TURKISH EQUITY STRATEGY - 2H09
Featuring an exclusive independent view on the Turkish economy by Prof. NOURIEL ROUBINI
“That which does not kill us makes us stronger”
FOREWORD
“That which does not kill us makes us stronger”
Nietzsche’s words summarize Turkey’s recent experience succinctly. Turkey faced the worst during the global crisis in the midst of shrinking credit markets, drying capital inflows and shattering export demand. Coupled with this negative global backdrop, concerns over Turkey’s high external financing requirement, large FX exposure in the private sector and the ris- ing trend in NPLs in the banking sector precipitated a massive sell-off in Turkish assets in late 2008 and early 2009. Fear was the overriding theme then.
However, the Turkish economy proved much more resilient than had generally been believed. The banking system did not face a huge asset deterioration thanks to strong balance sheets not burdened by toxic assets. On the contrary, with declin- ing interest rates Turkish banks posted spectacular earnings in 1Q09. Banks and companies continued to rollover their ex- ternal debts to a large extent alleviating concerns for further weakness in the currency as well. With the fall in domestic and export demand, industrial production declined considerably, however, thanks to cost control measures and timely gov- ernment incentives, Turkish industrials did not experience large scale bankruptcies. In other words, Turkish companies muddled through just fine during the worst crisis the world has experienced since the Great Depression of 1929.
Why was Turkey so strong? The answer is simple - experience. Turkey has a long history of frequent crises. All these crises have taught Turkish banks to be only conservatively aggressive when the times are good to avoid the pain when the times turn bad and Turkish industrials to be as flexible as possible at all times. Therein lies the real strength of the Turkish case. Having come out of the last crisis relatively unscathed as well, Turkey is now even stronger.
The resilience of Turkish industry and its banking sector is acknowledged and acclaimed by a large investment community as well. This was the main reason behind the rally we have seen at the ISE since the beginning of March. In our 2009 strategy report sent in January, we have correctly envisaged that the interest rates would continue to edge lower with the expected decline in inflation and a more stable exchange rate; and investors would start buying the potential recovery. Our market call was to buy on weakness, which proved highly rewarding considering 85% dollar return on the ISE since 9 March 2009.
i
FOREWORD
We foresee real and lasting recovery in domestic demand conditions in 2010 and forecast a 3% growth in Turkish economy. We predict that with a relatively stronger growth impetus, inflation is likely to edge higher to 6.5% after hitting a low of 4.5% at end-2009. Interest rates, in line with the upward move in inflation rate and the stretch on the fiscal side, are likely to increase to an average of 14.5% in 2010. Please note that this benign economic out- look we envisage rests on the assumption of a continuing improvement in global backdrop. Any major setback on the global front would inevitably create a downside risk to this outlook.
Meanwhile, the prospects for an IMF deal continue to be a hot topic. In our projections, we used a working assumption of a no IMF deal in 2009. We do not expect to see much short-term impact from a no deal scenario since with a lower private sector debt service amid an easier global credit and capital inflow environment, Turkey is unlikely to experience much diffi- culty in her balance of payments in 2010. We believe, this lack of urgency coupled with a preference to have freedom over fiscal stance in the face of ongoing economic slowdown and high unemployment were the main reasons behind govern- ment’s reluctance to sign an agreement so far. However, Turkey will still need a roadmap regarding fiscal structural re- forms to secure a comfortable mid to long term outlook either in the form of a formal IMF deal or a self initiated program. There is, of course, still hope for an agreement with the IMF, which would result in an improvement on all of the figures we pencilled in this report.
What is next for Turkish equities? We expect to see upward earning revisions gain pace after the announcement of 2Q09 results in August, which will lead to higher target valuations for Turkish companies. Therefore, we expect the up trend in equity prices to be maintained in 2H09 with occasional corrections on the way. Those short-term price weaknesses should be used effectively to build positions in the rest of 2009.
The following pages also feature an independent view on Turkish economy written by Prof. Nouriel Roubini exclu- sively for our report. Mr. Roubini, who has joined the ranks of legends by his extremely accurate predictions on the essence and course of the global crisis, naturally has a more cautious view on both global and the Turkish economy compared to ours.
We hope you enjoy reading our report and wish you an affluent second half to the year.
