CHAPTER 2 MARKING TIM E GGT AM anxious to increase the garrison at Wau-Bulolo as soon a s 1 possible by flying in approximately 1,500 troops, " wrote General Mackay on 18th April to General Kenney, the commander of the Allie d Air Forces in the South-West Pacific Area . "After these have arrived," he continued, "about 600 troops will be relieved and brought to Por t Moresby, leaving the garrison of Wau-Bulolo approximately 6,500 . The total number of plane loads required to carry the above personne l with their weapons, ammunition and limited stores is 103 ." These words emphasised the dependence of the Allied Services on one another in Ne w Guinea. Merchant ships, guarded by the navy, carried troops and wa r materials to Port Moresby but, without the use of air transport, the Wau- Bulolo area could not have been held in January 1943 . Against great difficulties engineers were building a road to Wau from Bulldog on the Lakekamu River but this would not be ready for some time . In the mean- time the only practicable way to reinforce and maintain the Australians in the Wau-Bulolo area was over the Owen Stanley Range in America n air transports guarded by Allied fighters . Possession by the Allies of th e DC-3 transport aircraft was thus a big factor in enabling the Australian s to hold their positions in the forward area against the Japanese who ha d more accessible bases at Lae and Salamaua . Mackay's Intelligence staff estimated that enemy strengths in New Guinea included between 9,000 and 11,000 men at Wewak, between 6,00 0 and 8,000 at Madang, about 5,500 in the Lae-Salamaua area, with smalle r detachments at Vanimo, Aitape, Bogia, Saidor and Finschhafen . Mackay thought that the Japanese were determined to strengthen their grip on th e north-east coast of New Guinea by using the divisions stationed in th e Wewak, Madang and Lae-Salamaua areas, and by preparing airfields fo r bombers at Wewak and for fighters at Madang and Saidor. He believe d that they would now try to build up the Lae-Salamaua area by developing the old coastal route from Wewak to Lae with barge staging point s between the main areas, and that, when their communications and air- fields improved, they would attack in the area south of the Markham or against the Australians' forward positions in the Mubo and Missim areas . Mackay therefore on 20th April directed General Savige to keep th e enemy away from the airfields at Wau, Bulolo, Bulwa and Zenag ; to pre- vent them from entering the Wau-Bulolo-Partep 2 area from the east , north and west; and to deny them a secure base for developing operation s south of the Markham River particularly in the Wampit and Watut River Valleys. He also made Savige responsible for developing the Wau-Bulol o area into "an active operational zone for mobile defence in such a manner as to facilitate offensive operations" . Mackay finally warned Savige Apr1943 THE JUNGLE BACKGROUND 21 that "Salamaua is a strongly defended area and no attempt is to b e made at present to capture it by siege tactics" . One of the most difficult and unpleasant areas ever to confront troops lay before the Australians. It posed an immense supply problem . Endur- ance and determination in generous quantities were needed from th e troops themselves, while a high degree of ingenuity was required fro m those responsible for planning and organisation . The troops found it difficult to find enough unpleasant adjectives to describe the country , which, for the most part, consisted of rugged mountains clothed with dense, almost impenetrable jungle, and in the higher areas with mos s forest. Occasionally hills covered with kunai grass, such as those in the Snake Valley, stood out against the jungle background . Gloom and eeri e stillness, clouds which frequently descended upon the mountains, rain , towering trees and drooping vines, which shut off the sunshine when it did eventually break through the clouds, sodden earth and rotting vegeta- tion, all combined to add a touch of the primaeval to the battlegrounds o f this part of New Guinea . When the wind blew it raised a sour unclean smell of decay from the vegetation which, season after season, rotted i n the all-pervading damp. Clothing was perpetually wet with rain an d perspiration; the ravages of insect pests, notably mosquitoes and leeches , were enough to call out the blasphemous superlatives of the sorely-tried Australian soldier. The tropical rains of many centuries had cut deep ravines and, as a result, any movement entailed constant negotiation of watercourses