Ideas in

POLICE American FOUNDATION Number 17 Policing December 2013 Embedded Criminologists in Police Departments Anthony A. Braga, Ph.D.

Introduction focused on working together in developing a body of police addressing (IACP 2004; science literature, academics can Past partnerships between Rojek et al. 2012). Academics conduct problem analyses and academics and police practitioners have much to offer to police high-quality research evaluations have sometimes been departments. In addition to in partnership with police characterized by role conflicts, providing training in analytic departments. Police departments such as researchers reporting the methods and concepts and should position themselves to “bad news” that an evaluated program was not effective in preventing crime (Weisburd Ideas in American Policing presents commentary and insight from leading 1994). For academic researchers, criminologists on issues of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers. success or failure mattered The papers published in this series are from the Police Foundation lecture series less than commitment to the of the same name. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Police Foundation. The full development of knowledge on series is available online at http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html.

what does or does not work in © 2014 Police Foundation. All rights reserved. preventing crime. For the police, this news could be interpreted Anthony A. Braga, Ph.D., is the Don M. Gottfredson Professor as their personal failure, and the of Evidence-Based in the School of Criminal skepticism of academics may be at Rutgers University and a Senior Research Fellow in the viewed as irritating. In recent Program in Policy and Management at Harvard years, partnerships between police University. Dr. Braga is a member of the Police Foundation’s and academics have become Research Advisory Committee. much more collaborative and support research initiatives with and high-powered analytical United States. Indeed, modern well-functioning internal crime models and methods. police practitioner-academic analysis and research units, as • Embedded criminologists researcher partnerships were set collaborations with outside assist police departments in motion by August Vollmer, researchers can be quite potent in determining whether who was a criminologist and should be encouraged. implemented programs and reform-minded chief in In this essay, I describe are generating the desired Berkeley, California from 1905 my experiences working as impacts through their to 1932. As part of his efforts an “embedded criminologist” training in rigorous program to professionalize the police, (a term coined by Petersilia evaluation methods. Vollmer developed educational 2008) in the Boston Police • Through their participation relationships with faculty at the Department (BPD) between in internal strategy meetings University of California, Berkeley 2007 and 2013. In contrast and ad-hoc research projects, to educate police officers on an to more traditional academic- embedded criminologists assortment of subjects such as practitioner research partnerships, provide scientific evidence public administration, sociology, becoming embedded within germane to problems, and criminology (Vollmer and a police department involved policies, and programs that Schneider 1917). Over the course taking the step from external can be considered by police of the next several decades, these partner to internal resource. executives as they decide how educational relationships evolved Embedded criminologists to address pressing matters. into research collaborations. As maintain their scientific objectivity • By working as an internal Rojek et al. (2012) describe, and independence in carrying researcher, criminologists can police executives began to open out scientific inquires within make strong contributions their doors to academics during police departments. However, to research and policy by the 1950s, gave them access to embedded criminologists also gaining access to rich data department records, and allowed function as an important part and powerful insights on the them to interview, survey, and of the police organization by nature of crime problems and ride with police officers. The collaborating on the development the strategies pursued by the resulting research became the of programs, through problem police departments. foundational literature in the analysis and evaluation research • When they leave the ivory study of policing. and by interjecting scientific tower and work with As American police evidence into policy conversations practitioners, embedded departments became more to guide police executive decision criminologists reap the invested in the idea of making. My experiences with the considerable personal rewards community and problem-solving BPD suggest that embedding of making a difference in the policing over the course of the criminologists in police real world. 1980s and 1990s, they started departments is highly beneficial to embrace working partnerships to police and academics alike. Academic-Police with community members and a In summary: Practitioner Research wide range of other governmental • Embedded criminologists and non-governmental actors. enhance the capacity of police Partnerships Police departments slowly began departments to understand There is a long history of to engage academic researchers as the nature of recurring working relationships between important partners in their efforts crime problems through law enforcement agencies and to be more effective in addressing their knowledge of research academic researchers in the community concerns. Federal

—— 2 —— funding initiatives, such as the U.S. Department of Justice’s Project Safe Neighborhoods and “To be effective in controlling the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Smart Policing Initiative, crime and disorder, research provided support for police suggests that police responses need practitioner-academic partnerships that could both raise the quality to be focused and tailored to of police crime prevention projects and improve the existing specific problems.” knowledge base on effective crime prevention practices. While not yet common features wrong?” and “what should a central activity of “evidence- of modern police departments, we be doing about it?” Police based policing” (Sherman 1998) these partnerships have certainly departments are called upon to and the broader move towards become more prevalent. A handle a broad array of societal evidence-based crime policy. It recent national survey of police issues. Indeed, the police are the is important to note, however, departments found that nearly most visible face of government that the scientific evidence that one third of responding agencies in many neighborhoods, offering police executives need to support had participated in a research services 24 hours a day and seven their decision making includes partnership in the past five years days a week, and encouraging high-quality descriptions of the (Rojek et al. 2012). citizens to “call the cops” when situations and dynamics that cause Police departments have problems arise. To be effective in problems to recur. Evaluating strong needs for research on controlling crime and disorder, programs to establish “what a wide variety of complex research suggests that police works” in policing is clearly organizational and operational responses need to be focused important. But it represents only challenges. For the purposes of and tailored to specific problems one type of research product providing a concise framework, (Weisburd and Eck 2004; Braga valued by police managers and I will simplify these needs into 2008). line-level officers alike. two broad categories of research Policing scholars and police The International Association activities that are relevant to the executives will immediately of Chiefs of Police (2004) has work I have performed for the recognize these two broad established the goal of developing Boston Police Department as a categories as capturing key police practitioner-research research partner and then as an aspects of the work pursued by partnerships for every law embedded criminologist. Police police officers implementing enforcement agency in the United departments need solid scientific “problem-oriented policing” States. There are a small number evidence to (1) understand strategies: the analysis of crime of academics with experience and the nature of the crime and problems to reveal underlying expertise in working with police disorder problems they seek criminogenic conditions, and departments on research projects, to address and (2) establish a the assessment of implemented especially when compared to the knowledge base on effective responses to determine whether roughly 18,000 law enforcement police crime prevention and recurring problems were reduced agencies regularly counted by control practices. In layman’s (Goldstein 1990; Braga, 2008). the Bureau of Justice Statistics. terms, police executives need Others will hone in on the Indeed, there is a relatively small to understand “what is going idea of program evaluation as cadre of criminologists who have