Garanti Securities Research and ICM
ii A FUTURE BOUNCE IN TURKEY’S STEP
There is no question that Turkey is in for a bumpy ride this year and next, but the econ- omy is in much better shape to weather the global financial crisis than earlier this dec- ade. A sharp recession in 2009 is inevitable. The big question mark now hanging over Turkey’s growth prospects is whether officials can reach a stand-by agreement with the IMF.
In my view, the sooner Turkey finalizes a deal, the better its recovery outlook. Not only would an IMF loan help Turkey finance its current-account deficit and bolster its deterio- rating public finances (Turkey’s latest Achilles’ heel), it would also give investors confi- dence in the ability of Turkish corporates, financial institutions, and its public sector to continue rolling over debt in the face of tight credit conditions. Worryingly, it now looks like an IMF deal is being put off until autumn at the earliest.
Even if a deal is signed, headwinds loom. High unemployment, which lingered above 15% in the February-April period, will have a negative drag effect on consumption, by far the biggest component of GDP. Industrial output has plunged, showing double-digit year- over-year declines for six straight months through April. Meanwhile, weak overseas de- mand is cutting into exports.
Our outlook forecasts near zero growth through 2010 in the eurozone, Turkey’s biggest export market and its biggest source of foreign investment, meaning a recovery will be painful and slow in coming. What this suggests is that Turkey’s golden era of growth, when the economy grew at an average rate of 7% from 2002 to 2007, will not return for several years.
Roubini Global Economics LLC - 131 Varick Street, 10th flr - New York, New York, 10013, United States - Tel: +212 645 0010 iii www.rgemonitor.com - [email protected] Officials have acted aggressively to minimize the recession by cutting 8% off the policy rate in the eight months to June. The problem is deteriorating public finances could limit the room for further easing. Growing public sector borrowing requirements could force interest rates upward.
All is not doom and gloom. Turkey took care of an important bogeyman by strengthening supervision of its financial sector in recent years. Unlike 2001, the banks appear well- positioned to ride out the downturn. Since retail deposits account for the bulk of Turkish banks’ funding, they are less dependent on difficult-to-access wholesale funding. More- over, the banking system is not dominated by foreign parent banks to the same extent as those in Eastern Europe, which limits the potential for contagion effects. So even though bad loans will rise from their current levels, the banking sector should remain in good shape. This suggests Turkey will experience a shorter recession than those countries ex- periencing severe financial sector distress.
In another bright spot, structural reforms undertaken after the 2001 crisis and favorable demographic trends (with half of the population under the age of 30) make us relatively upbeat about the economy’s long-term growth prospects.
Nouriel Roubini June 2009
Roubini Global Economics LLC - 131 Varick Street, 10th flr - New York, New York, 10013, United States - Tel: +212 645 0010 iv www.rgemonitor.com - [email protected]
CONTENTS
Page Equity Strategy 1 Turkish Economic Outlook 20 Sectors 37 Automotive 38 Aviation 44 Banking 48 Cement 60 Conglomerates 64 Consumer Durables 73 Food & Beverages 77 Food Retail 81 Media 83 Oil 85 Real Estate 89 Steel 92 Telecommunications 95 Valuation Sheets 100
v
EQUITY STRATEGY
Main Highlights... ISE-100 Index (US$)
54000 • Continue to overweight Turkish equities in an emerging mar- ket portfolio… 45000
• Expect a strong rebound in 2Q09 earnings… 36000
• Recent rise in bond yields - only a technical correction... 27000 • Turkish equities still cheap after a 3.5 month rally... 18000 • Economic recovery gathering momentum... 9000 • Low interest rate/stable currency environment to persist...
01.07 03.07 05.07 07.07 10.07 12.07 02.08 05.08 07.08 09.08 12.08 02.09 05.09 • Buy Isbank, Halkbank, TEB, Ford Otosan, TAV, Koc Holding, Source: ISE and Sise Cam...