an d steep descents on tracks hardly meriting the name, with correspondingl y steep ascents to follow. After many bitter and exhausting experiences th e troops learnt to measure distance in hours not miles. Time taken in one direction might be far different from time taken in another, depending on the lie of the land. The soldier's life was governed by the track s around and along which all operations took place . Mostly they led throug h the jungle of trees and undergrowth, but sometimes through moss forest s or the stifling kunai . As the track became worn the troops had to wallo w along in mud up to the knees and perhaps over them, stumbling now and then over hidden rocks and roots, and for support clutching vines an d branches which often broke off rotten in their hands. The report of the 3rd Australian Division said : Such conditions of rain, mud, rottenness, stench, gloom, and, above all, th e feeling of being shut in by everlasting jungle and ever ascending mountains, ar e sufficient to fray the strongest nerves . But add to them the tension of the constan t expectancy of death from behind the impenetrable screen of green, and nerve s must be of the strongest, and morale of the highest, to live down these conditions, accept them as a matter of course, and maintain a cheerful yet fighting spirit .l The Japanese shared such opinions. A company commander of th e 115th Regiment wrote of the overpowering jungle : "One advances as i f in the dark ." A senior staff officer on the headquarters of the 5I st Division described the characteristics of the jungle thus : I Report on Operations of 3 Aust Div in Salamaua Area 22 April 43 to 25 August 43 . 22 MARKING TIME Apr1943 All the tall trees are entwined by vine-like plants, which make them either die or fall . There are many fallen trees which frequently become an obstacle to move- ments. During the rainy season they collect water on the moss, and the vines grow luxuriantly in every direction, twisting among withered trees . As for the surface of the ground, it is covered with leaf-mould, and moss grows on the network of exposed roots. No matter to what high place one climbs, the eye can penetrate only a short distance, and since one cannot depend on this to see the form of the mountains of the vicinity, it is difficult to orient the actual terrain with maps. One can rarely see more than 100 metres through the jungle, so, when on e is crawling up on the enemy, it is not difficult to come within 20 metres . Con- sequently when perceiving the approach of the enemy, it goes without saying, on e must be alert for any rustling of foliage, and must make good use of one's ears , just as at night . In these conditions the human element played a big part for it wa s important to keep the fighting soldiers fit and cheerful . They were wet most of the time, and tended to become depressed and ill . Brigadier Moten had already decided that the main way to keep them interested and fit was to place rest camps where they could sleep dry, have a hot meal or two, and wash themselves and their clothing, close behind the for - ward positions . He established such a camp at Edie Creek, where it was cold enough at night for four blankets, and there the men gaine d appetite amazingly and even put a little weight on lean frames . The main route from Wau to Mubo was via Summit, which as its name implied was the highest point on this track, 6,400 feet above se a level, and Guadagasal . After leaving the kunai-covered spurs to the south of Wau the track entered mountainous jungle . To Mubo the track was reasonably well graded. The Mubo Valley in this region was a deep wedge - shaped cleft in the jungle-covered mountains with Observation Hill risin g sharply to the north. East of Mubo lay Lababia Ridge—an unbroken almost perpendicular wall of jungle . North of Lababia Ridge were the precipitous enemy strongholds of Green Hill 2 and the Pimple 3 while north again and across the Bitoi River was the jungle clad Bitoi Ridg e running west to Buigap Creek. North again was the mass of Moun t Tambu which could only be approached along narrow razor-backs wit h almost perpendicular drops on each side . Stretching out like three fingers to the north-east, north and north-west of Mount Tambu were thre e large ridges ; only one was yet named—Komiatum Ridge, a long sprawl- ing feature separating Buirali and Buiwarfe Creeks and finishing at thei r junction. West of Mount Tambu lay the Komiatum Gap separatin g it from the Pioneers Range at whose northern extremity lay Bobdub i Ridge.