—— 3 —— partnered with police departments Policing has a long history of project-based with social scientists in the past and currently maintain public criminology with scholars focused on collecting data, highly productive research such as James Q. Wilson (1968) completing analytical work, and relationships. Clearly, more and Herman Goldstein (1977) presenting results. Criminologists scholars are needed to carry out conducting seminal studies on are typically not embedded in this very important work. police behavior and the problems criminal justice organizations nor Public Criminology and of policing, by directly engaging tasked with the responsibility Embedded Criminologists police organizations and the of working with practitioners The field of criminology seems managers and line-level staff that to transform organizations by to be increasingly more invested comprise them. Indeed, since its developing, implementing, and in the idea that scientific inception, the Police Foundation testing innovative programs research should be relevant to has played a key role in a series of and policies. Criminal justice the world of practice. Similar to important field experiments that executives have historically movements in other academic have led to profound changes in not valued research enough to disciplines, most notably the way police departments do invite criminologists to observe sociology (Buroway 2005), their core business (e.g. Kelling and contribute to the inner “public criminology” refers et al. 1974; Police Foundation workings of their agencies. One to the call for criminologists 1981). And, as described above, noteworthy exception is Professor academic-police practitioner Joan Petersilia of Stanford Law to write and conduct policy- research partnerships have now School, who served as the Special relevant research studies. This ensures that those who make become much more common in Advisor for Policy and Research crime policy, those who police departments throughout in the California Department implement crime and justice the United States. of (CDC) as well programs, and those who are While there have been as Chair of the Governor’s affected by those policies and concerted efforts in criminology Rehabilitation Strike Force programs are engaged in the in general and policing in under then-Governor Arnold production and interpretation of particular to bridge the gap Schwarzenegger between 2004 the work (Uggen and Inderbitzin between research and practice, and 2008. In this role, Petersilia 2010; Loader and Sparks 2010). these relationships are usually (2008) participated in California’s historic attempt to reform its and ensured that research findings were central to “Becoming an embedded decision-making and to shifting the department’s focus towards criminologist was akin to moving reintegration. Like Professor Petersilia’s from “talking the talk” as a opportunity in California, I research partner to “walking the was fortunate enough to be invited to become an embedded walk” of actually making positive criminologist in a large urban police department. I had contributions to the day-to-day previously enjoyed a long and productive research partnership working of the BPD” with the Boston Police Department where we agreed

—— 4 —— upon projects of mutual interest Operation Ceasefire intervention, their crime control and and, in the tradition of public is by now well-known and prevention strategies, and their criminology, collaborated on the extensively documented (Braga external operational environment. framing of research questions et al. 2001; Kennedy 1997, Most importantly, I was able to and interpretation of results. As 2008; Kennedy et al. 1996). form strong working relationships suggested by Petersilia (2008: Briefly, a working group of with BPD command staff, mid- 339), becoming an embedded law enforcement personnel, level managers, and street officers. criminologist was akin to moving youth workers, and Harvard Over time, most of the officers from “talking the talk” as a researchers diagnosed the youth became very comfortable with my research partner to “walking the violence problem in Boston operational questions, requests walk” of actually making positive as one of patterned, largely for data, and general presence at contributions to the day-to-day vendetta-like hostility amongst strategy meetings connected to work of the BPD. The next a small population of highly these projects. In short, I had section describes this evolution criminally-active, gang-involved become a trusted research partner and the work I performed as part offenders. The Operation to the BPD. of my duties as an embedded Ceasefire intervention used a criminologist. focused approach to Becoming Embedded halting outbreaks of gun violence The evolution of my role from The Evolution of a among feuding street gangs trusted research partner to Research Partnership by combining resources from embedded criminologist in criminal justice, social service, and the BPD has its roots in prior with the Boston Police the community. research projects conducted in Department Between the late 1990s and Lowell, Massachusetts, a small I began working with the 2006, I worked closely with city of some 105,000 residents Boston Police Department the BPD on a series of action- located about 30 miles northeast in late 1994 when employed oriented research initiatives of Boston. In 1997, I formed as a research associate in the intended to enhance the quality a collaborative relationship Program in Criminal Justice of data available from official with Edward F. Davis when Policy and Management at homicide reports (Braga et al. he was the Superintendent of Harvard University. With the 1999), to disrupt illegal gun the Lowell Police Department support of a grant from the U.S. markets (Braga and Pierce 2005), (LPD). Over the next six years, National Institute of Justice, and to prevent by with colleagues, I worked with I was hired to work on The high-risk offenders released from the LPD on a series of analyses Boston Gun Project by David M. the local jail to Boston (Braga of gang violence problems and Kennedy, now a professor at et al. 2009) as well as other conducted a quasi-experimental John Jay College of Criminal crime prevention projects. These evaluation of a problem-oriented Justice, and Anne M. Piehl, research projects resembled the intervention to guide their gang now a professor of economics at more traditional collaborative violence reduction efforts (Braga Rutgers University. The Project arrangements that characterize et al. 2006; Braga, Pierce et al. was a problem-oriented policing the bulk of academic–police 2008). In 2004, Davis expressed enterprise expressly aimed at practitioner research initiatives. a desire to make a substantive reducing homicide victimization However, these projects allowed contribution to the policing field among young people in Boston me to develop a very strong by conducting a more rigorous in the 1990s. The trajectory of understanding of the internal test of the effects of problem- the Project, and the resulting BPD organizational structure, oriented policing strategies on