ISE-30 Quarterly Earnings* (TLmn) In this report, we turn to a “question and answer format” to address
some of the critical questions investors may have and discuss the key 7,500 forces that will shape the Turkish equity market in 2H09 and 2010. 6,000 Q. Turkish equities have enjoyed an amazing rally, yielding an im- pressive 85% US$ return since 9 March 2009, the start of the 4,500
global rally. For all the fundamentals driving the prices, do you 3,000 think this rally has been too quick and come too soon? 1,500 A. Turkish equities had been in an oversold state at the beginning of the year amid concerns over the high external financing requirement, 0 FX exposure in the private sector, and a rapid rise in NPLs in the bank- 1Q08 2Q08 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 ing sector. Most of these concerns started waning in a short period of *: Holdings are excluded time as both the Turkish economy and companies coped with the crisis Source: ISE
1
EQUITY STRATEGY
well. 1Q09 earnings performance, especially in the banking sector, sur- ISE-100 Forward Looking P/E prised the market on the upside. Thus, the recent recovery in stock 20 prices has been mainly on the back of a shift in the market sentiment from a very depressed state to the one driven by fundamentals. Opti- 16 mism is also building up around the 2Q09 earnings performance. Ana- 12 lysts have already started revising up their FY09 earnings estimates. 8 These revisions are likely to create further upside potential going for- ward. While a technical correction may be on the cards in the near 4 term, we believe Turkish equities are neither overbought nor expensive 0 at this stage.
01.03 05.03 09.03 01.04 05.04 09.04 01.05 05.05 09.05 01.06 05.06 09.06 01.07 05.07 09.07 01.08 05.08 09.08 01.09 05.09 Q. It looks as if a lot of good news has already been priced in. Source: Garanti Securities Estimates What could drive equity prices to higher levels going forward?
A. As we said above, what we have seen so far is more like valuations Banks P/BV catching up with the “reality”. The gap between the perception and the reality is closing. Going forward, the key force behind the valuations will 4.0 be earnings revisions thanks to the sooner-than-expected pick-up in 3.3
domestic consumption. Both Turkish banks and industrials have en- 2.6 joyed a strong rebound in demand in 2Q09 on the back of positive macro conditions driven by lower interest rates and a stronger Turkish 2.0 Lira. They will continue to benefit from similar conditions during the rest 1.3 of 2009. We expect that earnings revisions will gather pace after the 0.7
2Q09 earnings announcements in August 2009. 0.0
The current valuations still fail to reflect this benign outlook despite the 01.02 05.02 09.02 01.03 05.03 09.03 01.04 05.04 09.04 01.05 05.05 09.05 01.06 05.06 09.06 01.07 05.07 09.07 01.08 05.08 09.08 01.09 05.09
three and a half month rally. With a P/BV of 1.3x and a P/E of 8.4x Source: ISE
2
EQUITY STRATEGY
based on 2009 prospective earnings (see page 52), Turkish banks are External Financing Requirement (US$bn) still among the cheapest in the EM universe. Industrials are trading at a 2008 1Q09 2009E 2010E 9.6x P/E based on 2009 forecasts, still representing a discount to their Outflow s 84.6 11.8 61.5 63.4 Current Account Deficit 41.4 1.2 11.0 29.0 peers in other EMs. We believe this discount will close fast as Turkey Debt Service (MLT) 43.2 10.7 50.5 34.4 will be among the first to emerge from the crisis. Public 11.0 1.5 8.2 8.4 Private 32.2 9.2 42.3 26.0 The key risk factor seems to be another down-leg in global markets Inflow s 82.7 10.6 56.5 58.4 FDI (net) 15.0 1.9 6.0 9.0 triggered by renewed recession fears. While Turkish equities would in- Portfolio (equity; net off port.assets) -3.5 -1.6 2.0 3.0 evitably be affected from a sell-off, we believe they would still continue Borrow ing (MLT) 63.4 5.5 39.5 37.1 outperforming their peers in both developed and other developing Public 6.0 -1.4 7.6 8.4 Private 57.4 6.8 31.9 28.7 countries. Short Term (net) 4.0 -2.1 3.0 3.3 Others 3.8 6.9 6.0 6.0 Q. How would the Turkish markets be affected by the failure to Reserve Accumulation (inflow -outflow ) -1.9 -1.2 -5.0 -5.0 hammer out an IMF deal? Source: Treasury, Turkey Data Monitor,Garanti Securities
