Opinion No. 510 Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses Ethics page 84
LosAngelesLawyerAPRIL 2004, VOL.27, NO.2 / $3.00 Los Angeles lawyer EARN MCLE CREDIT David L. Brandon Choice of identifies ethical pitfalls Law Analysis in litigation involving page 37 burning limits policies page 30 Mediation Confidentiality page 14
Protective Orders Burning page 21 Madrid Issues Protocol page 26
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page 30 Contents Los Angeles Lawyer departments
The Magazine of the 14 Practice Tips Clarifying the confidentiality of Los Angeles County mediation evidence Bar Association By Joel M. Grossman
April 2004 21 Practice Tips Drafting protective orders for Vol. 27, No.2 confidentiality of documents By Michael H. Strub Jr.
cover 26 Practice Tips Protecting trademarks under the Madrid Protocol By Paul D. Supnik
84 Ethics Opinion No. 510 Fee sharing between financial planning company and lawyer employee rendering legal services to customers
87 Computer Counselor Is there a Bluetooth in your future? features By Gordon Eng
columns 30 Burning Issues Both defendants and plaintiffs have important tactical and 12 Barristers Tips ethical decisions to make when litigating under burning limits Practical implications of HIPAA By Alexander S. Gareeb insurance policies
92 Closing Argument By David L. Brandon Speed has been deliberate David L. Brandon, senior counsel By Judge Terry J. Hatter Jr. at Morris, Polich & Purdy, LLP in 89 Classifieds 37 Multiple Choice Los Angeles, practices the Successfully navigating California’s choice of law tests requires 90 Index to Advertisers as much art as science litigation of professional liability 91 CLE Preview By Brian Panish and Kevin Boyle and appellate matters. He is also adjunct professor of appellate Plus: Earn MCLE credit. MCLE Test No. 125, sponsored by CourtCall LLC, appears on page 41. law at Loyola Law School. In
“Burning Issues,” he explores 44 Secret Weapon the concerns that practitioners A well-timed motion requesting trade secret specifications may must address in litigation be the best defense against a claim of misappropriation involving burning limits By Brent Caslin insurance policies. His article begins on page 30. 50 Special Section page 44 Cover photo: Tom Keller Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses For all your personal and professional real estate needs (including probate sales) CALL: LosAngelesLawyer LILLIAN WYSHAK VISIT US ON THE INTERNET AT www.lacba.org/lalawyer E-MAIL CAN BE SENT TO [email protected]
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By Jerry Abeles
n every profession, it is natural that the are organized and ready to have their cases skill levels and competence of those heard, I offer the following basic suggestions Iinvolved will vary to some degree. We to practitioners who find themselves in arbi- hope, though, that professions such as law tration, before me or anyone else. and medicine, which have high thresholds Arbitration Brief. A brief does not need to and rigorous education requirements for be lengthy (I prefer five pages or less), but it admission and continued practice, have prac- has to at least mention the pertinent facts of the COMPUTER FORENSICS titioners with nearly universal case, applicable law, and the dam- Certified Data Discovery strengths. Jerry Abeles is a ages sought. Any unusual issues This hope, of course, is rou- litigation partner in also should be briefed. Submis- ¥ Hidden/deleted file recovery tinely dashed. We see it in court, the Los Angeles of- sion of a brief one week before ¥ Docs, Graphics, E-mail as judges impose monetary sanc- fice of Friedemann the arbitration helps the arbitra- ¥ Internet use & Date Codes tions for discovery shortfalls or O’Brien Goldberg & tor prepare and forces the attor- Zarian LLP. He is the ¥ Expert Witness Testimony gamesmanship. We see it in deal- ney to learn about the case. chair of the 2003-04 ¥ Litigation Support ings with opposing counsel, who Exhibits. Is it too much to Los Angeles Lawyer ¥ Full Forensic Computer Lab lose documents or other evi- expect that an attorney knows dence that they hold for their Editorial Board. what exhibits he or she will intro- clients. How often do we ask our- duce at arbitration, that those 909-780-7892 selves, “How did that person exhibits will have been produced DataChasers.com ever pass the bar?” to the opposing side, and that the exhibits can As an arbitrator for the Los Angeles be authenticated? In a word, no. Superior Court, I unfortunately see far too Discovery. Too often attorneys show up many attorneys who do their clients a great at the arbitration without having deposed the Legislative Intent. disservice by simply not preparing their cases. opposing party or key witnesses and with- You probably seldom On the date a case is set for arbitration, the out having conducted basic discovery. Cross- attorneys should be as ready as they would be examination at the arbitration becomes a need it. on the first day of a trial. While preparation deposition, and the process grinds to a halt. should be a given, I routinely experience the Some attorneys do not take the arbitration But when the need does arise, polar opposite in the arbitrations that I han- process seriously since they have the option it can be crucial to winning dle, with some attorneys not having a basic to request de novo review by the trial court. your case. understanding of the issues in their cases or Thus they use the arbitration merely to learn Tracking down sources of information can be even knowing the names of their clients and about the other party’s case, rather than to a frustrating and time consuming process. witnesses. obtain an accurate evaluation by the arbitra- When legislative history is important to your Though I could present myriad examples tor of the probable outcome of the case at trial. case it can be very cost effective to engage our of unprepared attorneys, two will suffice given When one side is unprepared, the arbitra- professional expertise to research the history space limitations. In one case, a party did not tion award often is predetermined. When nei- and intent of the statutes or administrative speak English, to the apparent surprise of ther side is prepared, the result is a waste of enactments at issue in your case. her lawyer. The attorney, of course, had not everyone’s time. When you call, you can explain what made any arrangements to have an inter- There are hundreds of attorneys in Los you need, or tell me your situation and I can make suggestions on possible approaches. preter at the arbitration, and the arbitration Angeles whose service as volunteer arbitra- You can draw on my years of experience, so would have ended before it could even start tors helps ease the enormous burdens on you will know what is likely to be available had a staff member in my office not been the courts. The task, which is difficult enough on your topic. You will get a precise quote able to provide rough translations. In another given the time commitment, becomes nearly for the cost of the project. When you case, I agreed to conduct the arbitration at 8 impossible when the participants are not pre- authorize us to proceed, the report will be in A.M. due to an attorney’s conflict during reg- pared. For those who plan to handle their your office on the date you specify. ular business hours. It was not until after next arbitration by the seat of their pants, both parties’ attorneys and I arrived that the they should instead do their clients and the AN AYMOND J R attorney with the conflict advised that his arbitrator a favor: Pass the case on to some- LEGISLATIVE HISTORY & INTENT client had not cleared the earlier time and one else who can give the matter the attention Toll Free (888) 676-1947 would not attend. The lawyer had no con- it warrants. ■ Fax (530) 750-0190 ■ E-mail: [email protected]. ception of the inconvenience he caused to www.naj.net the others involved in the arbitration. State Bar #88703 At the risk of boring those who routinely
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By Alexander S. Gareeb
Practical Implications of HIPAA How the privacy of personal health information concerns lawyers and law firms
n 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act HIPAA also affects the discovery of medical information. Although (HIPAA) was enacted to establish uniform standards to prohibit most courts in California liberally allow discovery of medical records Idisclosure of protected health information (PHI), which is infor- on the grounds that the plaintiff who places his or her medical con- mation relating to the physical or mental health information of an indi- dition in issue waives the right to privacy, HIPAA may narrow the scope vidual.1 Privacy regulations established under HIPAA include 1) lim- of medical information to that which is consistent with HIPAA’s pol- its on the nonconsensual use and release of PHI, 2) rights of patients icy of “minimum necessary.” That is, disclosure of PHI must be lim- to access their medical records and to know who has accessed them, ited to the minimum that accomplishes the intended purpose. Thus, 3) restrictions on disclosure of PHI to the minimum need and intended only PHI expressly called for by the subpoena or request may be dis- purpose, and 4) criminal and civil sanctions for improper disclosure.2 closed or made available to the requesting party. HIPAA regulations The act mandates that “covered entities,” which are defined as specifically provide for the continued use of subpoenas to obtain healthcare providers, health plans, employers, and healthcare clear- medical records with a court order.3 However, a subpoena does not inghouses, comply with its privacy measures. It is important to note need to be accompanied by a court order if the medical provider that pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies are receives appropriate documentation concerning assurances of con- not covered entities under the act. Although law firms are not directly fidentiality from the party seeking the information. That is, the covered entities, they are obliged to implement safeguards for the pro- requesting party must ensure that 1) a good faith effort was made to tection of PHI that pertains to or is received by a client. Law firms provide written notice to the individual, 2) the notice included suffi- should document their privacy protection measures in a Business cient information about the proceeding in which the PHI is requested Associate Agreement with any covered entity. This agreement effec- to permit the individual to raise an objection, and 3) a written state- tively imputes the duties of a covered entity regarding the protection ment that either the patient did not object in a timely manner or that of PHI to the law firm. Lawyers and law firms that are not compliant any objection was resolved in favor of disclosure.4 with the act may be subject to liability for penalties and fines for It should be noted that the HIPAA requirements are consistent with improper disclosure of PHI—not to mention potential loss of clients, California civil practice. Specifically, in California, the requesting detrimental consequences to reputation, and potential litigation. party must serve a “Notice to Consumer” with a subpoena, allowing To gain compliance, law firms must create and execute policies and individuals (or their counsel) 10 days to object to the production of procedures that address 1) access to, and release of, medical records, certain information.5 Therefore, although HIPAA has added a require- 2) a mechanism for privacy complaints, 3) internal sanctions for ment to be met prior to disclosure of medical records, this added improper disclosure, 4) access, restrictions, and security pertaining requirement does not affect California legal practice, since it is to computers, 5) accounting of disclosures and recording unauthorized already embodied in the California code. disclosures, 6) fax precautions, 7) telephone responses, 8) trans- The HIPAA privacy rule is compre- portation of charts and data, and 9) disposal of medical records. hensive, but it is important to remem- Additionally, law firms should train their lawyers and staff about ber that its hundreds of pages of regula- the mandates of HIPAA and the confidentiality of PHI. Administrators, tions may be distilled into a one-sentence professional staff, nonprofessional staff, and senior management will theme: Do not use or disclose personal require different approaches and levels of information. health information without a valid busi- Reasonable precautions include, for example, encryption of elec- ness purpose. ■ tronic mail containing PHI. When faxing PHI, personnel should call ahead to make sure someone will be at the receiving end, and some- 1 The author would like to acknowledge the con- one must remain at the fax machine until the transmission is com- tributions of David M. Humiston and Kenneth pleted. There should be no discussion of healthcare cases by name N. Rashbaum, partners in the Los Angeles and New York offices, respectively, of Sedgwick, outside the office without a valid business purpose. At the conclusion Detert, Moran & Arnold LLP. See 42 U.S.C.A. Alexander S. Gareeb of a case, drafts of reports to clients that include PHI should be §§1320d-2(a)(1). shredded. Access to files must be controlled to ensure that PHI is kept 2 42 U.S.C.A. §§1320d-1(a), 1320d(6), 1320d- is an associate with confidential. For example, access to file room shelves should be 2(a)(2). Sedgwick, Detert, restricted, distribution of files must be limited, and there should be 3 45 C.F.R. §164.502 (b)(1); 45 C.F.R. §164.512. Moran & Arnold LLP. 4 restrictions on keeping multiple files in offices. 45 C.F.R. §164.512(e). 5 CODE CIV. PROC. §1985 (b)-(e).
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By Joel M. Grossman
Clarifying the Confidentiality of Mediation Evidence
Guidance is needed statements they make during the fidentiality is to promote a frank (a) No evidence of any- mediation, or documents that and candid exchange of views, thing said or any admis- on the relationship they prepare for the mediation, both between the parties and sion made for the purpose are strictly confidential and can- between a party and the media- of, in the course of, or pur- between Evidence not be used in future litigation. tor.1 If the parties worry that a suant to, a mediation or a However, a thorough review of statement made or a document mediation consultation is Code Sections 1119 these code sections reveals that introduced at the mediation could admissible or subject to this assurance may be somewhat be discoverable or admissible in discovery, and disclosure and 1120 less than ironclad. Moreover, the a later proceeding, the goal of of the evidence shall not case law in this area has been candor and frankness will be lost.2 be compelled, in any arbi- marked by confusion, with the When a party seeks to invade tration, administrative ediation, virtually nonex- result that the California Supreme mediation confidentiality, a court adjudication, civil action, istent only 25 years ago, Court has decided to grant re- must consider whether its deci- or other noncriminal pro- Mhas become an accepted view in Rojas v. Superior Court. sions in this area will encourage ceeding in which, pur- part of the legal process. Courts This case, which most likely will or thwart the clear policy under- suant to law, testimony can regularly send cases to manda- be decided this year, hopefully lying mediation confidentiality in be compelled to be given. tory mediation, and disputing par- will provide a complete explana- California. Section 1119(b) extends the ties routinely agree to voluntary tion of the Evidence Code provi- Section 1119 states, in rele- same rule to a writing that is “pre- mediation. Compared to litiga- sions on mediation confidentiality, vant part: pared for the purpose of, in the tion, mediation offers many ben- with a specific focus on the inter- efits to parties, the most impor- play between Evidence Code tant of which is the ability to Sections 1119 and 1120, and thus control their own destiny. When give guidance to lawyers and a case is submitted to a judge, a their clients on what can be said jury, or an arbitrator, the parties and produced during mediation cannot control the outcome. In a without risk that the same evi- mediation, however, no deal can dence will reemerge to haunt the be reached unless all parties clients in future litigation. agree. The prospect of deter- Effective January 1998, vari- mining their own fate and limit- ous laws pertaining to mediation ing attorney’s fees and costs has that had been spread across attracted litigants to mediation in seven different California codes droves. Still, medi- were amended and ation is a relatively Joel M. Grossman is brought together new aspect of legal an attorney who is a in one place—Evi- practice, and many full-time mediator dence Code Sec- of the rules of med- and arbitrator tions 1115 to 1128. iation are not yet affiliated with ADR These code sec- certain. This is es- Services, Inc., in Los tions expressly pecially true in the Angeles. address the issue important area of of mediation confi- mediation confi- dentiality. In 2001, dentiality. the California Supreme Court Parties to a mediation usually made it clear that there is an are asked to sign a confidential- important policy behind these ity agreement. Typically, the Evidence Code provisions. Citing agreement cites sections of the both legislative history and a law California Evidence Code that review article, the court ex-
RICHARD EWING seemingly assure the parties that plained that the purpose of con-
14 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004
APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:41 AM Page 16
course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a with great caution, if at all. the case represented the “intersection mediation consultation.” Finally, Section In the first, Rinaker v. Superior Court,4 between court-ordered mediation, the confi- 1119(c) broadly states that “[a]ll communi- the state court of appeal created a limited dentiality of which is mandated by law…and cations, negotiations, or settlement discus- exception to Section 703.5’s ban on mediator the power of a court to control proceedings sions by and between participants in the testimony. The case involved a civil lawsuit before it by imposing sanctions on a party or course of a mediation or a mediation consul- and juvenile delinquency proceedings. At the the party’s attorney for statements or con- tation shall remain confidential.” The last mediation in the civil case, the complaining duct during mediation.”8 The key issue in word of the section is not defined. witness told the mediator that he did not actu- the case was whether the language of Evidence Code Section 703.5 provides ally see the accused commit the alleged acts. Evidence Code Section 1121 prohibiting a that judges, arbitrators, and mediators are The mediator was subpoenaed to testify about court from considering any report or find- not competent to testify in any subsequent this key fact at the juvenile delinquency hear- ing by the mediator applied to the sanctions civil proceeding as to “any statement, con- ing. The Rinaker court held that even though report. duct, decision, or ruling, occurring at or in a juvenile delinquency hearing is civil and The supreme court provided the clearest conjunction with the prior proceeding.” therefore a “noncriminal proceeding” as that possible answer to this question: Mediation Exceptions are provided only for statements term is used in Section 1119, nevertheless confidentiality is absolute unless the Evidence or conduct related to crimes, civil or criminal constitutional due process rights required Code provides an exception. Thus, the trial contempt, conduct that could give rise to that the accused juvenile be permitted to judge should not have considered the medi- lawyer disciplinary actions, or disqualifica- impeach his accusers. The court noted that ator’s report. The supreme court recognized tion of the neutral. In other words, in most mediation confidentiality is an important that with a court-ordered mediation, public cases, statements made by parties at a medi- value, but it must yield to “the constitutional policy dictates that all parties participate in ation are inadmissible, and mediators them- right to effective impeachment.”5 The Calif- good faith and may support sanctions against selves are not permitted to testify about what ornia Supreme Court in Foxgate Homeowners parties who do not. Nevertheless, the court transpired during the mediation. Association, Inc. v. Bramalea California, Inc. stated that “the Legislature has weighed and Section 1121 prohibits the mediator, or agreed with the court of appeal, noting that balanced the policy that promotes effective anyone else, from submitting to a court or Rinaker “is consistent with our past recogni- mediation by requiring confidentiality against adjudicative body any “report, assessment, tion and that of the United States Supreme a policy that might better encourage good evaluation, recommendation, or finding of Court that due process entitles juveniles to faith participation in the process.”9 any kind by the mediator.” The sole exception some of the basic constitutional rights Two years after Foxgate, the court of is a court-mandated report that states only accorded adults, including the right to con- appeal decided Eisendrath v. Superior Court,10 whether an agreement was reached at the frontation and cross-examination.”6 Thus the in which a party sought the testimony of a mediation. mediator in Rinaker was properly ordered to mediator. In Eisendrath, a couple reached a The Evidence Code gives a broad promise testify. mediated divorce settlement. The parties’ of confidentiality in Sections 1119 and 1121 In the second, Olam v. Congress Mortgage written settlement agreement specified that and underscores that promise with Section Company,7 a mediator’s testimony was com- spousal support would be paid for seven 703.5, but a good portion of that promise pelled in a federal case decided by a magis- years, even if the former wife remarried appears to be taken away in Section 1120. trate judge. The issue in Olam was whether before the seven years elapsed, and that the Subsection (a) of that section provides that: the party who defaulted on a loan had been former wife, in her sole discretion, could Evidence otherwise admissible or sub- competent to enter into a settlement that agree that spousal support should be less- ject to discovery outside of a mediation another party later tried to enforce. The plain- ened or stopped altogether after she remar- or a mediation consultation shall not be tiff had waived confidentiality, and the defen- ried. When the former wife remarried within or become inadmissible or protected dant had agreed to a limited waiver of confi- the seven-year period, the former husband from disclosure solely by reason of its dentiality. The magistrate judge, following contended that the settlement agreement had introduction or use in a mediation or a Rinaker, sought to balance the parties’ inter- been drafted incorrectly. According to the mediation consultation. est in having the mediator testify on the com- former husband, the settlement agreement Thus a party cannot invoke Section 1119 petency issue versus the state’s interest in actually provided that in the event of his for- as a tactic to protect statements or documents maintaining confidentiality, as expressed in mer wife’s remarriage, it was in the former that would otherwise be fully discoverable the Evidence Code. Ultimately the judge husband’s sole discretion to determine in the course of litigation. This is fair and allowed the mediator to testify. The judge whether spousal support should continue at reasonable. But is the language of Section deemed the mediator’s testimony to be cru- the same level as it began. He contended that 1120 so broad that it exposes to future pro- cial to the case’s being decided correctly. this was agreed to in conversations between duction all or even most of what is protected The trial judge in Foxgate faced different the parties outside the presence of the medi- by Section 1119? This question apparently circumstances when deciding whether to ator and that the written agreement incor- will be answered this year by the California accept a mediator’s report, contrary to Evi- rectly reversed the pronoun in the key pro- Supreme Court in Rojas.3 dence Code Section 1121. In this complicated vision regarding sole discretion from his to case, the trial judge had appointed a retired her. Based on this contention, he filed a Case Law before Rojas judge to serve as both special master and motion to correct the spousal support agree- In two cases decided before Rojas, a state mediator. When one of the parties failed to ment to clarify that spousal support would court of appeal and a federal district court attend hearings and bring appropriate par- continue only if he so chose. held that a mediator could be required to tes- ties to the mediation, the other party moved In response, the former wife contended tify. Both cases have been criticized in sub- for sanctions. The mediator then wrote a that the document accurately reflected the sequent decisions and limited to their specific report recommending sanctions, which was parties’ agreement, and to support her posi- and unusual facts. While the decisions have considered by the trial court. tion she sought to depose the mediator. She not been overruled, they should be relied on The supreme court in Foxgate noted that contended that mediation confidentiality
16 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 under the Evidence Code is not absolute and instead should be viewed as a privilege, sim- Professional ilar to the attorney-client privilege or other privileges set forth in Evidence Code Sections 910 et seq. The former wife stated that she Arbitrator was willing to “waive” this “privilege” and, as a result of seeking to correct the spousal and Mediator support agreement that had been reached by mediation, the former husband also had impliedly “waived” the mediation “privilege.” Steven Richard Sauer, Esq. Thus the statements made during the medi- ation, and the testimony of the mediator, were admissible. The former husband responded by requesting a protective order to bar the “He is truly a master mediator’s deposition or any other evidence from the mediation, except for the conversa- in his art.” tions outside the mediator’s presence between himself and his former wife that were the basis of his motion to correct the support Settled over 5,000 Federal order. The trial judge denied the former hus- and State Litigated Cases band’s motion for a protective order and declared that an in camera hearing would be held on the issue of whether or not the medi- 323.933.6833 ator could testify. The court of appeal granted the former Fax 323.933.3184 husband’s petition for writ of mandate and reversed the trial judge’s decision. The court E-mail [email protected] soundly rejected the former wife’s theory that the mediation confidentiality provisions 4929 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 740 Los Angeles, CA 90010 are analogous to the lawyer-client privilege and can be impliedly waived. The waiver pro- visions in Sections 910 et seq. “by their plain language, are limited to the particular privi- leges enumerated therein.”11 The court also rejected the former hus- band’s view that conversations between him and his former wife, which took place outside the presence of the mediator, were admissi- ble. Reviewing Sections 1119 and 1121 of the Evidence Code, the court held that these pro- visions “render confidential any communi- cations between mediation participants before the end of the mediation that occur outside the mediator’s presence, provided that these com- munications are materially related to the mediation.”12 The court specifically noted the broad language of Section 1119, which refers to statements made not only “in the course of” but also “pursuant to” a mediation. Thus, so long as the mediation has not ended, state- ments made between the parties that are related to the subject matter of the mediation will be deemed confidential. The court’s final ruling concerned the for- mer wife’s request to depose the mediator. The trial court had relied on both Rinaker and Olam in determining that the mediator might be compelled to testify notwithstanding the provisions of Section 703.5. The court of appeal held that the mediator would, in fact, be incompetent to testify under Section 703.5. The court had little trouble distinguishing Rinaker and Olam because, unlike Rinaker,
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 17 the Eisendrath case did not raise any consti- tutional due process issues, and unlike Olam, there were no executed waivers of the confi- dentiality rights. The Eisendrath court fur- ther noted that “given the forceful rejection of nonstatutory exceptions to mediation confi- dentiality requirements in Foxgate, we con- clude that Rinaker and Olam should be closely limited to their facts.”13 Thus, absent rare circumstances, a mediator will not be deemed competent to testify regarding any aspect of the mediation. These cases all seek to interpret the breadth of the confidentiality provisions of Sections 1119 and 1121. But what about the Evidence Code’s counterweight to these sec- tions, Section 1120, which declares that evi- MAKE WRONGFUL TERMINATION dence that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery cannot be made inadmissible A PROFIT CENTER! simply by being introduced at a mediation? Does Section 1120 take away the protections Danz & Gerber will handle your referrals. that the legislature provided in Section 1119? National origin, age, sex, race, retaliation, federal false Unlike Section 1119, Section 1120 had not claims on behalf of employees. been judicially interpreted prior to Rojas. This left the trial and appellate courts in Rojas with Please call to discuss your referral with senior partner Steve Danz. tough decisions to make without precedential Statewide, main office in Sherman Oaks. (818) 783-7300. guidance.
