DOCSLIB.ORG

Black Is the New Red Containing Jihad

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Black Is the New Red Containing Jihad Army M109A6 Paladin conducts fire mission at Qayyarah West, Iraq, in support of Iraqi security forces’ push toward Mosul, October 17, 2016, to defeat so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Christopher Brecht) Black Is the New Red Containing Jihad By Scott Englund diverse battlefront runs from politicians, academics, and journalists phenomenon of Salafi jihadism, the nightclubs in Florida and Paris, frequently remind whoever may be ideology that motivates terrorist orga- A along the Mediterranean coast listening that the United States and its nizations such as the so-called Islamic of France, through the Bosphorus allies face an enemy that is rigidly com- State, al Qaeda, and associated groups. Strait and among the shadowy dis- mitted to a radical ideology in which Examining the West’s understanding courses of online propagandists. It con- the old political orders of liberalism, and response to the ideology of com- tinues in the sieges of Iraqi and Syrian democracy, and a system of sovereign munism and the Soviet Union and towns, through the ruins of Afghan- states will be torn down and replaced.1 comparing them to the threat posed istan, and deep in the jungles of the This description, however, could by Salafi Jihadism provides a lens that Philippines. While this varied topogra- apply equally to the Soviet Union at can help shape a practical and credible phy presents a challenge, similar threats the beginning of the Cold War 70 response to current threats. This article have been confronted before. Pundits, years ago and to the present global applies the strategy of containment at the beginning of the Cold War to the current threat of Salafi jihadism. Dr. Scott Englund is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Orfalea Center for Global International Just as containment was successfully Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. deployed against the threat of Soviet-style 28 Forum / Black Is the New Red: Containing Jihad JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 communism in the Cold War, it may serve Kennan drew parallels between the outward ‘toughness.’”6 He suggested as an effective strategy against the present Kremlin under Joseph Stalin and a reli- that the United States create in the world ideological struggle against jihadist terror gious order, operating in a world where an image of consistency, harmony, and organizations. Published anonymously the forces of good (the Soviets) would, peaceful prosperity: as “X” in a 1947 Foreign Affairs article, through the inevitable progress of history, George Kennan described a strategy overcome the forces of evil (the global It is rather a question of the degree to for the ideological battle of his day that capitalist order): which the United States can create among later came to be known as containment.2 the peoples of the world generally the im- Applying Kennan’s prescription to Salafi The leadership of the Communist Party is pression of a country which knows what it jihadism means persistent, patient pressure therefore always right. On the principle wants, which is coping successfully with the and unified resolve to counter perceived of infallibility there rests the iron discipline problems of its internal life and with the re- Salafist expansionism. In containing an of the Communist Party. Like the sponsibilities of a World Power, and which idea, what Kennan called “superfluous Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts has a spiritual vitality capable of holding gestures” and “outward histrionics” are which are of long-term validity, and it can its own among the major ideological cur- counterproductive. Such political restraint, afford to be patient.4 rents of the time.7 however, proved difficult to come by in a super-charged U.S. Presidential campaign. In confronting an uncompromising He cautioned that disunity is a balm Promises by some candidates to quickly ideological opponent, one should ex- to one’s opponents in an ideological eradicate groups like the Islamic State pect that challenges to their motivating battle: “by the same token, exhibition through large-scale military action may ideology would be either disregarded or of indecision, disunity and internal dis- make headlines, but these promises are subsumed into the narrative of a decay- integration within this country have an disingenuous, misleading, and perhaps ing, corrupt governing political order. exhilarating effect.”8 reveal a misunderstanding of the threat Kennan observed: Kennan’s prescription for patiently posed by groups like the Islamic State. squeezing the Soviets was sometimes crit- Even after their inevitable military defeat, Now it lies in the nature of the mental icized as being not aggressive enough. It jihadi terror groups will still pose a threat world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the was, after all, a strategy for containing and to security in the Middle East and else- character of their ideology, that no oppo- eventually strangling the Soviet Union, where. This article first reviews Kennan’s sition to them can be officially recognized not abruptly