f EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE Department of Political and Social Sciences STRATEGY AND SECURITY : West German Doctrines and Their Predominance in the Evolution of the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979 Susanne Peters Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtain the Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute Department of Political and Scodal Sciences Florence Examining Turv Ian Budge, University of Essex (supervisor) Klaus Jurgen Gantzel, Hamburg University (co-supervisor) Werner Maihofer, European University Institute Roger Morgan, European University Institute Dieter Senghaas, Bremen University December 1989 European University Institute 3 0001 0041 9656 6 LIB EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 3 5 5 .0 3 3 5 Department of Political and Social Sciences 43 PET p STRATEGY AND SECURITY : ★ X West German Doctrines and Their Predominance in the Evolution of the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979 Susanne Peters Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtain the Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute Department of Political and Scodal Sciences Florence Examining lury Ian Budge, University of Essex (supervisor) Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, Hamburg University (co-supervisor) Werner Maihofer, European University Institute Roger Morgan, European University Institute Dieter Senghaas, Bremen University December 1989 2 tri isxjji sVTo?/ Strategy and Security: West German Doctrines and Their Predominance in the Evolution of the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979 1. Introduction 1.1. Nature of the problem 1 1.2. State of the debate 5 1.3. Purpose and approach of research 11 1.4. Organisation of thesis 24 Sec. I: The contradictory nature of the strategy of Flexible Response 2. The evolution of Flexible Response 2.1. The nature of nuclear deterrence 29 2.2. Refinement of nuclear war-fighting deterrence 34 2.2.1. Counterforce options as consistent elements in U.S. strategy 34 2.2.2. The continuation in PD 59 and Discriminate Deterrence 41 2.2.3. Retreat from Massive Retaliation 44 2.3. Consistent Problems in NATO's hardware decision 48 2.3.1. The introduction of INF 48 2.3.2. The deployment of IRBMs in the 50s and 60s 50 2.3.3. Parallels with the Plan for a Multilateral Force 52 3. Flexible Response and its divergent U.S. and German Interpretation 3.1. Description of flexible response 58 3.2. Reactions in the Federal Republic 61 3.2.1. German Parties 61 3.2.2. Institutionalising of research: the Ebenhausen Institute 64 3.3. Divergent national doctrines 67 3.3.1. Nuclear versus conventional 67 3.3.2. Strategic versus tactical 71 3.3.3. Political versus military use 72 3.3.4. Two incompatible first use concepts 74 3.4. Ambiguity of flexible response: the TNF posture 75 3.4.1. Description of the TNF 75 3.4.2. Attempts of TNF’s reduction 78 3.5. German apprehensions concerning first use 81 3.5.1.Nuclear weapons' employment planning 82 3.5.2. The selective use of TNF 84 3.5.3. Supersession of NATO's command system 86 Sec. II. The NATO-Dual Track as a solution: the Federal Republic's role within its evolution 4. Evolution of the LRTNF Decision within NATO 4.1. Evolution of the LRTNF decision in Nuclear Planning Group 94 4.1.1. Development of the Nuclear Planning Group 95 4.1.2. Provisional Political Guidelines (1967-1969) 96 4.1.3. Nuclear consultation procedures 99 4.1.4. Schmidt's success with the ADMs 101 4.1.5. Follow-on-use 103 4.1.6. German approval for military use 105 4.2. Restructuring NATO's TNF 106 4.2.1. U.S. revision of TNF 107 4.2.2. New technological developments 110 4.2.3. German revision of TNF 117 5. The LRTNF Decision as a result of US.-German Conflicts over SALT 5.1. Offer for an extension of the consultation process 121 5.2. The Federal Republic's interest in FBS in SALT I 124 5.2.1. Another cycle of concern about the U.S. guarantee 124 5.2.2. Political and strategical value of the FBS 126 5.2.3. Relationship to SALT negotiations 129 5.3. Disagreement over Long-Range Cruise Missile in SALT n 134 5.3.1. Development of the Cruise Missile 135 5.3.2. The Ban on Cruise Missile 137 5.3.3. German insistence on the Cruise Missile 141 5.3.4. Schmidt's public interference with the SALT process 144 5.3.5. Schmidt's strategic doctrine 148 6, The Evolution of the Transatlantic Consensus 6.1. Shifting Policy of the U.S. Administration 156 6.1.1. The Establishment of the High Level Group 156 6.1.2. Transatlantic alliance of the Defence Secretaries deputies 159 6.1.3. The neutron bomb debacle 163 6.1.4. Presidential Review Memorandum 38 168 6.1.5. Euro-American workshop 170 6.1.6. The