—— 5 —— crime were much higher and faith Figure 1. Violent Index in Boston, 2000–2012 in the BPD to prevent crime was much lower than residents in other parts of the city. Davis was committed to tackling Boston’s uptick in violence by analyzing the underlying conditions that gave rise to recurring violent crime problems in the city, implementing violence reduction programs that drew upon evidence-based practices and were appropriately tailored to the nature of Boston’s violent crime problems, and evaluating Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports the impact of these programs on violence. During the first months of his tenure as BPD crime and disorder hot spots and non-fatal shootings increased Commissioner, Davis appointed (see Braga and Bond 2008). 133 percent from 162 in 2000 to me his Chief Policy Advisor and We collaborated on the design 377 in 2006. used funds from his operating of a randomized controlled During this time period, budget to acquire half of my time experiment and jointly made a Boston residents became more from Harvard University to do successful argument to the State concerned about crime and less this work. With this appointment, of Massachusetts for research confident in the ability of the I was provided workspace in funds. BPD to prevent crime (Braga the Commissioner’s Office, a In December 2006, et al. 2008). In 1997, 14.2 BPD email address, and BPD Davis was sworn-in by Mayor percent of Boston residents identification that gave me access Thomas M. Menino as the BPD reported crime as their biggest to the department’s facilities. He Commissioner. Boston was concern. Crime as the biggest offered me this position because facing a troubling increase in concern of Boston residents of my prior experience with and serious violent crime when he dropped to only 7.2 percent in deep knowledge of the BPD, my took charge of the BPD. After 1999, remained low in 2001 and expertise in and experiencing dramatic decreases 2003, and then increased to 15.5 program evaluation, and, most in violent crime over the course percent in 2006. In 1997, only importantly, because he trusted of the 1990s, Boston experienced 16.2 percent of Boston residents me. I remained in this position a resurgence of serious violence had little or no faith in the BPD until Davis retired from the BPD during the early- to mid-2000s, to prevent crime; by 2006, this in November 2013. peaking at 7,533 violent index lack of faith in the police had crimes in 2006 (Figure 1). Most risen to include nearly one- The Work of an concerning was an increase quarter of Boston residents. In in assaultive street violence, minority neighborhoods suffering Embedded Criminologist especially assaults committed with from elevated levels of violent Based on his prior work guns. The yearly number of fatal crime, resident concerns about experiences and exposure to

—— 6 —— criminological insights on the Serving as Chief Policy been as useful as an embedded nature of crime problems, Advisor to the Commissioner criminologist. Put simply, if you Davis decided to pursue a set required my regular presence do not maintain “real-time” of strategies that would better at standing BPD meetings. Of knowledge of current events, position the BPD to manage course, there were ongoing whether significant crimes, arrests, the small number of places and meetings connected to the or political maneuvering inside small number of people that specific crime control initiatives and outside the department, it is generated the majority of violence that comprised my main work difficult to be credible in strategy in Boston. As will be described for Davis. However, I also meetings that are often very below, the bulk of my work as attended weekly Bureau Chiefs sensitive to emerging situations his Chief Policy Advisor involved meetings and bi-weekly Compstat and dynamics. Moreover, the working with his command staff, meetings. Bureau Chiefs meetings line-level officers and staff line-level officers, and civilian involved high-level conversations are very close to substantive analysts to design and implement on management issues and problems that I was called upon violence reduction programs challenges across the bureaus to help address. They held very appropriately tailored to control (field services, investigative clear insights on the nature of the these problem places and problem services, professional standards underlying conditions that caused people. However, I soon became and training, administration and problems to persist and often a key part of the inner circle technology, intelligence, and legal expressed very interesting and that advised Davis on a range of services). Similar to other police innovative thoughts on changes program development and policy departments, the BPD police that could be made to better matters, personnel decisions, and executives attempted to improve manage these problems. In short, resource allocations. Although organizational performance by their knowledge often made me my contract stated that I was embracing Compstat, using it look good in meetings with the supposed to work only half- for data-based decision making, command staff. time, my deep participation in enhanced problem-solving, and command staff work required a management accountability Controlling Violent Crime full-time effort. Since I needed (Weisburd et al. 2003). My Hot Spots to honor my traditional academic work also required a fair amount Commissioner Davis implemented responsibilities at Harvard, I did of time in the field directly the Safe Street Teams (SST) much of this additional work observing officers implementing hot-spots policing strategy in on a pro-bono basis during my programs. On a weekly basis, January 2007. Participating in personal time. It is important I participated in “ride alongs” the development of this program to note here that I was no and “walk alongs” with district was the first major task that different than anyone else on officers and specialized unit Davis asked me to perform. In the BPD command staff in officers. My participation in designing the SST program with terms of the sacrifices they made standing meetings and field-work the BPD command staff, Davis in their personal lives. These allowed me to become engaged and I drew upon our earlier police executives were incredibly in the day-to-day business experiences with implementing dedicated to serving the people of of the department and make a hot-spots policing program in Boston, often working extensive contributions as needed. Lowell (Braga and Bond 2008) hours and dealing with chaotic Without this constant contact and his experiences in reforming scheduling changes at a moment’s with BPD personnel and live the Lowell Police Department notice to deal with emergency knowledge of departmental from a traditional police situations. happenings, I would not have department to an organization