All fees paid in accordance with Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Rojas Dilemma A review of the facts of Rojas, especially the procedural context of the case, is crucial for an understanding of what the supreme court’s decision may mean for other mediated cases. Rojas is the second of two related cases involving a dispute over building defects. In Invitation for Public Comment the first action, the owners of an apartment on the Reappointment of Federal Public Defender complex sued the builders of the complex Ms. Maria Stratton regarding construction defects that caused the intrusion of water and led to toxic mold. The case was sent to mediation. At the medi- The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is ation, the plaintiff owners turned over to the conducting an evaluation of the performance of the Federal Public defendant builders a full report of their Defender (FPD) for the Central District of California, Ms. Maria experts’ investigation of the building defects, Stratton The Court conducts this evaluation in order to determine if including test data and hundreds of pho- the incumbent FPD should be appointed to an additional four year tographs. Eventually, the lawsuit between the term without a competitive recruitment. Any persons having owners and builders was settled. In Rojas, the tenants of the apartment knowledge of the performance of Ms. Stratton and/or her respective complex brought suit against the owners and staff are invited to submit comments. Anonymous responses will not the builders. The tenants claimed that the be accepted. However, the identity of all respondents will be kept building defects, including the resultant mold, confidential except to those with a need to know. had caused them health problems. The plain- All comments must be received no later than Friday, May 7, 2004 in tiff tenants propounded discovery requests to order to be considered. Comments may be submitted via mail or fax to obtain the expert reports, the test data, and the following address: the photographs that had been prepared by the owners and their experts for the media- Office of the Circuit Executive tion and that were submitted to the builders ATTN: FPD Evaluation, Central District of California at the mediation in the first case. When the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit defendants refused to produce the materials, P.O. Box 193939 claiming that they were protected from doing San Francisco, CA 94119-3939 so under Evidence Code Section 1119, the plaintiffs moved to compel production. The Fax: (415) 556-6179 trial court denied the motion, holding that Section 1119 did indeed bar production of
18 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 the sought-after materials. The plaintiffs next filed a more limited motion seeking pro- duction only of “raw evidence,” such as the photographs, and not the reports or impres- sions of the experts. The trial court also denied this motion to compel, although the court expressed concern that Section 1119 could be used by a clever litigant to make otherwise discoverable evidence “disappear” by producing the evidence at a mediation. The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandate, which was granted by the court of appeal. The court of appeal reversed the trial court decision and issued an opinion order- ing production of the “raw evidence,” such as the test data and photographs. The court emphasized that the confidentiality granted by Section 1119 must be read in tandem with Section 1120, which states in no uncertain terms that evidence that is otherwise admis- sible or subject to discovery outside the con- text of a mediation “shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation.” Thus, the court of appeal clearly shared the concern of the trial judge that a lit- igant could bury discoverable evidence merely by producing it at a mediation—a result that, according to the court, is exactly what the legislature meant to prevent when it balanced Section 1119 with Section 1120. The court explained that the mediation con- 36TH ANNUAL FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM fidentiality established by the Evidence Code is meant to protect the negotiations and com- Presented by the Family Law Section and the Los Angeles Superior Court munications that take place during a media- tion—not what the court referred to as “pure MAY 15, 2004 AT THE HILTON UNIVERSAL CITY evidence.”14 555 UNIVERSAL HOLLYWOOD DRIVE, UNIVERSAL CITY In reaching its conclusion, the Rojas court drew an analogy to the attorney work product doctrine. It held that to the extent raw evi- PANELISTS WILL DISCUSS: dence can be separated from the analysis of Paternity and Related Actions • Prosecution/Defense of Contempts the attorney or an expert, it is discoverable. Attorney Fees • Reimbursements Just as parties cannot use the attorney-client Recent Developments—Presented by Family Law Judicial Officers privilege to bury potentially damaging docu- ments merely by sending the documents to their attorneys, they also cannot invoke the Registration: 8:15 a.m. - 8:45 a.m. protection of Section 1119 to shield raw evi- Meal/Reception: 8:15 a.m. - continental breakfast dence during litigation simply by providing it Program: 8:45 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. (includes lunch) to the opposing side at a mediation.15 The court was influenced by the fact that the Rojas PRICING: $135 CLE+Plus Members; $75 non-profit attys/court research attys/first year admittees/non-attorney support staff/law students; $235 family law section members/ plaintiffs had no alternative means of obtain- barristers/retired judges; $255 other LACBA members; $260 affiliate bar members; $285 ing evidence of construction defects that was all others; $295 at the door obviously relevant to their case.16 The California Supreme Court has a Admission price includes reference book, CD-Rom, continental breakfast, luncheon, and unique opportunity to clarify the scope of breaks. mediation confidentiality and to let parties REGISTRATION CODE: 008500 (5.75 CLE hrs. including 1 hr. ethics); approved for to mediations know the extent to which Legal Specialization Credit in Family Law. Section 1120 limits Section 1119. Many of those who are regularly involved with alter- Registration by phone with Visa, MasterCard or American Express: Call (213) 896-6560 Monday-Friday 9:00 a.m.-4:00 p.m. For questions about programs or program native dispute resolution are concerned about registration, send e-mail to our Member Service Department at [email protected]. The Los Rojas. Some are worried that if the supreme Angeles County Bar Association is a State Bar of California MCLE approved provider. court affirms the court of appeal’s decision,
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 19 APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:42 AM Page 20
the ruling will open a huge hole in the wall of uments and photographs by producing them In sum, while the supreme court’s ruling protection provided by mediation confiden- at a mediation with the Rojas plaintiffs. In in the Rojas case is and should be eagerly tiality and discourage parties from engaging fact, the Rojas court was careful to note that awaited by all who seek clarity regarding the in the kind of candid exchange that helps obtaining evidence from the prior mediation law of mediation confidentiality, the decision, facilitate settlement. Others take the opposite was the plaintiffs’ only way to obtain the evi- whichever way it goes, is not likely to stop the view, warning that unless the decision is dence; in a typical case, such evidence would mediation juggernaut. The benefits of medi- affirmed, the process of mediation will be produced through the normal discovery ation are so significant that it will continue to become a tool for hiding unfavorable evi- process. thrive as the best alternative to costly and dence, and no one will voluntarily participate How should Rojas be decided? Given the uncertain litigation. in mediation. Thus, each side in the debate supreme court’s strongly stated view in views the outcome as potentially destroying Foxgate that there should be no exceptions to 1 Foxgate Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., or at least severely limiting the practice of confidentiality other than those in the Evi- Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1, 9 (2001). mediation as it is now known. dence Code, the court should take the oppor- 2 Id. at 9. 3 Rojas v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 97 (2002), Both sides in this debate, however, over- tunity to clarify that Section 1120 applies only review granted, No. S111585 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, state the potential fallout from the supreme to documents or statements that would have 2003). court’s decision. First, there can be no ques- existed if no mediation had taken place. Thus, 4 Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (1998). tion that mediation is here to stay. It has if evidence such as the photographs or test 5 Id. at 167. proven itself as an extremely effective process results at issue in Rojas would have been cre- 6 Foxgate, 26 Cal. 4th at 10. 7 that provides litigants with an excellent alter- ated in the ordinary course of litigation, such Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). native to judicial adjudication, and it will not evidence should be discoverable under Sec- 8 Foxgate, 26 Cal. 4th at 2. be devastated by an affirmance or reversal of tion 1120, and it cannot be immunized merely 9 Id. at 11. this one case. by being produced at a mediation. But if the 10 Eisendrath v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. App. 4th 351 Second, the unusual procedural context of evidence was truly created solely for use in a (2003). 11 Rojas makes the upcoming supreme court mediation and would not have come into Id. at 363. 12 Id. at 364 (emphasis in original). decision probably inapplicable in most cases. existence but for the mediation, Section 1119 13 Id. at 361. The documents at issue were produced at a should control and the evidence should 14 Rojas v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 97, 106 (2002), mediation in the first lawsuit between the remain confidential. The issue of whether review granted, No. S111585 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, builders and the owners. There is no sug- the evidence exists solely because of the 2003). 15 gestion in Rojas that the defendants in the sec- mediation is a question of fact to be deter- Id., 126 Cal. Rptr. at 108. 16 Id. at 110 ond lawsuit could have immunized the doc- mined by the trial court. Computer & Electronic Discovery Experts
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20 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 practice tips
By Michael H. Strub Jr.
Drafting Protective Orders for Confidentiality of Documents
New Rules of Court rules6—before sealing a record, kept out of the public record. ments he or she has, while an in- the trial court must make spe- The Code of Civil Procedure stitutional defendant may have challenge counsel cific findings that there is an over- authorizes courts to enter a pro- voluminous documents in its pos- riding interest in sealing the tective order, providing that “a session and serious privacy con- to properly protect record and that there is a sub- trade secret or other confidential cerns about the information in stantial probability that the dis- research, development, or com- those records. In these situations, confidential closing party will be prejudiced if mercial information not be dis- the party that is receiving most the sealing order is not entered.7 closed, or be disclosed only to of the confidential information will disclosures The newly adopted Rules of specified persons or only in a seek a less comprehensive, less Court set out a procedure that specified way.”9 The statutory burdensome agreement, while the parties must follow before sub- guidelines for determining party that is designating most of istorically, trial courts mitting records under seal.8 The whether a protective order its discovered material as confi- have routinely entered procedure requires that the party should issue in a criminal or civil dential will seek a more compre- Hprotective orders, based seeking to file documents under action are found in Evidence hensive agreement with more on stipulated confidentiality seal also file, simultaneously with Code Sections 1060 and 1061.10 onerous restrictions on disclosure. agreements between the parties, its substantive motion, a noticed In most cases, a court’s pro- The receiving party will, how- that require that documents the motion requesting that the record tective order relating to confi- ever, recognize that acceding to parties designate as confidential be sealed. This procedure as- dential information is based on the designating party’s demand be filed under seal.1 The practice sumes that the party submitting an agreement that has been for a more comprehensive pro- of entering these stipulated pro- the record is the party that des- negotiated and executed by the tective order can be in the receiv- tective orders has served the ignated it as confidential. In many parties.11 Stipulated protective ing party’s interest. In the interests of disclosing parties cases, the party receiving the con- orders set forth the framework absence of a protective order, the (who want to preserve the confi- fidential record may have little within which the parties—and, designating party can invoke the dentiality of their information) incentive to file a sealing motion depending on the terms of the trade secret privilege and refuse and the recipients (who want to or argue forcefully that the record agreement, nonparties—may dis- to produce documents, forcing review and use the information be sealed. close confidential and proprietary the receiving party to file a in discovery but generally have The new rules may surprise information during the litigation. motion to compel their produc- no interest in disseminating it to the unwary litigant who produces The stipulated protective order tion.13 But if a protective order the public). In NBC Subsidiary confidential information with also determines the process by has been entered, the designating (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior an expectation that a stipulated which confidential and propri- party’s leverage in refusing to Court,2 however, the California protective order will ensure its etary information can be filed disclose relevant information may Supreme Court held that this secrecy. The perspectives of with the court. be diminished.14 Moreover, while practice was not consistent with parties and those of courts on In the past, courts encouraged the receiving party will have a California’s open whether informa- these agreements to the extent strong interest in ensuring that it court statute3 or Michael H. Strub Jr. is tion is truly secret that they balanced the compet- is able to disclose relevant infor- the First Amend- of counsel at Irell & are often vastly dif- ing interests of open discovery mation to percipient and expert ment.4 Manella LLP in ferent, and this fact and legitimate privacy. These witnesses, the receiving party’s Following this Century City. should guide par- agreements also increase the effi- interest in the portions of the pro- decision, the Judi- ties in deciding ciency of pretrial discovery.12 tective order governing the filing cial Council adopt- whether to chal- Frequently, however, there is a of documents under seal with the ed Rules of Court— lenge discovery disparity between the discovery court is generally limited to ensur- notably, Rules 12.5, demands for confi- burdens of the parties, and, as a ing that the administrative bur- 243.1, and 243.2—that prohibit dential information. Parties may result, a disparity between their dens imposed on it are minimal. courts from simply endorsing the need to be more aggressive in interests in preserving the parties’ agreement to keep infor- asserting the trade secret privi- secrecy of disclosed information. A New Balance of mation out of the public record.5 lege to avoid production rather An individual plaintiff may have Interests In proceedings other than dis- than rely on the existence of a few if any documents to produce Several appellate decisions covery disputes—which are not stipulated protective order to and little interest in preserving and recently enacted Rules of within the ambit of the new ensure that the information is the confidentiality of the docu- Court, however, have imposed
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 21 significant restrictions on the ability of parties and procedures for [trial] courts to use when or proprietary information now face two sig- to agree contractually on whether documents a request is made to seal a record.”16 And for nificant questions. First, should the new Rules submitted to the court will remain under seal. “reviewing courts, the Judicial Council pro- of Court be reflected in the stipulated pro- In NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV),15 the mulgated rule 12.5.”17 “As in the case of rules tective order, and, if so, how? Second, how can California Supreme Court established guide- 243.1 and 243.2, rule 12.5 was adopted in a designating party be certain that informa- lines for whether trial court records and pro- response to the NBC Subsidiary decision.”18 tion it produces with an expectation of confi- ceedings can be closed to the public. Following Applying these rules, two recent decisions dentiality will not become part of the public the decision in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), by the Second District have denied a party’s record if a court should decide later that seal- the Judicial Council adopted California Rules request to seal documents.19 ing of the information is not appropriate? of Court 243.1 and 243.2 to “provide a standard Litigants in cases involving confidential NBC Subsidiary involved a dispute between Sondra Locke and Clint Eastwood.20 After the jury was sworn, the trial court, con- An Order to Protect Confidential Material cerned about the effect of press coverage on the jury’s deliberation, on its own motion The California Rules of Court do not clearly address the problem posed when a party relies issued an order closing all proceedings to on confidential information but is not the party that designated it as confidential. The following the press and public that were held outside language in a protective order may resolve this issue. In this example, the information to be the jury’s presence.21 News organizations covered by the protective order is labeled Confidential Material. The party that produced the petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the information is called the Designating Party, and the party that received the information is the Receiving Party. court granted. Citing Section 124 of the Code 1. Permission is hereby granted by the Court to file under seal documents marked of Civil Procedure, which provides that “the “Confidential” in connection with discovery motions or proceedings (as defined in sittings of every court shall be public,” and California Rule of Court (“CRC”) 243.1(a)(2)). A Party seeking to file such documents relying on First Amendment jurisprudence under such circumstances shall file such documents in sealed envelopes or other appro- from the U.S. Supreme Court, the California priately sealed containers on which shall appear a legend which provides substantially Supreme Court held that “two things” must as follows: occur before a courtroom proceeding in FILED UNDER SEAL—The enclosed materials are subject to a Protective Order of the California is closed: 1) “[A] trial court must Superior Court of the State of California for the County of ______. This envelope provide notice to the public of the contem- may not be opened without court order by any person other than this Court, Court per- plated closure,” and 2) the court must make sonnel, or counsel of record of the party filing these materials. 