A. Frankly, we expect no sustained weakness in financial markets in External Debt Roll-over Ratio (Private Sector) case of a no-IMF deal scenario provided the global markets remain supportive (see page 26). The key role of an IMF deal would be to 300% 246% meet Turkey’s large external financing requirement in 2009. As of 250% 224% 1Q09, both Turkish government and companies have done a great job 210% 200% 178% 159% in terms of meeting their foreign debt obligations. The good news is 148% that there will also be a marked decline in private sector’s external debt 150% 108% 102% service to around US$26bn in 2010 from US$42bn in 2009. Although 100% 82% 74%
this will be offset to some extent by a rise in the current account deficit 50% (CAD), Turkey should still cope reasonably well in terms of financing its 0% external debt requirements considering the expected recovery in global 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 1Q09 sentiment and a pick-up in portfolio/FDI inflows to EMs in 2010 (see page 32). Thus, the combination of a proven track record in finding for- Source: Turkey Data Monitor, Garantii Securities
3
EQUITY STRATEGY
eign debt and significantly lower debt obligations of the private sector in Budget (TLbn) 2010 will help reduce the significance of an IMF deal for the external 2008 2009P January-May debt repayments. Old Revised 2008 2009 Expenditure 229.5 259.1 259.1 86.0 106.9
Q. Still, the consensus view is that the lack of an IMF deal would Non-interest 175.0 201.6 202.9 66.4 80.8 Interest 54.5 57.5 56.2 19.6 26.1 mean further deterioration on the fiscal side. What is your view? Revenues 215.4 248.8 211.6 84.0 86.2 Tax 174.7 202.1 170.0 70.1 66.2 A. There is already some deterioration on the fiscal side. The budget Non-Tax 40.7 46.7 41.6 11.2 17.1 deficit for the first five months of the year has reached TL21bn, com- Budget Balance -14.1 -10.3 -47.5 -2.1 -20.7 paring unfavorably with the official FY09 target of TL48bn (5% of GDP) Primary Surplus 40.4 47.2 8.7 17.5 5.4 (see page 25). Part of the blame should be placed on the economic re- as of GDP (%) cession and the consequent decline in tax revenues. However, the Budget Balance -1.8 -0.9 -5.0 n.a n.a Primary Surplus 3.5 4.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. main culprit seems to be a dramatic rise in non-interest expenditures.
The consensus believes that fiscal discipline will be weak without an Source: SPO, Finance Ministry IMF deal and therefore sees the deal as the key to keep expenditures under control. Also, higher deficits are likely to lead to increased bor- Budget (%) rowing requirement for the Treasury, which is likely to crowd out the lo- cal credit markets for the private sector. This could be contractionary in 10 6.4 6.7 the longer term as private sector plays a much bigger role in economic 4.3 growth in Turkey. While we agree largely with the consensus on the 5 significance of the deal for fiscal discipline, we disagree on two fronts: 0 -0.7 -0.5 First, the expected recovery in 2010 GDP will limit the deterioration in -1.8 -2.0 -5 the budget balance thanks to the consequent improvement in tax col- Budget Balance / GDP -10 lection. Secondly, the share of foreign investors in local currency bond Primary Balance / GDP -9.3 market is now at a five year low at 12%. With a higher participation -15 from foreigners, Treasury may have a relaxed hand in 2010. Thus, the 1Q06 1Q07 1Q08 1Q09* deterioration in fiscal balance, if remains in manageable limits, is unlikely to disrupt the positive economic outlook. Source: SPO, Treasury, Finance Ministry *Estimated GDP for 1Q09
4
EQUITY STRATEGY