—— 7 —— that embraced community each of the targeted 13 violent in BPD headquarters, and the policing as its core operational crime hot spots. other two meetings were held strategy. Unlike the trajectory The SST officers applied in the policing district stations of the Lowell hot-spots policing problem-oriented policing to that covered the SST areas. In randomized experiment, the SST identify recurring violent crime these meetings, violent crime program was implemented with problems in their assigned trends and patterns in each little a priori thought given to hot-spot area, analyzed the SST area were reviewed and evaluation. Commissioner Davis underlying conditions that caused crime problems and appropriate was new to Boston and simply these problems to persist, and responses were discussed. did not have the political capital developed appropriate responses. I attended these meetings with the Mayor or with the city’s Commissioner Davis also required with then Superintendent-in- residents to launch a randomized officers to engage community Chief Daniel Linskey and then experiment during a disturbing members and local merchants Superintendent of Field Services violent crime increase (Braga in defining and responding to William Evans and participated 2010). However, Davis did identified problems in the hot- in discussions of problems and in mandate that the identification of spot areas. SST officers were the design of responses for each violent crime hot spots needed to expected to follow community SST violent crime hot spot. be a data-driven process. policing ideals in their efforts As the program was Using computerized mapping to reduce violence. Unless there implemented, the BPD wanted technology and violent index was an emergency that required to make certain that the SST crime data for the 2006 calendar additional support outside their areas were indeed centered on year, I worked with the BPD defined areas, SST officers were some of the most persistently Boston Regional Intelligence required to stay in their assigned violent places in Boston. Some Center (BRIC) to identify 13 hot spot. SST officers were also BPD command staff officers violent crime hot-spot areas to not allowed to ride around in were concerned that violent receive the SST program. It patrol cars; rather, they patrolled crime spatial concentrations is important to note here that target hot-spot areas on foot or might not be stable over time. not all identified violent crime on bicycles. Long-term investments of scarce hot spots received a SST. The All SST officers were required police resources in violent crime BPD only had enough patrol to go through additional hot spots would make little personnel to staff 13 teams. The in-service training on the sense if the location of these selection of the treatment areas requirements of the program and hot spots shifted year to year proceeded in a non-random on the principles and techniques irrespective of police activities manner based on BPD command of community and problem- (see Weisburd 2008). With the staff perceptions of need. The 13 oriented policing. I worked assistance of the Boston Regional SST hot spots covered 6 percent closely with BPD Academy Staff of Boston’s street geography to design an appropriate training and experienced 23 percent of curriculum and taught sessions on 1 While shootings and robberies are Boston’s violent index crimes in hot-spots policing and problem- highlighted here, the analyses included 2006 (1,743 of 7,533). A deputy oriented policing. To ensure total violent crime, aggravated assaults, and rape/sexual assaults. The distribution superintendent was assigned to that the program was being of violent crimes that generated higher oversee the SST initiative and a implemented as intended, the levels of fear, shootings and robberies, team comprised of a sergeant and BPD had quarterly accountability weighed more heavily in the minds of BPD command staff in making decisions six patrol officers were assigned meetings with the SST teams. on the actual locations of SST hot spot to implement the program in Two of these meetings were held areas.

—— 8 —— Intelligence Center and some Harvard colleagues, I analyzed Figure 2. Robbery Incidents at Street Units the concentration and stability of in Boston, 1980–2008 violent crime in specific hot-spot locations over time in Boston. The purpose of this exercise was to ensure that the SSTs were appropriately assigned to those locations that consistently generated repeated violent crime incidents over a longer time period. The BPD did not want to make investments of scarce police officer resources at locations that represented short-term or temporary problems. Our analysis drew upon methods developed in a seminal longitudinal study of Source: Braga, Hureau, and Papachristos (2011a) crime at small places conducted by a team of University of Maryland researchers in longitudinal analyses to examine 1 percent of street segments and partnership with the Seattle the stability of trends in robbery 8 percent of intersections were Police Department (Weisburd and serious gun violence over the the locations of nearly 50 percent et al. 2004). 29-year study period. of all commercial robberies and The analysis began with the The analysis uncovered 66 percent of all street robberies. creation of a spatial database that remarkable stability in crime Figure 2 demonstrates this captured each intersection and trends within these street units. stability in robbery trends in a street segment (the street sections From 1980–2008 approximately slightly different way. The steady in between two intersections) across the city (Braga et al. 2010; Table 1. Distribution of Gun Violence at Braga et al. 2011a). The research Street Units in Boston, 1980–2008 team identified 18,155 street segments and 10,375 intersections N of in the City of Boston. The team incidents per N of % of Sum of % of then gathered data from BPD on street unit street units street units incidents incidents all reported robberies (street and 0 25,245 88.5% 0 0.0% commercial; 142,213 robberies) and all injurious shooting events 1 1,923 6.7% 1,923 26.1% (shots were fired and a person 2–4 1,037 3.6% 2,674 36.3% was wounded; 7,602) from 5–9 269 0.9% 1,730 23.5% 1980–2008.1 These crimes were geocoded and assigned to their 10 or more 65 0.2% 1,032 14.0% appropriate “street unit” (segment Total 28,530 7,359 or intersection). The research team then used sophisticated Source: Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau (2010)

