“Whoever follows Mubarak will inevitably be weaker and less experienced than the man who has ruled the country for more than a quarter century.”

After Mubarak, Mubarak? Sa m e r Sh e h ata

n Egypt’s more than five thousand years of agencies have cooperated in the Bush adminis- history, only a few pharaohs and Muham- tration’s war on terror. The Egyptian succession Imad Ali, who ruled from 1805 to 1848, have could have profound consequences for US policy been in power longer than Hosni Mubarak. The in the Middle East. 80-year-old President Mubarak, who came to of- Deteriorating economic conditions for the ma- fice after the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in jority of Egyptians could complicate the succes- 1981, has now ruled for more than 27 years. In sion process. Prices are high and people are angry. a country with a median age of 25, this means Record levels of inflation coupled with the gov- the majority of Egyptians have known only one ernment’s economic liberalization policies have president. Moreover, Mubarak has never ap- resulted in unprecedented waves of economic and pointed a vice president. Thus it should come labor protests over the past two years. Bread short- as no surprise, even to those who do not follow ages earlier in 2008 led to violence among people Middle Eastern politics closely, that Egypt in the waiting in long lines for the cheap government- not-too-distant future will experience a historic subsidized bread that makes life possible for the leadership transition. 40 percent of Egyptians who live below or close Speculation about such a succession has been to poverty. nearly constant since a failed 1995 assassination And making the succession more dramatic attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa. At cer- still is that Mubarak’s son Gamal is apparently tain times—when Mubarak has a birthday or a being groomed for the presidency. Rumors to health crisis, or when elections are held—the this effect have long circulated and have made speculation intensifies. Interest in the succes- the transition even more controversial. Indeed, sion question is particularly acute because Egypt Egyptians have openly discussed the possibil- is the Arab world’s most populous country, stra- ity of a father-to-son succession since Bashar al- tegically located and with considerable regional Assad was installed as Syria’s president following influence. What happens in Cairo will have re- his father’s death in 2000. percussions far beyond Egypt’s borders—includ- But how exactly will the succession take place? ing in Washington. How will the transition affect the country’s sta- Egypt is a vital US ally. American warships bility? Will the elder Mubarak’s passing increase frequently pass through the Suez Canal and US prospects for political reform? And what challeng- military aircraft are routinely granted permis- es is Egypt’s next ruler likely to face? sion to fly over Egyptian territory. The Egyptian government maintains the terms of the Camp Hu r r y , y o u n g m a n David peace treaty with Israel and as a conse- Gamal Mubarak, the younger of the president’s quence receives billions of dollars annually in US two sons, turns 45 in December 2008. After com- economic and military assistance. Cairo plays a pleting a BA and an MBA at the elite American Uni- mediating role in the Palestinian-Israeli “peace versity in Cairo, Gamal worked as an investment process.” And Egypt’s security and intelligence banker for Bank of America in Cairo and then in London. When he returned to Egypt in the mid-1990s he became increasingly prominent in Sa m e r Sh e h ata is a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Interna- tional Center for Scholars and an assistant professor at George- public life, establishing a financial advisory firm town University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. and founding a nongovernmental organization fo-

418 After Mubarak, Mubarak? • 419 cused on training Egyptian youth to compete in President Mubarak traveled to Germany to un- the global economy. dergo back surgery in the summer of 2004, and Gamal Mubarak’s involvement in politics, when he returned a new cabinet was appointed. though informal, steadily increased as well. He The cabinet was distinctive because it included was appointed to the prestigious US-Egypt Presi- a number of younger faces, several of them Ga- dent’s Council, part of an initiative established by mal’s associates. This was especially apparent Hosni Mubarak and former US Vice President Al in the cabinet’s economic, finance, and invest- Gore to promote trade and strengthen relations ment portfolios. The independent press quickly between the two countries. Gamal began accom- labeled the new ministers “Gamal’s cabinet.” panying his father on trips to the United States, Since then, a number of others associated with to European capitals, and to the meetings of the the president’s son have also been appointed to World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. ministerial positions. In the late 1990s, Egyptian news reports indi- Gamal in fact is not popular among Egyptians, cated that Gamal was planning, along with a few and his popularity has declined since he came on prominent individuals from the ruling National the political scene. He is associated with disliked Democratic Party (NDP), to establish a new po- economic reforms and with rich, fat-cat business litical party. The new party, it was said, would be types who thrive in the ruling party. Yet Gamal’s “liberal” and pro-business. Although the initiative rise within the NDP has continued unabated. He never materialized, this was Gamal’s initial at- was