University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1989 The problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin. David S. Faber University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Faber, David S., "The problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin." (1989). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2039. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2039 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DATE DUE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST 3234 M267 1989 FI 153 THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE AND GOD'S ABILITY TO SIN A Dissertation Presented by DAVID S. FABER Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 1989 Department of Philosophy © Copyright by David Scott Faber 1988 All Rights Reserved THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE AND GOD'S ABILITY TO SIN A Dissertation Presented by DAVID S. FABER Approved as to style and content by: v / 0rome King, Member 1 ^ R 0 Co Sleigh, Jr./ Acting Head Department of Philosophy ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank a number of people for their help on this project. First, I would like to thank my dean at Tabor College, Dr. Stanley Clark, for providing me with release time to work on this essay. Secondly, I would like to thank Professor Gareth Matthews, the director of this dissertation, for his his helpful criticism and his consistent encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Edmund L. Gettier for his wise and encouraging counsel, both philosophical and personal. Professors Paul Faber and Steve Trammel of Fort Hays State University also provided valuable criti- cisms of early drafts of the first chapter. Finally I thank members of my family. My brother Paul introduced me to philosophy and has been a fine example to me. I thank my parents, Harry aid Joanne Faber, who supported me financially and morally through many difficult times and who taught me to use my ta- lents, such as they are, to the glory of God. Mostly, however, I wish to thank my wife, Connie. She encouraged me when I became discouraged; she prodded me when I procrastinated; she was patient when I became short tempered because my work had not gone well; and she celebrated with me when it improved. For her faith, her hope and her love I dedicate this to her. abstract THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE AND GOD'S ABILITY TO SIN FEBRUARY, 1989 DAVID S. FABER, B.A., CALVIN COLLEGE M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews In this essay I address the contemporary discussion of the problem of omnipotence and God’s ability to sin, or POGAS. After some preliminary distinctions I distinguish three versions of the problem. I argue that two versions pose genuine problems for the the traditional Judeo- Christian concept of God. One of these versions is shown to be equivalent to the modal problem of evil. This version of the problem relies on a standard definition of omnipotence and the claim that there are some states of affairs sjch that necessarily it is not morally permisible for anyone to bring them about. In the middle portion of the essay I look at several proposed solutions to POGAS that involve the concept of omnipotence. The radical omnipotence theory holds that an omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs including impossible ones; it is rejected because the intellectual cost is too high. Next I distinguish two other approaches to redefining omnipotence. One appraoch is a Thomist approach. This involves defining omnipotence as the ability to bring about all metaphysically possible states of affairs. To solve POGAS those in the Thomist tradition further restrict those states of affairs that an omnipotent being can be expected to be capable of bringing about. Secondly, I address several Anselmian understandings of omnipotence. An Anselmian understanding of omnipotence is one which allows that there may be possi- ble states of affairs which an omnipotent being cannot bring about. However, an omnipotent being must be such that it can do whatever it wills and such that nothing can control it. These Anselmian solutions reveal a further problem, the problem of necessary omnipotence, or PONO. 0N0 shows that, on a plausible understanding of omnibene- volence, it is impossible for any being to be necessarily omnibenevolent . Finally I argue that both POGAS and PONO can be solved by adopting an Anselmian understanding of omnipotence as well as a revised understanding of omnibene- volence which allows that morally significant alternatives may involve only morally permissible options. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv ABSTRACT v Chapter I. THE PROBLEM DEFINED 1 II. PIKE'S RESPONSE 5! III. THE RADICAL OMNIPOTENCE RESPONSE 67 IV. THOMIST RESPONSES 82 V. ANSELMI AN RESPONSES 121 VI. THE PROBLEM OF NECESSARY OMN I BENE VOLENCE . 1 6 VII. A PAIR OF MORE PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS 187 VIII. SOME CONCLUDING, SUMMARY COMMENTS 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY 224 v i i CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM DEFINED The problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin (henceforth known as POGAS) arises in a number of dif- ferent ways. In this chapter we shall look at three ways in which it might be presented. I shall argue that the first way does not present a problem for the tradi- o tional J u de -Ch r i s t i a n theist. The second way in which the problem arises is more complex, but, I shall argue, it does seem to present a problem for traditional Judeo- Christian theism. Furthermore I shall show that a prob- lem recently called "the modal problem of evil" by Theodore Gulesarian is really another way of stating the second version of POGAS. Finally I will distinguish a third version of POGAS which is suggested by Peter Geach in Providence and Evil . I Nelson Pike may be responsible for much of the recent interest POGAS. His article "Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin" has spawned considerable discussion of this topic. At the beginning of his paper he neatly sums up the problem: An omnipotent being is one that can do all things possible. But surely, it is possible to sin. Men do this sort of thing all the time. It would thus appear that if God is perfectly good (and thus impeccable) He cannot sin; and if God is omnipotent (and thus can do all things possible), he can sin. that it A virtue of Pike's statement of the problem is places the problem before us clearly and simply; the simplicity of the statement, however, masks the complex- ity of the problem. In fact, Pike himself recognizes that the topic is more complex than the above quotation suggests. In Chapter II, I will discuss Pike’s version of POGAS in some detail. However, before discussing Pike’s particular version of POGAS we will examine whether or not there is a genuine problem in holding that one being is both essentially omnipotent and essentially morally perfect. In much of the Judeo- Christian tradition, it is held that God is both essentially omnipotent and essentially omnibenevolent (or morally perfect). Thus our investigation will involve an element of considerable interest to philosophical theologians. In order to state the problem carefully we will need to define a number of notions, including essential property , omnipotent , and omnibenevolent . The concep- tion of essential property which we will use is one that is widely used in contemporary philosophy. 2 It is as follows: D 1 . 1 . Pis an essential property of x =df Neces- sarily, if x exists, then x has P where x is an object and P is a property. In other words, P's being an essential property of x means that it is impossible for x to exist and lack P. In possible worlds terminology it means that x has P in every world in which x exists. It should be noted that I will use x 2 . has P e ssentially interchangeably with P is an essential property of x. This definition is somewhat broader than another common conception of essential properties - namely, the Aristotelian notion of essential properties — from which it must be distinguished. This distinction is intended for clarification. There is no claim made here as to which is the proper understanding of essentiality. In a paper entitled "Essential Properties"^ Daniel Ben- nett offers a discussion of essential properties which stands in the Aristotelian tradition. Bennett says that essential properties are properties that an object has necessarily. But, he says, essential properties must be more than necessary properties. He writes, "Essential properties sort the entities of which they are true in some fashion." 4 So essential properties are both neces- sary and sortal. Furthermore according to Richard So- rabji, for Aristotle "...the essence is, or includes, in a way, a cause or explanation of the thing itself " 5 So it seems that D1.2. P is an essential property of x =df (i) Necessarily, if x exists, then x has P, (ii) P is a sortal property ( i.e. it is true of some but not all objects) and (iii) P helps explain the exist- ence of x is closer to being a correct definition of an essential property in the Aristotelian sense than Dl.l.