Q. Commodity prices have also started to increase. How do you Energy Prices vs. Current Account think the Turkish economy - which is still in a fragile state - cope 49 98 100 CA Def icit 42 90 up with higher commodity prices? (US$bn)
35 70 80 A. It is fair to expect that higher energy prices will shift Turkey’s inflation 66 72 60 28 70 Net Energy and current account deficit to higher levels. However, we expect the im- 55 Import 21 60 pact to be limited under our current average oil price assumptions. We (US$bn) 14 50 Oil price now assume an average oil price of US$60/bbl for 2009, edging up to (US$/bbl)- 7 40 US$70/bbl in 2010. However, we had already penciled this in our 6.5% rhs inflation forecast for 2010, which is in line with the CBT’s inflation target 0 30
(see page 27). We predict a CAD of US$29bn in 2010, with a sharp 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009E 2010E rise from our US$11bn forecast for 2009. With a more supportive global environment and a lower private sector external debt service, Turkey is Source: CBRT, Garanti Securities unlikely to experience an external financing problem. Forward Looking Inflation (%)
Q. When combined with higher commodity prices, do you think 12 the economic recovery you envisage could reverse the downtrend 10 in inflation in 2010? 8 CBT's target A. Inflation is likely to edge higher next year as a result of the expected 6 pick-up in growth and rising commodity and food prices. The Turkish 4 economy has enjoyed a steady decline in inflation so far in 2009, with Current inflation Garanti Securities' 2 the annual rate of CPI inflation declining from 10.1% at the end of 2008 May 2009: 5.2% estimate to 5.2% in May-09. The main drivers behind lower inflation have been 0 very weak demand conditions hindering any pass-through from the de- valuation of Turkish Lira, high inventory levels, a rapid decline in com- 04.09 06.09 08.09 10.09 12.09 02.10 04.10 06.10 08.10 10.10 12.10 modity prices and one-off price adjustments (in natural gas). Some of Source: CBRT, Garanti Securities
5
EQUITY STRATEGY
these drivers may work in a reverse direction in 2010. Commodity Expected Inflation & Interest Rates (annual, %) prices are likely to continue their ascent. Furthermore, having rid their high inventories, manufacturers will begin to pass higher production 17.5 Benchmark-lhs 10.0 9.0 costs to final product prices. As a result, the declining trend in inflation 16.5 Inf lation 8.0 may come to a halt some time around end-2009. We project that the 15.5 rate of CPI inflation will start to edge back upwards after hitting a re- 7.0 cord low of 4.5% by end-2009, and climb to 6.5% at end-2010. 14.5 6.0 5.0 13.5 Q. So given the budget and inflation dynamics, how do you think 4.0 12.5 local currency bond yields will sustain the down trend in 2010? 3.0 11.5 2.0 A. Turkish local bond market has rallied so far in 2009 driven by strong appetite from domestic banks. The benchmark yield has declined to a 01.09 03.09 05.09 07.09 09.09 11.09 01.10 03.10 05.10 07.10 09.10 11.10 record low 11.5% in May-09 from over 20% in Dec-08. However, the Source: Garanti Securities continuing deterioration in fiscal discipline and the expected pick-up in Macro Summary inflation seems to have reversed the down trend. An increasing convic- tion that the Central Bank is nearing the end of its easing cycle is also 2007 2008 2009E 2010E seen as another reason behind the steeper yield curve we have seen GDP (US$bn) 663.0 740.0 635.0 665.0 recently. In our view, these concerns have already caused some dis- GDP Grow th (real, %) 4.50 1.10 -3.50 3.00 C/A Deficit (US$bn) -38.00 -41.40 -11.00 -29.00 tress in the bond market, leading to an upward correction in yields to Current Account Deficit (% GNP) -5.70 -5.60 -1.7 -4.4 12.5-13% level. Nevertheless, we do not foresee further rise in yields in CPI (year-end) 8.40 10.00 4.50 6.50 the near term as low cost of funding determined by the CBT’s policy Benchmark Rate (avg) 18.50 19.27 13.60 14.50 rate will continue to lure local banks into the bond market. (see page Benchmark Rate (eop) 16.50 16.50 13.50 15.00 29) Real Interest Rate (avg) 11.20 11.00 6.50 7.50 Policy Rate (eop) 15.75 15.00 8.50 10.00 In 2010, the course of the bond yields will be determined by inflation US$/TL (eop) 1.16 1.51 1.55 1.65 Budget Deficit/GNP (%)* -1.60 -1.70 -5.00 -3.80 and the budget balance. Higher inflation and the Treasury’s rising bor- rowing requirement are likely to place some upward pressure on yields. Source: CBRT, TurkStat, Garanti Securities
