Roger Dingman. of War: The Sinking of the Awa Maru and Japanese-American Relations, 1945-1995. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. xi + 373 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-55750-159-2.

Reviewed by Roger Chapman

Published on H-US-Japan (September, 1998)

Roger Dingman's book, a story of an Ameri‐ The bare facts of what happened have all the can submarine's sinking of a Japanese passenger- marks of sheer disaster. As Dingman explains: cargo that was promised safe passage, is the "The Queenfsh's kill set a record. Her Mark history of a wartime mistake and its far-reaching XVIII-2 torpedoes sent more human beings to consequences. As a war commentary, the book is their deaths in the depths of the Taiwan Strait another reminder that armed confict is fraught than had the single German torpedo that had with complexities that often lead to human error sunk the SS Lusitania of the coast of and miscalculations. At a deeper level, the book is nearly thirty years earlier, during World War I. a cross-cultural lesson on how a single event can The SS Titanic had plunged three-quarters as be simultaneously infused with diferent mean‐ many victims into the North Atlantic when she ings. struck an iceberg in 1912. Only one other Ameri‐ It was April 1, 1945, an apparently foggy night can submarine in the Pacifc War up to that point of the coast of . The Awa maru, a Japanese had killed in one blow so many Japanese on board passenger cargo-ship returning from having de‐ a noncombatant vessel. livered Red Cross packages to American prison‐ "But the Queenfsh's victims had been on a ers, was crossing the Taiwan Strait under an ship traveling under an American guarantee of American guarantee of safe passage. The Queen‐ safe passage. The Awa maru wore white crosses fsh, an American submarine on its fourth combat and was festooned with lights to signify her spe‐ patrol, lurked under the surface and by radar cial character: she was a relief vessel authorized identifed what appeared to be a Japanese de‐ to carry Red Cross packages of food and medicine stroyer. Torpedoes were fred with all four scor‐ to American and Allied prisoners and civilian in‐ ing a direct hit. The Awa maru was history, but a ternees in Japanese hands. On that foggy night of history that would not soon go away. 1 April 1945, the ship was homeward bound, trav‐ eling along a prearranged course. Word of her H-Net Reviews protected status and projected course and sched‐ would have normally taken under such circum‐ ule had been broadcast repeatedly to American stances. But all of these details were irrelevant submarines. since the submarine crew was not aware that in "In sinking the Awa maru, the Queenfsh com‐ their patrol area was a Japanese ship under pro‐ mitted the 'greatest submarine error in World tection status. War II'" (p. 7). The fact remains, the Queenfsh commander Dingman's Ghost of War: The Sinking of the never got the word. Before the submarine began Awa maru and Japanese-American Relations, its fourth mission on 9 March 1945, it was docked 1945-1995 traces how such a shocking event could in Saipan. During that time, its radio operator did take place. In the process, it becomes clear that not write down the safe-passage message con‐ the was not totally at fault, even cerning the Awa maru, even though it was broad‐ though Tokyo immediately denounced the torpe‐ cast on three nights. Upon departure, brought on doing as the "most outrageous act of treachery un‐ board the Queenfsh was a sheaf of classifed mes‐ paralleled in the world history of the war" (p. sages picked up from another submarine berthed 103). How could it have happened? A number of nearby. In the pile of papers was the warning things can be noted: a lapse in communication, about the Awa maru, but it never reached the the pressures felt by a submarine crew to meet commander and was interpreted by subordinates certain expectations in the amount of tonnage as "another insignifcant message" (p. 64). Later, sunk, a problem of target misidentifcation, and while the submarine was on its patrol, another the insistence of Japan to exploit the safe passage message about the Awa maru was received but in for the transporting of war contraband. such an abbreviated form it did not make sense to the crew. It was a lapse in communication that led On that fateful night the Awa maru was over‐ to the disaster, one that would also result in the loaded with several thousand tons of rubber, submarine commander's court martial. Nonethe‐ twenty-fve hundred tons of refned and crude oil, less, many Japanese believed it was a purposeful tons of oil drilling machinery, tin ingots, tungsten, act; and in the process of such thinking, "They ig‐ and nearly twenty-fve hundred "of the best, nored one of the grimmest truths that war brightest and most useful ofcials, technicians, presents to all who engage in it: the constant and fghting men from the far reaches of empire" threat, real presence, and terrible consequence of (pp. 44-48). Consequently, the ship rode low in the human error" (p. 69). water, to where on the radar screen it resembled a destroyer or destroyer escort (p. 66). Moreover, The United States soon admitted to the mis‐ when the Queenfsh detected this ship it was sus‐ take. "For the frst and only time during the war, piciously racing through the water and not zigzag‐ the U.S. government acknowledged responsibility ging to avoid any possible attacks, as if in a hurry for the wrongful sinking of a Japanese ship, of‐ to complete a war mission. fered to replace it, and promised full indemnifca‐ tion after the war. That was extraordinary" (p. The transporting of such contraband and the 101). One reason for the contrition was the fear movement of key personnel was a clear violation that Japan would cease distribution of the human‐ of the safe-passage agreement. Furthermore, the itarian aid and not agree to any more deliveries. Awa maru was eleven miles of the prearranged All along the American government was aware course and eighteen miles ahead of schedule (p. that Tokyo was not being honest about the relief 84). According to the Queenfsh crew, it was a fog‐ shipments. One ship could have handled the dis‐ gy night[1] and the Awa maru was not blowing its tribution, but the Japanese government insisted horn, a precaution a ship under safe passage

