Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

NATO’s Strategic Adaptation WP Is the Backbone for the Alliance’s Military Reorganisation

Claudia Major S

In reaction to the Ukraine crisis, NATO allies decided at the September 2014 Summit in Wales on the most fundamental military adaptation of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. The objective is a large scale reinforcement and reorganisation of defence capabilities. Collective defence has thereby been reinstated as the core task of NATO, requiring considerable political, military and financial input from all Allies. The focus of attention is, however, on Germany. First, Germany played a considerable part in shaping the Wales decisions. Second, the partners expect Germany to bear a substantial military and financial burden because of its economic strength. Third, Berlin placed itself under pressure to promote defence cooperation when it launched the framework nation concept in 2013.

The Wales Summit has rung in fundamen- February 2015, NATO defence ministers tal change. Although NATO had given it- agreed initial proposals for its implement- self three equal tasks in its 2010 Strategic tation. The Wales decisions should be im- Concept: collective defence, crisis manage- plemented as far as possible by the 2016 ment, cooperative security, in reality, crisis NATO Summit in . management has dominated over recent years. In particular, the operation in Af- ghanistan informed strategic thinking and Fundamental change decisions as to how NATO states equip and The RAP constitutes the starting point for train their soldiers. With the Ukraine crisis, a military reorganisation of the Alliance, collective defence has once again become requiring far-reaching changes in planning the primus inter pares of NATO tasks. The and logistics as well as in equipment and Alliance solidified this at the Wales Sum- exercises. It embraces two areas: short term mit with a work programme. The Readiness reassurance measures and long-term adap- Action Plan (RAP), agreed in Wales, is the tation measures. most important steering instrument with First, the assurance measures agreed which NATO plans to orient its military set- in spring 2014, shortly after the outbreak up once more towards collective defence. of the Ukraine crisis, have been carried for- At their first meeting at the beginning of ward. In so doing the Alliance is signalling

Dr. Claudia Major is a Senior Associate in SWP’s International Security Division SWP Comments 16 March 2015

1 to its eastern members, alarmed by Rus- A further element in this adaptation is sian actions, that they can rely on NATO’s the reform of the rapid reaction force – the promise of assistance. These measures are NATO Response Force (NRF). An enhanced to protect those Allies who are particularly NRF should be deployable more rapidly in exposed and deter adversaries. They in- future. Furthermore, a small, particularly clude air policing in the Baltic, more AWACS rapid, reaction force of around 5,000 men flights over Poland and Romania, intensi- (land components) is to be created within fied maritime surveillance, additional exer- the NRF to deploy at very short notice – the cises and more personnel for NATO Head- Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), quarters (HQ). which, despite its defensive nature, is often Second, the Alliance wants to improve also called spearhead force. Some elements its readiness and responsiveness. This means of the VJTF are to be deployed in theatre creating the planning, logistical and equip- within two to three days. An initial exercise ment conditions for larger units to be moved is planned for April to test alarm mecha- more rapidly to their theatre of operations nisms and readiness times; a further one is and enabling them to be more rapidly op- to follow in June. The various RAP measures erational once there, whether on NATO’s are clearly interlinked, as the MNC NE is to southern or eastern flank. Whilst crisis man- be able to command VJTF deployments from agement in Afghanistan involved smaller, 2016 and NRF deployments from 2018 in brigade – sized units (approx. 3,000 men), the Baltic and in Poland. the rapid relocation and command of com- plex, larger units the size of a division or corps are now required. Up to 40,000 (long Not a hegemon, but the backbone term 100,000) soldiers must be able both Germany has not only considerably shaped to reach the area of operations and be able this strategic adaption in terms of concepts, to cooperate. it is now also laying the foundations for This adaptation is taking place hand in its successful implementation in materiel hand with a regional focus and the streng- terms. Berlin is providing NATO with con- thening of regional hubs. The creation of siderable underpinning, comprising up to small regional integration units (NATO Force eight brigades. Within the framework of Integration Units, NFIU) is part of this. Each the RAP, Germany has undertaken to make will have approximately 40 men as a visible substantial contributions. With regard to and permanent presence, initially in the assurance measures it has, for instance, in- Baltic states, Poland, Romania and . creased its naval participation in the Baltic They are to facilitate the rapid relocation of and is sending significantly more soldiers armed forces into the region and assist in on exercise. As for the adaptation measures, the planning and coordination of training Berlin is taking part in all NFIUs and doubl- and exercises. In addition, regional NATO ing its personnel at MNC NE from 60 to 120 HQs are to take on more responsibility, soldiers. Germany is also the first state to namely the multinational Division Head- take on the command of the new VJTF in quarters South-East being set up in Roma- 2015. This means Germany will be testing nia and the multinational Corps Headquar- the concepts agreed in February 2015 and ters North-East (MNC NE), which Germany, developing them further, thereby shaping Poland and are jointly running in the force and presenting a tried and tested Stettin. The MNC NE will increase its readi- concept for approval in 2016 at the Poland ness, take on more tasks and will become Summit. a hub for regional cooperation. In the long Germany had already agreed with NATO term it is to command a collective defence in 2013 that it would take its turn serving operation up to the size of a corps in the as the lead nation for the then NRF. This Alliance’s eastern area. is why the German- Corps in