6
EQUITY STRATEGY
While this may push the local currency yields up to 14-15% level, this is Real Exchange Rate vs TL unlikely to have any significant and lasting impact on the positive out- 1.8 $/TL-lhs RER-CPI based 200 look for Turkish equities. 1.7 190 1.6 Q. The Turkish Lira has held up relatively well through the storm 180 in global markets in 2009. What do you think will happen to the 1.5 170 Turkish Lira next year? 1.4
160 A. Turkish Lira has weakened over the past year in line with other EM 1.3 currencies. We now expect a more relaxed environment for the Lira as 1.2 150
global market sentiment gradually goes back to normal and risk appe- 1.1 140 tite increases. The comfortable external financing environment ahead
will give support to TL. Moreover, FX liquidity in the system remains 01.07 03.07 05.07 07.07 09.07 11.07 01.08 03.08 05.08 07.08 09.08 11.08 01.09 03.09 05.09 quite healthy and local households’ FX deposits amounting to a sub- Source: TurkStat stantial US$93bn will continue to act as a buffer against FX volatility. In line with the supportive global environment scenario, we expect the Lira Overview of the WEO Projections to remain strong in 2H09 and 2010. (see page 34) Annual change, % Current Projections
2008 2009 2010 Q. What if global sentiment turns bearish and risk appetite sours World Output 3.2 -1.0 to -0.5 1.5 to 2.5 again? How would Turkey cope with a potential second wave of Advanced Economies 0.8 -3.5 to -3.0 0.0 to 0.5 selling in global markets? US 1.1 -2.6 0.2 Euro Area 0.9 -3.2 0.1 A. The consensus view is that global economic environment will be- Japan -0.7 -5.8 -0.2 come even more supportive for EMs in 2010. We simply stick to this Emerging and Dev. Economies 6.1 1.5 to 2.5 3.5 to 4.5 Central and Eastern Europe 3.2 -0.4 2.5 view. However, if a second wave of global sell-off was to strike, Turkish Developing Asia 7.8 5.5 6.9 markets would suffer along with the other EMs. In this episode however Consumer prices we believe the level of damage would be significantly more limited for Advanced economies 3.5 0.3 0.8 essentially three reasons: First, Turkish banks have proven their ability Emerging and Dev. Economies 9.2 5.8 5.0 Source: IMF, WEO
7
EQUITY STRATEGY
to deal with the crisis. In fact, they emerged stronger with better than Banks NPL (Monthly)
expected earnings growth so far. With a stronger capital base, they will 5% 15% continue to provide a cushion for the Turkish economy against possible sell-offs in global markets. Secondly, Turkish industrials have all raced 4% 12% to reduce their debt and FX exposure during the crisis in an effort to 3% 9% limit potential damage should the crisis continue deepening. They have 2% 6% also spent the crisis period in reinforcing their balance sheets via cost cutting, inventory rundown and capital increases. As a result, they are 1% 3%
now better positioned and guarded to cope with a new wave of sell-off. 0% 0% Last but not least, Turkish companies will have substantially lower debt service in 2010 as mentioned before. This will not only help reduce 06.08 07.08 08.08 09.08 10.08 11.08 12.08 01.09 02.09 03.09 04.09 05.09 their dependency on global markets, but it will also limit the impact on NPL ratio MoM grow th in NPL stock their balance sheets of a potential worsening in global conditions. Source: BRSA Weekly Data
Q. Now that the bond yields have started creeping up again, how Loan Growth (YoY) will the banks resume their earnings growth?