2. A Party seeking to lodge or file any document that contains Confidential Material specific factual findings that closure is war- with the Court in connection with a motion or other proceeding governed by CRC 243.1 ranted by applying four criteria: and 243.2 shall either: (a) file a motion to seal the record in accordance with CRC 243.2; (i) [T]here exists an overriding inter- or (b) comply with the provisions of Paragraph 3. Any motion filed pursuant to sub- est supporting closure and/or sealing; paragraph (a) hereof must be made in good faith and must present facts and argument (ii) there is a substantial probability in support of the sealing. Otherwise, no Confidential Material may be used in such a that the interest will be prejudiced way (including lodging or filing) that would permit it to become part of the public record absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the without the Designating Party having the opportunity to move to seal the Confidential proposed closure and/or sealing is Material as provided in Paragraph 3. narrowly tailored to serve the over- 3. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 2, no Confidential Material shall be riding interest; and (iv) there is no less lodged or filed with the Court except as provided herein. a. To facilitate compliance with this Order by the Clerk’s office, and provided that the restrictive means of achieving the over- Designating Party shall have timely filed a motion as provided in subparagraph (c) below, riding interest.22 Confidential Material filed with the Court shall be contained in a sealed envelope bear- Those four criteria now appear, with dif- ing the confidentiality legend on its front face, shall state thereon that it is filed under ferent wording, in Rule 243.1 of the Rules of the terms of this Order, and shall comply with all other applicable requirements of Court. Trial courts have broad discretion in CRC 243.2. applying the criteria.23 b. The Receiving Party shall provide five (5) court days advance written notice to the Rule 243.2 sets out the procedures to be Designating Party, by hand delivery or facsimile, of its intent to file Confidential Material followed for filing a record under seal. produced by the Designating Party. If the Confidential Material is contained in a doc- Specifically, the “party requesting that a ument, the notice shall include the production number of the document. If the record be filed under seal must file a noticed Confidential Material is contained in a written discovery response, the notice shall iden- tify the response. If the Confidential material is contained in deposition testimony, the motion for an order sealing the record” at notice shall identify the testimony by page and line number. In all other cases, the notice the same time that the record is presented to must identify and describe the Confidential Material to be filed with sufficient partic- the court.24 “If necessary to prevent disclo- ularity such that the Designating Party will be fully able to present a case to the Court sure, the motion, any opposition, and any for the express findings enumerated in CRC 243.1(d). supporting documents must be filed in a pub- c. The Designating Party may, within four (4) court days of such written notice, file a lic redacted version and lodged in a complete noticed motion for an order sealing the Confidential Records. version conditionally under seal.”25 d. The Receiving Party shall cooperate in good faith with the Designating Party in facil- Practitioners should note that Rules 243.1 itating the Designating Party’s attempt to obtain a court order sealing the Confidential and 243.2 “do not apply to discovery motions Records, including lodging the Confidential Material conditionally under seal as described and records filed or lodged in connection in CRC 243.2. The foregoing notwithstanding, nothing contained herein shall prevent 26 the Receiving Party from objecting to the designation of such material as confidential. with discovery motions or proceedings.” 4. In the event that the Court denies a motion for an order sealing the allegedly This is a very important exception, as it means Confidential Material, the Party seeking to file the Confidential Records may replace the that most pretrial disputes will not be cov- “Conditionally Under Seal” copy of the Confidential Records with a copy not under seal, ered by these new obligations. and such material shall no longer be deemed to be Confidential.—M.H.S. Jr. If a party is seeking to rely on its own
22 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:42 AM Page 23
confidential information in support of a the party that designated the information as afoul of client expectations. Rule 243.2 places nondiscovery motion, the obligations of Rule confidential and therefore does not have the certain burdens on a party seeking to file 243.2 and the procedures to be followed are option of withdrawing the confidential des- confidential information with the court. The clear. The movant must file the confidential ignation for the material on which it intends “party requesting that a record be filed under information on which it intends to rely con- to rely? seal must file a noticed motion for an order ditionally under seal and file with its papers These questions should be addressed in sealing the record,” accompanied by a “mem- a noticed motion requesting that the records the stipulated protective order itself. Under orandum of points and authorities and a dec- remain under seal.27 If the court denies the NBC Subsidiary and Rule 243.1, the nature of laration containing facts sufficient to justify the motion to place the documents under seal, the the information that has been designated sealing.”36 The party must lodge the record to designating party then can elect either to confidential will drive the court’s decision as be filed under seal “when the motion is include the documents in the public record or to whether the documents are to remain made.”37 “If the court denies the motion to to withdraw them from the public record and under seal. If the information qualifies for seal, the clerk must return the lodged record not to rely on them in connection with its protection under the four criteria of Rule to the submitting party and must not place it motion. 243.1 but is of marginal relevance, the court in the case file.”38 Additional provisions of This was the factual situation of two recent should order the movant to remove the infor- Rule 243.2 set forth the procedure for lodging appellate court cases. In Universal City mation from its papers, just as it would refuse the records and the process followed by the Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court,28 the defendant to order production in the first instance.34 If court if it grants the sealing request. in the underlying case, Universal City Studios, the information does not satisfy the confi- If the designating party is relying on its filed a mandate petition seeking to compel the dentiality test under Rule 243.1, the court own confidential information, it files the seal- trial court to seal various documents pertinent should simply strike the confidentiality des- ing motion with its moving papers. Implicitly, to an arbitration dispute. In support of its ignation and refuse to seal the record. If the the rules place the same burden on the receiv- petition, the defendant lodged two documents information qualifies for protection under ing party. Thus, if the receiving party is filing under seal and filed a motion to seal the appel- 243.1 and is relevant to the motion, the court a motion not involving discovery and intends late records under Rule of Court 12.5(e). The should grant the request to keep the record to rely on confidential information from the court denied the defendant’s motion to file the under seal. designating party, the receiving party is documents under seal and returned them to The recent trend in which courts prevent required to file a noticed motion concurrently the defendant, giving the defendant leave “to documents from being filed under seal, how- with its moving papers that asks that the con- file any supporting documents it wishes; but ever, should guide counsel in making the fidential information be placed under seal. they must not be lodged under seal.”29 decision whether to withhold confidential The receiving party, however, may be ambiva- Similarly, in Huffy Corporation v. Superior information that is within the gray area of lent as to whether the record is sealed and Court,30 the appellate court barred Huffy, a discovery permitted by the Code of Civil therefore may have little incentive to argue bicycle maker, from submitting evidence Procedure.35 Once a document is disclosed to persuasively that the record should be under seal in support of its mandate petition another party in the litigation, the stipulated sealed.39 It may, in fact, undermine the seal- seeking to set aside an order denying its sum- protective order may not be enough to ensure ing request by stating simply that it is filing mary adjudication motion in an insurance that the document will stay out of public view. the motion because it is required to do so by dispute. The trial court had permitted the Once the receiving party relies on the docu- the protective order but then arguing that it documents to be filed under seal based on a ment in a motion, the court may refuse to seal does not believe that the information is con- stipulated confidentiality agreement between the record and strike the confidentiality des- fidential. Thus it is in the interest of the des- the parties and made no specific findings as ignation. It may be in the client’s best inter- ignating party to draft a protective order that to whether the documents designated confi- est, therefore, to assert the trade secret priv- clearly states what obligations the parties are dential were, in fact, confidential.31 As a con- ilege and resist disclosing this information in to assume in connection with sealing the sequence, the order sealed thousands of the first instance—assuming, of course, that record—in discovery disputes and non-dis- pages of nonconfidential material, including the client has a good faith basis for asserting covery disputes. “routine legal argument concerning insur- the trade secret privilege. In addressing the burden of sealing the ance coverage, notices of motion,” and proofs Often, a client’s views about the sensitiv- record, the protective order can reflect one of of service.32 Not surprisingly, the appellate ity of information may be different from those the following three alternatives. One alter- court gave no deference to the trial court’s ini- of the court, as Huffy and Universal City native is simply to draft the protective order tial decision to seal the documents.33 The Studios illustrate. If a client cannot withdraw so that it requires the receiving party to file court of appeal’s ruling sent the confidential a document that is about to lose its confi- the motion to seal the record. If the receiving documents back to Huffy and gave it 10 days dential status, counsel may find themselves party does not sufficiently address the either to appeal without the documents or to in the unenviable position of having to tell grounds for the sealing request, the desig- appeal with the documents lodged in open the client that the information that the client nating party would join the motion and file a court. had expected would be seen only by the lim- supplemental brief explaining why the record A court may face a more difficult issue, ited group of persons identified in the stipu- should be sealed. There are two disadvan- however, when the party seeking to rely on lated protective order will now be part of the tages to this approach. First, it puts the bur- the confidential document is not the party public record. That conversation will be even den on the receiving party to file what, from that produced it and has no interest in keep- more uncomfortable if the client believes that its point of view, is an unnecessary brief. ing the document confidential. No court has he or she did not have to provide the infor- Second, it puts the designating party in the explained how the procedure outlined in Rule mation at all. procedural posture of being an opponent to a 243.2 applies in this situation. Who has the motion it ostensibly supports and offers no burden of filing the motion? How will a court Drafting the Protective Order opportunity for the designating party to address the sealing request when the party Proper drafting of a stipulated protective respond should the receiving party, in its relying on the confidential information is not order, therefore, is important to avoid running reply papers, further challenge the confi-
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 23 dentiality designation. A second alternative is to seek the court’s Steve Fisher approval to file the motion, opposition, and reply briefs simultaneously. This gives the
Deposition Summaries designating party the opportunity to make Providing comprehensive, accurate, and the appropriate sealing motion, which may be easy to read deposition summaries for all filed along with the record that the designat- types of civil cases since 1987. ing party wants sealed. Because the desig- 818/563-4496 nating party will have the full set of papers on sfi[email protected] which to base the sealing motion, it can iden- For rate information, summary samples, tify with precision the portion of the record and client testimonials, please visit that it wants to be kept confidential. www.deposummary.com This alternative imposes the fewest admin- istrative burdens on the parties. However, it alters the filing procedures described in the Code of Civil Procedure. It therefore may not be acceptable to the court. It also might not be acceptable to the court’s clerks, who will have less time to review the moving and opposition papers. A third alternative is to give the receiving JudgmentsEnforcedJudgmentsEnforced party a choice: make a good faith motion to seal the record or give the designating party advance notice of the information on which it Law Office of Donald P. Brigham intends to rely, sufficient to enable the des- ignating party to prepare the motion. In most 23232 Peralta Dr., Suite 204, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 cases, this alternative is the one that is likely P: 949.206.1661 to be most acceptable to the parties if the F: 949.206.9718 court is not willing to accept the motion [email protected] AV Rated papers as a package. This alternative is con- structive because it balances the interests and burdens of both parties. (See “An Order to Protect Confidential Material” on page 22 for a sample stipulated protective order form that incorporates this third alternative.) If a receiving party does not believe the information was properly designated, it should challenge that designation at the time of pro- duction. This process, of course, also should be described in the stipulated protective order. At some point, the Judicial Council may clarify the rules governing the procedure for sealing records. In the meantime, however, these issues must be considered and addressed at the time the stipulated protective order is being negotiated and before deci- sions are made concerning information to be disclosed. ■
1 See, e.g., Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 4th 97, 105 (2003) (“The respondent court’s order seals the entirety of any law and motion papers which refer to a document deemed confidential by the parties which is disclosed as part of the discovery process.”). 2 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999). 3 CODE CIV. PROC. §124. 4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 5 See CAL. R. CT. 12.5, 243.1, 243.2. 6 CAL. R. CT. 243.1(a)(2) (Rules 243.1 and 243.2 “do not apply to discovery motions and records filed or lodged in connection with discovery motions or proceedings.”). 7 Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 4th 97, 105 (2003) (The trial court’s sealing order that did not require the court to make factual findings beforehand failed to comply with the requirements of the NBC
24 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 decision and Rules of Court 243.1 and 243.2.); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1283 (2003) (setting forth the findings that trial CORPORATE 34 Years Experience in the Boardroom courts must make before sealing records). • Member, Corporations Committee of the 8 See CAL. R. CT. 243.2. LAW 9 CODE CIV. PROC. §§2031(f)(5), 2025(i)(13); see GT, Inc. Business Law Section, State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 755 (1984); EXPERT • Author, Lecturer, Consultant Hofmann Corp. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d • Editor of the Southern 357, 363 (1985); Moscowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1982). WITNESS California Law Review 10 The Evidence Code provides statutory guidelines R for determining whether a protective order should ogers, Sheffield issue to protect trade secrets during a criminal pro- campbell,llp ceeding. See EVID. CODE §§1060, 1061. In Stadish v. (805) 963-9721 Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1130, 1144-45 (1999), B. Keith Martin, Esq. however, the court held that “the procedures called for caltech bsee • usc jd [email protected] in section 1061 have utility in a civil action in protect- www.high-techlawyer.com ing the trade secret privilege provided in section 1060 and should be followed.” See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 4th 625, 650 (1997). 11 2 CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE §9.60, at 810 (3d ed. May 2001). 12 See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 584, 590 (1995). 13 See EVID. CODE §1060; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1384, 1397 (1992). 14 See, e.g., TBG Ins. Svc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 454 (2002). 15 NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999). 16 Cal. R. Ct. 243.1 advisory committee cmt. (brackets added). 17 Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 4th 97, 104 (2003). 18 Id. 19 See Huffy Corp., 112 Cal. App. 4th 97, 104; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1283 (2003). 20 NBC Subsidiary, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1178, 1182. 21 See id. 22 Id. at 1217-18 (footnotes omitted). 23 See In re Providian Credit Card Cases, 96 Cal. App. 4th 292, 299-300 (2002). 24 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b). 25 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b)(3). 26 CAL. R. CT. 243.1(a)(2). 27 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b). 28 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1283 (2003). 29 Id. at 1275. The court noted the axiomatic conclusion that the denial of the defendant’s sealing request would lead, inexorably, to a denial of the mandate petition: “Without the foregoing documents, the denial of defen- dant’s mandate petition is now foreordained because it will not be supported by the documents it seeks to have sealed.” Id. 30 Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 4th 97, 105 (2003). 31 Id. at 105. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1384, 1397 (1992). 35 CODE CIV. PROC. §2017(a) (requiring that the infor- mation sought be “not privileged,” “relevant to the sub- ject matter of the action,” and either admissible or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis- sible evidence”). 36 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b)(1). 37 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b)(2). 38 CAL. R. CT. 243.2(b)(4). 39 If it is in the recipient’s interest to have the material no longer designated confidential, it should file a motion challenging the confidentiality designation at the time of production.
