The Definition of Antisemitism Kenneth L. Marcus* 1. INTRODUCTION Defining antisemitism has always been complicated by the disreputable origins of the term, the discredited sources of its etymology, the diverse manifestations of the concept, and the contested politics of its applications. Nevertheless, the task is an important one, not only because definitional clarity is required for the term to be understood, but also because conceptual sophistication is needed for the associated problem to be resolved. This article will explore various ways in which antisemitism has historically been defined, demonstrate the weaknesses in prior efforts, and develop a new definition of antisemitism. Building on the work of such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Theodor Adorno, Helen Fein, and Gavin Langmuir, this article demonstrates that a theoretically sophisticated definition of this term must fully account for antisemitism’s ideological, attitudinal, and practical qualities; its persisting latent structure within Western cultures; its continuities and discontinuities with analogous phenomena; its chimerical quality; its potentially self-fulfilling character; and its role in the construction of Jewish identity. Most impor- tantly, the definition must account for the participation of antisemitic discourses and practices in the construction of the individual and collective “Jew,” both as false image and as actual being. This process is equally critical to the understanding of antisemitism and to the development of means of counter-acting what might be called antisemitism’s chimerical core. 2. ANTISEMITISM AS RACISM The first and most treacherous intuition of many commentators is to begin with etymol- ogy. To this day, some commentators insist that antisemitism cannot mean hatred of Jews, when the term “Semites” refers to speakers of a language family consisting of many historical Middle Eastern languages, including not only Hebrew but also Arabic. From the beginning, however, antisemitism has always meant hatred of Jews, not hatred of Arabs or Semites.1 Bernard Lewis has debunked the canard, sometimes offered on * President, The Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C. This article benefits from comments by Gabriel Noah Brahm, Aryeh Weinberg, and Dennis Ybarra, although any deficiencies remain the responsibility of the author. 1 Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Anti-Semitism: From Ancient Times to the Present Day (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 21-22; Bernard Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (1986), p. 117; Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Schocken Books 1991), p. xvi. 97 © Kenneth L. Marcus, 2013 | doi 10.1163/9789004265561_011 Kenneth L. Marcus - 9789004265561 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NCDownloaded 4.0 license. from Brill.com09/28/2021 12:00:55PM via free access 98 KENNETH L. MARCUS behalf of Arabs, that they cannot be antisemitic, since they themselves are Semites. “The logic of this,” he responded, would seem to be that while an edition of Hitler’s Mein Kampf published in Berlin or in Buenos Aires in German or Spanish is anti-Semitic, an Arab version of the same text published in Cairo or Beirut cannot be anti-Semitic, because Arabic and Hebrew are cognate languages. It is not a compelling argument.2 The etymological approach is more broadly problematic because the term was coined (or at least popularized) by a self-confessed antisemite, Wilhelm Marr, who hoped that it would facilitate greater adoption of the racial hatred of Jews and Judaism which he and his compatriots promoted.3 Early definitions stressed the relationship between Jewish racial distinctness and repugnant moral attributes. For example, one 1882 German dictionary defined an antisemite as “[a]nyone who hates Jews or opposes Judaism in general, and struggles against the character traits and the intentions of the Semites.”4 The racial dimension is even clearer in a definition offered five years later by one of the architects of modern political antisemitism, who explained the concept as follows: “anti—to oppose, Semitism—the essence of the Jewish race; anti-Semitism is therefore the struggle against Semitism.”5 In recent years, no reputable authority would embrace a definition, like these, which assumes that Jews actually possess the character traits which their antagonists attribute to them.6 Nevertheless, some authorities continue to define the term in a manner that stresses the racial element in some forms of this animus. Those who define antisemitism this way tend to emphasize that racial Jew-hatred has been qualitatively different than other forms of this animus. They may point to the unique horrors of the Holocaust or argue that racist hatreds are more dangerous than other animus, such as religious bias, since racial characteristics cannot be eradicated other than by extermination. This approach has various disadvan- tages, such as its exclusion of even the most virulent forms of religiously motivated hatred of Jews and Judaism. More profoundly, such definitions have been criticized on the ground that that they appear to accept, or at least to assume, the discredited “Aryan myth” that Jews can be meaningfully described in terms of “race.”7 3. ANTISEMITISM AS ETHNIC PREJUDICE OR XENOPHOBIA Many modern formulations have defined antisemitism, instead, as a discrete but largely generic form of a more general phenomenon such as ethnic prejudice or xenophobia. For 2 Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites, p. 16. 3 Wistrich, Antisemitism, p. xv. 4 Brockhous Enzyklopädia, Vol. I (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 585-86, quoted in Dina Porat, “Historical Perspective,” in Dina Porat and Kenneth Stern, Defining Antisemitism (2005), available at: <http:// www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/porat.htm>. 5 Theodor Fritch, Antisemiten Katechismus (Leipzig, 1887), quoted in Dina Porat, “Historical Per- spective.” 6 Gavin Langmuir, “Toward a Definition of Antisemitism,” in Toward a Definition of Anti- semitism (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990), p. 311. 7 Ibid. For a discussion of the complexity of this question of Jewish racial distinctness, see Ken- neth L. Marcus, Jewish Identity and Civil Rights in America (New York: Cambridge University Press 2010). Kenneth L. Marcus - 9789004265561 Downloaded from Brill.com09/28/2021 12:00:55PM via free access THE DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM 99 example, Webster’s Dictionary has influentially defined antisemitism as consisting of (any) “hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial group.”8 Indeed, some historians have characterized antisemitism in terms that suggest that it is merely a manifestation of xenophobia, rather than a specific form of hatred. In one strong version of this formulation, antisemitism is defined as being merely “the dislike of the unlike.”9 Such definitions treat antisemitism as distinguishable only in its objects from other forms of discrimination such as anti-black racism or anti-Hispanic ethnocentricity, rather than identifying a peculiar characteristic of the hatred of Jews. This tendency to blur the lines among forms of prejudice has certain practical advan- tages. Analytically, it facilitated research, particularly in the period immediately follow- ing World War II, which demonstrated similarities among the divergent forms of hatred directed at different groups.10 Politically, it provides a basis for coalition-building activities by various minority groups. Legally, it supports the development of parallel regulatory regimes to protect persons who face discrimination under different suspect classifications. In Europe, where Jews are the paradigmatic case of a persecuted minor- ity, other historical outgroups may seek legal protections by comparing their lot to the Jewish condition. In the United States, however, where African Americans are the paradigmatic case, other groups tend to achieve protection by comparing their status to that of American blacks. Understandably, general definitions of antisemitism, i.e., those that stress antisemitism’s continuities with analogous phenomena, have proliferated because they serve a number of practical objectives at times and in places where opposi- tion to the persecution of Jews is perceived to be weaker, standing on its own, than if combined with other forms of anti-racism, multiculturalism, or human rights activity. The problem with such general definitions, however, is that they suggest that anti- semitism may be different only in the choice of persecuted outgroup, rather than in the nature or intensity of hatred. Historian Ben-Zion Netanyahu recognized this difference in intensity when he defined antisemitism as an animus that combines “hatred of the other, hatred of the alien and hatred of the weak” but “in a more forceful and consistent form than in any other form of hatred of minorities.”11 This recognition of intensity levels is important, but it neglects the difference in character that might explain the difference in virulence. Gavin Langmuir expressed this insight when he admonished that the kind of hatred symbolized by Auschwitz must be distinguished in more than intensity from the hostility represented by a swastika on the Eiffel Tower.12 The chal- lenge, then, is to expand the definition of antisemitism in a manner that reflects the peculiar virulence to which it has been inclined. 8 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002), p. 96.