destroying it. Applying con- containment strategy, then turns to com- as having any merit or justification what- tainment to the present struggle against pare Salafi jihadism to the Soviet system soever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, jihadism may be similarly criticized as not that inspired Kennan’s 1947 analysis, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces doing enough, but of critical importance noting some critical differences, and then of dying capitalism.5 are persistence, patience, and consistency applies containment to the jihadist threat. along multiple vectors of action (some of According to Kennan, Soviet leaders which are clandestine), and coordinated Kennan’s Containment believed themselves to be absolutely efforts with allied states. In a political Though jihadi groups represent a powerful at home and infallible in their contest, opponents attempt to create challenge to the peace and security of interpretation and application of their differing visions of a political reality and the Middle East and threaten terrorist ideology; they could rest assured of then try to convince people that the vi- violence abroad, one cannot conclude their inevitable victory, and could not sion they create is preferable. The United that this is either wholly unique and be criticized from without. The Soviets States and its allies were arguably better unprecedented or that the challenge were a formidable ideological opponent; than their Soviet opponents at this kind they present is insurmountable. Their the political-ideological dimension of the of competition during the Cold War. In absolutist ideology and unwavering challenge the Soviet Union posed im- its present conflict with jihadist terror hostility to liberal political institutions mediately after World War II was greater organizations, the United States has been is also nothing new. In 1947, George than the threat they posed to the physical notably less successful. Kennan wrote of the Soviet Union: security of people beyond its immediate Since 1947, Kennan’s blueprint for influence. containment has evolved as successive subjectively these men [Soviet leaders] Kennan’s prescription for foreign administrations were confronted by the probably did not seek absolutism for its policy under such circumstances is now Soviet challenge. For example, Fareed own sake. They doubtlessly believed—and well known: “a long-term, patient but Zakaria argued in 1990 that Ronald found it easy to believe—that they alone firm and vigilant containment of Russian Reagan’s administration thought of itself knew what was good for society and that expansive tendencies.” He cautioned as implementing containment, “but one they would accomplish that good once their that “such a policy has nothing to do quite different from any previous version power was secure and unchallengeable.3 with outward histrionics: with threats of containment.” He concluded that in or blustering or superfluous gestures of spite of its high-risk tendencies, Reagan’s JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Englund 29 version of containment was successful.9 they operate.13 Writing in the last years of terrorist organizations that assert its In a Cold War postmortem, Daniel of the 1980s, Kennan suggested, “what religious superiority. In spite of some Deudney and John Ikenberry argued most needs to be contained, as I see it, differences in application, a core belief that over 50 years, with small changes is not so much the Soviet Union as the system that inalterably divides the world occasionally, “the basic thrust of Western weapons race itself.”14 Furthermore, “the into two oppositional camps remains. policy toward the [Soviet Union] re- first thing we Americans need to learn Other important differences should mained remarkably consistent.”10 They to contain is, in some ways, ourselves; be noted: no jihadist terror organization concluded that though containment our own environmental destructiveness, possesses the massive industrial complex must have played an important role in our tendency to live beyond our means and economy the Soviets did; though the ultimate demise of the Soviet system, and to borrow ourselves into disaster.”15 the Islamic State has successfully seized it cannot be the sole cause. Writing Of course, war is sometimes necessary— modern military equipment, nothing in 1989, Paul Kreisberg laid out how Kennan was no pacifist. What Thomas they have compares to the massive Soviet changes in Soviet economic and military Schelling called the “diplomacy of vio- Red Army. Secondly, though eventually behavior in the late 1980s meant that lence” is a legitimate means of achieving the Soviet nuclear force actually posed an containment was on its “last gasp” and a political outcome in some cases.16 existential threat to the United States and innovation in U.S. foreign policy was Properly accomplished, containment its allies, presently no terror group poses overdue.11 The sudden and unpredicted keeps the widest array of policy options such a threat—in spite of claims made collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be open to ultimately defeat jihadism.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • U.S.-China Relations: the Search for a New Equilibrium Ryan Hass