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 25 practice tips
By Paul D. Supnik
Protecting Trademarks under the Madrid Protocol
A new tool exists menting legislation and regula- Act,4 which Congress passed in through all the member coun- tions in the United States allow 2002, provides the implementing tries, because the cost of that type for U.S. businesses for the filing of a single interna- legislation, and the USPTO has of extensive filing, even under tional application through the promulgated rules of procedure.5 the Madrid Protocol, is still pro- seeking trademark U.S. Patent and Trademark Most U.S. businesses could hibitive and usually unnecessary. Office (USPTO). This application not take advantage of the older Clients and their counsel should protection in other is then transmitted electronically Madrid Arrangement because pick countries of greatest interest. to the World Intellectual Property companies resident in nonmem- Significant cost savings will most countries Organization (WIPO), an organ- ber countries are required to likely be achieved because, ization of the United Nations have a physical presence or a instead of multiple national fil- located in Geneva, Switzerland, “real and effective industrial ings, the Madrid Protocol offers nternational trademarks pro- that administers various intellec- or commercial establishment” in a single registration, and payment tect companies doing busi- tual property treaties. WIPO in a member country. The United of agents and attorney’s fees Iness abroad from foreign turn forwards the application to States was not a member of the abroad may be reduced if not infringers who may profit from, the countries designated in the Madrid Arrangement,6 and even eliminated. Companies seeking and destroy, a company’s good- application. Each designated if a subsidiary corporation of a trademark protection abroad can will and reputation. While trade- country examines the application U.S. company was located in a be guided by a rule of thumb: If mark protection in the United according to its laws, subject to Madrid Arrangement country, they are considering registering States is often achieved through certain limitations imposed by that was not adequate for the sub- their marks in three or more common law rights and through the Madrid Protocol. The result- sidiary’s parent company to file a countries, it is worthwhile to con- Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,1 ing trademark protection is a Madrid Arrangement application. sider filing under the Madrid foreign trademark protection is Madrid registration, known as an Nevertheless, the Madrid Ar- Protocol. obtained primarily through actual international registration, that is rangement has been an impor- registration of the marks. Thus, effective in those countries that tant part of the international The Application foreign trademark registration did not raise timely objections. trademark community in Europe Procedure for U.S. companies may be the The Madrid Protocol is part of and elsewhere. While the Madrid To understand the procedure only route to sig- the Madrid Sys- Arrangement does not extend to for prosecuting an international nificant protection Paul D. Supnik tem, which consists every country in the world, it has registration, it is helpful to first in other countries. practices copyright, of two companion been effective in numerous coun- understand the procedure for Foreign registra- trademark, and treaties. One of the tries considered to be major and obtaining protection abroad using tion is expensive, entertainment law in treaties, the Ma- midrange export markets. national filings and not the and the procedures Beverly Hills. He is a drid Arrangement, The more recent Madrid Madrid Protocol. A national trade- may be cumber- former chair of the has been in exis- Protocol in many ways parallels mark application is filed abroad some. With the pri- Intellectual Property tence since 1891 the Madrid Arrangement proce- by initiating a request with a for- mary exception of and Entertainment but without the par- dure, though the membership of eign trademark attorney or agent the Community Law and the ticipation of the the two treaties is somewhat in the nation in which protection Trade Mark estab- International Law United States. The different. The Madrid Protocol is desired. Usually, that request is lished by the Euro- Sections of the Los other treaty, the makes cost-effective registrations sent through trademark counsel pean Union (EU), Angeles County Bar Madrid Protocol, available in more countries while in the United States, who sends a registration must Association. was entered into in taking into account limited busi- letter to the foreign trademark be obtained in each 1989.2 The United ness budgets. A U.S. business is counsel. The foreign trademark country in which States deposited now able to obtain a registration counsel puts the application in a trademark protection is desired. with the director general of WIPO that can have validity currently in form satisfactory to the local gov- Since November 2, 2003, how- its instrument of accession to the more than 62 countries, including ernment office, which registers ever, the Madrid Protocol has Madrid Protocol on August 2, those in Western, Central, and the intellectual property rights. been available to U.S. businesses 2003, making the Madrid Eastern Europe, in Asia, and in The trademark owner pays attor- to simplify the process of regis- Protocol in force for the United other regions as well.7 This does ney’s fees for U.S. counsel and tering trademarks abroad. The States on November 2, 2003.3 The not mean, however, that applica- foreign counsel and government Madrid Protocol and its imple- Madrid Protocol Implementation tions will regularly be processed filing fees and registration fees,
26 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:42 AM Page 27
usually on a country-by-country basis (the designated countries, a response by a trade- for the recordation or transfer of an interna- primary exception being the EU’s Community mark attorney abroad will be necessary, and tional registration or application filed under Trade Mark, for which a single fee is paid).8 registration expenses will increase. The pro- the Madrid Protocol will be less than for mul- Companies face additional fees if the appli- tection of what the Madrid Protocol refers tiple national filings. The only real restric- cation is rejected. As the number of coun- to as an international registration will apply if tion on transfers of a registration to a new tries chosen for trademark protection the application is not opposed or rejected by entity is that the assignee must have an estab- increases, so do the number of filings and any of the designated countries within 18 lished place of business or residence in a attendant costs. months of the WIPO notification. country that is a member of the Madrid Under the Madrid Protocol, registration in An applicant can still receive an interna- Protocol.15 many countries is achieved with one appli- tional registration even if one or more of the cation, referred to as the international appli- designated countries object to the registration. Disadvantages cation under Article 3 of the protocol. For Rejection by a particular country will limit The disadvantages of using the Madrid United States applicants, that international the territorial scope of the international reg- Protocol for international trademark protec- application must be based either on an exist- istration but does not affect the registration tion must be considered by companies and ing U.S. registration or a pending U.S. appli- as to other designated countries. their counsel. There is less flexibility in a sin- cation, which may be filed simultaneously. An international registration under the gle international registration than in filing The usual Madrid Protocol application Madrid Protocol lasts 10 years and may be multiple national applications. This is true process will begin with the trademark attor- renewed for additional 10-year periods.11 The particularly and most significantly regarding ney sending the international application to applicant may later apply to extend the terri- the issue of the scope of the registration. the USPTO. At press time, only paper forms torial reach of the international registration to When an application for registration is filed in were acceptable, and the forms must be additional member countries.12 the United States or abroad, the goods and mailed or delivered by hand. Ultimately, these services must be identified in the applica- forms will be available online, and the USPTO Maintaining the Registration tion. The identification cannot be indefinite or will require them to be transmitted via the One of the key features of the Madrid overly broad, or the USPTO will reject it. Internet.9 Protocol’s trademark registration process is Foreign government intellectual property The application designates various coun- that renewal of the registration, and title and offices tend to permit much broader desig- tries for which “territorial extension of pro- name changes, are greatly simplified in com- nations of goods and services than are per- tection” is desired. Protection under the parison to what is required for individual mitted in the United States. However, the Madrid Protocol cannot be extended to the national filings. Indeed, renewing the regis- identification of goods and services in the EU as a whole, because the EU is not cur- tration at 10-year intervals can be accom- Madrid Protocol international application rently a “contracting organization” and, there- plished by a single filing with WIPO. must be the same as or narrower than the fore, designation of each of the EU countries When a trademark is transferred or identification of goods and services of the for which protection is sought must be made assigned, whether in a foreign country or trademark registration in the originating on the application. However, it is anticipated the United States, it is usually beneficial or home country.16 that this year, the EU will become a member necessary to record that transfer. The recor- Broader identifications become more sig- of the Madrid Protocol, thus permitting the dation may be a prerequisite to maintaining nificant abroad because foreign laws often EU to be designated in place of selected and a lawsuit in the name of the transferee or it require similarity of goods and marks in order named EU countries. may establish priority over subsequent bona to find trademark infringement. Broad iden- The cost of filing the international appli- fide purchasers without notice. There are tifications are less important in the United cation is based upon the countries desig- significant benefits under the Madrid Protocol States, which tends to rely more on liberal nated. The cost for designating each country when transferring or assigning a mark. For interpretations of trademark law through the varies but is not more than the cost of filing instance, when companies are acquired, sold, general concepts embodied in Sections 32 individual national applications in the desig- or merged, only a single document need be and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. For example, nated countries, and is usually less. The fact filed to transfer the application or registration Section 32 of the Lanham Act provides for a that a very specific, standardized format is in all member countries of the Madrid civil trademark infringement action when required in connection with Madrid Protocol Protocol.13 Under the method of multiple there is use in commerce of “any reproduc- applications means there will be fewer rejec- national filings, trademark counsel must send tion, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation tions of the applications at trademark offices paperwork and instructions to counsel in of a registered mark in connection with the abroad. At least in the initial stages of the each country in which there is an applica- sale…of any goods or services on or in con- process, foreign counsel may not be needed, tion or registration, with attendant costs of nection with which such use is likely to cause though early advice of foreign counsel may local counsel and government filing fees in confusion, or to cause mistake, or to still at times be desirable to reduce the like- each country. Various countries have special deceive….”17 Thus, a showing that the goods lihood of a rejection from a particular coun- requirements regarding the “legalization”14 of at issue are similar is not necessary to sustain try at a later stage.10 documents or other formalities that affect a claim for infringement in the United States Within two months of filing with the the costs of recording transfers. For California if there is a likelihood of confusion. USPTO, the international application is sent companies, legalization—even under the sim- Another drawback is that there are a num- by the USPTO to WIPO in Geneva. WIPO plified Hague Convention Abolishing the ber of important countries that are not cur- then distributes the international application Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public rently members of the Madrid Protocol, to the previously designated countries, which Documents—generally means having a doc- including Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, may examine the application with the option ument notarized locally and sending it to the and Chile. However, WIPO has agreed to add to object to registration within a fixed time fol- California secretary of state’s office for an Spanish as a third language acceptable for lowing the WIPO notification. In the event the “apostille” (certification of authenticity) to document filings (French and English are Madrid application is rejected by any of the be affixed to the document. Clearly the costs the other two), and with this act there is antic-
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 27 ipation that Spanish-speaking countries may tion granted under U.S. laws to foreign com- TRUST DEED FORECLOSURES ultimately join the Madrid Protocol. At pres- panies that are doing business here in the “Industry Specialists For Over 15 Years” ent, it would seem that the Madrid Protocol United States. The protection granted by the t Witkin & Eisinger we specialize in the Non-Judicial is primarily useful for filing in countries in the international registration under the Madrid A Foreclosure of obligations secured by real property Far East, particularly China, Japan, South Protocol is the same as if the mark were reg- or real and personal property (mixed collateral). Korea, and Singapore. istered in the USPTO.22 When your client needs a foreclosure done profession- The Madrid registration is subject to what ally and at the lowest possible cost, please call us at: Domestic Searches 1-800-950-6522 is known as a central attack. One of the basic We have always offered free advice to all attorneys. facts about a U.S.-originated international Even for those not contemplating regis- registration under the Madrid Protocol is tration abroad, the Madrid Protocol has con- WITKIN that the registration will be based on the sequences for companies that are only inter- underlying U.S. application or registration. ested in using their trademarks in the United EISINGER, LLC If the U.S. registration fails at any time during States. Because of the advantages provided RICHARD& G. WITKIN, ESQ. ✦ CAROLE EISINGER the first five years of the international regis- under the Madrid Protocol, potential users of tration, the entire international registration a mark may be vulnerable to hidden rights also fails. An attack on the underlying U.S. that may not immediately appear in trade- application or registration can occur through mark searches. an opposition or cancellation proceeding in For example, a company that files an appli- the USPTO or a court. If the U.S. trademark cation in a country other than the United registration is not canceled within its first States may file an application to register the five years, then the international registration mark in the United States within six months takes on a life of its own, independent of the of the filing date in the other country. A cur- U.S. registration.18 Thus, the Madrid regis- rent domestic search will not uncover the tration remains vulnerable for only the first use of the mark in the country abroad, yet the five years following registration, after which use may establish a priority over a subse- it becomes independent of the home country quent use in the United States. This so-called registration. blind spot results from the Paris Convention, If a successful action challenging the reg- which preserves the filing date of an appli- istration is begun prior to the expiration of the cant’s home country filing for up to six five-year period, such as an opposition or can- months for the purpose of establishing priority cellation proceeding, the protection from the for a filing in a member country.23 The Madrid international registration can no longer be Protocol may extend the time period of this invoked. Under the Madrid System, central blind spot because an international application attacks have occurred infrequently; anecdo- may be filed that might not appear in a search tally, the number of international registra- for two or more months beyond the six tions subjected to a central attack is less than months provided by the Paris Convention.24 1 percent.19 However, Madrid System filings are now com- If a mark is canceled in the home country, monly shown on comprehensive trademark and the Madrid application fails, trademark search reports. Follow-up searches for protection may not necessarily be lost. The Madrid filings are possible, though not always Madrid Protocol borrowed a concept from practical on a regular basis. the EU’s Community Trade Mark System While a Madrid registration that is applic- that allows the applicant or registrant to “trans- able outside the United States may be form” the underlying home country applica- extended to the United States, the priority of tion by filing national applications with each the registration in the United States is not of the desired countries while preserving the likely to be effective until after the extension priority resulting from the filing date of the is sought. Thus, it is not likely to have a sig- otherwise invalid Madrid application.20 nificant effect on domestic trademark rights. Although renewals are effected simply by The Madrid Protocol is a new tool in the paying a filing fee to WIPO, member countries hands of the U.S. trademark lawyer to evalu- may still require affidavits of use to maintain ate the best route to obtaining trademark pro- registrations. For example, the USPTO tection in countries outside the United States. requires the filing of affidavits between the While not perfect, the Madrid Protocol pro- fifth and sixth year following the issuance of vides a system for a lower-cost method of an extension of protection, and within six obtaining trademark protection in many mar- months of the 10-year anniversary of the date kets around the world, enhancing the ability of the extension of protection.21 of companies in the United States to do busi- While U.S. companies have the opportu- ness abroad in selective territories on a more nity to file trademark applications abroad cost-effective basis. under the Madrid Protocol, foreign countries Not every foreign application may war- may designate the United States as a country rant a Madrid filing. Discussion with trade- in which protection is sought. This may have mark counsel may be helpful in determining a tendency to slightly increase the protec- an optimal approach to foreign filing that will
28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 balance the issues of cost, registration, and protection. ■
1 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1123(a). This statute is commonly used to stop infringement of unregistered trademarks or common law marks in the United States as “false designations of origin” affecting interstate commerce. 2 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concern- ing the International Registration of Marks, Adopted at Madrid on June 28, 1989 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol], available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal _texts/madrid_protocol.htm 3 116 Stat. 1761, Pub. L. No. 107273 (Nov. 2, 2002). 4 The Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, 116 Stat. 1913, Pub. L. No. 107-273 (2002). 5 68 Fed. Reg. 187 (Sept. 26, 2003). 6 See Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 2, §1(i). 7 For a list of contracting parties, see http://www.wipo .int/treaties/index.html. 8 See Frits Mutsaerts, The Community Trademark, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Sept. 1996, at 17. MOHAJERIAN 9 These filings will take place on the TEAS Web page LAW CORPORATION of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 37 C.F.R. §7.11(a); http://eteas.uspto.gov. 10 A calculator for determining filing fees can be found ◆ COMPLEX BUSINESS CORPORATE & ENTERTAINMENT on the WIPO website at http://www.wipo.int. LITIGATION 11 Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6(1): “Registration ◆ of a mark at the International Bureau is effected for ten EMPLOYMENT, REAL ESTATE & FRANCHISE LITIGATION years, with the possibility of renewal under the condi- ◆ FRANCHISING & LICENSING; TRADEMARKS & tions specified in Article 7.” COPYRIGHTS; CORPORATIONS, LLC, LLP 12 Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3ter(2). 13 Id., art. 9, art. 9bis. 14 Legalization is the process of authenticating docu- “Balancing the Scales of Justice, Tel: (310) 289-9625 ments and their execution in international transac- One Day At at a Time” Visit us Online: www.law-up-date.com tions. When the country in which the document needs to be filed is not a member country of the Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization of Foreign Public Documents, the process may be complex: The county clerk authenticates the notary cer- tificate, the California secretary of state authenticates Anita Rae Shapiro the county clerk certificate, the U.S. State Department SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER, RET. attests to the secretary of state authentication, and the embassy of the country in which the document is to be used approves the U.S. secretary of state authentication. PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION See http://travel.state.gov/authentication.html. PROBATE, CIVIL, FAMILY LAW 15 See Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 9bis, art. 2(1). ROBATE XPERT ITNESS 16 37 C.F.R. §7.11. This regulation specifies as one of the P E W requirements for an international application originat- ing from the United States “(7) A list of the goods TEL/FAX: (714) 529-0415 CELL/PAGER: (714) 606-2649 and/or service that is identical to or narrower than E-MAIL: [email protected] the list of goods and/or service in each claimed basic http://adr-shapiro.com application or registration and classified according to FEES: $300/hr the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks.” 17 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1988). 18 Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6. 19 WIPO, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK ABROAD: 20 QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MADRID PROTOCOL: “In 2000, nearly 23,000 international registrations were effected; during the same period, only 140 international regis- trations were canceled (in whole or in part) as a result of central attack.” 20 Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 9 quinquies; 37 C.F.R. §7.31(a). 21 15 U.S.C. §1141k. 22 Madrid Protocol, supra note 2, art. 4(1)(a). 23 21 U.S.T. 1583, 15 U.S.C. §1126(d). 24 Article 3(4) of the Madrid Protocol requires that the International Bureau accord a date when the interna- tional application was received in the office of origin if it is received by the International Bureau within two months of that date.
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 29 By David L. Brandon Burning ISSUESThe representation of insureds under burning limits policies raises a host of ethical issues
nder standard liability insurance poli- ple: Every dollar spent on defense reduces by costs are not charged against the indemnity cies, the insurer has a duty both to one dollar the amount available to settle or limits until after the exhaustion of the defend the claim being asserted otherwise resolve the claim. insured’s deductible and/or a preset expense against the insured and to indemnify Most professional liability policies now allowance. For example, one lawyer’s pro- the insured from the risk.1 Although include burning limits provisions.5 These fessional liability policy provided that the standard policies limit the amount include lawyers’ professional liability poli- indemnity limits would not erode until defense U 6 that the insurer must provide to indemnify the cies, director and officer (D&O) professional costs exceeded $55,000—the combined total insured (to fund a settlement and/or judg- liability policies,7 and employment practices of the $50,000 expense allowance and the ment), they do not limit the amount that the liability (EPL) policies.8 Although the major- insured’s $5,000 deductible.12 insurer must pay to defend the claim (to pay ity of casualty insurance policies, such as Some insurers have disclosed the fact that for the fees of defense counsel, retained automobile, homeowner’s, and general lia- there are burning limits directly on the dec- experts, and other defense costs).2 bility policies, do not yet contain burning lim- larations page. For example, one professional Increasingly, however, liability policies its provisions,9 they are increasing in fre- liability policy issued in 2001 stated conspic- contain a provision that controls the amount quency in those types of policies as well.10 uously on the declarations page: “THIS POL- that insurers will pay for the defense of a A typical burning limits policy does not dis- claim. These types of “self-liquidating” policies tinguish between the cost of defense and the David L. Brandon is senior counsel at Morris are also known as “wasting,” “cannibalizing,” cost of settlement or judgment when calcu- Polich & Purdy LLP in Los Angeles and adjunct “self-consuming” or “defense within limits” lating the amount charged against the policy professor of appellate law at Loyola Law School. policies because the available indemnity limit limit.11 While some burning limits policies His practice includes the litigation of profes- may be eaten or wasted by the costs of provide that defense costs begin to erode the sional liability and appellate matters. The defense.3 They are also frequently referred to indemnity limits when the first dollar is spent author would like to thank Walter J. Lipsman as “burning limits” policies.4 The idea is sim- on defense, others may provide that defense for his assistance in writing this article. KEN SUSYNSKI
30 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004
APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:43 AM Page 32