—— 9 —— lower line demonstrates that allocated to persistently violent the proposal to acquire these about 2 percent of the street locations, this exercise also funds. Given the presence of units experienced 50 percent of revealed that there were many other untreated violent crime hot the robberies during each of the violent places in Boston that were spots in Boston, my colleagues 29 years under examination. The not covered by the SST. As will and I were able to use statistical top line shows the percentage of be discussed below, this provided matching techniques to identify street units that experienced 100 an important opportunity to equivalent comparison street percent of the robberies during conduct a rigorous controlled intersections and block faces each year of study. For example, evaluation of the SST initiative. for inclusion in a rigorous in 1980 all of the robberies Over the course of the three quasi-experimental research occurred in just under 12 percent years after SST was implemented, design (Braga et al. 2011b). of the street units in Boston. violent index crimes in Boston Panel regression models, with Over time, the concentration steadily decreased (Figure 1). appropriate covariates to help of robberies increased rather By 2009, violent index crimes in control for any observable dramatically. By 2008, all of the Boston had decreased by nearly differences between the treatment robberies during occurred in just 18 percent to a decade low of and control groups, revealed that 6 percent of the street units in 6,192 incidents from the decade the SST program was associated Boston. high of 7,533 incidents in 2007. with a statistically significant The story was much the Unfortunately, in the absence of 17 percent reduction in violent same for gun violence, as a controlled evaluation design to Index crimes in the treatment only 5 percent of street units accompany program development areas relative to the control experienced 74 percent of the and implementation, it was areas. Most of this reduction in gun violence from 1980–2008. unclear whether the SST strategy violent Index crimes was driven Table 1 shows the distribution could claim any credit for the by a large 19 percent reduction of gun violence across each of observed decreases. For instance, in robbery incidents with a the 28,530 street units, and the observed Boston violent smaller 15 percent reduction from 1980–2008, 88.5 percent crime decreases could have in aggravated assault incidents. of the street units in the city did been part of a larger national A subsequent analysis of street not experience a single shooting trend; U.S. violent index crimes units in two-block buffer zones event. Alternatively, 269 street decreased by 7.5 percent between surrounding the treatment and units experienced 5–9 shooting 2000 and 2009. A simple pre- control street units revealed no events, and 65 street units post analysis of citywide violent evidence of significant violent experienced 10 or more shooting crime trend data obviously does crime displacement. In other events. Amazingly, the worst 60 not parse out the independent words, violent crime did not street units in Boston experienced effects of the SST program simply move around the corner more than 1,000 shootings relative to other rival causal due to focused police attention in between 1980 and 2008. factors. the hot-spot areas. In short, both robberies In 2009, the Boston Police and gun violence were highly Department received Smart Reducing Ongoing concentrated at a small number Policing Initiative funding from Gang Violence of street corners and intersections U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance Despite national acclaim, the in Boston, and this concentration to formally evaluate its SST Boston Police Department remained remarkably stable program. I worked closely with discontinued its well-known over time. While the analysis the BPD’s Office of Research Operation Ceasefire gang confirmed that SST officers were and Development (ORD) on violence reduction strategy as its

—— 10 —— primary response to outbreaks of revealed that the resurgence were under probation and/or gang violence in January 2000 in gun violence during the parole supervision. (see Braga and Winship 2006). 2000s was linked to the same We also used social-network By 2006, fatal and non-fatal underlying gang dynamics as the analyzed police records to shootings had reached levels not 1990s. In 2006, slightly more map the social networks of seen in Boston since the early than 1 percent of the city youth 763 individuals in one Boston 1990s. ages 14 to 24 participated in community (Figure 3), by Soon after his appointment, 65 street gangs that were active using non-arrest observations Davis announced that Operation in violence. However, street to create links between Ceasefire would once again gang violence generated more individuals (the nodes) who were be the BPD’s main response than half of total homicides and observed hanging out together to outbreaks of serious gang gang members were involved in (Papachristos et al. 2012). We violence. He promoted Gary nearly three-fourths of non-fatal found that fully 85 percent of French, who led many of shootings as victims. The gun all shootings in this community the BPD’s Ceasefire efforts violence offenders and victims occur within the observed during the 1990s, to Deputy were often very well known to network (less than 3 percent of Superintendent with oversight of the criminal justice system with total neighborhood population)— the Youth Violence Strike Force long criminal histories and many nearly all of which are driven by (YVSF, known informally as the “gang unit”), school police unit, and the tactical bicycle Figure 3. The Social Network of High-Risk Individuals unit. With the support of Davis in Cape Verdean Community in Boston, 2008 and his command staff, French reinstated the Ceasefire approach as a citywide, interagency effort to disrupt ongoing cycles of gang violence. As was the case in the 1990s, I became a member of the Ceasefire working group. The first contribution I made to the working group process was to complete a fresh problem analysis of homicides and gang- involved shootings. As shootings began to increase in the early- to mid-2000s, some BPD managers believed that the gun violence problem was very different than it was in the 1990s and was linked to increasing juvenile populations and prisoner reentry issues (Braga et al. 2008). Completed with my then Harvard colleagues David Hureau and Andrew Papachristos, Source: Papachristos, Braga and Hureau (2012) the problem analysis research

