying particular attention to its foundational 1 ships afforded by those same advanced ICTs. Rather assumptions and methodological commitments. Next, a than representing a fatal gap, it opens up a new avenue two-phase discussion of the literature is presented. This first for the renewed consideration of Rawls—his ideas on phase attends to a wide range of engagements with Rawls the basic structure of society and the importance of based on more than 150 scholarly articles from databases self-respect are offered as 2 possible paths forward. and journals dedicated to considerations of information and technology ethics, information science, philosophy of infor- mation, philosophy of technology, technology and human Introduction values, and related areas. The second phase focuses on This article presents a comprehensive overview of how scholars whose bodies of work demonstrate a significant scholars of information and technology (broadly construed) 1Given that Rawls’s scholarship spans decades and thousands of have incorporated the ideas of political philosopher John pages, an exhaustive account of his work will not be possible here. In Rawls—among the most prominent political philosophers of the interest of efficiency, I have tried to focus on the most salient the 20th century. Rawls has long offered scholars from a aspects of his central theory—justice as fairness. Necessarily, certain range of disciplines a comprehensive and systematic vision tangential concepts and discussions are omitted. At the same time, how- ever, some citations of Rawls in the literature make reference to con- cepts omitted from this initial discussion. In order to keep the literature Received August 26, 2015; revised January 20, 2016; accepted March review as complete as possible, I have—where necessary—incorporated 27, 2016 brief discussions of concepts that may not have been adequately addressed earlier. For a more thorough accounting of many of these con- VC 2016 ASIS&T Published online 21 December 2016 in Wiley Online cepts, please see the comparable review that first appeared in Hoffmann Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/asi.23747 (2014) (doctoral dissertation). JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 68(7):1601–1618, 2017 commitment to the development of Rawlsian theory with (Rawls, 1980/1999a, p. 307). Put another way, moral con- regard to information and technology: Drahos (1996), van structivism adopts principles not because they are true, but den Hoven (1994, 1995, 1997), Brey (2000, 2007), Britz because they issue “from social procedures that are, in some (2004, 2008), and Duff (2006, 2011, 2012). Each author sense, suitable”—this is acceptable by all to whom they shares a set of core conceptions and commitments: They are apply (Darwall, Gibbard, & Railton, 1992, p. 139). The all committed to the idea that access to information should practical task before the constructivist, then, is to identify be a basic liberty; they each argue that information is vital to “what social procedures [are] suitable” (Darwall et al., p. the pursuit of individual and collective ends; and they focus 139). It is this task that Rawls sees before him in developing on the concept of information as a resource in the abstract, an account of justice. in particular by conceiving of information as a primary Rawls views the basic structure of contemporary liberal good. Combined with the most common uses of Rawls democratic societies as the primary problem for a theory of revealed by the broader review, these central concerns come justice (Rawls, 1971, p. 4). He gives two kinds of reasons for together to form what I will refer to as the “standard taking the basic structure as his primary subject. Under the account” of Rawls in informational and technological con- first kind of reason, he argues that principles of justice are texts. At the end of the article, I sketch the main ideas of the necessary for the regulation and preservation of just back- standard account and point toward some overlooked Rawl- ground conditions—what Rawls refers to as “background sian connections for future research and discussion. justice”—against which individuals set and pursue valued ends in line with their philosophical, moral, or religious John Rawls and Justice as Fairness beliefs, their sentiments and loyalties, as well as their funda- mental values and projects, among other things (what Rawls Committed to the idea that there can be a reasonable, pub- refers to as a person’s comprehensive doctrine). Under the lic basis for argument on moral issues, Rawls’s work sets out second kind of reason, Rawls (2001) centers on the basic to develop a basis for reasoning about justice in contemporary 2 structure for its “profound and pervasive” influence on the liberal democratic societies. Initially, Rawls had hoped that life chances of citizens, given that it is integral to the structur- such a procedure might be useful for constructing a wide ing of individuals’ political, social, and economic possibilities range of ethical principles, but as his career progressed he (p. 55–56). Within the basic structure, Rawls intends his prin- refined and restricted the scope of its applicability, eventually ciples of justice as applying to the “basic institutions,” includ- limiting it to the construction of principles of justice (see, gen- ing a constitution and the system of government it defines, erally: O’Neill, 2003; Rawls, 1980/1999a, 1993). Perhaps his systems of property for regulating the use of goods, and eco- most notable achievement was the development of the nomic markets for distributing productive resources. “original position”—a constructive procedure for modeling Guided by his constructivist method, Rawls puts forward rational decision making under conditions that are fair (hence the “original position” as a suitable procedure for arriving at thenameofhistheory,justice as fairness). It is through this principles of justice suitable for regulating the basic struc- procedure that Rawls was able to revive and further the idea ture of society. Importantly, however, a great deal of the of a social contract as found in the work of Hobbes, Locke, “heavy lifting” of Rawls’s theory is done well before Rawls and—in different ways—Kant and Rousseau (Rawls, 1971, p. arrives at the original position. The device does not carry xviii). In addition, his work differs in important ways from justificatory force in and of itself, but instead works to oper- other strands of liberalism, especially classical economic lib- ationalize relevant features—referred to as “model- eralism and so-called neoliberalism, given that he does not conceptions”—of persons and society that he lays out in view liberalism as a fundamentally or narrowly economic advance.3 The first relevant model-conception is that of the doctrine tied to the rise of capitalism and market economic “well-ordered society”—that is, a society (i) in which every- thought. Rather, Rawls is situated in a liberal tradition that (i) one accepts (and knows others also accept) the same princi- is fundamentally concerned with ideals of toleration and the ples of justice and (ii) its basic structure is