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National Social Science Association Proceedings Portland Summer Seminar, 2015 Portland, OR August 2-5, 2015 Volume 59 #1 NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE PROCEEDINGS Volume 59 Portland, Oregon Summer Seminar, 2015 Table of Contents Corporate Personhood: The Implications for Business, People and Society Sue Burum, Georgia Holmes, Minnesota State University – Mankato 1 Special Education Teachers’ Level of Training and Self-Efficacy for Bullying Prevention and Intervention Yvonne Ortiz-Bush, Yeunjoo Lee, California State University Bakersfield 16 Internal Control in Liuzhou Social Medical Insurance Fund Bin Chen, Central Washington University 21 Greece and the Eurozone Crisis: “The Past as Prelude” Bruce A. Forster, John Becker, University of Nebraska at Kearney 32 Violence and Greed: Politics in Southern Oregon 1852-1868 Patricia M. Kirtley, William M. Kirtley, Central Texas College 40 Farmland Preservation in Liuzhou City Zi Lin, Central Washington University 54 Transforming Schools Through Latino Parent Engagement and Participation Elsa Valdez, California State University, San Bernardino 66 “Go Global” Liuzhou: An Outward Foreign Direct Investment Policy for the City Xifang Wang, Central Washington University 75 A Comparison of Foreign Direct Investment Programs in China and the United States: Strategies for Improving the Rate of Foreign Direct Investment Yanru Wei, Central Washington University 92 Community Recreation Service in Liuzhou Chen Yang, Central Washington University 103 Outside Pressure: How Educational Financing Reforms Have Circumvented Washington State Legislature? Joshua Zender, Humboldt State University, Eric Allen, Central Washington University 119 Reindustrialization in Urban China: A Policy Analysis for Yufeng District Huanhuan Zeng, Central Washington University 131 Corporate Personhood: The Implications for Business, People, and Society. Georgia Holmes and Sue Burum Minnesota State University, Mankato 1 In a headnote to the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, J.C. Bancroft Davis, a Supreme Court reporter and former railroad president, noted: Before argument Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.” (Jorezak, 2014). “This statement raises an important question – are corporations just as much persons as natural people and should they enjoy all the protections and freedoms held by natural persons? ”This paper will examine the history of corporate personhood, which is far more nuanced than this incorrect headnote implies, from the days of Chief Justice John Marshall (1801-1835) to Citizens United (Citizens, 2010), Hobby Lobby (Burwell, 2014), and now to the potential implications from Obergefell v. Hodges (Obergefell, 2015). The paper will also examine the reasons corporations might want these rights and other rights that could be contained in corporate personhood. Finally, this paper will consider the potential implications to corporations, society, and people if corporate personhood is allowed to continue and expand. These writers question if a corporation should have all the rights of a natural person. These writers will also suggest that, if corporations are given all rights of a natural person, they should lose some protections from being incorporated. If corporations can enjoy the rights of natural people, they should be subject to the same civil and criminal liabilities in the exercise of those rights. Development of Corporate Personhood In early colonial times and after the revolution, original corporate charters were given by the crown or state. Therefore, the crown or state was in control of the corporation. Corporations were considered artificial beings created to advance public interests. They were legal constructs to facilitate commerce and make it possible for corporations to hold property, enter into contracts, and sue and be sued. In England and in colonial America, corporations were extensions of the government. They were a type of delegated jurisdiction under the King and, later, the state’s exclusive prerogative (Guisado, 2015). One early British trading company was the East India Company, which functioned as an early version of a for-profit business with investors who shared in the profits. However, it also operated as a vehicle to extend the military and political power of the British government and to act as a bank that could lend money to the monarchy. To maintain control of the business, the monarchy granted exclusive charters for this and other corporations for only a specified time period, thereby ensuring the monarchy’s ability to renegotiate terms (Coates, 2015). This practice of issuing exclusive charters continued in early America and until the middle of the nineteenth century in the United States. Eventually, public opinion turned against the exclusivity and cronyism that resulted. The public was very anti-monopolistic and in favor of the regulation of business (Guisado, 2015). New York passed the 2 first general law of incorporation in 1811. The issuing of corporate charters became a ministerial governmental function. But government also began to regulate and control the life of the corporation through the charters (Coates, 2015). This began a period of hyper-regulation where states began to control all aspects of the life of the corporation (Guisado, 2015). An early case considering the rights of corporations was Dartmouth College v. Woodward (Dartmouth, 1819). In 1769, the British crown granted a charter to the trustees of the college. Later, the state of New Hampshire tried to force the college to become a public institution and placed the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the state legislature. The U.S. Supreme Court cited the Constitution in concluding, “no State shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts.” The charter was not dissolved by the revolution and the state could not take over the college. The Court stated, “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it” (Dartmouth, 1819). The Court did not say that corporations do not have constitutional rights. The Court, in fact, held that the corporation was entitled to protection under the Contracts Clause. This was the first time the Supreme Court recognized that corporations may exercise a right of a natural person. During the nineteenth century, the territory of the United States, as well as its people and businesses, expanded. New Jersey began a push to deregulate by allowing corporations to purchase stock in other corporations. Other states began to follow New Jersey’s lead so as not to lose business to the other states. This began a shift in thinking from the idea that a corporation was an artificial entity belonging to the state to the idea that a corporation owed its existence to the people who formed it (Guisado, 2015). These individuals contracted with each other to organize and utilize a corporation for their mutual benefit. This began the aggregate theory of corporate personhood and started an anti-regulatory approach to corporate law. The rights and duties of corporations were the rights and duties of the people who composed it. The corporation was not a separate entity because the corporation could not exist without the individuals in it. Individuals created the corporation for their own benefit, not the benefit of the public. This approach can be seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (Santa Clara County, 1886). This 1886 case concerned the taxation of railroad properties. Multiple railroad corporations alleged that California’s state and local governments violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection clauses by taxing railroad property differently from that of natural citizens. The Court’s decision never addressed corporate personhood or whether the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment should extend to corporations. The Court decided in favor of the railroads because the taxes were improperly levied under the California state constitution. Justice Harlan explained in the decision that there was no need to reach the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The inaccurate heading, which was not a part of any opinion in the case, became the precedent for the case. Was Mr. Davis, the writer of the headnote, mistaken or did he deliberately misinterpret the 3 decision? Chief Justice Waite fell ill and died before the opinion was published. Therefore, we may never know. Conspiracy-types blame Justice Stephen Johnson Field. He was a railroad attorney and the fifth Chief Justice of California before becoming a Justice on the Supreme Court in 1863. He advocated for corporate personhood throughout his career, and some believe he may have influenced Mr. Davis (Jorezak, 2014). Regardless, the case now stands for the idea that a corporation is a person for Fourteenth Amendment purposes and a corporation’s property cannot be taxed differently from that of a natural person. If this were the true holding in the case, it would be an example of the aggregate theory because the rights and duties of an incorporated association would be the same as the rights and duties