made one of the party’s three assistant sec- tempt to enter formal politics and it foreshadowed retary generals in early 2006, while remaining his future ambitions. as head of the influential Policies Secretariat. At His official political de- the 2007 NDP conference, but came in 2000 when he a Higher Committee was was appointed to the NDP’s Senior officers could established—according to a General Secretariat and be- 2005 constitutional amend- came head of its Youth and collectively reject the notion ment, this committee will Development Committee. of Gamal Mubarak as president. nominate the party’s candi- In that capacity, he traveled dates in future presidential the country giving speeches elections—and, not surpris- to college students and other young people about ingly, Gamal was appointed to the committee. economic issues and domestic policies. Gamal Meanwhile, as Gamal and his associates have swiftly rose within the NDP and in 2002 was elect- gained leadership positions within the NDP, old- ed chairman of the party’s newly formed Policies time party stalwarts have lost ground. Secretariat. At the time, the NDP’s secretary gener- al described the new body as the party’s “beating Mi n d t h e a m e n d m e n t s heart and mind.” The Policies Secretariat quickly In 2005 and 2007, the Egyptian parliament became the NDP’s center for policy directives and passed much-heralded constitutional amend- today remains the most significant political body ments that have altered the rules of the game in in the country. favor of Gamal’s potential succession. The 2005 As Gamal gained prominence in the party, he amendment created a constitutional mechanism and a group of like-minded colleagues attempted that may enable Gamal’s succession through the to change the NDP’s image from that of an old- ruling party. The 2007 amendments, among oth- fashioned and corrupt government party into er things, expanded the government’s powers of one of a modern political organization. The slo- surveillance, eliminated the independent judi- gan at the party’s 2002 general convention was cial supervision of elections, and placed further “New Thinking,” and increasing numbers of restrictions on the legal political participation of smartly dressed, well educated, younger profes- the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s most powerful sionals from Cairo University’s prestigious Fac- opposition group. ulty of Economics and Political Science could be Hosni Mubarak initiated the 2005 constitution- seen moving up in the organization. As Gamal al change when he unexpectedly asked the parlia- used the party as a vehicle for his own political ment to amend Article 76 of the constitution to ascension, the sections of the party connected to allow for multicandidate presidential elections for him also became more powerful. the first time in the country’s history. (Previously, 420 • CURRENT HISTORY • December 2008 citizens had merely participated in presidential to nominate candidates from their higher boards. referendums in which they could cast “yes” or These exceptions potentially set up another farci- “no” votes on a candidate nominated by the NDP- cal presidential election in 2011, in which weak controlled parliament.) and inconsequential parties would run candidates The 2005 amendment carried significant con- against the NDP. sequences for Egyptian politics, but it was not The Mubarak regime has portrayed the chang- the radical, democratically transformative mea- es to Article 76 as democratic reforms of histori- sure that its proponents claimed. Indeed, the cal significance. They are hardly that. The amend- amendment placed significant new restrictions ments were a shrewd response to domestic and on who could run for president. It required can- especially international pressure. This response didates to be high-ranking members of political allowed President Mubarak to give the appear- parties that had existed for at least five years. It ance of undertaking reform while in fact gaining further mandated that parties had to hold at least a fifth six-year term in office through putatively 5 percent of seats in the parliament in order to democratic elections, rather than an anachronis- nominate candidates. And it required nominees tic presidential referendum. At the same time, the to have held leadership positions in their parties constitutional amendments removed the military for at least one year before they could become from the succession process and laid the ground- eligible to run for office. work for a father-to-son succession—a classic case Restrictions placed on independent candidates of pseudo-reform. were even more severe. According to the amend- ment, independents need the endorsement of 250 Ho w to s u c c e e d elected officials—including 65 members of the No one knows how or when a succession will parliament’s lower house, 25 members of the up- take place. At the age of 80, Mubarak could sur- per house, and 10 members of municipal councils vive until the next presidential election—or he in 14 different governorates (totaling 140 munici- could die tomorrow. No matter the timing, the pal councilmen)—in order to stand in elections. succession seems likely to play out in one of four All these bodies are dominated by the NDP. The ways. In two of the scenarios, Gamal Mubarak be- requirements are so restrictive that they essen- comes president. In the other two, a high-ranking tially eliminate the possibility of independent military officer ends up in command. No other presidential candidates. The measure was widely outcomes seem likely. interpreted as an effort to prevent a Muslim Broth- In the first and most likely