SWP Comments 16 March 2015

2 Münster has been in command of the NRF’s applicable, in multinational structures. land forces since January 2015. The Alliance This means on the one hand, that for the Bun- has charged the Corps’ headquarters with destag to take decisions without delay, it using this year’s exercises to test how a has to be informed comprehensively about spearhead unit can be formed from the German contributions, about its potential existing intervention troops and be combat role in case NATO’s article 5 is invoked and ready in any deployment area in a fraction about NATO’s decision-making procedures. of the 30 days initially set for the NRF. Since For example, although NATO can certainly such a unit will require considerable opera- launch VJTF alarm exercises, already relo- tional, logistical and planning input, along- cation exercises (that is, when troops move side significant financial expenditure, there to exercise in a different place), require a will first be an interim solution: 2015 the political decision by the North Atlantic Interim VJTF, 2016 an operational VJTF Council. If involvement of the and, finally, 2017 the fully operational VJTF. in armed operations is to be expected, then During this interim period, not all require- the Bundestag has to vote on it. The upcom- ments will have to be met; for example, ing results of the Rühe Commission, which forces will not have to be quite as rapidly is also discussing how to assure both the deployable. The current test phase will, rights of the Bundestag and Berlin’s inter- however, lead the way by laying down the national obligations such as in NATO, may foundations of the concept. offer pointers here. A further element is Germany, the Netherlands and better communication with the public about will provide the majority of the troops how radically the Alliance is changing at in the 2015 set-up phase and will bear the present, how substantial the German con- associated costs. The Bundeswehr and tribution is and why both are necessary. the Dutch armed forces contribute by far On the other hand, the federal government the largest contingents, Germany approxi- should consider together with the Allies mately 2,700 of the total of some 5,000 how the Alliance is to deal with uncon- soldiers. As well as the HQ, Germany is ventional threats, often also called hybrid also providing paratroopers, mechanised threats. The Alliance plans to present a infantry and transport aircraft. concept at the 2016 Summit at the latest. At a cursory glance, the German contri- According to NATO, it is not only conven- butions to the RAP appear rather compart- tional attack that can lead to the invoca- mentalised: the VJTF, the Stettin head- tion of Collective Defence according to quarters, contribution to the re-assurance Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but measures, additional personnel for NATO. also unconventional attack, for example However, in overview it turns out that Ger- by troops without insignia. This is precise- many is providing the backbone for the ly what happened in the Ukraine, which successful implementation of the Wales is why the eastern Allies in particular want decisions. Without German participation, to be prepared for such situations. How they would be hardly feasible. should the Alliance react if the boundary between war and no war is fluid, if a case of national defence in the classical sense Homework for Berlin does not exist, yet a NATO country is The new tasks pose political, military and being destabilised à la Ukraine. Although financial questions for Berlin. the invocation of Collective Defence is Politically, Germany has to be in a posi- not automatic but will always be a politi- tion to underpin its military contributions. cal, consensus-driven decision taken by It has to create the preconditions for rapid the Allies, being acquainted with the argu- decision-making on any deployment and ments, options and decision-making pro- Germany’s share therein, including, where cesses is indispensable.

