IRC Special Report Rise and Demise of the New American Century By Tom Barry | June 28, 2006 The glory days of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) quickly passed. When neoconser- vatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan formed PNAC in 1997, they aimed to set forth a new agenda for post-Cold War foreign and military policy that would ensure that the United States could claim the 21st century as its own—where U.S. military dominance would not only protect U.S. national security and national interests but would also establish a global Pax Americana. The election of George W. Bush opened the door to the Pentagon, vice president’s office, State Department, and the National Security Council for PNAC associates, many of whom—including Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Douglas Feith, and Paul Wolfowitz—became the leading figures in the Bush administration’s foreign policy team. Although not all were neoconservatives themselves, the PNAC associates brought neoconservative ideology and a common conviction of U.S. supremacy with them into government. However, it was not until Sept. 11 that the PNAC-dominated foreign policy team got its chance to fast-forward their plans to remake the world as a U.S. dominion. Back in 2001 and even into 2002 few Americans—even in foreign policy circles—knew about the Project for the New American Century or could speak knowledgeably about the history and ideological convictions of neoconservatives. Nearly five years after Sept. 11 and more than three years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, most Americans who follow foreign policy and U.S. politics are familiar with the term neoconservative and probably have heard about the Project for the New American Century. As the wars and occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan have become quagmires, the glory days of PNAC have been cut short by the limits of U.S. power and the follies of the Bush administration’s arrogance. Yet by no means is it certain if the lessons of PNAC’s successes and delusions have been learned, either by the U.S. public or the U.S. policy community. The agenda set out by PNAC in its 1997 “Statement of Principles” reflects the exceptionalism and supremacy that still pervades this country. And many of PNAC’s policy prescriptions regarding regime change, increased U.S. military budgets, unilateral action, and America’s moral mission remain part of the common political discourse. By 2005 PNAC began to fade from the political landscape, and though the website is still functioning, it has been dormant since late that year. But the neoconservatives, together with their Religious Right and military-industrial complex allies, remain prominent actors in shaping the directions of U.S. for- eign and military policy—some within government and others from a wide array of neocon-led think tanks, front groups, and policy institutes. The IRC is publishing this special report on the Project for the New American Century, along with an accompanying report on the Committee on the Present Danger, as part of an effort to stimulate more reflection on the dangers of the ideology and political projects of the neoconservatives and their allies. International Relations Center www.irc-online.org People-Centered Policy Alternatives Since 1979 From an office in the same building that houses would no longer suffice. Positioning themselves as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in down- New Democrats, Bill Clinton and Al Gore had town Washington and with funding from the stolen the neoconservative thunder on free mar- Bradley Foundation, William Kristol established ket and big government issues. the Project for the Republican Future in 1993 in anticipation of the 1994 congressional elections. Following the resounding victory of right-wing Republicans, he founded the Weekly Standard in Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with 1995 in the vacated offices of the Project for the America” played a key role in Republican Future. The next year Kristol and unifying conservatives around Robert Kagan established the Project for the New an almost exclusively domestic American Century, whose offices are also located agenda of big-government in the American Enterprise Institute building and which is also generously supported by the Bradley bashing, glorifying in traditional Foundation.1 family values, and attacking secular humanism. By the time Kristol and Kagan formulated the idea for the Project for the New American Century in 1996, the widespread conservative frustration at having to endure another four years of Clinton lib- The challenge was to create a “neo-Reaganite” erals had largely papered over the conservative agenda—one that would appeal to the same rift of the late 1980s. Newt Gingrich’s “Contract “moral majority” citizens who were still fighting with America” played a key role in unifying con- the backlash cultural wars against multiculturalism servatives around an almost exclusively domestic and the counterculture of the 1960s, who agenda of big-government bashing, glorifying in responded to messaging about moral clarity and traditional family values, and attacking secular America’s mission, and whose sense of patriotism humanism. The domestic side of a reinvigorated and nationalism could again be rallied to support right wing was coming together nicely in the increased military spending and interventionism 1990s, as seen in the winning role played by the abroad. Collectively, the neoconservatives, the “Contract with America” in ushering in a Republican Party’s hawks, and the social conser- Republican majority in both houses of Congress vatives aimed to awaken America from its slum- under the Clinton presidency. ber to wage the ‘good fight against the forces of evil’ that were gathering round the world. PNAC’s The right, however, had not recovered from the founding statement in 1997 crystallized this new loss of its chief mobilizing principle: militant anti- sense of America’s power and moral mission. communism. Central to the right’s role in winning the White House for Ronald Reagan in 1980 was PNAC’s 1997 “Statement of Principles” set forth a the fusion of three core conservative constituen- new agenda for foreign and military policy that cies: social conservatives, economic libertarians, was described by William Kristol and Robert and national security militarists. In the late 1970s, Kagan as being “neo-Reaganite.” Signatories of neoconservatives played a key strategic role in this charter document said that they aimed “to engineering this right-wing fusion, providing make the case and rally support for American many of the key intellectual and ideological global leadership.”2 Excerpts from the statement frameworks for the right wing’s expanding count- follow: er-establishment and for the right-wing populists. “We seem to have forgotten the essential ele- If they were to reprise this same unifying role in ments of the Reagan administration’s success: a the late 1990s, the neocons knew that the old military that is strong and ready to meet both political messages daring the Democrats to associ- present and future challenges; a foreign policy ate themselves with the “L” word of liberalism that boldly and purposefully promotes American p. 2 www.irc-online.org People-Centered Policy Alternatives Since 1979 principles abroad; and national leadership that discourse. At a time when most pundits and politi- accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.” cians were caught up in national debates about the price of prescription drugs, the future of social “Of course, the United States must be prudent in security, and the impact of globalization, PNAC how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely warned of “present dangers” to U.S. national avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or security. the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and On the whole, however, PNAC’s associates—many security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If of whom joined the administration of George W. we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges Bush—were hopeful. If conservatives would con- to our fundamental interests. The history of the tinue to resist “isolationist impulses from within 20th century should have taught us that it is their own ranks” and if a new government would important to shape circumstances before crises adopt the history-tested principle of “peace emerge, and to meet threats before they become through strength,” the “greatness” of the United dire. The history of this century should have States would be ensured in the next century. If the taught us to embrace the cause of American lead- American people were to again embrace “a ership.” Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity,” they could look forward to a New “Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and American Century.5 moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.” At a time when most pundits Liberals and progressives might regard the success and politicians were caught up of the Project for the New American Century set- in national debates about the ting a new foreign policy agenda as an example of price of prescription drugs, the how the right’s unity, its messaging skills, its net- future of social security, and the working, and the focused political agenda of its small circle of foundations have enabled it to impact of globalization, PNAC effect radical political change. Recalling the warned of “present dangers” to group’s origins in the mid-1990s, PNAC’s execu- U.S. national security. tive director Gary Schmitt told a different story: “It is actually just the opposite. We started up pre- cisely because the right was so divided—between The rhetoric, political tactics, and assumptions the realists and the neo-isolationists.” According about America’s moral mission articulated by the to Schmitt, “What we thought was that a tradition Project for the New American Century all had that was both more American and more particu- deep historical resonance.