scenario, Hosni erhood candidate from competing in presidential Mubarak announces—either well before the next elections as an independent. scheduled presidential election or immediately The amendment allowed an exception to the preceding it—that he will step down. Mubarak de- rules for the 2005 election—all registered par- clares that the time is right because he has served ties were able to nominate candidates in the first the country for many years and Egypt is now presidential election. Without the exception, not ready for a step forward on the path to democracy. a single political party—except the NDP—would The announcement is heralded as momentous by have met the requirements needed to nominate the government press, state intellectuals, and the candidates for president. The amendment, along regime-dependent business class. Some unease with the exception, allowed Mubarak to “run” exists among the general public, and opposition against nine other candidates in the 2005 election figures criticize the maneuver as a ruse to install and to “win” a fifth six-year term, which is set to Gamal Mubarak as president, so “spontaneous” expire in 2011. demonstrations in support of Gamal break out in In 2007, as 34 far-ranging constitutional Cairo. Rank-and-file NDP members urge him to amendments were enacted—including more re- run for president. strictions on the Muslim Brotherhood—Article Gamal initially refuses the call, but he is ulti- 76 was further modified to allow parties with as mately forced to accede to appeals by the public few as 3 percent of the seats in the parliament to and his party that he serve the country. Of course nominate candidates for presidential elections, he meets the eligibility requirements laid out in compared to the previous 5 percent. And in elec- the twice-amended Article 76, and he soon be- tions held before May 1, 2017, political parties comes the NDP’s nominee for president. Business with just one seat in parliament will be eligible leaders endorse him, saying a Gamal Mubarak After Mubarak, Mubarak? • 421

presidency will be beneficial for Egypt’s economic constitution stipulates) assumes limited powers growth. State intellectuals busily argue that Ga- until elections can be held. Still, as in the first mal possesses the requisite experience and skills scenario, “spontaneous” demonstrations in Cairo needed for the job and should not, simply because and other cities encourage Gamal to run for pres- his father is president, be denied the right to com- ident. Also as in the first case, inconsequential pete for elected office. Several opposition parties, opposition parties field “competing” candidates including some that are completely unknown, in sham elections, and again Gamal emerges nominate candidates to play supporting roles in victorious. We can call this the “Syrian model,” this amateurish theatrical production. After a along the lines of Bashar al-Assad’s inheritance of short campaign, Gamal “wins” a controlled elec- Syria’s presidency in 2000. tion that has the trappings of legality but is com- Because the older Mubarak is not alive to en- pletely devoid of legitimacy. sure a smooth transition, the second scenario is Independent intellectuals, opposition parties, accompanied by greater uncertainty and poten- and the Muslim Brother- tially by increased tur- hood condemn the sham bulence. More actors are election. The Brother- possibly willing to chal- hood refrains from tak- lenge Gamal’s inheri- ing to the streets, howev- tance of power; some may er, correctly calculating feel emboldened to try to that the cost of direct derail the plan. In this confrontation is too high respect, paradoxically, when measured against Hosni Mubarak’s person- the low likelihood of ality poses perhaps the successfully preventing biggest threat to Gamal’s Gamal from becoming becoming president. The president. octogenarian Mubarak, Limited protests take extremely risk-averse, place in Cairo and other has hinted that he will cities, including demon- never step down from of- strations by university fice. Mubarak said twice students and by Kifaya in a 2006 speech before (Enough), the protest the parliament that he movement founded in would stay in power “as 2004 to oppose both long as there is in my President Mubarak and chest a heart that beats Gamal’s “inheritance” of and I draw breath.” Yet power. But none of the if Mubarak does not at- protests comes close to tempt a transition be- seriously destabilizing Gamal Mubarak fore he dies, the prob- the regime or threatening The prince-in-waiting? ability that his son can national order. And with be installed as president Hosni Mubarak alive in this scenario, the presi- decreases significantly. Even the best-laid plans dent’s hands remain on the levers of power during could go awry once the elder Mubarak is dead. the hand-off. The father’s standing with the mili- tary and the security agencies remains intact, and If t h e military w e i g h s in deals negotiated ahead of time can be enforced. The third scenario, like the second, begins with Loyalties paid for in advance can be maintained. Mubarak’s death and no vice president in place. The costs of defection are extremely high. But before the sequence of events described in the The second scenario also leads to Gamal’s be- second scenario can fully unfold, a senior military coming president. The major difference is that in officer seizes control. This could happen in one of this scenario Hosni Mubarak dies before the next two circumstances. presidential election, without having appointed First, senior officers could collectively reject