ICY CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT accompanied by a budget of potential costs the policy limits.24 REDUCE THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY through trial. These initial documents should The plaintiff attorney whose normal STATED IN THE POLICY BY THE COSTS be provided to both the insurer and the approach includes aggressive litigation in the OF LEGAL DEFENSE AND PERMIT insured and should be updated at regular early part of a claim—such as by filing suit LEGAL DEFENSE COSTS TO BE APPLIED intervals and after significant events in the lit- and conducting discovery before opening a AGAINST THE DEDUCTIBLE.” The applic- igation. If defense counsel concludes that the dialogue with the insurer—needs to consider able burning limits language was contained potential costs of the defense may severely that every dollar spent on defense counsel’s within the body of the policy itself, under a impair the ability of the insurer to indemnify response could be decreasing the plaintiff’s section entitled “Defense, Settlement,” and the insured for the potential exposure, the potential recovery.25 The plaintiff attorney stated, “It is further agreed that…the lawyer should bring this to the attention of should therefore evaluate the potential ben- Company shall not be obligated to pay any both the insurer and the insured at the earli- efits that could accrue from any proposed lit- Claim, judgment or Claim Expenses or to est possible opportunity.16 igation activity and weigh them against the defend or continue to defend any Claim after If the attorney determines that a certain potential decrease in available policy limits for the applicable limit of the Company’s liability activity is necessary to defend the action, but the client’s eventual recovery.26 Since an attor- has been exhausted by payment of judgments, the insurer directs the attorney to forego that ney has an ethical duty to keep the client settlements or Claim Expenses.” activity, the attorney should advise the insured fully informed,27 the plaintiff attorney must Other policies provide for burning limits of the recommended activity and determine explain to the client the effect of the pro- by using language that defines the “loss” for if the insured wants the attorney to conduct posed litigation activity on the client’s even- which the insured is covered as including that activity. While it has been held that the tual recovery.28 defense expenses. For example, in one case13 insurer should have absolute control of the In turn, defense counsel should be care- a court of appeal construed as containing a defense in the absence of a conflict of inter- ful about the accuracy of the representations burning limits provision a D&O policy that est,17 it has also been suggested that restric- that are made to the plaintiff regarding the defined a “loss” as “‘any amount which the tions that the insurer places on discovery or indemnity limits available to satisfy a claim. In insureds are legally obligated to pay for a other litigation costs could “violate the insur- a recent case, the court of appeal held that an claim or claims made against them for er’s duty to defend as well as the attorney’s attorney retained by an insurer to provide a Wrongful Acts, and shall include damages, ethical responsibilities to exercise…inde- coverage analysis (“coverage counsel”) could judgments, settlements, costs, charges and pendent professional judgment in rendering be sued by a judgment creditor of the insured expenses (excluding salaries of officers or legal services.”18 This conforms to the rule for misrepresenting the scope of available employees of the Company) incurred in the that when “an attorney represents two clients coverage for the claim.29 After entry of an defense of actions, suits or proceedings and with divergent or conflicting interests in the adverse judgment against the insured, the appeals therefrom….’”14 same subject matter,…the attorney must dis- coverage attorney advised the judgment cred- For defense attorneys who agree to rep- close all facts and circumstances which, in the itor that the available insurance did not pro- resent an insured under a burning limits pol- judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and vide indemnity for any willful acts—despite icy, unique ethical issues may emerge in the capacity, are necessary to enable his client to being aware that the insurer had agreed to course of the representation. These issues make free and intelligent decisions regarding cover willful acts. Noting that “cases from can arise when the attorney is first retained, the subject matter of the representation.”19 If twenty-eight states hold that an attorney can during litigation and settlement discussions, the disclosure of this information results in an be liable to a nonclient, even an adversary in and even at the termination of the insurer’s irreconcilable conflict in which the insured no litigation, for fraud or deceit,”30 the court duty to defend. longer consents to the defense attorney’s reversed an order of dismissal and permitted continued representation, the defense coun- the plaintiff to proceed against the insurer’s Ethical Issues at Retention sel may be required to withdraw from fur- coverage counsel.31 The attorney’s representation of a client under ther representation.20 Defense counsel, however, may have the provisions of a declining limits policy may defenses to misrepresentation claims by liti- challenge commonly understood notions of Litigation and Settlement gation opponents that are not available to the attorney’s duties of loyalty and full dis- If the potential value of the claim meets or coverage counsel. For example, the plaintiff closure. The insurer may want certain activ- exceeds the available indemnity limits, both may not be permitted to justifiably rely on rep- ities to be undertaken in order to protect its sides—the plaintiff and the defendant—will be resentations by defense counsel, whose state- potential indemnity liability, while the insured motivated to preserve the indemnity limits for ments may be protected by the litigation priv- may want to refrain from some activities to the eventual satisfaction of the claim.21 The ilege.32 However, the prudent defense preserve the policy limits for a potential set- plaintiff and defense attorney must be aware attorney should take steps to avoid becoming tlement or payment of an eventual judgment. of this possibility at the outset of the claim a test case for the scope of this protection. One commentator believes that the defense process. Therefore, when responding to inquiries attorney, in order to fulfill the duty of loyalty One of the plaintiff attorney’s first objec- regarding available insurance,33 defense coun- and to perform competently, must advise the tives therefore should be to determine not just sel should consider revealing with specificity insured of the benefits of the suggested liti- whether the defendant is insured and, if so, that the stated policy limits may be subject to gation activity and its potential effect both the policy limits, but also whether the limits reduction by defense costs. on the defense of the case and on the available are subject to reduction by defense expendi- indemnity limits.15 tures.22 Instead of merely serving the Judicial Termination of the Insurer’s Duty to Defend One means to satisfy this requirement is Council-approved Form Interrogatory 4.1,23 If the declining limits are exhausted, the to create a liability analysis report and a liti- the plaintiff attorney may also consider pro- insurer will in all probability advise the gation budget. Defense counsel should pounding an interrogatory that inquires in insured and defense counsel that it will cease attempt to prepare a preliminary liability more detail the extent to which any other funding the defense. The insurer’s decision, analysis as soon as possible after assignment, current or existing claims have compromised however, does not relieve defense counsel
32 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 of the fiduciary duty to the insured. An attor- ney’s fees may not be enough to relieve the instead, the attorney must obtain the con- ney may not simply stop representing the attorney of the obligation to continue to rep- sent of the client to the change.36 client in such cases; instead, the attorney resent the insured in litigation. Defense counsel may therefore want to must obtain permission to withdraw from the Nor may the defense attorney simply start attempt to negotiate a fee agreement directly case, either by a voluntary substitution signed billing the insured. The fact that the insured with the insured. Although there is a gen- by the client or by an order from the court.34 is the attorney’s client does not necessarily eral presumption of undue influence when In both cases, the attorney should consider mean that the insured must pay the attor- an attorney negotiates a contract with an the relevant procedural and ethical require- ney’s bills when the insurance company stops existing client, this presumption does not ments for withdrawal, because the mere fact paying them.35 An attorney cannot make a exist when the contract involves fees for legal that the insurer has stopped paying attor- unilateral alteration to a fee arrangement; services.37 So long as the fee agreement is “fair, reasonable and fully explained to the client,” it will be enforceable.38 What Are Burning Limits Policies? If the client declines to enter into a sepa- rate fee agreement at the time that the policy lthough attorneys with experience in litigating professional liability claims are usu- limits are exhausted, any attempt by the attor- ally familiar with the mechanics of burning limits policies, those who practice in ney to collect fees directly from the insured may subject the attorney to disciplinary other areas may be unfamiliar with the policy provisions. This may change if burn- A action. The California Supreme Court has ing limits provisions are incorporated into more types of coverage. In order to identify held that “under a fixed fee contract, an attor- the ethical issues that can arise in cases involving such policies, the practitioner should ney may not take compensation over the fixed be familiar with the mechanics of these policies. fee without the client’s consent to a renego- The following examples demonstrate how the potential ramifications of a burning tiated fee agreement. This is true even if the limits policy can depend on several factors, including the limits of the policy, whether work becomes more onerous than originally the single and aggregate limits differ, whether there is an expense allowance, and the anticipated.”39 amount of any deductible. For purposes of these examples, assume that each claim For this reason, the defense attorney asserted is a separate claim under the provisions of the policy. might discuss with the insured the possibil- Some policies may provide for combined single and aggregate limits in the same ity of entering into a fee agreement at the amount. For example, a policy with combined limits of $1 million provides a maximum inception of the representation. It should be noted, however, that this approach is not uni- total indemnity limit of $1 million for all claims made within the policy period. Therefore, versally practiced by defense attorneys and if the insurer pays out $1 million worth of indemnity for one claim, or $500,000 each can raise as many problems as it seeks to on two claims, there is nothing left on the policy to satisfy any other claims made within solve. For example, the insured may refuse to the policy period. sign a retainer agreement with the defense On the other hand, some policies provide for different single and aggregate limits. attorney at the outset, or the insurer may be Suppose an insured buys a policy with limits of $1 million per claim and $3 million aggre- reluctant to assign cases to a firm that rou- gate. This means that the insurer will pay a total of $3 million for all claims made under tinely seeks separate retainer agreements the policy, but the maximum amount to be paid for any one claim will be $1 million. with an insured. The defense attorney, when Under this policy, if there are three separate claims for $500,000 each, the insurer would seeking a separate retainer agreement with pay $500,000 on each claim, for a total of $1.5 million, leaving $1.5 million to satisfy the insured, should also bear in mind that any remaining claims. But if one claim is seeking $2 million and the other two are seek- many parties purchase insurance precisely because they cannot afford the costs of ing $500,000 each, the insurer will only pay out a total of $2 million: $1 million for defending a litigation claim and may be unable the claim seeking $2 million and $500,000 for each remaining claim, leaving $1 mil- to pay defense costs after erosion of the pol- lion for the satisfaction of any future claims. icy limits, even after agreeing to sign a sepa- The existence of a burning limits provision can change this result. Assume that there rate retainer with defense counsel. is a policy with $1 million combined single and aggregate burning limits. If there is an In either event—whether the defense indemnity payment of $500,000 under a nonburning limits policy, there would be attorney proceeds with or without a separate $500,000 left to satisfy future claims. But under a burning limits policy, defense costs retainer—the attorney should consider send- also reduce the indemnity limits. If the insurer pays a $500,000 claim and also pays ing copies of all the statements for services to defense costs of $100,000, this would leave a total of only $400,000 to satisfy future the insured, including a running total of claims. If the policy provided for indemnity limits of $1 million per claim and $3 mil- defense expenditures. This will enable the lion in the aggregate, there would be $2.4 million left for future claims. insured to remain fully informed of the effect of defense costs on the erosion of the indem- If there is a provision in the policy for an expense allowance and a deductible, the nity limits.40 erosion in policy benefits is reduced somewhat. Given a $1 million combined limits pol- icy with a $50,000 expense allowance and a $10,000 deductible, assume that the insurer Terminating Representation satisfies a claim by paying $500,000 in indemnity and $100,000 for defense. The pol- If the attorney seeks to terminate the repre- icy is eroded by the $500,000 indemnity payment, but its erosion by defense costs is sentation of a litigation client, he or she may limited to $40,000—$100,000 incurred less the $50,000 defense allowance and the do so only after taking “reasonable steps to $10,000 deductible paid by the insured. This leaves $460,000 in indemnity for any future avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the claims. If the policy provides for indemnity limits of $1 million per claim and $3 million rights of the client….”41 An attorney repre- in the aggregate, there would be $2,460,000 left for future claims.—D.L.B. senting a client in litigation cannot simply cease working42 and has a duty to continue to
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 33 represent the client until there is a formal been held in another context that the funding for the Legal Services Corporation. withdrawal,43 even in the absence of com- “[r]efusal of the client to consent to an The committee had to address whether attor- pensation for services.44 In addition, the attor- increase of the attorney’s fee does not con- neys whose funding was cut off could with- ney may only withdraw from representation stitute a sufficient excuse for the attorney to draw from representation of their clients.56 after complying with the applicable rules of refuse to proceed further in the case”51 and COPRAC concluded that the attorneys could the particular tribunal before which the case since the granting of a motion to withdraw is not cease representing their clients without is pending.45 These ethical obligations apply within the discretion of the trial court,52 the obtaining a substitution or a court order, opin- regardless of who terminates the attorney- court may require the defense counsel to ing that “legal services attorneys and their client relationship.46 The failure to comply perform services after the exhaustion of the programs may not discontinue representa- with these requirements may subject the policy limits. tion of existing clients merely because fund- ing is impaired or cut off entirely.”57 Once an attorney agrees to undertake the represen- tation of a client, even with an agreement to be paid by a third party, the attorney can only withdraw from representation after follow- ing the Rules of Professional Conduct and applicable statutes. The opinion argued, “Regardless of whether the attorneys in the legal services organizations are being paid, once having undertaken to represent a given client, they must continue to serve the client unless withdrawal is permitted by the provi- sions of rule 2-111 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”58 While COPRAC concluded that the loss of funding was a legitimate basis for the attor- neys to seek to withdraw from representation, it noted that the attorneys might not be able to obtain voluntary substitutions or orders permitting withdrawal from the courts. Under these circumstances, the attorneys would be ethically required to continue to represent their clients despite not getting paid. One paragraph of the opinion is particu- larly germane to attorneys defending insureds under burning limits policies: While the Committee is sympathetic to the extraordinary dilemma faced by attorney to disciplinary proceedings before In certain circumstances, attorneys who the nearly 500 legal services lawyers in the State Bar.47 were being paid by third parties have been California who may be forced to con- An attorney may withdraw from repre- held to have a duty to continue to represent tinue representation of clients if they sentation in litigation only if the client signs the client when the third party failed to pay are not permitted by the rules to with- a voluntary substitution of attorney or if the the attorney’s fees. This rule was the basis for draw from representation, we are not attorney obtains an order from the court per- a 1981 opinion from the California State Bar at liberty to interpret the rules in a mitting the withdrawal.48 If the client is coop- Committee on Professional Responsibility manner contrary to the plain meaning erative, the attorney may be able to obtain and and Conduct (COPRAC) that the failure of a of the words.59 file a substitution of attorney at any time third party to pay an attorney’s fees does not To avoid this problem, some defense before trial.49 If the client is uncooperative, the release the attorney from an obligation to lawyers may be tempted to request that the attorney must seek an order permitting the continue to represent a client in litigation.53 It insured provide at the commencement of lit- withdrawal, which the trial court could deny was also the basis for a federal court’s refusal igation a signed substitution of attorney form, if it finds that the withdrawal will cause prej- to permit an attorney to withdraw from rep- which would be filed only if policy limits are udice to the client—for example, if the motion resenting an insured even though the insurer exhausted. This practice should be discour- is made close to trial or while a dispositive claimed that its payment of the full policy aged because it runs the risk of subjecting the motion is pending.50 limits ended the insurer’s duty to defend54 attorney to disciplinary proceedings. A 1977 It is unclear whether the exhaustion of and a New York court’s holding that the mere opinion from the Los Angeles County Bar policy limits is a justification for defense coun- fact that the insurer was unable to fund the Association Ethics Committee addresses this sel to seek an order of withdrawal. When a defense did not relieve defense counsel from tactic in a related context.60 The committee defense attorney agrees to represent a client an obligation to continue to represent the was asked to determine whether it was pursuant to a burning limits policy, the attor- insured.55 improper for an attorney to include language ney should consider that a court may con- The 1981 COPRAC opinion addressed the in a retainer agreement that provided for the strue this as accepting representation know- ethical obligations of attorneys who were client to sign an undated substitution form and ing that there is a maximum amount available employed by legal services programs to rep- to grant the attorney authority to file it upon for payment of defense costs. Since it has resent indigent parties when Congress cut 30 days’ written notification to the client. The
34 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 4 proposed provision would have stated that tioners should be aware of the potential of Wayne Baliga, Insurance Law: Understanding the ABC’s, 652 PLI/LIT 463, 477 (2001). the substitution could only be filed in the being forced to continue representation of a 5 Karen J. Dilibert, Taking the Hell out of LPL, 90 ILL. event that the client failed to pay for services defendant in litigation without a guarantee B.J. 431, 433 (2002); see also Jack Smart, An Attorney’s rendered and costs advanced. of being paid by the insurer and without an Fees Provision May Not Be a Good Idea, 42-OCT ORANGE The committee concluded that the use of agreement as to who is responsible for the fur- COUNTY LAW 34 (2000). a preexecuted substitution form was incon- ther fees and costs. 6 In 2001, the American Bar Association reported that “38 of the 48 insurers providing legal malpractice cov- sistent with the Rule of Professional Conduct Attorneys must recognize that the com- erage include defense costs within the limits of liabil- precluding withdrawal by an attorney without plexities of the tripartite relationship can cre- ity in their policies.” Munro, supra note 1, at 135. first taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice ate unique ethical issues. The insurance 7 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Mixed Bag for Chicken Little: to the client. While the committee recognized defense attorney must be aware of the ethi- Analyzing Year 2000 Claims and Insurance Coverage, that an attorney armed with a preexecuted cal rules that govern attorney-client rela- 48 EMORY L.J. 169, 207 (1999). 8 substitution might refrain from filing it if tionships and their application to their own Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judge-Made Insurance That Was Not on the Menu: Schmidt v. Smith and the Confluence there was a risk of prejudicing the client, the area of practice. Defense counsel should ana- of Text, Expectation, and Public Policy in the Realm of mere “existence of the [form] creates a sub- lyze the ethical aspects of each potential rep- Employment Practices Liability, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. stantial risk that it will be utilized without the resentation on a case-by-case basis. It is REV. 283, 318 (1999). balancing of the client’s and attorney’s inter- entirely possible that the issues present in one 9 Munro, supra note 1, at 131. 10 ests which would occur if the client were particular situation, such as in a case of high Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a Thicket of Potential requested to sign the [substitution] at the potential exposure but low policy limits, will Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL time the attorney’s desire to withdraw be absent in another case, such as one with L. REV. 769, 853 (1999). arose….”61 The committee ruled that when low potential exposure and high policy limits. 11 Baliga, supra note 4, at 477. the attorney decides to withdraw, the attorney The consideration of the application of estab- 12 Lipton v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1599, 1606 should first discuss the reasons and conse- lished ethical rules to each attorney-client (1996). Under this type of policy, while the insured is charged with a deductible for each claim made within quences with the client before seeking the situation is a necessary aspect of modern the policy period, the preset expense allowance is ■ substitution. practice. affected by the defense expenses on all claims within These guiding principles may motivate that policy period. See also “What Are Burning Limits defense attorneys to discuss and resolve 1 Gregory S. Munro, Defense within Limits: The Conflicts Policies?” pg. 33. issues regarding the representation of the of “Wasting” or “Cannibalizing” Insurance Policies, 62 13 Helfand v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. cert. denied sub nom. insured at the outset of the attorney-client MONT. L. REV. 131, 132 (2001). 4th 869 (1992), National Union Fire 2 Id. at 132-33. Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Helfand, 510 U.S. 824 relationship. Although defense counsel may 3 Rus, Miliband & Smith v. Conkle & Olesten, 113 Cal. (1993). be reluctant to deal with these issues, practi- App. 4th 656, 661 n.1 (2003). 14 Id. at 880 n. 3.
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LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 35 15 Shaun McParland Baldwin, Legal and Ethical 16 Baldwin, supra note 15. be obligated to respond to such an interrogatory has not Considerations for “Defense within Limits” Policies, 61 17 Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Assoc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1388, been specified by case authority in California. DEF. COUNS. J. 89, 99 (1994). However, defense coun- 1406 (2002). 25 Munro, supra note 1, at 157. sel should be aware that any discussion of policy pro- 18 Dynamic Concepts, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 61 Cal. 26 Baldwin, supra note 15, at 97. Counsel may find that visions may be construed by the insured as rendering App. 4th 999, 1009 (1998). discovery battles will become even less desirable than coverage advice, which may cause the insured to expect 19 Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 151 (1968). they have been previously. Id. that the defense attorney has a duty to render legal ser- 20 American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 27 “A member shall keep a client reasonably informed vices regarding insurance coverage. The defense coun- App. 3d 579, 593 (1974). about significant developments relating to employment sel may consider sending the insured a letter at the 21 Baldwin, supra note 15, at 98. or representation, including promptly complying with inception of the relationship that specifically states that 22 Id. at 97. reasonable requests for information and copies of sig- the defense attorney will not be rendering any cover- 23 Form Interrogatory 4.1(e) asks the defendant to dis- nificant documents when necessary to keep the client age advice. “Although counsel may perceive a duty close “the limits of coverage for each type of coverage so informed.” RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-500. limited to defense, unless the insured is so informed or contained in the policy” for any policy that may insure 28 Id. circumstances suggest otherwise, the insured may the defendant from the claim asserted. 29 Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon legitimately believe that appointed counsel will advise 24 For example, an interrogatory might ask, “State the & Gladstone, 107 Cal. App. 4th 54, 74 (2003). on all issues, including coverage.” 4 RONALD E. MALLEN total dollar amount by which the aggregate policy lim- 30 Id. at 75 (quotations omitted). & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §29.13, at 305 its have been eroded during the policy year applicable 31 Id. at 85. (5th ed. 2000). to this claim.” The extent to which the defendant may 32 Id. at 76-78. 33 See, e.g., Judicial Council Form Interrogatory 4.1. 34 CODE CIV. PROC. §284. 35 Church v. Hofer, Inc., 844 P. 2d 887 (Okl. App. 1992). 36 Severson & Werson v. Bolinger, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1569, 1573 (1991). 37 Walton v. Broglio, 52 Cal. App. 3d 400, 404 (1975). 38 Severson, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1572. In any dispute over fees, the attorney will have the burden of proving that got the fees were fair and reasonable. Ramirez v. Stur- devant, 21 Cal. 4th 904, 917 (1994). 39 Grossman v. State Bar, 34 Cal. 3d 73, 78 (1983). ebriefs? 40 ALLEN MITH M & S , supra note 15, §29.21, at 365. 41 RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-700(A)(2). 15,000+ Los Angeles County Bar Association 42 In Matter of Doran, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 871, 877 (1998). members receive free online case summaries 43 In re Jackson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 773, 781 (1985); In re Dahlz, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 269, 280 (2001). each day—Are you one of them? 44 People v. Prince, 268 Cal. App. 2d 398, 406 (1968). 45 RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-700(A)(1). 46 Kallen v. Delug, 157 Cal. App. 3d 940, 950 (1984). 47 Matter of Miller, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131, 135 THE DAILY EBRIEFS—the Association’s online summaries of published (1990). appellate court decisions issued over the previous 24 hours—are 48 CODE CIV. PROC. §284. However, in the Central District of California, the district court’s approval is always re- emailed each weekday afternoon exclusively to Association mem- quired before a substitution is effective. CA C.D. RULE bers. What’s more, the Daily EBriefs, which include links to the full text 2.8.2.1. Counsel should also be aware that under cer- tain circumstances, a client may be legally incapable of of each opinion (posted on the Internet as a PDF file), are FREE! acting in pro per. See, e.g., Torres v. Friedman, 169 Cal. App. 3d 880, 887-88 (1985) (guardian ad litem for a minor could not substitute into the action in pro per). Do we have your current email 49 Hock v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 670 (1990) address? To receive the Daily (invalidating local court rule requiring leave of court for EBriefs, Association members substitution and/or withdrawal of counsel occurring after trial setting conference as being irreconcilable can send their name and cur- with CODE CIV. PROC. §284). 50 rent email address to ebriefs Mossanen v. Monfared, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1402 (2000). 51 Cassel v. Gregori, 28 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 769, 771 @lacba.org or call the LACBA (1937). Member Service Department 52 People v. Prince, 268 Cal. App. 2d 398, 406 (1968). 53 California State Bar Committee On Professional at 213/896-6560. Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1981-64 (1981). 54 Smith v. Anderson-Tulley Co., 608 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Miss. 1985), aff’d, 846 F. 2d 751 (5th Cir. 1988). 55 Heller v. Alter, 257 N.Y.S. 391 (N.Y. 1932). 56 California State Bar Committee On Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1981-64 (1981) at 2. 57 Id. get the competitive edge—get ebriefs 58 Id. at 4. At the time, COPRAC was construing then- Rule of Professional Conduct 2-111, the predecessor to LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION current Rule of Professional Conduct 3-700. Rule 2- 111(A)(2), like the current rule, precluded withdrawal unless the attorney took “reasonable steps to avoid dailyebriefs foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client.…” 59 Id. at 4. 60 Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 371 (1977). 61 Id.