2 H-Net Reviews on safe-passage protection for a series of trans‐ the Japanese camps. Japanese ofcials were pres‐ ports. Each shipment was arranged to have many sured to agree to end all claims over the matter. stops along the way, both coming and going. In At the time it was argued that American economic other words, by delivering American care pack‐ aid to Japan would far exceed all Awa maru ages to prisoners and internees the Japanese were claims. For Japan, it became a symbol of double at the same time able to safely transport contra‐ victimization. For America, an honest mistake of band and personnel. This was an important bene‐ war was more than adequately compensated in ft considering that by that time ninety percent of the postwar development of Japan. Japan's merchant feet had been sunk by the U.S. Dingman's book is an excellent work of schol‐ Navy (p. 37). arship, very thorough and well written. Also, Washington felt that it had few alternatives there is fairness and balance in the presentation. for getting humanitarian aid to American and Al‐ Until additional information is forthcoming from lied prisoners. As early as 1942 an attempt had the Chinese who in 1975 salvaged the wreckage been made for the Red Cross to deliver quinine to and returned to Japan some of the remains, it is American prisoners held in the Philippines, but not likely that there can be a more defnitive book Japan denied the request (p. 13). In 1943 a stock‐ on the sinking of the Awa maru. But what needs pile of relief aid was sent to the port of Vladivos‐ to be considered is more input from the Japanese. tock, with the hope that Japan would eventually Although Dingman draws from several Japanese be persuaded to pick it up at what was the neutral sources, most seem to be works that are popular Soviet Union (p. 20). That aid sat there until 1944 in nature. It would be interesting to know the when Japan fnally agreed to an arrangement that viewpoint of a Japanese counterpart, someone would enable it to help resupply its own forces. who is a scholar in naval history and at Ding‐ Dingman points out that one problem at the man's level. If Ghost of War could be translated onset was a clash of values concerning what was and published in Japan, that would create an op‐ felt to be standard living conditions (p. 11). At the portunity for a deeper level of dialogue on this time the average Japanese diet was less than what matter. was found to be acceptable by Americans. Japan A question hovers over the discussion. What determined that prisoners would certainly not be kind of ghost is the Awa maru? Is it the ghost of fed any better than its own soldiers who ate pick‐ war or simply a ghost of war? There is a big dif‐ les, rice, and bits of fsh. From the Western per‐ ference between the two. The American reader of spective, such a diet was inferior. As the war pro‐ Ghost of War is left with the impression that ev‐ ceeded, camp life got worse. After the war it was ery person in Japan, up to this present moment, learned that prisoners of Japan received one- remains bitter about the fate of the Awa maru. tenth as much as those held in Europe (p. 113). But is this "ghost of war" something that can be The sense of American anger over the treatment documented, or is it simply the case of Dingman of its prisoners was perhaps not fully appreciated seeing and hearing things after spending too by the Japanese. After the war the Awa maru inci‐ much time in the archives? If indeed the Awa dent became the frst formal negotiation topic of maru has become the kind of symbol that the discussion between Washington and Tokyo (p. book suggests, then it seems that more Japanese 121), but from the American point of view it was sources could be cited. This is not to say that Japa‐ then determined to be politically unfeasible for nese sources were not used (many were), but it the United States to directly provide any compen‐ does question the extent to what those sources sation after what had been done to its soldiers in represent for the nation as a whole. If the Awa

3 H-Net Reviews maru is a cultural fxation of postwar Japan, then tradition worthy of being thrown overboard as that culture should be saturated with references we sail into the twenty-frst century. about it in songs, poems, plays, movies, art work, Despite the above-mentioned criticisms, Ding‐ political speeches, newspaper editorials, letters to man's Ghost of War is remarkably well done. Tom the editor, and other forms of public discourse. Clancy, who is not so versed on complexities, Furthermore, there should be a multitude of an‐ could learn a lot from Dingman. niversary rituals marking the event. If such a real‐ Notes: ity exists, then that kind of supporting evidence should be made known. If such a reality does not [1]. According to the weather report of 1 April exist, then perhaps the thesis of Dingman's book is 1945, there was no fog in the Taiwan Strait. See p. constructed on a bit of exaggeration. 185 of Dingman's book. A similar criticism can be made regarding the Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ author's interpretation of the Awa maru memori‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft al at the temple burial grounds of the Tokugawa educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ Shoguns in Tokyo. The names of the drowning vic‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tims have been inscribed on polished black gran‐ tact [email protected]. ite walls. According to Dingman, the memorializ‐ ************************************************************** ing of the individuals who died on board the Awa H-US-Japan has the following books available for maru is a proof that the Japanese people view review. http://www.sugita.org/book2.htm themselves as the ultimate victims of World War If you are interested in reviewing for H-US- II (p. 179). Whether or not the Japanese believe Japan, please send me your brief CV and your that they were the victims, it does not make the choice. [email protected] two Awa maru memorials (the one in Tokyo and For H-NET review project, please see http:// the other in Nara) any more unique than the war www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/ monuments constructed in other countries. Do **************************************************************** such monuments attest to the concept of victim‐ ization or do they serve as a form of resistance to the processes that would otherwise render war (or an event of a war) an absraction? Remember‐ ing individuals is frst and foremost humanizing. More would have to be explained in order for Dingman to prove his point about the Awa maru memorials. Furthermore, the role of ancestral veneration should certainly be a factor of any such analysis. One other comment: The author in the future may want to consider the social merits of continu‐ ing to refer to as "she." Besides the fact that ships are inanimate objects and cannot have gen‐ der anyway, it is ofensive to some that these ves‐ sels which are almost always controlled by men would be designated as female. While it may be a naval tradition to regard a ship as a "she," it is a

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Citation: Roger Chapman. Review of Dingman, Roger. Ghost of War: The Sinking of the Awa Maru and Japanese-American Relations, 1945-1995. H-US-Japan, H-Net Reviews. September, 1998.

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