—— 11 —— 10 different gangs, also observed focused deterrence strategies especially when supported by in the network. Second, the can be difficult to implement a management accountability shooting victims occupy unique and sustain over extended time system (in this case, the Ceasefire and identifiable positions in the periods (Braga 2012; Kennedy working group meetings and network. And, third, the risk of 2011). Research products broader Compstat sessions), victimization within the network that document these high-risk can be very helpful in ensuring spreads outward from other social networks and the violent that the groups most active in shooting victims to infect their behaviors of particular groups gun violence, and the groups friends and associates. In fact over time are very valuable in that offend after the deterrence each “handshake” closer one is to ensuring that these strategies message has been delivered, a shooting victim increases one’s are sustained in a particular receive the enforcement attention own probability of getting shot jurisdiction. Working with the they merit. Scorecards keep the by approximately 25 percent. Boston Regional Intelligence operational partners focused Focused deterrence strategies Center, we developed gang on risky groups over time and honor core deterrence ideas, “shooting scorecards” to help maintain the implementation of such as increasing risks faced guide Ceasefire implementation. the focused deterrence strategy as by offenders, while finding new In the most basic form, shooting a whole. and creative ways of deploying scorecards are simply rank- Figure 4 presents the gangs traditional and nontraditional ordered frequencies of the that generated the highest law enforcement tools to do criminal groups that commit the numbers of fatal and non-fatal so, such as communicating highest number of shootings and shootings in Boston during incentives and disincentives experience the greatest number calendar year 2010. The Mozart directly to targeted offenders of shooting victimizations during gang committed 16 shootings, (Kennedy 2008). Unfortunately, a specific time period (Braga by far the most active shooter practical experience suggests that et al. 2014). Shooting scorecards, group in Boston that year. In order, the next most frequent shooter groups in Boston were Figure 4. Gangs that Generated the Highest Numbers the Thetford (12 shootings), of Shootings in Boston, 2010 Wendover (9 shootings), and Cameron (7 shootings) gangs. The key analytical insight is clear. Relative to other gangs in Boston, these top shooter groups should be closely reviewed to determine whether focused enforcement attention is necessary to halt their persistent involvement in serious gun violence. Gang scorecard data were also used to measure Ceasefire performance by simple comparisons of year-to-year counts of shootings committed by particular groups or more Source: Braga, Hureau, and Grossman (2014) complex analyses of longitudinal data.

—— 12 —— involved shootings and the victim Figure 5. The Number of Shootings Committed by the group in seven gang-involved 2009 Most Frequent Shooter Gangs in 2010 shootings in 2006. Boston Regional Intelligence Center intelligence suggested that most of the Lucerne shootings, which accounted for nearly 10 percent of all Boston shootings in 2006, were carried out by no more than six or seven members of the gang. As Figure 6 reveals, the impact of the Ceasefire intervention on their gun violence behavior was noteworthy. In 2006 and 2007, Lucerne gang averaged 33.5 total shootings per year. Their yearly average plummeted by 87.2% to 4.3 per year between 2008 and 2010. The formal quasi- Source: Braga, Hureau, and Grossman (2014) experimental evaluation estimated that the re-invigorated Ceasefire focused-deterrence strategy Figure 5 presents the number strategies focused on these generated a statistically-significant of shootings committed by the groups and implement a strategic 31 percent reduction in shootings 2009 most frequent shooter response immediately. involving treated gangs relative gangs in 2010. The number These gang shooting to shootings involving matched of shootings committed by the scorecard data were then used comparison gangs. CVO/Homes Ave, H-Block, to conduct a rigorous quasi- Orchard Park, Greenwood, experimental evaluation of Translational Criminology Lenox, Hitfam, Morse, and the impact of the post-2007 Beyond my close involvement in Franklin Field gangs decreased Ceasefire intervention on gang two key BPD violence reduction between 2009 and 2010. While violence in Boston (see Braga programs, I was regularly called more careful evaluation of any et al. 2013). Between 2007 upon to summarize and explain implemented violence reduction and 2010, the BPD and its the available scientific evidence strategies is clearly warranted, this criminal justice, social service, on the nature of crime problems simple year-to-year comparison and community-based partners and the impact of evaluated suggests that shootings conducted Ceasefire interventions crime reduction programs. These committed by these gangs were on 19 violent gangs. The exchanges would occur when in short-term decline. In contrast, Lucerne Street Doggz was the participating in official meetings shootings by the DSP and first group selected for renewed and during casual conversations. Mission gangs increased between Ceasefire attention because it In many ways, this dynamic 2009 and 2010. This suggested was the most violent gang in interface between research and to the Ceasefire working group Boston at the beginning of the practice represents what former that they needed to reassess study time period. Lucerne was U.S. National Institute of Justice existing violence reduction the suspect group in 30 gang- Director John Laub (2012)