SWP Comments 16 March 2015

3 Militarily, German obligations signify a released thanks to the Bundeswehr no long term, increased requirement for per- longer being engaged in Afghanistan to the sonnel, equipment and exercises as well as extent it was before. In addition, more effi- the reform of existing plans and processes. cient cooperation and division of tasks, as At present, only the German armoured bri- proposed in the framework nation concept, gades are fully capable of conducting opera- could restrict additional expenditure. But tions in line with Article 5 of the Washing- even then, the defence budget would have ton Treaty. And even these brigades would to grow over the longer term. For this reason, have to be supplemented with personnel a solid and long term financing plan has to and equipment. Added to this are increased be produced for military capabilities and logistical requirements. If troops, where activities. applicable with heavy equipment, are to be relocated faster, then corresponding transportation capacity has to be available, Contributions allow a say

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und whether aircraft or flatbed trucks. There Through its substantial military contribu- Politik, 2015 would have to be increased exercises to meet tions, Germany is gaining credibility and All rights reserved the changed requirements. In the short political latitude. Backed by and These Comments reflect term, military means can be re-tasked. In Great Britain, the federal government had solely the author’s views. the long term, a robust solution will be rejected alternative reassurance and adap- SWP required to the problem of how more tasks tation proposals, for example for a forward Stiftung Wissenschaft und can be fulfilled while capabilities stay the defence with permanent stationing of sub- Politik German Institute for same or reduce. stantial combat troops in eastern Europe. International and For that challenge, Berlin has already This brought Berlin the accusation of being Security Affairs proposed a solution that it must now imple- too pro-Russian. Amidst all criticism of the Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ment systematically. In 2013 it introduced Russian behaviour, Germany is also push- 10719 Berlin the framework nations concept, according ing to keep the dialogue with Moscow, such Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 to which smaller armies plug specific capa- as by summoning the NATO-Russia Council. www.swp-berlin.org bilities into a larger framework nation, Its intensive participation in the RAP enables [email protected] which forms the organisational backbone Berlin to put forward such suggestions with ISSN 1861-1761 for the collaboration. The construction more prospect of success and, furthermore, Translation by Kiersten Sparke of such multinational units is supposed to to build the profile of a reliable security increase sustainability and key military policy player. On the basis of its exemplary (English version of SWP-Aktuell 20/2015) capabilities. Yet, it is at least just as impor- military contribution, Germany is becom- tant that the Bundeswehr’s political and ing a recognised political shaper in the military ability to cooperate are improved Alliance. Yet, this is also due to that fact that if Germany, as a framework nation, wants traditional leading states are either occu- to act even more in future in multinational pied by other issues (France in Africa), do structures. not have available the necessary means in Financially, it is questionable whether the the foreseeable future (Great Britain) or, substantial contributions and the changes despite providing essential support, want necessary for these can be borne from cur- to leave the lead on the RAP to the Euro- rent funds. Planning is still to be done. But peans (the USA). if there are to be increased exercises, if new equipment is required and used more intensively and if more personnel are des- patched, then costs will also rise. Consider- ation is, however, being given to reforming NATO’s financing mechanisms in order to reduce the burden on the larger framework nations. Financial resources are also being

SWP Comments 16 March 2015

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