WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020 3:13 PM IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE ILAN WURMAN† ABSTRACT The standard formalist account of Article II’s Executive Vesting Clause is that “the executive power” refers to all the powers and authorities possessed by the executive magistrate in Great Britain prior to the Constitution’s adoption, subject to the assignment of such powers and authorities to the other departments of the national government. In recent papers, a handful of scholars have challenged this “residual vesting thesis” by amassing evidence that “the executive power” textually referred only to the power to carry law into execution and not to the bundle of other royal prerogatives—for example over foreign affairs and national security—enjoyed by the British monarch. According to the advocates of both accounts, the scope and nature of the executive is dramatically altered depending on which account one adopts. This Article dissents from both views. “The executive power” was indeed about law execution and was not a residual grant of power; but both the Founding generation and its key guide, Blackstone, likely shared a “thick” understanding of this power. Their writings and statements suggest that “the executive power,” even in its narrower law- execution sense, plausibly included the powers to appoint, remove, and direct executive officers and to promulgate regulations as necessary incidents to law execution. Not only is this account consistent with Blackstone and the historical meaning of “the executive power,” but it better fits the available data from the Constitutional Convention and early practice than either of the other two accounts. The residual vesting thesis requires us to believe that the Committee of Detail ignored the instructions of the delegates in the Constitutional Convention, to infer Copyright © 2020 Ilan Wurman. † Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. Thanks to William Baude, Philip Hamburger, John Harrison, Kathryn Kovacs, Michael McConnell, Julian Mortenson, James Pfander, David Upham, Matt Steilen, Peter Strauss, Seth Barrett Tillman, and Lael Weinberger; to Emily Bremer, Linda Jellum, Matt Lawrence, David Rubenstein, Daniel Walters, and the organizers of the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center workshop; to Christopher Walker and the participants of the AALS legislation/administrative law new voices workshop; and, of course, to my colleagues Laura Coordes, Ben McJunkin, Trevor Reed, Erin Scharff, Josh Sellers, Bijal Shah, and Justin Weinstein-Tull for their usual early intervention. WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020 3:13 PM 94 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:93 that the delegates themselves were unaware of the implications of what they had written, and to ignore the fact that not a single opponent of the Constitution during ratification so much as mentioned the possibility of a residual grant. On the other hand, the law-execution thesis, at least a “thin” version of it, may not account for important practices and precedents. The “thick” view of “the executive power” advanced in this Article is the theory of best fit: it is the only one that fits the text, the Framers’ apparent intent, and the historical practice. The upshot of this approach is that the president probably has more power in the domestic sphere than under a thin law-execution account but less in foreign affairs than under the residual vesting thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................................. 95 I. The Textual Meaning of “the Executive Power” ........................... 107 A. Competing Textual Evidence ............................................. 108 1. Influential Political Thinkers ........................................... 108 2. State Constitutions and “Executive Powers” .................. 113 3. Hamilton as Pacificus ....................................................... 118 B. “The Executive Power” in Blackstone .............................. 119 II. “The Executive Power” in Convention ......................................... 122 A. Distributing Prerogative Powers ........................................ 122 B. Two Key Omissions ............................................................. 125 1. The Power To Erect Corporations .................................. 126 2. The Immigration Prerogative .......................................... 128 C. The Convention’s Instruction, and Ratification ............... 131 D. The Vesting Clauses Reconsidered .................................... 133 E. Summary ............................................................................... 137 III. Domestic Separation of Powers Disputes .................................... 138 A. Appointments, Removals, Presidential Administration .. 138 B. Prosecution ........................................................................... 145 C. Proclamation Power ............................................................. 153 1. Blackstone ......................................................................... 153 2. Administrative Regulations .............................................. 154 3. Youngstown ...................................................................... 155 IV. The Executive and Foreign Affairs .............................................. 159 A. The Standard Picture ........................................................... 160 B. Revisiting Presidential Powers ........................................... 163 1. Neutrality and “Setting” Foreign Policy ......................... 163 2. Terminating Treaties......................................................... 166 3. Instructing and Recalling Ambassadors ......................... 168 WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020 3:13 PM 2020] IN SEARCH OF PREROGATIVE 95 4. Recognition ....................................................................... 171 5. Torturing Terrorists .......................................................... 172 6. Executive Agreements ...................................................... 172 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 173 INTRODUCTION Article I of the United States Constitution creates a national government of limited and enumerated legislative powers; it declares that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”1 Article II creates the executive branch, but its vesting clause is formulated differently: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”2 The Article II Vesting Clause does not say only those executive powers “herein granted” shall be vested in the president; rather, it says “the executive power” shall be vested in the president. This distinct formulation has caused much controversy over the past 230 years because Article II nonetheless contains an enumeration of some kind. The first paragraph of Article II, Section 2 declares the president to be the commander in chief of the armed forces and grants the president the power to demand written opinions from the principal officers of the executive departments and to grant reprieves and pardons.3 The second paragraph of Section 2 gives the president and the Senate certain shared powers, namely to make treaties and appointments, although Congress may place responsibility for the appointment of inferior officers in the president alone, the heads of 4 departments, or the courts. 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 2. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 3. The first clause states, in full: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 4. The second clause states, in full: He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and WURMAN IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20_FIXED CHART (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020 3:13 PM 96 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:93 Article II, Section 3, then seems to involve the president’s duties and relationship to Congress. The president must from time to time give Congress information about the state of the union; may convene Congress on extraordinary occasions and may adjourn them in the event the House and Senate disagree about adjournment; and “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”5 This paragraph also gives the president the duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”6 There are at least three ways to read the Executive Vesting Clause in light of this structure. The prevailing view among formalists may be termed the “residual vesting thesis.”7 According to this view, the vesting clause of Article II, unlike