    U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM RYAN HASS FEBRUARY 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY it did not actively seek to change the existing order on a magnitude corresponding to China’s ambitions For over 40 years following President Richard Nixon’s today, nor did it have the capabilities to do so.) Third, first tentative steps in China in 1972, the relationship China’s rise from a low-wage manufacturing hub to between the United States and the People’s Republic a technology power has introduced friction into the of China (PRC) navigated many ups and downs, but economic relationship, as both economies increasingly generally developed along a trajectory of deepening move from being complementary to competitive with social, economic, people-to-people, and diplomatic one another. And fourth, unresolved questions about ties. In recent years, that trajectory has been broken. the nature of ideological or systems competition are Now, the relationship has reached what respected fueling tensions. China scholar David M. Lampton describes as a “tipping point.”1 This paper will explore how the relationship Looking ahead, the paper argues that Washington and reached its current moment, why the relationship has Beijing each will need to take steps to allow conditions been nose-diving, and what steps the United States to emerge over time that would make possible the could take to protect its interests in its relationship emergence of a new equilibrium for the relationship. with China going forward. Such an outcome would bolster each side’s confidence in their ability to protect their own vital interests, This paper argues that neither the United States prevent a mutually harmful deterioration in relations, nor China own a monopoly of responsibility for the and enable both sides to focus more on improving downturn in relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembering George Kennan Does Not Mean Idolizing Him
    UNITED STATES InsTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Melvyn P. Leffler This report originated while Melvyn P. Leffler was a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He was writing his book on what appeared to be the most intractable and ominous conflict of the post–World War II era—the Cold War. He was addressing the questions of why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it ended when Remembering it did. As part of the ongoing dialogue at the United States Institute of Peace, he was repeatedly asked about the lessons of the Cold War for our contemporary problems. George Kennan His attention was drawn to the career of George F. Kennan, the father of containment. Kennan was a rather obscure and frustrated foreign service officer at the U.S. embassy in Lessons for Today? Moscow when his “Long Telegram” of February 1946 gained the attention of policymakers in Washington and transformed his career. Leffler reviews Kennan’s legacy and ponders the implications of his thinking for the contemporary era. Is it Summary possible, Leffler wonders, to reconcile Kennan’s legacy with the newfound emphasis on a “democratic peace”? • Kennan’s thinking and policy prescriptions evolved quickly from the time he wrote the Melvyn P. Leffler, a former senior fellow at the United States “Long Telegram” in February 1946 until the time he delivered the Walgreen Lectures Institute of Peace, won the Bancroft Prize for his book at the University of Chicago in 1950.
    [Show full text]
  • The Origins of George F. Kennan's Theory of Containment: Stalin's Russia and the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy
    Powell 1 The Origins of George F. Kennan’s Theory of Containment: Stalin’s Russia and the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy Becky Powell Rice University’s History Department’s Honors Senior Thesis March 27, 2017 Powell 2 Introduction Kennan’s Containment Reconsidered: A New Context for Containment On a train headed to Moscow in 1933, a young, slightly naïve U.S. diplomat sat up all night, restless as he traveled through the once forbidden lands of the U.S.S.R. On the other side of the compartment, a Russian from the Soviet official news agency felt no such giddiness. Instead, he made himself at home in their tight quarters, stretching “himself out in his underwear” and sleeping “the sleep of the innocent.” George F. Kennan cared little though; he remained too excited at the prospect of setting up the new U.S. embassy in Moscow and living in the country he had learned to admire so much from afar. Reflecting back on the ride not long after, however, Kennan could only speak of it cynically. His compartment companion had almost certainly since that time “gone the way of most Soviet citizens who had contacts with foreigners in those days, and either…lost his head entirely or [was] laying it on a less comfortable pillow.” Years later, he would avoid conversation with everyday Russians he met while walking through Moscow, resigned to save them the trouble of explaining their actions to the Soviet secret police, who followed him everywhere.1 In time, the weight and ever present shadow of the Soviet regime in Stalin’s Russia, hardened Kennan as it had hardened the Soviet people.