36 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST Sponsored by By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To COURTCALL® LLC apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 41. Telephonic Court Appearances
By Brian Panish and Kevin Boyle
MultipleMultipleMultiple MultipleChoice A separate choice of law analysis is required for each legal issue arising in a case
awyers conducting a choice of law analysis address a that should be explored is the applicable statute of limitations. In basic but extremely important question: “What law California, as in most states, statutes of limitations are considered to applies to my case?” In a world in which it is not uncom- be procedural (as opposed to substantive) law, and the general rule mon for matters in litigation to have their tentacles in is that the forum state’s procedural law applies. Accordingly, for a case multiple jurisdictions, understanding the laws of the var- filed in California state court, the applicable California statute of lim- L 1 Lious forums is just the beginning. Mastering the elements required itations will apply, and choice of law analysis is unnecessary. for an effective choice of law analysis (also referred to as a conflict But attorneys must be cognizant of California’s “borrowing of law analysis) is a true test for litigators. statute,”2 which was designed as a vehicle for courts to apply the statute Unlike most other areas of pretrial litigation, a choice of law analy- of limitations of the jurisdiction in which the cause of action arose.3 sis can be more dependent on art than science. Every case contains Specifically, the borrowing statute provides: a unique set of circumstances that make it difficult to find binding When a cause of action has arisen in another state, or in a for- precedent regarding choice of law. California’s conflict of law rules eign country, and by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot require that attorneys and courts examine these circumstances there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of through a complicated analytical framework known as the govern- time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in mental interest and comparative impairment tests. The creativity of this state, except in favor of one who has been a citizen of this attorneys in constructing arguments about why one jurisdiction’s law should apply over another is crucial and can carry the day, as Brian Panish and Kevin Boyle are plaintiffs’ trial lawyers with Greene, courts want attorneys to provide reasons that courts can state for the Broillet, Panish & Wheeler in Santa Monica. They specialize in catastrophic record when they rule on which jurisdiction’s law should apply. products liability and punitive damages claims as well as business torts. When a case arrives at a lawyer’s office, one of the first questions The authors thank Stuart Fraenkel for his comments and assistance.
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 37 state, and who has held the cause of action from the time it ment of each state’s policies. The law ultimately applied will be that accrued.4 of the state whose policies would suffer most were a different state’s In other words, the statute “borrows” the statute of limitations of law applied.15 another jurisdiction that is pertinent to the case, and if the borrowed It cannot be stressed enough that a separate choice of law inquiry statute of limitations would prevent a suit in that jurisdiction, the suit must be made with respect to each issue in a case.16 The term of art cannot be brought in California—even if California’s statute of limi- for this process is “depecage.”17 Attorneys should be careful to com- tations would allow the suit. pare all the applicable laws of competing jurisdictions to determine The borrowing statute generally applies only in cases brought by if one of the jurisdictions has law that may be advantageous to any non-California plaintiffs.5 Also, the borrowing statute specifically part of the client’s case. Moreover, if a court applies the law of a juris- addresses cases barred by a “lapse of time” but does not use the words diction to one aspect of the case, that does not mean that the court “statute of limitations.” It is unclear whether the borrowing statute bor- will apply that jurisdiction’s law to all aspects of the case. For exam- rows all statutes concerning the lapse of time, such as statutes of ple, a court may conclude that the law of the plaintiff’s domicile repose, in addition to statutes of limitation.6 applies to damages but that the law of the defendant’s domicile Unlike statutes of limitation, statutes of repose are generally con- applies to liability. sidered to be substantive in nature, most likely because the lapse of time at issue in a statute of repose has nothing to do with a potential True Conflict and Governmental Interest plaintiff’s failure to timely file a suit after a cause of action arose. In conducting a California choice of law analysis, the first question for Statutes of repose are concerned with what happened before, not after, counsel to consider–a seemingly obvious one–is whether the law of the emergence of the cause of action. Accordingly, the determination the foreign jurisdiction actually is in conflict with California law.18 Ver y of whether a foreign jurisdiction’s statute of repose is applicable to a little case law explores how different the laws must be from one case should be determined through a choice of law analysis just like another to result in what courts term a true conflict.19 A results-ori- that of any other substantive law. ented analysis seems to be the basis for determining whether laws are However, a survey of California law reveals one published case, in conflict; that is, a court will find that laws conflict if their applica- Geist v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., in which the borrowing statute was used tions could lead to differing results. In most cases in which a party to borrow a statute of repose.7 This case was most likely decided incor- seeks the application of a law of a particular jurisdiction, the existence rectly. First, every other published California case that mentions the of the conflict is seemingly obvious, because attorneys would not seek borrowing statute does so in the context of a statute of limitations. the application of a law that would not help their case. For example, Second, the issue of whether a borrowing statute can borrow sub- if one jurisdiction has a damages cap and another does not, the laws stantive law was not specifically addressed in Geist.8 Finally, case of the two jurisdictions probably are in conflict, and a defendant law and commentators generally take the position that the intent of would likely urge the court to apply the law of the jurisdiction sup- the borrowing statute was to borrow procedural statutes of limitations, porting caps. not substantive law, because a determination of which substantive law In examining whether laws conflict, foreign law may be pleaded should be applied in a case is governed by a choice of law analysis. and proved, but it need not be. The California Evidence Code provides Indeed, the commentators in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of that trial courts may take judicial notice of the decisional, statutory, Laws contend that borrowing statutes should be repealed in their and constitutional law of any state or foreign nation.20 The code also entirety and that choice of law analysis should be used to determine provides for compulsory judicial notice on the request of a party, pro- the applicable statute of limitations.9 But for now, the Geist opinion vided that the requesting party gives each adverse party sufficient time remains on the books, and plaintiffs and defense counsel must be to oppose the request and furnishes the court with sufficient infor- aware that a California court potentially could borrow another state’s mation to enable it to understand the foreign law.21 As a practical mat- statute of repose and bar an action. ter, attorneys seeking the application of foreign law should brief that California’s borrowing statute also must be considered when par- law thoroughly when requesting its application and should request ties are in federal court on diversity grounds. A federal court that has judicial notice of that law. Attorneys opposing the application of for- jurisdiction as a result of diversity will apply 1) the statute of limita- eign law should make sure that they are given sufficient time to brief tions of the forum in which the court sits,10 and 2) the choice of law their opposition to the application of the foreign law by using a con- rules of the state in which the court sits.11 Federal courts in California flict of law analysis and to contradict the other side’s characterization hearing diversity cases based on causes of action that arose outside of the foreign law, if necessary. To accomplish these tasks, attorneys of California may apply California’s borrowing statute and, following generally seek expert assistance in the foreign law at issue. Geist, apply another jurisdiction’s statute of repose. If there is a true conflict, the second question that must be In California, a choice of law analysis will determine the substan- answered is whether both jurisdictions have any significant interests tive law applicable to a case (with the exception of substantive “lapse in having their respective law applied. The case law refers to this of time” law that may be covered by California’s borrowing statute). inquiry as the governmental interest test.22 Some California courts This is true whether parties are in state court or in federal court as have merged the first and second questions; in analyzing whether a result of diversity—and the federal court will apply California’s there is a true conflict, the courts look to whether both jurisdictions choice of law rules.12 have a legitimate governmental interest in the application of their law.23 A California state court will apply California law unless a party Accordingly, if the interests of the foreign jurisdiction will not be invokes the law of a foreign jurisdiction.13 Thus, attorneys convinced significantly furthered by the court’s application of that jurisdiction’s that the law of another jurisdiction should apply in their case in a law, the court may conclude that there is a false conflict and apply California court must bring the choice of law issue to the court’s atten- California law.24 tion. Under the choice of law approach in California, California law will Either approach leads to the same result. The basic question is be applied unless the foreign law conflicts with California law and both whether the jurisdictions have a significant governmental interest in California and the foreign jurisdiction have significant interests in hav- having their law applied. If a foreign jurisdiction does not have an inter- ing their respective law applied.14 If there are significant interests and est in having its law apply, then the law of the forum will apply.25 those interests conflict, the court must assess the comparative impair- Lawyers should have a solid understanding of their cases and
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CALIFORNIA Riverside Superior Court Nineteenth Judicial Circuit 286th District Court (Levelland) Court of Appeal Banning Twentieth Judicial Circuit 325th District Court (Ft. Worth) Sixth Appellate District Blythe (Naples) 360th District Court (Ft. Worth) Alpine County Superior Court Hemet (Ft. Myers) 400th District Court Amador County Consolidated Courts Indio County Courts Bakersfield Municipal Court Lake Elsinore GEORGIA Hildalgo-#1 Butte County Consolidated Courts Palm Springs Atlanta Superior Court Midland Calaveras Superior Court Riverside INDIANA San Angelo Colusa Superior Court Southwest Marion County Superior Court Tom Green Contra Costa County Superior Court Temecula (Indianapolis) UTAH Martinez Sacramento Superior Court LOUISIANA 4th District Court (Provo) San Benito Del Norte Superior Court* Fourth Judicial Dist. (Monroe) San Bernardino Superior Court WASHINGTON Eleventh Judicial Dist. (Mansfield) El Dorado County Superior Court Barstow Adams County Superior Court Twenty-Sixth Judicial Dist. (Benton, Cameron Park Big Bear Spokane County Superior Court Minden) South Lake Tahoe Central WEST VIRGINIA Placerville Joshua Tree MARYLAND Fourth Judicial Circuit Fresno Superior Court Needles Glenn County Superior Court Second Circuit Court (Centreville) UNITED STATES DISTRICT Rancho Cucamonga Talbot County Circuit Court Humboldt Superior Court Victorville COURT Imperial County Superior Court San Diego Superior Court MICHIGAN Eastern District of California Kern County Superior Court Central 36th District Court (Detroit)* Fresno Kings County Superior Court East County Washtenaw County Trial Court Sacramento Lassen County Superior Court North County 18th Judicial Circuit Northern District of California Los Angeles Superior Court South County MISSISSIPPI San Jose Beverly Hills Santa Clara San Francisco Superior Court 4th Circuit Court Burbank San Joaquin County Superior Southern District of California Central Court NEW JERSEY San Diego Central Civil West San Luis Obispo County Superior Bergen UNITED STATES Chatsworth Court Bridgeton BANKRUPTCY COURT Compton Burlington Grover Beach CALIFORNIA Culver City Paso Robles Cumberland Glendale Essex Central District of California San Mateo County Superior Court Los Angeles Long Beach Santa Barbara Superior Court Gloucester Norwalk Hudson Riverside Central Santa Ana Palmdale/Lancaster Lompoc Hunterdon Pasadena Mercer Woodland Hills Santa Maria Eastern District of California Pomona Santa Cruz Superior Court Middlesex Redondo Beach Monmouth Fresno/Bakersfield Santa Cruz Modesto Rio Hondo (El Monte) Watsonville Morris/Sussex San Fernando Passaic Sacramento Shasta County Superior Court Northern District of California San Pedro Sierra County Superior Court Salem Santa Anita Oakland Solano Superior Court Somerset San Francisco Santa Monica Sonoma Superior Court Warren Torrance San Jose Stanislaus County Superior Court NEW MEXICO Van Nuys Tehama Superior Court HAWAII West Los Angeles Dona Ana County (Las Cruces) Trinity County Superior Court First Judicial Circuit (Santa Fe) ILLINOIS Madera Superior Court Tulare County Superior Court Northern District of Illinois Bass Lake Tuolumne Superior Court NEW YORK Chicago Marin County Superior Court Yuba County Superior Court New York Supreme Court Mendocino County Coordinated New York City NEW JERSEY FLORIDA USDC-New Jersey Courts TEXAS Merced Superior Court Fifth Judicial Circuit (Ocala) Newark 22nd District Court (San Marcos) Mono County Superior Court First Judicial Circuit (Defuniak Springs, NEW YORK Okaloosa, Santa Rosa Beach) 33rd District Court (Burnet) Napa Superior Court 75th District Court (Liberty) Southern District of New York Twelfth Judicial Circuit North Kern Municipal Court 105th District Court (Corpus Christi) Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Tampa) OREGON Orange County Superior Court 133rd District Court (Houston) Fifteenth Judicial Circuit (W. Palm District of Oregon Placer Superior Court 219th District Court (McKinney) Beach) Portland Plumas Superior Court 238th District Court (Midland) When a true conflict is found to exist, the comparative impairment test comes into play. This test requires the court to determine which jurisdiction’s policies would suffer most if the other jurisdiction’s laws were applied. The test is not supposed to involve a determination of which law embodies the better social policy with regard to a particular issue.
how the competing laws would affect each aspect of a case. Although dent that seriously injured Bernhard, another California resident. articulating governmental interests is usually possible on both sides Bernhard sued Harrah’s Club in California under the dram shop rule. of an issue, it is not an easy process—but it is generally worthwhile. Harrah’s Club demurred, relying on Nevada case law rejecting the Indeed, a court could rule for a party’s choice of law on the grounds dram shop rule. The California Supreme Court held that both states that the other side did not present a reason why their desired juris- clearly had a governmental interest in having their own law apply: diction had an interest in its law being the applicable law. Attorneys California had an interest in seeing its resident compensated, and need to do all they can to make the court’s job in this area an effort- Nevada had an interest in protecting its resident tavern keeper from less one by fully setting forth the analysis for the court to use in reach- liability.31 ing its decision. Because there was a true conflict, the court proceeded to apply the The case of Hurtado v. Superior Court is an excellent example of comparative impairment test to the case. The court found that applying the true conflict and governmental interest analyses in con- California’s interest in protecting its residents would be significantly cert.26 Hurtado involved a wrongful death action brought in California impaired if state policy regarding the excessive selling of alcoholic bev- by the Mexican heirs of a Mexican national who died in California as erages were not extended to out-of-state taverns that sell alcoholic bev- the result of the negligence of a California driver. Defendant Hurtado erages to California residents who can be reasonably expected to argued that Mexico’s strict damages limitation should apply to the case return to California after consuming those beverages.32 The court also because the decedent and the plaintiffs were Mexican residents. The found that Nevada’s interest in protecting tavern owners from civil lia- court disagreed and ruled that California damages law applied to the bility would not be significantly impaired, because Nevada already had case. The court reasoned that Mexico’s interest in limiting damages a policy of establishing criminal liability for tavern owners who con- is to protect its residents from excessive financial burdens. Since the tinued to serve alcohol to intoxicated guests, and the extension of the defendants were not Mexican residents, Mexico had no interest in California policy to out-of-state taverns only applied to those taverns denying full recovery to its plaintiff residents injured by non-Mexican that actively sought the business of California residents.33 Accordingly, defendants.27 California has a decided interest in furthering its deter- the court ruled that California’s dram shop rule applied. rent policy of full compensation by applying its own laws to California The California Supreme Court further expounded on the compar- defendants.28 Accordingly, there was a false conflict, and the court ative impairment test in Offshore Rental Company v. Continental Oil applied California law. Company.34 In that case, a California corporation brought a negligence action in California against a Louisiana corporation for damages result- Comparative Impairment ing from an injury sustained by the California corporation’s vice pres- When a true conflict is found to exist, the third question, in the form ident while he was on business at the Louisiana premises of the of the comparative impairment test, comes into play. This test requires Louisiana corporation. Louisiana law did not allow a corporate plaintiff the court to determine which jurisdiction’s policies would suffer to state a cause of action for the injury of its employees. An old California most if the other jurisdiction’s laws were applied. The test is not sup- master-servant statute, however, appeared to grant a cause of action posed to involve a determination of which law embodies the better against a third party for loss caused by an injury to a key employee. social policy with regard to a particular issue; instead, it addresses the After determining that both states had an interest in applying relative commitment of the respective states to the laws involved.29 their laws and that, accordingly, a true conflict existed, the court An instructive example of a case involving a true conflict and the turned to the comparative impairment analysis. The court stated the comparative impairment test is Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club,30 a case comparative interest test succinctly: “In sum, the comparative impair- involving California’s dram shop rule that was eventually superceded ment approach to the resolution of true conflicts attempts to determine by statute. Defendant Harrah’s was a Nevada corporation that adver- the relative commitment of the respective states to the laws involved.”35 tised its Nevada casino in California. Mr. and Mrs. M were California The court articulated other, more specific factors to consider, such citizens who drove to the casino and were served copious amounts as 1) the history and current status of the laws at issue, and 2) the func- of alcohol, beyond the point of their obvious intoxication. On their tion and purpose of the laws. drive home from Nevada, Mr. and Mrs. M were involved in a car acci- Regarding the first factor, the court noted that if one of the com-
40 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 MCLE Answer Sheet #125 MULTIPLE CHOICE This Los Angeles Lawyer MCLE True. Sponsored by COURTCALL LLC self-study test is sponsored by False. 10. The comparative impairment test is concerned Name with determining which law embodies the better ® Law Firm/Organization COURTCALL LLC social policy, not with the relative commitment of Telephonic Court Appearances the respective states to the laws involved. True. Address False. City 11. Whether one of the competing laws is “archaic and isolated” in comparison to the laws of the rest State/Zip MCLE Test of the states may not be considered when con- E-mail ducting the comparative impairment test. Phone True. No. 125 False. State Bar # 12. In contracts cases involving contractual choice Instructions for Obtaining MCLE Credits The Los Angeles County Bar Association of law provisions, California courts look to the certifies that this activity has been Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. approved for Minimum Continuing Legal True. 2. Answer the test questions opposite by Education credit by the State Bar of False. California in the amount of 1 hour. marking the appropriate boxes below. Each 13. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws question has only one answer. Photocopies of strongly favors enforcement of contractual choice this answer sheet may be submitted; however, 1. California’s borrowing statute generally is of law provisions. this form should not be enlarged or reduced. True. applicable only in cases brought by non-California 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $15 testing fee plaintiffs. False. ($20 for non-LACBA members) to: True. 14. In determining the enforceability of a con- Los Angeles Lawyer False. tractual choice of law provision, the court looks to 1) whether the chosen state has a substantial MCLE Test 2. California’s borrowing statute only has been P.O. Box 55020 relationship to the parties or their transaction, or applied to borrow statutes of limitations from Los Angeles, CA 90055 other jurisdictions and has never been applied to 2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for borrow a statute of repose. the parties’ choice of law. Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. True. True. False. 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will False. return your test with the correct answers, a 15. If either the substantial relationship or rea- 3. A federal court that has diversity jurisdiction will rationale for the correct answers, and a apply the statute of limitations of the forum in sonable basis analyses are applicable to the con- certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned which it sits. tractual choice of law provision, the court must through this self-assessment activity. True. determine whether the law of the chosen state is contrary to a fundamental policy of California. 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE False. test materials returned to you. 4. A federal court with diversity jurisdiction will True. apply the choice of law rules of the state in which False. Answers it sits. 16. If a California court ultimately determines that a foreign jurisdiction’s law will apply, it Mark your answers to the test by checking the True. appropriate boxes below. Each question has becomes the province of the California court to False. only one answer. 5. A federal court in California with federal ques- determine and apply that law. True. tion jurisdiction will apply California choice of 1. ■ True ■ False law rules. False. 2. ■ True ■ False True. 17. When a California court applies the law of False. a foreign jurisdiction, the general rule is that the 3. ■ True ■ False 6. A California state court will apply California law foreign court’s statutory construction will not be 4. ■ True ■ False unless a party invokes the law of a foreign juris- followed. 5. ■ True ■ False diction. True. ■ ■ True. False. 6. True False False. 18. A California court applying a foreign jurisdic- 7. ■ True ■ False tion’s law must respect the decision of a foreign 7. California’s Evidence Code provides that trial 8. ■ True ■ False courts may take judicial notice of the decisional, intermediary appellate court if it is the highest ■ ■ statutory, and constitutional law of any state or court in that jurisdiction to have ruled on the 9. True False foreign nation. issue. 10. ■ True ■ False True. True. 11. ■ True ■ False False. False. 12. ■ True ■ False 8. If the interests of a foreign jurisdiction will not 19. A California court can never construe the be significantly furthered by applying that juris- meaning of a statute of a foreign jurisdiction 13. ■ True ■ False diction’s law, the court in California may con- before the courts in the foreign jurisdiction have 14. ■ True ■ False clude that there is a false conflict and apply done so. 15. ■ True ■ False California law. True. ■ ■ True. False. 16. True False False. 20. It is improper for a California court to deter- 17. ■ True ■ False mine the law of another state based on hearing 9. The question of whether two jurisdictions have 18. ■ True ■ False any significant interests in having their respective expert testimony. ■ ■ law applied has been referred to as the govern- True. 19. True False mental interest test. False. 20. ■ True ■ False
