( 36 ) Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1, December 2002 Misunderstanding of Madhyamika's Perspective on Language Jong-in KIM Many Western thought systems have been utilized for the purpose of interpreting Buddhism. The most popular of the system is so-called linguistic interpretation, which nearly gained acceptance as the authentic interpretation of Madhyamika Bud- dhism. Since in the late 1960's Wittgenstein's philosophy was seen to possess strong parallels with Buddhist thought, the interpretation of Madhyamika as a theory of language obtained almost unanimous consent among contemporary scholars. Before we equate Wittgenstein's theory of language with Madhyamika's perspec- tive on language we should see that the limits of language in Wittgenstein's thought does not particularly refer to its limit in dealing with metaphysical objects. Although Wittgenstein's skepticism concerning the substantiality of language derived from his recognition of the metaphysical usage of language by professional philosophers, his skepticism extends to ordinary language. As it were, in his philosophy the sign in general is questioned. Since Wittgenstein's skeptical idea extends to language in general, his skepticism concerning language is quantitative, due to the fact that it derives from an empirical basis. The following examples may show this. When Wittgenstein talks about the possibility of "exact" in practicing "language-games," a similar idea is implied. Thus, when a housewife buys a pound of potatoes, her measurement will not be as exact as when a scientist measures a pound in the laboratory. 2) Although the limit of language, that is its inability to properly express the truth, has been acknowledged by Buddhists throughout the history of their tradition, the meaning of the limit of language here is very different from that used by Wittgens- tein. The skeptical concept with regard to the reality of words in Madhyamika phil- osophy does not concern language in general. In the Madhyamaka-sastra the rule of language in general is called conventional use of language (vyavahara satva), -489- Misunderstanding of Madhyamika's Perspective on Language (J. KIM) (37) and the correspondence between things and words in conventional language is not denied. Nagarjuna rather imparts to conventional language a genuine trust . The fol- lowing passage reflects this : In this way, the words that I said are producedby the combinationof causes and condition. Thereforeit can be said that they do not have their own substance.If so, the doctrine of the emptinessof things is validated.Although words are empty, they comprehendconventionality. 3) The substantiality of words is denied by the phrase "combination of causes and conditions," but the referential content of words is not. Rather, the latter is confirmed with the phrase "comprehend conventionality." Nagarjuna's negative theory concerning language does not refer to the referential content of language in the ordinary world. The limit of language in Nagarjuna, like the Buddha, concerns not that which derives from the lack of referential content of language, but from the limit of human reason. Since with our reason we do not perceive the world beyond the empirical realm, we cannot explain it. Facing a reality we have never experienced, we are as if blind. And the limit faced here is not something quantitative which cause a lack of, or difference from, the truth, but it does cause a fundamental frustration. Following Wittgenstein, Derridean philosophy has emerged to serve as an effective substitute. Comparisons of Derridean philosophy and Buddhism have been started on behalf of their accordance in the denial of a metaphysical self and their seeming resemblance in the theory of language. After the appearance of Robert Magliola's Deyyida on the Mend, 4)a considerable number of works on the same issue were followed. Magliola compared Nagarjuna's middle path to Derrida's "and/or," and interpreted sunyata as "devoidness" in order to intermingle the Derridean notion of differance into sunyata in Madhyamika. u However, his interpretation of sunyata as "devoidness" and thus his insistence of the resemblance between the two thought systems is very much controversial. Derride ,an differance derives from a reexamination of the dominant Western in- tellectual tradition, which is defined as logocentrism. The word logocentrism, as we can assume and Derrida explains, means the presence of logos, or "God's infinite understanding." With the concept differance, Derrida de-constructed this logocen- -488- (38) Misunderstanding of Madhyamika's Perspective on Language (J. KIM) trism. Logocentrism, he says, "supports the determination of the being of the entity as presence," or in other words "presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence [ousia], temporal presence as point [stigme] of the now or of the moment [nun], the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, sub- jectivity, the co-presence of the other and of the self." 7) All these terms brought by Derrida involve the concept of self, which is strongly denied by Buddhism ; thus, scholars have been inclined to compare Derrida to Buddhism. However, Derrida's definition of no-self, more correctly the absence of presence differs from the meaning of no-self in Buddhism. The denial or deconstruction of no-self in differance is not a dialectical denial of being, in which both the presence and absence of self is denied in a radical way, as it is in Nagarjuna's thought. Derrida denies self but admis trace, detemination, effect, and forces of differance. 8) When Nagarjuna says, "neither self nor non-self is the truth,"9) the phrase does not even suppose anything like trace, determination, effect, or forces of sunyata. His "middle way" does not suppose anything we can perceive through our senses. It denies all presuppositions concerning the issue of being. Derrida often uses the phrases "present in its absence" or "deferred presence"11) in order to explain the epistemic distance of the sign from its designation. By im- posing this distance Derrida denies possibility of capturing the essence of being. Derrida's idea of sign as such seems to be similar to the Buddhist theory of language, which also refutes the substance of sign as revealing truth. However, it is still too early to assert that the two systems are alike. First of all the impossibility of description of self in Madhyamika, does not have to do with the lapse of time between the sign and the thing it present. Madhyamika's no-self theory is based on its four-cornered logic. According to this, whether we assert self or no-self, the truth is not found within language. What we call self or no-self is not the truth but merely our perceptual viewpoint. Everything is sunyata not because it is conditioned and thus subject to changes of time, in other words temporal mode of time, but because our reasoning and language have a limited na- ture. Responses from Derrida and Buddhists to the following question also show how they are not alike : if language does not present truth, what else can present or -487- Misunderstanding of Madhyamika's Perspective on Language (J. Kim) (39) help to present truth? In answering this Derrida sharply differs from Buddhism , for he believes that there exists no metaphorical meaning other than language itself. There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text ; ].... there has never been anything but writing ; there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of the supplement, etc. 14) On the other hand, from the perspective of Buddhism truth exists beyond language "N ot expressed in words or written in letters," and "special transmission apart from the textual teaching" are the mottos of Ch'an Buddhism, which finds its origin in Madhyamika , Buddhism. Enlightenment represents the perfect presence of truth. The fundamental limit of language in Madhyamika Buddhism does not result in the denial of the possibility of obtaining truth. Unlike most modern philosophical traditions, Madhyamika Buddhism is committed to the pursuit of the truth which transcends language. Furthermore, this truth which transcends language is the ultimate truth. It is not a trace of truth, but the truth itself. Since it is truth itself there is no deferring of presence when it is realized. 2) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York : Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1958) no.88. 3) Hui-cheng lun, Taishd shinshu daizokyo 32,18a. 4) Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend (West Lafayette : Purdue UP, 1984). 6) Magliola, 116. 7) Jacques Derrida, Of Gramatolohy, trans, Gayatri Chariotry Spivak, (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins UP, 1974) 12. 8) Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans, Barbara Johnson (Chicago : U of Chicago P, 1982) 15-17. 9) Madhvamkak-sastra 18: 6. 11) Derrida, Margins, 9. 14) Derrida, Gramatology, 158-159. •q Key Words•r India, 2nd-3rd b. c., Madhyamikd, Nagarjuna, Madhyamaka-sastra, Hui-cheng lun, conventional use of language, language games, differance. (Lecturer, State University of New York at Stony Brook) -486-.