KHALED DESOUKI/AFP/Getty Images DESOUKI/AFP/Getty KHALED a vice president, and the prime minister (as the the notion of Gamal Mubarak as president. The 422 • CURRENT HISTORY • December 2008 military is the most powerful and coherent insti- cessor because he lacks charisma and enjoys little tution in Egyptian society and, unlike any of the regard within the army, Suleiman is considered political parties, it enjoys a significant amount of smart, responsible, and serious. legitimacy. But Gamal does not have a military The fourth succession scenario—and the least background, as all previous Egyptian presidents likely—also ends with a military officer as presi- have had. Recent reports suggest that Gamal has dent. In this instance, the president dies in of- strengthened his ties to the military, but the high- fice. But unlike the scenarios described above, est echelons of the officer corps might still deem Gamal Mubarak in this case is pushed aside and unacceptable the idea that a 45-year-old without a high-ranking officer, most likely Suleiman, is military credentials, whose major qualification is nominated as an independent candidate in presi- that he is the president’s son, could become presi- dential elections following Hosni Mubarak’s dent and command the armed forces. death. Although truly independent candidates Similarly, if Gamal Mubarak’s candidacy were face seemingly insurmountable restrictions considered threatening to the military’s or senior against running for president, it is not so diffi- officer corps’ material interests, this could prompt cult to imagine such a candidate succeeding as action to prevent Gamal or another civilian from long as he enjoys the full backing of the military becoming president. The Egyptian military is and the ruling party. deeply involved in a wide range of economic activ- The benefits of this scenario for the regime ities, from heavy manufacturing and light indus- and the military are obvious: The messy illegal- try to agriculture and food production. Extensive ity of an unconstitutional seizure of power, as government programs also afford the officer corps described in scenario three, would be avoided. a comfortable standard of living. If a non-military The same farcical elections among competing succession threatened these arrangements, some candidates could occur, but with victory guaran- in the armed forces could attempt to block a civil- teed to the officer-candidate. ian from the presidency. A second circumstance in which a military of- Th i s is d e m o c r a c y p r o m o t i o n ? ficer could seize control relates to domestic sta- Washington would be comfortable with either bility. After Mubarak’s death, securing Cairo and Gamal Mubarak or Suleiman. Both men are fa- other cities would be an immediate priority of the miliar to US officials and both are committed to security forces. In the unlikely event that major maintaining the current US-Egyptian relation- disturbances occurred during the transition— ship. Many in Egypt, however, believe that Ga- sustained protests, social unrest, riots, or the de- mal has already gained the backing of the United struction of property—a military officer might as- States. And they have good reason to think so. His sume control on national security grounds. With economic views are in line with Washington’s, tanks on the streets, a military commander could the World Bank’s, and the International Monetary plausibly justify suspending the constitution in Fund’s. More importantly, he has made frequent order to ensure domestic stability. trips to the United States for high-level discus- When observers discuss the possibility of a mil- sions with American officials. itary officer’s succeeding Mubarak, the name most Gamal visited Washington twice in 2003, often mentioned is that of Omar Suleiman, the di- meeting with then–National Security Adviser rector of intelligence. Suleiman—a former general, Condoleezza Rice, Vice President Dick Cheney, a veteran of both the 1967 and 1973 wars, and one and Pentagon officials. He also accompanied his of Mubarak’s closest confidantes—is deeply con- father to President George W. Bush’s Crawford nected to both the military and the security ser- ranch in 2004 and paid a “secret visit” to the vices. He is also responsible for managing sensi- White House in May 2006. During the 2006 trip tive security aspects of Egypt’s involvement in the he met with, all in the course of a single visit, Na- Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a responsibility that tional Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, Secretary has entailed participation in negotiations both be- of State Rice, Vice President Cheney, and Presi- tween Palestinian factions and between Palestin- dent Bush. The visit would not have been report- ians and Israelis. This assignment has earned him ed publicly if not for a sharp Al Jazeera journal- the trust of Washington and Tel Aviv. And unlike ist who happened to spot Gamal, along with the longstanding Defense Minister Mohammad Tan- Egyptian ambassador, entering the White House. tawi, who is generally dismissed as a possible suc- The Egyptians later stated that Gamal was in the After Mubarak, Mubarak? • 423