20% A. We believe that the dynamics that led to buoyant earnings growth in 15% 1Q09 are still in effect with one exception: They are only stronger now. In 1Q09, banks benefited from a decline in interest rates in two ways: 10% Marked-to-market gains on their securities portfolio and a decline in 5% their cost of funding. On the other hand they suffered badly from a 0% sharp rise in NPL provisioning. In 2Q09, bond yields have crept back -5% up from record low levels to 12.5-13%. They however are still lower -10% than their end-March levels of 14%-14.5%. More importantly, cost of 05.08 06.08 07.08 08.08 09.08 10.08 11.08 12.08 01.09 02.09 03.09 04.09 05.09 2009F 2010F 1H09F funding which is a result of the CBT’s policy rate is still at record low TL Loan Grow th FX Loan Grow th (US$ based) levels. Thus, banks still enjoy some marked-to-market gains on securi- ties and low cost of funding. Better news is that banks will have sub- Source: BRSA, Garanti Securities Estimates
8
EQUITY STRATEGY
stantially lower NPL provisioning in 2Q09 as the rise in NPL ratio over Automotive Domestic Sales Growth (YoY) 60% the period was much more limited than 1Q09. Last but not least, vol- 40% ume growth has begun in May 09 after nearly six months. We expect t c t loan demand to accelerate in 2H09 thanks to low interest rates and the 20% fe u f c e T continuing recovery in global markets. The bottomline is that banks will 0% e C h S T f continue to enjoy solid NIM expansion on the back of low funding costs, o declining NPL provisioning and growth in loan demand. Investors -20% should continue building positions in Turkish banks. (see page 48) -40%
-60% Q. The recent correction in industrials’ share prices appears to be
pricing in a fast recovery. Is this justified? Is there still some up- 01.08 02.08 03.08 04.08 05.08 06.08 07.08 08.08 09.08 10.08 11.08 12.08 01.09 02.09 03.09 04.09 05.09 06.09 side left? Source: AMA
A. Turkish industrials were hard hit by substantial FX losses and de- pressed demand conditions in 1Q09. US$/TL started 2009 at 1.52 and White Goods Domestic Sales Growth (YoY) ended 1Q09 at 1.67, causing significant losses to those companies sit- 40% ting on large short FX position. Good news is that part of these losses will be reversed in 2Q09 if US$/TL closes the quarter at the current lev- 20% els (1.50-1.55). We are also observing a rapid pick up in demand in
certain sectors thanks to some one-off incentives such as a major cut 0% in SCT (Special Consumption Tax) rate in the automotive market. How- ever, in general, demand conditions are affected by lower interest rates -20% positively. Thus the combined effect of possible reversal of 1Q09 FX
losses and a sustained pick-up in domestic consumption is likely to -40% lead to a strong rebound in earnings in 2Q09. Industrials are likely to
post earnings growth in 2H09 as well, thanks to the expected rebound 01-07 03-07 05-07 07-07 09-07 11-07 01-08 03-08 05-08 07-08 09-08 11-08 01-09 03-09 05-09 in domestic consumption and the continuing recovery in global mar- Source: WGSA kets.
9
EQUITY STRATEGY
Q. You seem to have a quite positive outlook for the Turkish econ- Recommended Portfolio omy and companies. Assuming that you are right about your re- Company Strength Upside Potential covery scenario, how should investors play the market going for- Fortis Discount to its book 36% ward? Ford Otosan Export to the US 45% Halkbank Strong earnings potential 30% A. To play for any revival in Turkish market, banks are a must have as- Isbank Comfortable in funding 41% set class. As mentioned previously, at their current valuation multiples, Koc Holding ISE proxy 31% we believe there is still good upside potential in Turkish banks. We Netas Improved profitability 30% Otokar Defense contracts 30% would also recommend having exposure to large cap industrials that Sise Cam Resilient margins 35% would be affected positively by a revival in domestic demand. Our cur- Tat Konserve Growth potential 39% rent top picks are Is Bank (see page 56), Halkbank (see page 55), Teb TAV Growth expectations 35% Bank (see page 57), Ford Otosan (see page 40), TAV (see page 46), TEB Strong fundamentals 34% Koc Holding (see page 67), and Sise Cam (see page 69). Trakya Cam Attractive valuation 29% Turk Telekom Attractive valuation 29%
ISE-100 (end 2009) (YTL) 18% Source: Garanti Securities Estimates
10
OUR RECOMMENDATED PORTFOLIO
Company Market Cap (TLmn) Closing Price (TL) Target Price (TL) (2009-end) Upside %
Fortis 1,460 1.39 1.89 36% Ford Otosan 2,123 6.05 8.75 45% Halkbank 7,688 6.15 8.00 30% Isbank 13,735 4.46 6.31 41% Koc Holding 6,328 2.62 3.44 31% Netas 160 24.60 32.00 30% Otokar 307 12.80 16.61 30% Sise Cam 1,375 1.25 1.69 35% Tat Konserve 302 2.22 3.08 39% TAV 1,497 4.12 5.55 35% TEB 1,320 1.20 1.61 34% Trakya Cam 723 1.35 1.74 29% Turk Telekom 17,150 4.90 6.34 29% ISE-100 215,317 36,328 42,773 18%
11
RECOMMENDED STOCKS-HIGHLIGHTS
Ford Otosan (FROTO.IS, Current Mcap: TL2,123mn, Upside Potential: 45%)