High Level Group's final report 172 6.2. The Predominance of German Positions 176 6.2.1. Non-singularity 176 6.2.2. Land-based option 179 6.2.3. Insistence on link to Arms Control 185 Sec. Ill: The solution of the LRTNF modernisation: its possible employment options 7. Compatible strategic doctrines and rationales 7.1. Key justification for the LRTNF Decision: the SS-20 191 7.2. LRTNF as a means for escalation control 197 7.2.1. Compensation of the loss of escalation dominance 197 7.2.2. Assumptions implied in the acceptance of flexible options 200 7.2.3. Parallels between Deliberate Escalation and Escalation Control 202 7.2.4. Dual Role of LRTNF 204 7.2.5. Compatibility through the Pershing's ambiguous data 206 7.3. Conclusion: Blurring of traditional categories 209 8. The LRTNF decision as a result of U.S.-Doctrines: 8.1. Pershing II and Cruise Missiles: Spearheads of a first strike strategy? 213 8.1.1. The Political Background 213 8.1.2. Characteristics of First Strike 216 8.1.3. The Scenario of a Disarming First Strike 219 8.2. Schlesinger"s doctrine of Limited Nuclear Options 224 8.2.1. Description of the Counterforce Doctrine 226 8.2.2. Basic Features of the Limited Nuclear Options 229 8.2.3. The role of the TNF in Schlesinger's doctrine 232 8.3. LRTNF for follow-on use 238 8.3.1. Counterforce targeting 238 8.3.2. Criticism of the LRTNF 242 8.3.3. Intolerable degree of vulnerability 245 9. LRTNF decision as a result of German doctrines 9.1. Implementation of First Use Concept 253 9.1.1. Rühl's discussion of the Schlesinger doctrine 253 9.1.2. Governmental Level 256 9.1.3. Theory of controlled nuclear strategic war 259 9.1.4. Pershing's employment options in German first use concept 268 9.1.5. LRTNF as a means for first-and follow-on use 273 9.2. Predominance of German doctrines in the hardware decision 277 9.2.1. Prevalence of the Pershing's Extended Range 277 9.2.2. Land deployment versus sea deployment 281 9.2.3. Vulnerability 285 10. Summary and Conclusions 10.1. Germany's Role in the Evolution of the LRTNF Decision 289 10.2. Germany and the Implementation of the 1979 Decision 291 10.3.1979 as Background to INF Treaty 294 Abbreviations 299 Glossary 303 Chronology of executives involved in the NATO-Dual Track Decision 309 Bibliography 312 1 1 .Introduction The thesis analyses the Federal Republic's motives for backing the NATO Dual- Track decision. The purposes are twofold: First, explanation will be given for the inconsistencies which are involved in the controversial and heatedly debated NATO-Dual Track decision by pointing to the Federal Republic's responsibility for its realisation. It will be brought out that during the seventies the Federal Republic opted for land-based intermediate-range theatre nuclear forces in NATO and requested the preservation of the option of long-range cruise missiles in the SALT consultations. Secondly, in their adherence to flexible response German strategic doctrines will be presented basically as independent of party memberships and will be compared with U.S. strategic doctrines as a coherent and national entity. The contradictory nature of the strategy of flexible response will serve as a starting point for elaborating its divergent U.S. and German interpretations. The focus on German strategic doctrines shall serve to demonstrate that land-deployed long-range theatre nuclear weapons have been regarded as an optimal means for implementing the German interpretation of flexible response. As the methodological approach a documentary analysis has been chosen. Generally, West German nuclear policy has been interpreted to a considerable extent as a reaction to U.S. hegemonic policy. This interpretation pattern will be drawn into question. The thesis wants to serve as a stimulus for further research to pay more attention to German contributions to NATO's decisions concerning nuclear issues than has been done so far. 1.1. The Nature of the Problem On December 12, 1979 at a special meeting in Brussels NATO's Foreign and Defence Ministers agreed on the following decision: "... Ministers have decided to modernise NATO’s LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I-A and 464 ground- launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads.”' 1 "Communique issued at a special meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979" in John Cartwright, Julian Critchley, 2 The deployment of these 572 nuclear systems would be distributed among five European countries: all 108 Pershing n and 96 ground-launched cruise missiles would be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 160 cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, 112 in Italy and 48 each in Belgium and the Netherlands.