United States on personal business (renewing tion or as an antidemocratic force, there can be his pilot’s license) and simply decided to drop by little argument about the group’s recent history: 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. This account is im- The Brotherhood has consistently demonstrated a plausible; even heads of state rarely receive such commitment to nonviolent political participation a reception at the White House. in the face of overwhelming regime repression. When the succession plays out, it will be diffi- Moreover, the group has neither the organization- cult for the United States to credibly claim neutral- al capacity nor the hardware needed to overthrow ity in the process. If Gamal is “elected” president, the regime. Any attempt at mass mobilization dur- a State Department spokesperson will likely be ing the succession period—even nonviolent pro- asked about the administration’s position during test—would be met with overwhelming regime a daily press briefing. The spokesperson will like- force, and the Brotherhood knows this. ly declare—to an incredulous press corps—that Conflict and tension are more likely to erupt be- the United States does not intervene in the do- tween forces within the regime than between the mestic politics of other nations, that it maintains regime and the opposition. Noticeable movement strong relations with Egypt, and that it encour- within the elite may occur, and one may expect a ages Egypt’s leaders to continue down the path of reshuffling of positions. Some regime insiders may reform. So much for democracy promotion. remain while many old-timers are removed. (Likely candidates for removal include NDP chief Safwat al- Ap r è s m o i , little c h a n g e Sherif and old-time party boss Kamal al-Shazli.) In the end, however, the difficulties facing The new ruler will be pressed on a wide range Egypt’s next president will arise not primarily of issues by political parties, opposition groups, during the succession period, but rather during intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, the weeks and months that follow. Whoever fol- journalists, and reform-minded judges. These lows Mubarak will inevitably groups and individuals will be weaker and less experi- call for reducing the power of enced than the man who has The legal opposition parties the executive branch, impos- ruled the country for more ing presidential term limits, are weak, internally divided, than a quarter century. The amending antiterrorist leg- new president, after he has and dysfunctional. islation, enhancing judicial secured power, will almost independence, reforming the certainly attempt to enhance law governing NGOs, and his standing and redress the legitimacy deficit eliminating prison sentences for journalists con- that will be inherent in a nondemocratic transi- victed of press offenses. They also will demand tion. Egypt’s next ruler, like newly established a lifting of the Emergency Law. (In effect since leaders elsewhere, will promise reform, commit 1981, it grants tremendous powers to the execu- to democratization, and make assurances about tive and security forces to detain citizens with- development. He will vow to reduce corruption out trial for extended periods, to censor and shut and pledge to increase the government’s respon- down newspapers, and to prohibit strikes, dem- siveness to ordinary citizens. onstrations, and public meetings.) Fears of instability during the transition are The new government will promise to carry out probably unfounded. Sustained nationwide pro- some of these measures, possibly including the es- tests are unlikely. Sporadic demonstrations on tablishment of presidential term limits. Genuine university campuses and smaller protests by Ki- political reform, however, remains highly unlikely. faya supporters will almost certainly occur, but Egypt’s new ruler will not usher in democracy. As will not threaten the regime’s stability. The legal the head of the Egyptian Organization for Human opposition parties are weak, internally divided, Rights once told me about the NDP reformers, in- and dysfunctional. As opposition parties estab- cluding Gamal Mubarak, they are willing to reform lished within a semi-authoritarian system, they as long as reform does not mean losing power. have never aspired to power and are incapable of The current US-Egyptian relationship will al- seriously challenging the regime. most certainly be maintained. The next Egyptian Speculation about a Muslim Brotherhood take- president will look for continued military, eco- over is also misguided. Whether one thinks of the nomic, and political support from Washington. Brotherhood as a progressive Islamist organiza- The Camp David accords with Israel will remain 424 • CURRENT HISTORY • December 2008 intact, and we should expect no major geopolitical Mubarak will be sorely missed. His accomplish- realignments out of Cairo. ments have been remarkably thin after 27 years Meanwhile, the pace of Egypt’s economic reform in power. While other countries and regions have could actually slow. Starting in 2004, the govern- experienced significant political and economic ment initiated renewed efforts at economic reform, development during this period, Egypt has large- including subsidy cuts and privatization. These ly languished. Democracy is no closer than when policies have come attached to significant social Mubarak entered office, Egypt’s regional influence costs in a nation where the state traditionally has has waned, corruption and human rights abuses dominated the economy. If, in the immediate post- are still common, and the majority of citizens re- transition period, continued economic reform is main poor and vulnerable. Egyptians are frustrat- deemed overly destabilizing, a new government ed and yearning for change, yet the government could slow or suspend economic reform—as Egyp- has lost all credibility when it comes to political tian governments have done in the past. reform. Sadly, the upcoming political transition is Although who will emerge as Egypt’s next pres- unlikely to produce the type of change that Egyp- ident remains uncertain, it is unlikely that Hosni tians desperately desire and deserve. ■