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Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes

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Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2016v37n73p19 Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes Reavaliando a Dupla Responsabilidade por Crimes Internacionais Beatrice I. Bonafè Università di Roma – La Sapienza, Roma, Itália Abstract: the recent decision of the Internatio- Resumo: a recente decisão da Corte Interna- nal Court of Justice in the case between Croatia cional de Justiça no caso entre Croácia e Sérvia and Serbia provides us with the opportunity to nos oferece a oportunidade de reavaliar a rela- reassess the relationship between state and in- ção entre responsabilidade individual e estatal dividual responsibility for international crimes. por crimes internacionais. Embora limitada ao Although limited to the commission of acts of cometimento de atos de genocídio, a sentença genocide, the judgment shows that the concep- demonstra que o quadro conceitual explicando tual framework explaining such relationship is tal relação é ora bem definido. Contudo, a Corte now well settled. However, the Court seems parece chegar a conclusões que por vezes não to reach solutions that at times are not entirely são completamente consistentes com as pre- consistent with the premises of such conceptual missas de tal quadro conceitual. O objetivo da scheme. The purpose of the following analysis análise é testar a abordagem teórica geral em is to test the general theoretical approach with relação a alguns problemas lidados pela Corte respect to a number of issues dealt with by the em sua recente decisão. Court in its recent decision. Palavras-chave: Crimes Internacionais. Res- Keywords: International Crimes. Individual ponsabilidade Individual e Estatal. Casos Ge- and State Responsibility. Genocide Cases. nocídio. 1 The General Approach Towards dual Responsibility The Court was asked to rule on Croatia’s claim and Serbia’s counter-claim both concerning the alleged commission of genocide by Recebido em: 17/05/2016 Revisado em: 12/07/2016 Aprovado em: 18/07/2016 Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes the other party1. Eventually, the Court rejected both: it found evidence that material acts of genocide had been perpetrated, but was not provided with sufficient evidence that those acts had been committed with the required specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a particular group, i.e., genocidal intent. One of the central issues of the case regarded the relationship between state and individual responsibility for genocide under international law. Indeed, certain facts at issue before the Court had already formed the subject of proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). And the Court had to clarify 1) whether state responsibility could be assessed even though the individual criminal responsibility of its organs for the same conduct had not been previously established and 2) which probative value could be attributed to the decisions of the ICTY, since no accused before the Tribunal had been convicted with regard to the facts at issue before the Court. As to the first question, the Court recalled what it had already observed in the 2007 decision on the genocide case between Bosnia and Serbia: “State responsibility can arise under the Convention for genocide and complicity, without an individual being convicted of the crime or an associated one”2. Therefore, a state can in principle be held responsible for genocide even if none of its organs has been convicted for genocide. In addition, the Court noted that: “State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are governed by different legal régimes and pursue different aims. The former concerns the consequences of the breach by a State of the obligations imposed upon it by international law, whereas the latter is concerned with the responsibility of an individual […] and the resultant sanctions to be imposed upon that person”3. The Court could not express more clearly the separation between the regime of state responsibility and the regime of individual criminal liability 1 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, 3 February 2015 [hereafter: 2015 Genocide case], available on the Court’s website (www.icj-cij.org). 2 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment [hereafter: 2007 Genocide case], I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 182. 3 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129. 20 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016 Beatrice I. Bonafè for international crimes. In other words, different sets of secondary rules entail state and individual responsibility. As far as genocide is concerned, the Court explained that state responsibility would be established according to “the rules of general international law on the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”4. But the same would undoubtedly apply to the establishment of state responsibility for other international crimes. On the other hand, individuals are convicted or acquitted by applying the secondary rules of international criminal law5. One of the clearest signs of this separation between the regimes of state and individual responsibility for international crimes is that there are different and independent bodies charged with enforcing obligations of states and obligations of individuals under international law. Thus, just as “it is not for the Court to determine the individual criminal responsibility for such acts”6, it is not for international criminal tribunals to determine state responsibility for international crimes7. As to the second question, the Court clarified that the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals might nonetheless be taken into account in the establishment of state responsibility as far as the “constitutive elements” of the crime of genocide are concerned. In other words, the establishments of the ICTY were relevant as far as the violation of primary norms is concerned. The same case law was irrelevant in the application of the secondary norms of state responsibility. Indeed, the Court added that: “If it is established that genocide has been committed, the Court will then seek to determine the responsibility of the State, on the basis of the rules of general international law governing the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”8. Accordingly, individual and state responsibility are separate regimes of responsibility but they are entailed by the breach of the same primary obligations. 4 Ibid., para. 128. 5 See for example ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 2. 6 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129. 77KLVKDVEHHQD൶UPHGIRUH[DPSOHE\WKH,&7<LQProsecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96- 23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 470. 8 ICJ, 2015 Genocide case, para. 129. Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 73, p. 19-36, ago. 2016 21 Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes Other conceptual schemes can certainly be envisaged and have actually been put forward by international scholars9. However, the conceptual scheme adopted by the Court, according to which state and individual responsibility originate from the violation of the same primary rules but consist of different sets of secondary rules, seems to have gained wide support. It was already at the basis of the 2007 decision in the Bosnia v. Serbia case10; it is reflected in the works of the International Law Commission (ILC)11; it is reaffirmed in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)12; and has been expressed in similar terms by ad hoc tribunals13. It must be added that this conceptual scheme is not limited to the crime of genocide but is capable of explaining the relationship between the regimes of state and individual responsibility with respect to all “core crimes” prohibited under customary international 9$WOHDVWWZRRWKHUDSSURDFKHVFDQEHLGHQWL¿HGDQLQGLYLGXDORULHQWHGDSSURDFKDFFRUGLQJ to which international criminal law is fully independent from state responsibility as even WKHSULPDU\QRUPVHQWDLOLQJVWDWHDQGLQGLYLGXDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\DUHGL൵HUHQWDQGDVWDWH oriented approach according to which individual criminal responsibility is to be understood as nothing else but a consequence of the regime of state responsibility. For a detailed analysis, see B.I. Bonafé, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsibility for International Crimes/HLGHQ%RVWRQ0DUWLQXV1LMKR൵S 10 ICJ, 2007 Genocide case, paras 163, 173 and 182. 11 The ILC Articles on State Responsibility include a without prejudice clause – article 58 – according to which “These articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State” (General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001). The ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind include a similar clause – article 4 – which reads: “The fact that the present Code provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of mankind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States under international law”. 12 Article 25, paragraph 4, of the ICC Statute reads: “No provision in this Statute relating WR LQGLYLGXDO FULPLQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ VKDOO D൵HFW WKH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ RI 6WDWHV XQGHU international law”. 13 See in particular ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 10 December 1998,
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