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 41 peting laws was “archaic and isolated” in com- absence of the choice of law provision.38 cmt. b (2002). 10 Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft, 520 F. 2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. parison to the laws of the rest of the states, it The Nedlloyd Lines court further distilled 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS may need to yield to a more “prevalent and these principles: A court must determine §142. progressive” law.36 Similarly, the law may be “either (1) whether the chosen state has a sub- 11 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 considered archaic and isolated when com- stantial relationship to the parties or their (1941). 12 pared to the other laws of the state in which transaction, or (2) whether there is any other Id. If a case is in federal court in California as a result of federal question jurisdiction, federal common law it was enacted. Indeed, the decisional law of reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of choice of law rules apply. Chan v. Society Expeditions, 39 the state may indicate that the law is out of law.” If neither of these two tests is met, 123 F. 3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997). Federal common favor, even though it is still in force. The that is the end of the inquiry. But if either test law applies the conflict of laws principles that are set court noted that the majority of common law is met, the court must determine whether forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. states that had addressed the issue in the the chosen state’s law is contrary to a funda- Chan, 123 F. 3d 1287. 13 case do not sanction actions by corporations mental policy of California (or the state whose Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581 (1974). 14 Sommer v. Graber, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1455 (1995). for harm to business employees, noting the law would have applied absent the provi- 15 Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 40 radical changes in the master-servant rela- sion). If no fundamental policy is threat- 157 (1978) (en banc). tionship since medieval times. Also, the court ened, the choice of law provision will be 16 See S.A. Empresa v. Boeing Co., 641 F. 2d 746, 749- noted that despite the existence of the Calif- enforced. If, on the other hand, enforcing the 50 (9th Cir. 1981) and Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter ornia master-servant statute, no California provision would be inconsistent with a fun- Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 896-97 (1998). These two cases provide a cohesive analysis of California court had squarely held that the cause of damental policy of, say, California, the court choice of law principles and procedures. action stemming from the statute still exists, must determine whether California’s inter- 17 Commentators have used the French word depecage and in recent years no California court had est in its fundamental policy is “materially for the idea that a separate choice of law analysis even considered the issue. greater” than the chosen state’s interest in needs to be applied to each legal issue arising in a As for the second factor, the court noted having its law applied.41 case. See, e.g., R.A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW (3d ed. 1977); Reese, Depecage: A Common that the purpose of Louisiana’s law was to If a California court ultimately decides Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 promote freedom of enterprise within that a foreign jurisdiction’s law will apply, (1973). Depecage can lead to different law being Louisiana’s borders, and not applying the the California court will determine and apply applied to the same aspects of nearly identical cases more modern Louisiana law for an accident that law. The general rule is that the forum arising out of the same incident. See In re Aircrash that occurred in Louisiana would undercut court will follow the foreign court’s statu- Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 948 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Ill. 1996). that purpose. The court also observed that a tory construction.42 Also, courts and parties 18 Sommer v. Graber, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1455 (1995). law may be less comparatively pertinent if must respect the decision of a foreign inter- 19 See Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574 (1974). the purpose and policy of the law is no longer mediary appellate court if it is the highest 20 EVID. CODE §452(a). of “grave concern” to the state, or if the pol- court in that jurisdiction to have ruled on 21 EVID. CODE §453. icy underlying the law may easily be served the issue.43 If the courts of a foreign juris- 22 Sommer, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1455. 23 by more modern means other than enforce- diction have not construed a statute, the Cal- American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni, 169 Cal. App. 3d 368 (1985). ment of the law itself. ifornia court will need to determine how the 24 Id. In the end, the court essentially deter- highest court in the foreign jurisdiction would 25 Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Servs., 39 Cal. mined that Louisiana had a stronger com- have interpreted the law if that court had App. 4th 1844 (1995). mitment to its more modern law than Calif- ruled on the law under the same facts.44 It is 26 Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574 (1974). 27 ornia had demonstrated to its more archaic improper for a California court to determine Id. at 581. 28 Id. at 584. law. Accordingly, the court held that Louisiana the law of another state based on hearing 29 Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 45 law should apply. expert testimony. 157, 165 (1978) (en banc). Choice of law issues are complex and very 30 Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313 (1976) Choice of Law in Contracts important to the outcome of a case. The key (superceded by statute). The legislature significantly Cases is to recognize potential choice of law issues altered California‘s dram shop rule so that tavern own- ers are no longer strictly liable for injuries caused by California’s choice of law rules apply whether early in the litigation process and to develop their intoxicated customers. Thus the liability aspect of an action lies in contract or in tort. But an a strategy for determining the best time in the the Bernhard case is no longer good law, but Bernhard important exception applies in cases involving process to raise the issues and marshalling remains instructive on the application of California contracts with choice of law provisions. In convincing arguments to win judicial support choice of law analysis. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court,37 the for the most favorable law to apply. ■ 31 Bernhard, 16 Cal. 3d at 318-19. 32 California Supreme Court officially adopted Id. at 323. 33 Id. at 323-24. 1 the principles set forth in the Restatement Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F. 2d 940, 942 (9th 34 Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which strongly Cir. 1950). 157, 165-67 (1978) (en banc). 2 favors enforcement of choice of law provi- CODE CIV. PROC. §361. 35 Id. 3 Delfosse v. C.A.C.I., Inc.-Federal, 218 Cal. App. 3d 683, 36 sions. Specifically, when a contract contains Id. at 166. 691-92 (1990). 37 Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th a choice of law provision, California courts will 4 CODE CIV. PROC. §361. 459, 465 (1992). apply the substantive law of the state desig- 5 Grant v. McAulliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 865 (1953). 38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §187(2). 6 nated by the contract unless the state has no An example of a statute of repose is a bar on a prod- 39 Nedlloyd Lines, 3 Cal. 4th at 466. substantial relationship to the parties or the ucts liability suit when the product at issue was pur- 40 Id. transaction at issue, or the application of the chased a specified number of years before the suit was 41 Id. filed. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §51-1-11. 42 McManus v. Red Salmon Canning Co., 37 Cal. App. chosen state’s law would be contrary to a fun- 7 Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc., 83 Cal. App. 4th 300 133 (1918). damental policy of a state 1) that has a mate- (2000). 43 Fritz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 570 8 rially greater interest than the chosen state in See People v. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th 926, 945 (1993) (“[A]n (1942). the determination of the particular issue and opinion is not authority for a proposition not there con- 44 Id. sidered.”). 45 2) whose law would be applicable in the EVID. CODE §§311, 106. 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §142,
42 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004
Understanding what constitutes “reasonable particularity” can be the decisive element in trade secret litigation SecretWeapon
By Brent Caslin FAIRNESS DEMANDS that those who requests a specification at the right moment, accuse others of theft describe the allegedly presses the request until true particularity is stolen property, especially before being provided, and uses the specification properly allowed to rummage through the belong- will gain some control over the subject of the ings of the accused. This principle applies dispute. The defendant who does not will well to trade secret disputes. While the have little or no control. description of a commercial trade secret is When should a defendant request a trade usually more complicated than that, say, of secret specification? In California state court, a stolen bicycle, written specifications of the Code of Civil Procedure largely answers allegedly misappropriated trade secrets are this question with the requirement that every now required at the outset of most actions plaintiff identify its allegedly misappropriated involving trade secret claims. trade secret “before commencing discovery Obtaining a full and complete trade secret relating to the trade secret.”1 Consequently, specification sometimes entails a great deal at the beginning of most cases, when the dili- of effort at the beginning of a dispute. Quick gent plaintiff follows a complaint with dis- study of the technology at issue is ordinarily covery requests, the defendant should imme- necessary. Experts may be needed immedi- diately request disclosure of the alleged trade ately. And a motion requesting a specifica- secret’s specifics.2 If the plaintiff refuses to tion, or a more detailed specification, may provide the identification required by Code of be the only way to force disclosure of key Civil Procedure Section 2019(d), the defen- details of the information claimed as the trade dant can either move for a protective order secret. Nevertheless, these efforts are worth preventing discovery by the plaintiff until the their cost. The trade secret defendant who disclosure is prepared, or simply object and
Brent Caslin is a senior associate in the Los Angeles office of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, where he focuses on international and domestic commercial disputes. KEN SUSYNSKI
44 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 wait to defend a motion to compel. Either covery is requested in connection with an ing the specification compulsory to every motion should be won easily against those application for a temporary restraining order claim.9 In 1999, a Massachusetts court wrote, who altogether refuse to produce a trade or preliminary injunction, Section 2019(d) “A plaintiff has no cognizable trade secret secret specification. In most cases, however, must be raised immediately. Better prepared claim until it has adequately identified the the plaintiff will recognize its obligation to defendants will ask the plaintiff for a reason- specific trade secrets that are at issue.”10 provide a Section 2019(d) disclosure and ably particular trade secret specification Requesting a trade secret specification at agree to prepare one. After the specification before the first court appearance, even if the the beginning of every case, including those is produced, the wrangling can begin over its pressing schedule permits the request just involving provisional remedies, is a trend that particulars. hours before an expedited hearing. If the is gathering steam around the country. In Two circumstances merit special atten- request is made but no specification provided, the past year, several courts in an assortment tion as defendants consider when they should the failure can be placed with the plaintiff. The of states have denied preliminary injunctions, request a trade secret definition: prefiling plaintiff chose the fast pace of the litigation or reversed their entry, when plaintiffs failed settlement discussions and provisional rem- when it requested a provisional remedy. It to adequately define the allegedly misappro- edy situations. As to the first, settlement dis- must know the details of the alleged trade priated trade secret.11 Defendants should thus cussions clearly do not always precede the fil- secret, and it must know that the law requires demand a specification immediately and ing of formal misappropriation claims. But a reasonably particular specification. Indeed, request that all provisional relief and discov- when a plaintiff asks to discuss its claim the absence of a proper specification may be ery be denied until the plaintiff adequately before filing a complaint, the effort should not enough for the court to deny the application specifies its alleged trade secret. be ignored. Not only might settlement dis- for a temporary restraining order or prelim- cussions be a good alternative for the defen- inary injunction.3 On the other hand, if the The Appropriate Trade Secret dant not totally free from guilt, or the per- plaintiff provides a specification before a hear- Definition ception of guilt, but they also may give the ing on a provisional remedy, any inadequacies Detailing the particulars of an allegedly mis- defendant an opportunity to figure out exactly can be brought to the court’s attention at the appropriated trade secret is sometimes sim- what it has been accused of misappropriating. hearing.4 ple. If, for example, a company that sells cook- In fact, much can be gained by requesting a A reasonably particular trade secret spec- ies alleges that another corporation stole its specific identification of the purported trade ification should also be requested if a plaintiff secret recipe for chocolate chip cookies, the secret at the beginning or in advance of a requests a provisional remedy but no imme- company might simply provide the recipe as prefiling settlement talk. It is difficult, and diate discovery. Although the language of its trade secret disclosure—1/2 cup unsalted perhaps impossible, for a defendant to eval- Section 2019(d) does not require a trade butter, 1 cup brown sugar, 1 egg, 2 teaspoons uate a trade secret claim and determine secret specification outside the discovery vanilla, and so forth. Of course, cases as whether settlement discussions are worth- context, courts rule almost uniformly that straightforward as this are few and far while without knowing exactly what the plain- plaintiffs must show the existence of a specific between. In the many cases in which the tiff thinks was misappropriated. trade secret at the outset of litigation. In FSI alleged trade secret is not as easy to define as This is perhaps truer today than at any International v. Shumway,5 for example, the a cookie recipe, defendants should seek to cal- time in the past because the difficulty of ana- plaintiff, FSI, a supplier of equipment used to ibrate the disclosure to the level of specificity lyzing trade secret claims has increased with manufacture microelectronics, sought a tem- that will prevent the plaintiff from later chang- the advance of technology. Thirty years ago, porary restraining order to prevent one of ing the alleged trade secret in order to navi- for example, it may have meant something for its account managers from working for a com- gate through discovery disputes and other a plaintiff to state that its allegedly misap- petitor. FSI alleged the account manager had problems that might harm the plaintiff’s case. propriated trade secret was the process, “numerous trade secrets and other confi- To determine what level of specificity is unknown in every way to all others, by which dential and proprietary information as a nec- required in more complex cases, the natural a hand-held camera could take pictures with- essary component of his sales position,” starting point is the language of California’s out film and store the pictures on an internal including “valuable customer, pricing, mar- statute. Section 2019(d) requires plaintiffs to data chip. Today, however, such a broad state- keting, and product formula and manufac- “identify the trade secret with reasonable par- ment means almost nothing to those in the turing information that is not generally known ticularity.” The “reasonable particularity” stan- electronics industry. Indeed, every manu- to FSI’s competitors.” The district court did dard means different things to different peo- facturer has or could have the technology to not rely on any statute when it concluded ple, and there is not much information create and market digital cameras, and most that the order should be denied because FSI’s regarding its precise meaning for those who of the specifics of the technology have been listing of broad information categories was not drafted Section 2019(d). Dictionary defini- revealed in patent applications across the an appropriate trade secret disclosure: “Given tions can help to illuminate the meaning of the globe. If a trade secret exists in 2004 with FSI’s lack of specificity in identifying what is words chosen by the drafters of the statute. respect to digital camera technology, it prob- a trade secret, it is impossible for the Court Merriam-Webster defines “particularity” as “1 ably relates to a specific manufacturing to fashion a meaningful injunction that would a: a minute detail…b: an individual charac- process or a previously unknown and not overly restrict legitimate competition.”6 teristic…2: the quality or state of being par- unpatented improvement on existing tech- Other courts in California, including state ticular as distinguished from universal…3 a: nology. The details of that process or improve- and federal courts, also have required rea- attentiveness to detail….”12 Similarly, Oxford ment would be at the heart of any trade secret sonably particular trade secret specifications defines “particular” as “relating to or consid- claim. They should also be at the center of any outside the realm of discovery,7 including in ered as one thing or person as distinct from settlement discussion. situations involving provisional remedies.8 others.”13 Both definitions are in line with the When considering whether to request a Some courts in California and elsewhere have primary purpose behind Section 2019(d) and trade secret definition in response to motions gone so far as to find that a specifically iden- the goal of defendants who rely on the for provisional remedies, counsel should tified trade secret is a necessary piece of a statute—to obtain enough detail about the know that in California, when expedited dis- trade secret cause of action, effectively mak- plaintiff’s allegedly secret information that
46 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 the trade secret definition can be distin- ification. Not doing so may tie the hands of the have the expertise to evaluate the projector guished from other similar information and testifying expert while giving the plaintiff and and determine which dimensions and toler- not later transformed to match something its experts room to maneuver. ances were secret.20 In a recent case, IDX the plaintiff finds in the defendant’s files. A leading case, Imax Corporation v. Cin- Systems Corporation v. Epic Systems Cor- Drafting the necessary level of specificity ema Technologies, Inc.,16 offers further instruc- poration, the plaintiff’s explanation of an entire is easier said than done. Plaintiffs may not tion regarding the level of detail necessary for software package as a trade secret was also simply allege that a defendant has misap- an appropriate trade secret definition. In the rejected as overinclusive.21 As in Imax, the propriated trade secrets but provide no infor- case, Imax claimed the precise dimensions IDX court communicated that it is not the mation other than the most basic allegation.14 and tolerances of its rolling loop projector court’s responsibility to dig through a prod- Disclosures that identify the class or type of were misappropriated by Cinema Tech- uct specification and determine exactly what information that makes up the trade secret, nologies. But Imax failed, after four attempts, is and what is not part of the alleged trade secret.22 When preparing a trade secret spec- ification, the simple rule to remember is that indicating an entire process or a product itself is ordinarily not enough for the specification to pass muster with a court.23 Using the Specification The obvious and immediate best use of a trade secret disclosure is investigation of the claim. The defendant should examine the files and memories in every relevant busi- ness unit with the specification in hand to determine if a mistake actually was made— or if circumstances exist so that a conclusion can be drawn that a mistake may have been made—in the defendant’s handling of the identified trade secret information. If so, it may be more economical to settle before costly discovery. If not, the disclosure should be used to begin framing a complete story about the alleged trade secret. How was the alleged secret information received from the plaintiff? Was it received at all? What duties of confidentiality were attached to the infor- mation? A crucial aspect of some cases is determining what uses and disclosures the plaintiff authorized regarding the secret. The defendant must proceed to a deter- mination of what conduct the plaintiff claims was wrong. Did the alleged use or disclosure actually occur, or is the plaintiff mistaken? but not the information itself, are also to provide a trade secret definition identifying The defendant should investigate how the improper.15 It is not enough, for example, to those precise dimensions and tolerances. The plaintiff’s belief about the alleged use or dis- disclose that the allegedly secret information district court eventually granted summary closure of the secret may be addressed at is a method of producing a particular product. judgment because of Imax’s failures, and the trial. The defendant, and an expert witness if The method itself must be described with Ninth Circuit affirmed.17 The Imax case con- appropriate, must also begin investigating its reasonable particularity. firms that plaintiffs cannot simply claim their files and patent applications, as well as indus- Frequently, it will be necessary to con- trade secret comprises certain types of infor- try journals and all other public sources of tact an expert early in the case to determine mation, such as dimensions, measurements, information, to discern if the alleged secret what degree of specificity might be needed in tolerances, and ingredients. They must iden- really was a secret at the time it was given to the trade secret specification to later defend tify those dimensions, measurements, toler- the defendant. Finally, the defendant should the case effectively. When preparing their ances, or ingredients. As another court wrote, begin planning how to discover the plaintiff’s reports, for example, testifying experts will plaintiffs must provide “specific, concrete efforts to protect the alleged trade secret and likely require sufficient detail regarding the secrets.”18 any unprotected disclosures of the allegedly alleged trade secret to compare it with the In their quest for detail, trade secret defen- secret information. defendant’s own confidential information, as dants should be vigilant of plaintiffs who pro- None of these key considerations in the well as prior art and the library of information vide too much information but no real defense of a trade secret case can be properly generally known to the relevant industry. specifics. The plaintiff in Imax attempted this analyzed without first determining exactly Generally, it is best to determine exactly how approach, stating “every dimension and tol- what information is at issue in the case. much detail will be needed by the expert erance” in its projector was a trade secret.19 Consider the difficulty of defending a patent before the court rules on how much detail the The Ninth Circuit disapproved, concluding it case or a trademark case without reference to plaintiff must provide in its trade secret spec- was unlikely a district court or jury would the patent or the ability to review the details
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 47 APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:45 AM Page 48