—— 13 —— problems to recur. The working Figure 6. Shootings Involving the Lucerne Street Doggz, group participants started to 2006–2010 develop programmatic elements to encourage problem-solving responses in the BPD version of Compstat as result of this information. Sometimes the translation of criminological findings occurred in a much more spontaneous manner. For instance, during a particular Compstat session that involved the discussion of a recent uptick in burglary, Davis asked me to give a quick summary of the research on repeat victimization and the strategies used to protect Source: Braga, Hureau, and Papachristos (2013) vulnerable victims and detect the offenders that continue to victimize them. As another would describe as “translational implement Compstat in the example, while getting some criminology”–academics and BPD and scheduled a series of coffee in the cafeteria, former practitioners working as equal working group meetings to make Superintendent Bruce Holloway, partners in applying scientific the necessary administrative then the Chief of the Bureau of knowledge to develop more arrangements to launch this Investigative Services, asked me effective programs and policies. initiative. In preparation, I closely to provide a quick synopsis of my In these settings, I disseminated read research on Compstat by past research on the sources of criminological findings as general Weisburd et al. (2003), Silverman illegal guns to Boston criminals. information that BPD command (1999), and others. During key Apparently, he had been recently staff could consider as they made moments of these meetings, I asked by Commissioner Davis to decisions on how to proceed in interjected factoids from these think about alternative strategies dealing with a particular problem studies for their consideration. to reduce the availability of guns or policy dilemma. Given their desire to advance on Boston streets. The command Significant strategy meetings community problem solving staff seemed generally to find were often scheduled well in in the BPD, I made sure to these brief commentaries helpful advance of the actual date highlight that Weisburd et al. in making decisions on how and time that they were held. (2003) found that Compstat to approach particular crime During the interim period, I was more likely to generate problems. would be sure to educate myself reactive crime control responses, Occasionally, I would be on the most recent research such as flooding a problem area called upon to deliver formal in whatever substantive area with patrol officers (putting presentations on specific subjects the meeting would focus. For ‘cops on the dots’), rather than that Davis thought the command example, immediately after he more creative problem-solving staff would find germane to was appointed, Commissioner responses designed to address their work. For instance, after Davis decided he wanted to the conditions that cause crime his participation in a plenary

—— 14 —— discussion at the 2011 U.S. trends in their districts were writing for the Commissioner National Institute of Justice not accurate. They suggested by adding scientific evidence annual research and evaluation that the Field Reports Unit, into his talking points as conference, Davis asked me to which is charged with coding appropriate. There were times present the available research on incident reports according to when I was asked to participate “” and crime, the strict FBI Uniform Crime in media interviews to justify as well as the problem of “legal Reports standards, was not why particular crime control cynicism” when the police try to always properly characterizing strategies were being pursued work with disadvantaged minority the incidents. Davis asked me and how these interventions communities suffering from high to conduct a policy analysis of seemed to be generating desirable levels of violence. Apparently, this issue. This project involved impacts. My participation in he was very impressed by the modest data analysis and these media sessions basically presentation given by Harvard interviewing and took about one involved summarizing the Professor Robert Sampson at the month to complete. The analysis results of problem analyses plenary session and felt that his suggested that the problem and explaining the findings of command staff should know the was not with the Field Reports impact evaluations. I also assisted general research in these areas. Unit. Rather, the front-line the Office of Research and As such, I prepared a ten-minute supervisors in the districts needed Development in writing particular presentation that I delivered at to more closely scrutinize the proposals, such as submissions to the next Bureau Chiefs meeting. narratives of completed crime the Bureau of Justice Assistance While I am far from an expert reports to ensure that the proper and the National Institute of in these substantive areas, the elements were identified before Justice for much-needed funding, command staff seemed to submission to Field Reports and reviewed requests for data appreciate the material as a very for final coding. Occasionally, submitted to the BPD by other thoughtful discussion on the I would be asked to lead other academic researchers. While implications of this work for their policy analysis work that was Commissioner Davis made community policing strategies much more complex and required the final decisions on whether followed my presentation. multiple years to complete. For particular proposed research instance, the American Civil projects would be supported Ad-Hoc Research Projects Liberties Union of Massachusetts by the BPD, I provided him and Other Jobs requested the BPD analyze their with assessments of whether Over the course of my tenure Field Interrogation Observation the research methodology as Chief Policy Advisor, I reports (more commonly called represented sound social science participated in a number of ad- field contact cards) for possible and whether the research seemed hoc research projects. Most of racial disparities. This project well positioned to generate value these projects were small in scale landed in my lap and required to the BPD in particular and and carried out in partnership extensive collaboration with broader crime and justice policy with the Boston Regional external research partners such discussions more generally. Intelligence Center and Office as Professor Jeffrey Fagan at of Research and Development. Columbia Law School. Conclusion For instance, during a Compstat Beyond these ad-hoc research session, several Captains projects, I helped out with The idea of embedding a raised concerns that the crime other important tasks as needed. criminologist inside of a police incident data used to hold them For instance, I was regularly department to work alongside accountable for managing crime called upon to assist in speech practitioners on particular