    [Show full text]
  • Design and Emergence in the Making of American Grand Strategy By
    Design and Emergence in the Making of American Grand Strategy by Ionut C. Popescu Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Peter Feaver, Supervisor ___________________________ Bruce Jentleson ___________________________ David Rohde ___________________________ Alex Roland Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 ABSTRACT Design and Emergence in the Making of American Grand Strategy by Ionut C. Popescu Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Peter Feaver, Supervisor ___________________________ Bruce Jentleson ___________________________ David Rohde ___________________________ Alex Roland An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 Copyright by Ionut C. Popescu 2013 Abstract The main research question of this thesis is how do grand strategies form. Grand strategy is defined as a state’s coherent and consistent pattern of behavior over a long period of time in search of an overarching goal. The political science literature usually explains the formation of grand strategies by using a planning (or design) model. In this dissertation, I use primary sources, interviews with former government officials, and historical scholarship to show that the formation of grand strategy is better understood using a model of emergent learning imported from the business world. My two case studies examine the formation of American grand strategy during the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. The dissertation concludes that in both these strategic eras the dominating grand strategies were formed primarily by emergent learning rather than flowing from advanced designs.
    [Show full text]
  • From George Kennan's Long Telegram to the Vietnam
    Max Leshne 1 Policy Set Loose in the World: From George Kennan’s Long Telegram to the Vietnam War “George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.”–Henry Kissinger1 The Long Telegram and its author George Kennan are widely recognized for their importance. Written from Moscow in February 1946, in his capacity as the US charge d’affaires, at a pivotal juncture in world history, Kennan’s Long Telegram2 established the framework of American policy toward the Soviet Union, which, under the heading of “containment” would last for half a century. But what––exactly––was that framework, especially as it concerned the role of U.S. and Western military action abroad to “contain” Soviet expansionism? Was it one in which emerging tensions with the Soviet Union, as stated in the telegram itself, were “within our power to solve—and ... without recourse to any general military conflict?” Or did the Long Telegram instead allow for the latitude, and grant permission, for subsequent US actions in which the Cold War turned “hot,” notably in Korea (1950-1953) and most significantly and tragically in Vietnam (1954-1975)? This is the fundamental tension of the Long Telegram. The highly charged and authoritative language of the Long Telegram, freighted with existential stakes for democracy and freedom, and coupled with poorly formulated policy prescriptions, created a foundational justification for the nearly perpetual set of U.S. military actions to follow. This essay analyzes both the policies and the actions of the U.S. in the decades following Kennan’s Long Telegram.
    [Show full text]
  • Containment: a Failed American Foreign Policy and How the Truman Doctrine Led to the Rise in Islamic Extremism in the Muslim World Christopher Jonathan Gerber
    University of South Florida Scholar Commons Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 3-2-2016 Containment: A Failed American Foreign Policy and How the Truman Doctrine Led to the Rise in Islamic Extremism in the Muslim World Christopher Jonathan Gerber Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd Part of the Political Science Commons Scholar Commons Citation Gerber, Christopher Jonathan, "Containment: A Failed American Foreign Policy and How the Truman Doctrine Led to the Rise in Islamic Extremism in the Muslim World" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6087 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Containment: A Failed American Foreign Policy and How the Truman Doctrine Led to the Rise of Islamic Extremism in the Muslim World by Christopher J. Gerber A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science with a concentration in International Relations Department of Government and International Affairs College of Arts and Sciences University of South Florida Major Professor: Steven Roach, Ph.D. Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D. Darrell Slider, Ph.D. Date of Approval: February 29, 2016 Keywords: Government, Middle East, Realist Critique Copyright © 2016, Christopher J. Gerber Dedication There are many to whom I owe acknowledgment and thanks for this overdue accomplishment. First and foremost I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my best friend, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • “Crush Zone”: Geopolitical Games in Post-Cold War Eastern Europe