of the trademark. tion.33 In Combined Metals of Chicago Limited nition of the primary reason for the rule The specification required by Section Partnership v. Airtek, for example, a district requiring trade secret specifications: basic 2019(d) not only relates to discovery but also court wary of the potential for a late amend- fairness. These developments almost cer- usually governs its scope. As the U.S. District ment to a trade secret disclosure warned tainly reflect the practical concerns of courts. Court for the Southern District of California early in the case that no change would be Without a trade secret specification, it is dif- wrote, the trade secret specification require- allowed.34 Remarking that the identity of a ficult to control discovery—and it is nearly ment “assists the court in framing the appro- trade secret had caused “confusion” during impossible to compare similar collections of priate scope of discovery and in determin- summary judgment proceedings in a previous sophisticated information at summary judg- ing whether plaintiff’s discovery requests fall case, the court wrote that it “would not enter- ment or trial without first knowing the within that scope.”24 Many courts outside tain such a dispute at such a late stage in the specifics of the alleged secret at issue. Trade California agree, and they regularly halt dis- proceeding again.” With candid language the secret disclosures provide the specifics and covery until an appropriate trade secret def- court ordered the plaintiff to state its trade thus a baseline against which to judge infor- inition is available and appropriate bounds secret and not modify it: mation allegedly used or disclosed by the can be placed on discovery.25 [The plaintiff] will be held to those defendant. They also give defendants some- Because the information requested in trade secrets, i.e., it will not be per- thing against which they can compare infor- almost every trade secret dispute is itself mitted to change or narrow them as mation in the public domain, information valuable,26 defendants should not be reticent the case progresses.…[The plaintiff] developed on their own, and the public dis- about attempting to place tight restrictions on better put [the defendant] on notice closures of plaintiffs. Without a properly discovery. Limits on discovery are often of such technology now…or forfeit the detailed trade secret specification, the defen- approved, even those that are novel in their right to claim such technology as a dant will have a difficult time making these approach. In Microwave Research Corporation trade secret at a later time in this case.35 comparisons. The trade secret, and thus the v. Sanders Association, for example, a court In 1995 the Central District of California case, could be subject to a plaintiff’s changing required a plaintiff to demonstrate a “sub- expressed similar concerns. The court directions, leaving the defendant little op- stantial factual basis” for the trade secret stopped a plaintiff from switching trade portunity to effectively defend its position. claim before it would allow any discovery secrets in the midst of litigation, writing that into the defendant’s confidential informa- the “plaintiff must be judicially estopped from 1 CODE CIV. PROC. §2019(d). tion.27 Finding no such basis, it denied the arguing, in a desperate attempt to avert sum- 2 The parties might negotiate a protective order regard- plaintiff’s request to take discovery of the mary judgment, that these ‘different’ trade ing confidentiality as they discuss a trade secret spec- ification. Code of Civil Procedure §2019(d) specifically defendant’s confidential files.28 Other courts secrets are really the subject of its claims.”36 refers to the provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets have limited discovery by requiring plaintiffs Summary judgment is not the only pro- Act regarding the maintenance of confidentiality in to show relevance, based on the trade secret cedure that can be used against plaintiffs trade secret disputes (Civil Code §3426.5). See gener- definition, as well as a necessity for the who refuse to properly identify their alleged ally MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW §5:33 (2003) requested confidential information.29 trade secrets or try to change their trade [hereinafter JAGER]; JAMES F. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS Perhaps the most important use of the secret specifications late in a case. A motion §11.03 (2003); TRADE SECRETS PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA §11.28 (2d ed. 2002). trade secret definition arrives near the close to dismiss might be successful if the plaintiff 3 FSI Int’l, Inc. v. Shumway, No. CIV02-402RHKSRN, of discovery, as the parties progress through fails to plead facts identifying the trade secret 2002 WL 334409, at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2002); Analog summary judgment proceedings and into or if the plaintiff continually fails to define Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E. 2d 449, 452-54 trial. Plaintiffs frequently face enormous the alleged trade secret.37 Sanctions under (N.C. App. 2003); Southwest Research Inst. v. Keraplast incentives at these junctures to modify, if only Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro- Techs., Ltd., 103 S.W. 3d 478, 482-83 (Tex. App. 2003) (noting “every order granting an injunction must be spe- slightly, the identity of the allegedly misap- cedure were granted in at least one case fol- cific in its terms and describe in reasonable detail the propriated trade secret. Some want the lowing a plaintiff’s repeated failure to abide by act or acts to be restrained” and ruling that the plain- alleged trade secret to more closely match the a court’s order to prepare a proper specifi- tiff failed to specify its alleged trade secret); Motorola, misappropriation theory developed during cation.38 Motions in limine are also an obvious Inc. v. DBTEL Inc., No. 02C3336, 2002 WL 1610982, at the course of the case.30 Others need to avoid tool with which to exclude new theories going *16-*17 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2002); AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F. 2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987). summary judgment because the defendant into trial, and these motions might be useful 4 Counsel should avoid a situation in which an unhelp- discovered a patent or some other form of in excluding undefined aspects of purported ful trade secret specification is drafted and approved by public information identical to the plaintiff’s trade secrets.39 The Ninth Circuit effectively the court in haste and becomes the definition of the alleged secret, making the alleged secret no did just that in Twin Vision Corporation v. trade secret for the entire case. secret at all.31 Plaintiffs may have good inten- BellSouth Communication Systems, Inc., when 5 FSI Int’l, 2002 WL 334409, at *9. 6 Id. tions—they believe their secret was stolen it refused to examine a district court’s sum- 7 Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F. 3d 1161, and they do not want their claim to fail mary adjudication of several trade secret 1164-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment because the specification varies slightly from claims.40 The appellate court simply ignored of trade secret claim after the plaintiff failed to properly the evidence—but defendants should never- the trade secrets that were not properly identify the trade secret); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., theless attempt to prevent last-minute changes defined and only analyzed the merits of a sin- 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1452-56 (2002) (examining to the plaintiff’s trade secret specifications. gle properly defined secret. The logic used by whether the plaintiff sufficiently specified its alleged trade secrets in connection with a request for a TRO and Several have had success in stopping plaintiffs the appeals court seems equally applicable to preliminary injunction); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. from asserting trade secret information that motions in limine before trial. App. 2d 244, 250-53 (1968) (affirming dismissal based is a variation from their original claims.32 The recent success of defense tactics— on the plaintiff’s failure to properly plead the identity of Most of these changes occur during sum- chiefly motions for summary judgment—in its trade secret). 8 mary judgment proceedings, and courts are cases involving allegations of trade secret Whyte, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 1452-56; Cinebase Software, Inc. v. Media Guar. Trust, Inc., No. C98- increasingly concerned about allowing the misappropriation, and courts’ increasing focus 1100FMS, 1998 WL 661465, at *10-*13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. plaintiff to deviate from its original trade on trade secret definitions at provisional rem- 22, 1998) (“Defendants are correct that for the pur- secret specifications at this stage of litiga- edy hearings, may reflect a renewed recog- poses of obtaining a preliminary injunction based on
48 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 actual use of a trade secret, plaintiff has failed to ade- A. 2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1985) (specification necessary to set Airlines initially claimed as its trade secret a combina- quately identify what portions of its overall software ground rules for relevancy); Struthers Scientific, 51 tion of five elements in an algorithm used to predict cus- architecture are trade secrets.”). F.R.D. at 154 (“Struthers’ discovery will be limited to tomer demand. After it was revealed that the defendant 9 Canter v. West Publ’g Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1193 those specific trade secrets which it claims were dis- received only four of the five elements, and a motion for (N.D. Cal. 1999) (opinion withdrawn) (granting sum- closed to General Foods.”) Of course, federal courts summary judgment was filed on this basis, American mary judgment partially on ground that the plaintiffs’ have discretion to order the sequence for the taking of claimed the four elements as its secret. The court did “failure to adequately designate their trade secret con- discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (d). not allow the change, however, and granted summary stitutes a failure to carry their burden on this necessary 26 A court decision resulting in the disclosure of valuable judgment. Id. at 111-12. See also Thermodyne Food element of their claim”); Cambridge Internet Solutions, confidential information may trigger the taking clause Serv. Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 940 F. Supp. Inc. v. The Avicon Group, No. 99-1841, 1999 Mass. of the U.S. Constitution. See generally James R. McKown, 1300, 1305 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Stutz Motor Car, 909 F. Super. LEXIS 387, at *4 (Mass. Super. Sept. 20, 1999) Taking Property: Constitutional Ramifications of Litigation Supp. at 1360. But see Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den (citing Microwave Research Corp. v. Sanders Assoc., Involving Trade Secrets, 13 REV. LITIG. 253 (1994). Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 51 n.16 (1992) (The plaintiff 110 F.R.D. 669, 672 (D. Mass. 1986)). 27 Microwave Research Corp. v. Sanders Assoc., 110 was permitted to amend its trade secret disclosure 10 Cambridge Internet Solutions, 1999 Mass. Super. F.R.D. 669, 672 (D. Mass. 1986). during discovery.). LEXIS 387, at *4. 28 Id.; see also Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Pruitt, 142 F.R.D. 33 American Airlines, 114 F. 3d at 109-10; Thermodyne, 11 Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E. 2d 449, 452- 306 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (“[T]he court is not yet persuaded 940 F. Supp. at 1305 n.4; Stutz Motor Car, 909 F. Supp. 54 (N.C. App. 2003); Southwest Research Inst. v. that P-B has demonstrated ‘a substantial factual basis at 1360. Keraplast Techs., 103 S.W. 3d 478, 482-83 (Tex. App. for its claim.’”) and MBL Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E. 34 Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. P’ship v. Airtek, 2003); Motorola, Inc. v. DBTEL, No. 02C3336, 2002 WL 2d 418, 426-27 (Ill. App. 1983) (The court refused to Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 1610982, at *16-*17 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2002); AMP, Inc., allow questioning of the defendant regarding its con- 35 Id. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F. 2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987). fidential information until the plaintiff evidenced a pro- 36 Stutz Motor Car, 909 F. Supp. at 1360. 12 Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary (2003), avail- tectable trade secret.). 37 Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250-53 able at http://www.m-w.com/home.htm. 29 Duracell, Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 576, (1968). See also Victoria A. Cundiff, How to Identify 13 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1087 (Am. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1989); A-Mark Auction, Inc. v. American Your Trade Secrets in Litigation, 574 PLI/Pat 557, 572 ed. 1996). Numismatic Assoc., No. 3-99-MC-0014-P, 1999 U.S. (1999) (“[T]o hold off a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs can 14 Universal Analytics, Inc. v. The MacNeal-Schwendler Dist. LEXIS 15192, at *7-*9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1999) recite in the complaint that a more detailed specifica- Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989); see (Discovery of trade secrets “should be allowed only if tion of the secrets will be provided once the protective generally JAGER, supra note 2, at §5:32. the competitor can demonstrate a true need for the con- order is issued.”). Cundiff’s PLI lesson is an excellent 15 FSI Int’l, Inc. v. Shumway, No CIV02-402RHKSRN, fidential information and can establish the potential resource on trade secret specification requirements. 2002 WL 334409, at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2002); Mai Sys. harm is outweighed by the need for discovery.”). 38 Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F. 2d 511, 522-23 30 American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 01C0873, 2002 WL 485710, at *7-*8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, (9th Cir. 1993) (vacating injunction because the plain- Inc., 114 F. 3d 108, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1997). 2002). tiff stated only that the trade secret was in computer soft- 31 Stutz Motor Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 909 39 See generally JAGER, supra note 2, at §5:32. ware); 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F. 3d 587, 595 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d, 113 F. 3d 1258 40 Twin Vision Corp. v. BellSouth Communications Combined Metals of Chicago Ltd. P’ship v. Airtek, Inc., (Fed. Cir. 1997). Sys., Inc., No. 97-55231, 1998 WL 385135, at *2 (9th Cir. 985 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[T]he court 32 American Airlines, 114 F. 3d at 109-10. American June 22, 1998). expects an amended counterclaim from Airtek identi- fying specific, concrete secrets underlying the process of producing the catalytic converters.”); Thermodyne Food Serv. Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 940 F. Supp. 1300, 1305 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“The court is mindful that it is not enough for a plaintiff to point to broad areas of technology and assert that something there must have been secret and misappropriated.”) (citing Composite Mariner Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F. 2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1992)). JACK TRIMARCO & ASSOCIATES 16 Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F. 3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 Id. POLYGRAPH/INVESTIGATIONS, INC. 18 Combined Metals of Chicago, 985 F. Supp. at 832. 19 Imax, 152 F. 3d at 1166 (paragraph bb of the trade secret definition). 9454 Wilshire Blvd. 20 Id. at 1167. 21 IDX Systems Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F. 3d 581, Sixth Floor 583 (7th Cir. 2002). Beverly Hills, CA 90212 22 Id. Similarly, courts also do not allow parties to insert catch-all provisions in specifications. Struthers Scientific (310) 247-2637 & Int’l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 51 F.R.D. 149, 153 (D. Del. 1970). 23 A magistrate recently rejected an attempt to define 1361 Avenida De Aprisa an entire software program as a trade secret. Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. Camarillo, CA 93010 01C0873, 2002 WL 485710, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002). Because of repeated failures by the plaintiff to identify Jack Trimarco - President (805) 383-8004 its trade secret, the magistrate recommended dismissal Former Polygraph Unit Chief of claims relating to 9 of 12 products. Id. at *7-*8. Los Angeles F.B.I. (1990-1998) 24 Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. email: [email protected] CA. P.I. #20970 Supp. 2d 980, 985-86 (S.D. Cal. 1999). www.jacktrimarco.com 25 Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Del. 1991) (“[D]isclosure of plain- Former Polygraph Inspection Team Leader tiff’s trade secrets prior to discovery of defendant may Member Society of Former Special Agents Office of Counter Intelligence be necessary to enable the defendant and ultimately the Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Department of Energy Court to ascertain the relevance of plaintiff’s discov- ery.”); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); Engelhard Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505
LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 49 The LOS ANGELES LAWYER Semiannual Guide to Expert Witnesses
Ten Rules By David Nolte If you want to improve your chances of success in litigation, com- presentations must be accurately scaled to show amounts, measures, mit these rules to stone. Then follow them religiously. times, etc. For example, the y-axis (the vertical line in any numer- Keep it simple. This is the greatest commandment and the one ical chart) should begin with zero, and not skip amounts through most frequently violated. Too much information in a visual aid will the data that is being shown. Doing otherwise presents a biased confuse rather than clarify. To achieve your goal, invoke the following picture of the graphed data. Your charts should also include the guidelines: 1) Each chart should have only one major point, so use source of the information that it conveys. multiple charts that build on one another for more complex ideas; Use word charts rarely, if at all. Not all graphics are created 2) details that are too small to be easily seen should be eliminated equal. Graphics need to show pictures, concepts, and objects—not from the chart; and 3) eliminate extra words, numbers, and details. words and numbers. A typical PowerPoint slide presentation con- Use graphics with every important witness. Studies con- sisting of words and bullet points lacks creativity and interest. sistently show that memory increases several hundred percent Remember the seriousness of the setting. Modern com- when the information is both explained and shown. Armed with puterized graphics packages have a wide range of fancy do-das. this knowledge, you should improve every important witness’s That does not mean you need to use them in a courtroom. Jurors presentation with graphics. Graphics enhance the jury’s attention have a job to do, and most of them take it seriously. Keep to the span, increase witness credibility, and forcefully communicate your basics. Numbers should be presented with simple pie, bar, and line case’s theme between witnesses. Place the emphasis on the evi- charts. Overly flashy elements may even backfire by raising the sus- dence, not the witness. If allowed in the jury room, your graphics picion that you are attempting to hide something by being slick. will also serve as a tool that can be used by sympathetic jurors to Charts improve the entire process. Graphics can be useful convince others. during settlement, witness preparation, and strategy planning, so Improve interest through variety. Blowups of written doc- develop graphics early in the process. They can then be used dur- uments by themselves will cause a jury to lose interest almost as fast ing depositions as a means of having witnesses agree with your pre- as if no graphics were used. Use a combination of illustrations, pho- sentation of the facts. Each time you present your graphics, you will tographs, pie charts, line charts, bar charts, document blowups, and need to consider logistics, so acquaint yourself with the actual phys- video. Display these through a variety of presentation media, such ical layout where your presentation will occur before finalizing as foam boards, models, and on-screen projection. Variety also your plans. means not using graphics for everything. Although every witness Keep up with technology. Recent computer advances have should have some graphic support, the litigator needs to select those revolutionized the preparation and presentation of information. Costs issues that are truly important and direct graphic attention there. are a small fraction of what they used to be, but a budget is nec- Test your charts with those unfamiliar with your case. You essary. Even a low-budget case can afford some graphics. For need to be able to explain the key facts and rationale of each graphic example, document video cameras (sometimes called ELMOs after in a few minutes. If your graphic is not immediately understood by a particular brand) are now cost effective for every trial practice. those unfamiliar with your case, your explanation and/or your Storage of electronic images and graphics is also easier than ever. graphic needs to be reworked. Your jury will not have studied Hard disk and CD/DVD storage have advanced to the point where your case in any way comparable to the agonizing detail that you you can carry the equivalent of whole rooms of paper documents have mastered. The risk is that what is obvious to you will be lost in your briefcase. on the judge or jury. This does not require expensive jury research; Get help. In the end, each of these commandments is easier a small budget case can be reviewed with colleagues who promise said than done. There are a wide range of consultants who are skilled to be candid. in the technology and methods of producing effective presentations. Use only properly scaled and labeled color graphs. All Have them listen to your case and present ideas based on what they have seen be effective in similar circumstances. Judge them accord- ing to how they honor the first nine commandments. Vendors who David Nolte is a principal at Fulcrum Financial Inquiry LLP, with 28 years frequently violate these commandments do not have an appreci- of experience performing forensic accounting, auditing, business ation of what it takes to make a convincing courtroom presenta- appraisals, and related financial consulting. He regularly serves as an tion. Keep looking until you find someone with the right skill and expert witness. approach in the courtroom.
50 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS/ RECONSTRUCTION DISCOVERY DIAGNOSTICS, MEDICAL CORPORATION A R TECH FORENSIC EXPERTS, INC. 18075 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 209, Encino, CA RADIOLOGY 91316, (818) 344-2700, fax (818) 344-3777. Engineers: B Reader experienced, registered, advanced degrees, and extensive testimony experience. Traffic accidents (all Board Certified Diagnostic and Nuclear Radiologist motor vehicle types, bicycles, pedestrians), collisions, Providing Statewide Diagnostic Imaging Services and Second Opinions rollovers, skid marks, visibility, signal phasing, time- Deposition, Arbitration and Trial Support motion, and low-speed impact. Industrial and construc- tion accidents: OSHA issues. Automotive, industrial, Pre-trial Research and Education and consumer products: brakes, seat belts, forklifts, Liens Accepted on Primary Imaging Studies machinery, tools, protective equipment, lawn mowers, heaters, chairs, fixtures, ladders, scaffolds, fasteners. 6200 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 1008, Los Angeles, CA 90048 Premises liability (code analysis, stairways, ramps, (800) 222-6768 ¥ (323) 933-5100 ¥ Fax (323) 933-4966 doors, gates, windows, guardrails, pools, lighting). Slip, trip, and falls. Biomechanics. Safety. Human factors. Web addresses: www.themripeople.com ¥ www.msus.com ¥ www.breader.com See display ad on page 52. E-mail address: [email protected]
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LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 51 and premises liability, product failure analysis, work- ACCIDENT/RECONSTRUCTION/ place accidents, fire cause analysis, chemical hazards, VEHICULAR TRAFFIC AA RR TECHTECH mechanical design, patent validity and infringement, FORENSIC EXPERTS INC. laboratory examinations, and field inspections. Princi- BIOMECHANICS INSTITUTE WEST pal consultant has more than 40 years of experience in 3202 Campanil Drive, Santa Barbara, CA 93109, (805) mechanical and safety engineering. 898-0198, fax (805) 898-0178. Contact Dr. Anthony Sances Jr. Services available: Biomechanics, head in- FRED M. JOHNSON, PhD jury, spinal injury, all injuries—head to toe. Crashworthi- Experienced engineers P.O. Box 3011, Fullerton, CA 92831, (714) 526-6661, ness. Professor and chair major university, more than fax (714) 526-6662. Contact Fred M. Johnson, PhD. 30 years. Vehicle analysis and product analysis. 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52 LOS ANGELES LAWYER / APRIL 2004 APRIL 2004 MASTER 3/12/04 11:45 AM Page 53
WHITE, ZUCKERMAN, WARSAVSKY, LUNA, WOLF & HUNT
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY for business, real estate, and personal injury litigation and marital dissolution, investigative analysis of liability, damage analysis of lost profits and earnings, business valuation, accounting, and tax. Hundreds of times as expert witnesses. Prior Big Four accounting firm experience. Specialties include: accounting, antitrust, breach of contract, business interruption, business dissolution, construction delays, defects, and cost overruns, fraud investigations, asset tracing, intellectual property (including patent, trademark and copyright infringement and trade secrets), malpractice, marital dissolution, personal injury, product liability, real estate, spousal support, taxation, unfair advertising, unfair competition, valuation of businesses, and wrongful termination.