—— 15 —— staffs. Boston now serves as an important example of the potential “For criminologists, the personal crime control efficacy of preventive policing strategies that reduce rewards of engaging work that the need to arrest, prosecute, and directly influences practice and incarcerate offenders. In response to an increase in violent crime helps address long-standing during the early- to mid-2000s, the Boston Police Department societal problems are substantial.” implemented two preventive policing strategies. The revitalized Operation Ceasefire focused- program initiatives and as a departments. Rather, inviting a deterrence program concentrated general resource for a wide range criminologist to work on the inside criminal justice, social service, of issues represents an evolution of a police department in a stable and community-based resources from traditional academic-police position enhances the capacity on halting outbreaks of gun research partnerships that are of the agency to understand and violence among feuding street usually limited to very specific address these challenges by virtue gangs. The BPD also launched its projects and typically last for very of adding a skill set not held by Safe Street Teams initiative that short time periods. Embedded other police staff. Commissioner used community problem-solving criminologists can enhance the Davis deserves much credit for techniques to control violent capacity of police departments to recognizing the need for this skill hot-spot locations in Boston. understand the nature of ongoing set in his agency and taking the Controlled evaluations of both crime problems and develop bold step of inviting an outsider programs suggest immediate innovative programs to prevent into his department. Similarly, violence reduction impacts (Braga these problems from recurring. the willingness of BPD personnel et al. 2011b; Braga et al. 2013). Working in close partnership to share data and insights on Influenced by these programs with sworn and civilian staff, problems allowed me to generate and other innovations, violent embedded criminologists value for the department. Davis UCR Index crimes in Boston develop important insights and the BPD staff co-produced decreased by 30 percent between on the reality of urban crime the knowledge that led to 2006 (7,512 incidents) and 2012 problems and the complexity of important policy changes and led (5,265 incidents) (Figure 1). the operational environments to the implementation of programs Equally impressive, total arrests in which police departments that generated violence reduction decreased by 37 percent during operate. These insights magnify gains in Boston. While my research the same time period (from the value of criminologists’ was a part of this change effort, 24,745 arrests in 2006 to 15,625 scientific knowledge and the BPD command staff and line- arrests in 2012). analytical expertise in developing level officers and civilians executed For criminologists, the information products that can the programmatic work inside the personal rewards of engaging improve practice. department and on the streets of work that directly influences It is important to note here Boston. practice and helps address that embedding a criminologist is The Boston experience longstanding societal problems not a silver bullet that, by itself, suggests that police departments are substantial. Unfortunately, ameliorates the multifaceted do benefit in tangible ways by most universities place less challenges faced by police adding criminologists to their emphasis on public service

—— 16 —— and more value on conducting there is some convincing evidence more rigorous controlled sophisticated research studies of widespread evaluator bias or evaluations. However, it is that generate high-quality journal conflict of interest associated important to be wary of bias articles. For young scholars with such arrangements, these issues and adopt safeguards seeking tenure, the pressure collaborations seem necessary when serving as an internal to produce in a way that fits to put academics in the position researcher. To ensure that I with well-established scholarly of being able to conduct high wasn’t unintentionally biased in traditions may prevent some from quality evaluations of prevention my approach and interpretation, engaging police departments in and intervention programs. As I invited external colleagues to such a direct way. However, it David Olds (2009) argues in his participate in the design and is important to recognize that essay in support of “disciplined execution of all problem analysis forming research partnerships passion,” balancing scientific and program evaluation work with law enforcement agencies, integrity with the practical completed for the BPD. While whether as a research partner challenges associated with my colleagues improved the rigor or an embedded criminologist, program evaluation in real world of these studies, their involvement and conducting high-quality settings needs to be addressed also increased the transparency research that will stand up to peer through higher standards for of the research enterprises review are not mutually exclusive reporting trials, better peer described here. Indeed, serving enterprises. Basic problem analysis review, improved investigator as an objective voice that can be expanded to a more training, and rigorous collegial presents unbiased findings for rigorous examination of larger support of those who choose this consideration by police decision criminological issues. Innovative line of work. makers is the most important crime prevention programs Welsh, Braga, and Peel contribution that an embedded can be evaluated in ways that (2012) recently examined the criminologist can make. advance methods and models in importance of evaluator influence criminology. Finally, the trust that on outcomes in police crime is built between academics and prevention programs. Their Author’s note: Any the criminal justice practitioners study did not find support for opinions, findings, they are serving can result in the cynical view, which holds conclusions, or richer data being made available that researchers have a personal recommendations in this for new analyses. stake in the program or are document are those of the There are divergent views pressured to report positive author and do not necessarily on how closely program results. Importantly, they found reflect the views of the evaluators, such as external or that an evaluator’s involvement Boston Police Department. in this case internal academic in the implementation of the The author would like to researchers, should be involved program may be a necessary thank former Commissioner with practitioners in program condition of successfully executed Edward F. Davis and the development and implementation. police experiments in complex Boston Police Department To some observers, close- field settings. My experiences as for giving him the working relationships between an embedded criminologist in opportunity to work closely practitioners and academics may the Boston Police Department with an incredibly dedicated violate the purported scientific support their findings. By being group of men and women necessity to separate program involved in program design and on improving public safety in developer and evaluator roles implementation, I was much Boston. (Eisner 2009). To others, unless better positioned to conduct

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—— 19 —— ABOUT THE POLICE FOUNDATION The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing innovation and science in policing. As the country’s oldest police research organization, the Police Foundation has learned that police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-based policing. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.

Police Foundation Staff BOARD OF DIRECTORS Office of the President Weldon J. Rougeau Blake Norton Mary DeStefano Chairman Vice President Research Associate Mora Fiedler James Bueermann Senior Policy Analyst President Research Division Dr. Karen L. Amendola Mary Sigler George H. Bohlinger III Chief Behavioral Scientist Research Assistant Edwin E. Hamilton Dr. Travis Taniguchi Clarence Edwards Professional Services Director Senior Research Associate Adam Kaufman Maria Valdovinos Dean S. Esserman Research Assistant Research and Administrative Coordinator Amber Scherer Paul Helmke Research Assistant Dr. Daniel J. Woods Senior Research Associate Julie Horney Science Advisors & Research Fellows Dr. David Weisburd Jonathan Knowles Chief Science Advisor Research Fellows Bernard Melekian Dr. Garth den Heyer Dr. Emily G. Owens Senior Research Fellow Senior Research Fellow Mark S. Mellman Clifford Karchmer Dr. Shefali Tripathi Senior Research Fellow Senior Research Fellow W. Walter Menninger Dr. David Klinger Julie Wartell Senior Research Fellow Research Fellow Elsie L. Scott Dr. Laura Wyckoff Senior Research Fellow Andrew L. Sonner

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