    Ordering the “Crush Zone”: Geopolitical Games in Post-Cold War Eastern Europe John O’Loughlin Institute of Behavioral Science University of Colorado Campus Box 487 Boulder, CO. 80309-0487 Email: [email protected] In Nurit Kliot and David Newman (Eds.) Geopolitics and Globalization: The Changing World Political Map. (London: Frank Cass). Word count: 9145 Acknowledgement: The research in this paper was supported by a grant from the Geography and Regional Science Program of the National Science Foundation 1 Biography John O’Loughlin is Director of the “Globalization and Democracy” graduate training program, funded by the National Science Foundation, in the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder. His research interests are in the diffusion of democracy, the relationship between economic and political transitions in Russia and Ukraine, and the changing identities of the peoples of the post-Soviet states. He is editor of Political Geography. 2 Abstract In the aftermath of the Cold War, no consensus has emerged in American political circles on a replacement for the containment geopolitical code of the 1945-1990 era. Various geopolitical paradigms are on offer, each emanating from a world-view that is heavily coloured by domestic political ideologies. Seven of these paradigms are described and considered in light of the momentous geopolitical decision in 1998 to expand NATO into Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has been considered a “crush zone” by political geographers for over a century and the region has been intimately involved in the geopolitical re-orderings of this century. Strenuous avoidance of geopolitical issues, including long-term relations with Russia, was notable during the NATO expansion debates.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembering George Kennan Does Not Mean Idolizing Him
    UNITED STATES InsTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Melvyn P. Leffler This report originated while Melvyn P. Leffler was a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He was writing his book on what appeared to be the most intractable and ominous conflict of the post–World War II era—the Cold War. He was addressing the questions of why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it ended when Remembering it did. As part of the ongoing dialogue at the United States Institute of Peace, he was repeatedly asked about the lessons of the Cold War for our contemporary problems. George Kennan His attention was drawn to the career of George F. Kennan, the father of containment. Kennan was a rather obscure and frustrated foreign service officer at the U.S. embassy in Lessons for Today? Moscow when his “Long Telegram” of February 1946 gained the attention of policymakers in Washington and transformed his career. Leffler reviews Kennan’s legacy and ponders the implications of his thinking for the contemporary era. Is it Summary possible, Leffler wonders, to reconcile Kennan’s legacy with the newfound emphasis on a “democratic peace”? • Kennan’s thinking and policy prescriptions evolved quickly from the time he wrote the Melvyn P. Leffler, a former senior fellow at the United States “Long Telegram” in February 1946 until the time he delivered the Walgreen Lectures Institute of Peace, won the Bancroft Prize for his book at the University of Chicago in 1950.
    [Show full text]
  • The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Division of Europe Written by Stephen Mcglinchey
    The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Division of Europe Written by Stephen McGlinchey This PDF is auto-generated for reference only. As such, it may contain some conversion errors and/or missing information. For all formal use please refer to the official version on the website, as linked below. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Division of Europe https://www.e-ir.info/2009/10/13/the-marshall-plan-the-truman-doctrine-and-the-division-of-europe/ STEPHEN MCGLINCHEY, OCT 13 2009 The Cold War grew out of anxiety over Soviet expansionism and widespread economic problems in Europe following the Second World War. It was institutionalised in minds by 1947, and in reality in 1950 during the Korean war. The Cold War then became a system of carefully managed “irreconcilable antagonism” that evolved out of the plan to rehabilitate Europe (Cox 1990: 30). The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine of Containment together defined the structure of the emerging Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Europe, the location of Churchill’s infamous ‘Iron Curtain’ dividing line between the rival powers, would see its future geopolitical orientation defined by the creation and consolidation of these spheres of influence. One way of viewing the division of Europe is as two areas under the dominance of Great powers. Whilst there is no doubt some truth in this for the West of Europe, it is clearly historically demonstrated in the Soviet bloc particularly through its military presence and the manipulation of elections. Western Europe is therefore a more interesting candidate to analyse when viewing the effects of the Marshall Plan and the doctrine of Containment.
    [Show full text]
  • Mr. "X" and Containment
    ARTICLES C. BEN WRIGHT Mr. "X" and Containment Few issues in recent years have been more hotly contested in the historical profession than the origins of the Cold War, and few Cold War documents have been more controversial than George F. Kennan's 1947 "X" article.1 Entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," this article was published anony­ mously in the July issue of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X". Since the author of the "X" article was almost immediately identified as the director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, it was widely assumed that his ideas were "a guide to official thinking about Russia."2 In words which have since become very familiar, Mr. "X" advocated "a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Such tendencies, he argued, could be contained "by the adroit and vigilant applica­ tion of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and politi­ cal points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."3 No sooner had the "X" article appeared than its "containment" thesis became the focus of debate. In September and October of 1947 Walter Lipp- mann composed a series of columns for the Neiv York Herald Tribune criticiz­ ing the "X" article and, by implication, United States policy. The essence of Lippmann's criticism was his prediction that containment would commit the United States indefinitely to military holding actions around the Soviet periphery. Such a policy, he feared, would mean surrendering the "strategic initiative" to the Soviet Union and the "misuse of American power." Pub­ lished later in book form, Lippmann's columns constituted the first important critique of the containment policy.4 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Who's to Blame for the Cold War?
    KENTUCKY C3 TEACHERS HUB 11th Grade Cold War Inquiry Who’s to Blame for the Cold War? Soviet Prime Minister Josef Stalin, President Harry S. Truman, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pose for the first time before the opening of the Potsdam Conference, July 7, 1945. National Archives and Records Administration. Office of Presidential Libraries. Harry S. Truman Library. Supporting Questions 1. What tensions were visible during and immediately after WWII? 2. How did these tensions turn into actions by the U.S. and Soviet Union? 3. What arguments do historians make about who started the Cold War? 4. Does it matter who is to blame for the Cold War? THIS WORK IS LICENSED UNDER A CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION- NONCOMMERCIAL- SHAREALIKE 4.0 INTERNATIONAL LICENSE. 1 KENTUCKY C3 TEACHERS HUB 11th Grade Cold War Inquiry Who’s to Blame for the Cold War? HS1.HT.13 Historical Understanding: Contextualization and Perspectives: Analyze complex and interactive factors that Kentucky influenced the perspectives of people during different historical eras and explain how perspectives of people in the Academic present shape interpretations of the past. Standards HS1.HT.14 Historical Arguments: Categorize and prioritize various arguments obtained from historical sources to help for Social build a valid argument, including counterclaims, after considering change over time, historical perspectives and Studies relevance of sources. Staging the Read The Atlantic article “Can containment work against modern Russia?” and discuss how modern-day tensions Compelling between Russia and America are in many ways a continuation of Cold War aggressions by both sides. Question Supporting Question 1 Supporting Question 2 Supporting Question 3 Supporting Question 4 What tensions were visible How did these tensions turn What arguments do historians Does it matter who is to blame during and immediately after into actions by the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • George F. Kennan's Strategy of Containment: an Assessment of Kennan's Coherence and Consistency
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository 1 GEORGE F. KENNAN‟S STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF KENNAN‟S COHERENCE AND CONSISTENCY By LEANNE M.J BACON A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY Department of American and Canadian Studies The University of Birmingham April 2010 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. 2 Abstract This thesis examines George F. Kennan‟s coherence and consistency when he formulated the strategy of containment. Kennan‟s work went through different stages which depended on the political context it was set in as circumstances evolved and the position he held. The aim is not to criticise Kennan but understand whether he remained consistent and coherent and why changes occurred. When Kennan sent the Long Telegram and delivered lectures at the National War College, the strategy had not been structured. In 1946 and early 1947, containment was not a strategy, it was still an idea. The Long Telegram provided him with the opportunity to move to the National War College to develop and structure a strategy.
    [Show full text]