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Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 101–110 doi: 10.1002/app5.121 Special Issue

How are Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China?

Linda Jakobson1 andRyanManuel2*

Abstract 1. Introduction

The growing number of actors involved in China watchers continuously debate which China’s international activities has led to frac- factors determine how the Chinese government tured authority in foreign policy decision- responds to international events. In this paper, making. Actors vie for the attention of senior our initial starting point is that China’s officials to promote their interests on any responses to international events are moulded specific issue. As a result, decision making is by China’s decision-making system. We often a slow process; there are multiple chan- assume that foreign policy actors have their nels of information, and actors appeal to own bureaucratic interests, and they make public opinion to support their claims. Since calculations according to these interests. While 2012, has taken charge of all this is a relatively common approach within foreign policy related decision-making bodies international relations, it is not one often in what appears to be an attempt to improve followed in studies of Chinese foreign policy.1 coordination of interest groups. A slight shift We also take foreign policy to be as it is de- to a more personified foreign policy than dur- fined by the Chinese system itself; issues with ing the Hu or Jiang eras has also taken place. transnational implications (such as climate In this paper, we describe how foreign policy change or monetary policy, to give two exam- decisions should be made in China according ples) are covered in this paper only when they to formal rules; next, we take into account the are designated by the Chinese system as being reality of how the Chinese political system ‘foreign policy issues’. deals with China’s evolving international role. To analyse how domestic interests shape We conclude by assessing the risks of fragmen- foreign policy decisions, we must focus on tation, on the one hand, and Xi’seffortsto how the Chinese system makes decisions. We recentralise foreign policy, on the other hand. first assess the formal decision-making system Key words: Chinese foreign policy, Xi Jinping by focusing on the official rules, regulations, administration, foreign policy decision- laws and decisions of the Communist Party of making, Chinese foreign policy actors, China (‘CPC’ or ‘the Party’) or the People’s Chinese political system, Chinese political Republic of China (‘PRC’) to explain how fragmentation China’s political organisation should in theory influence China’s international behaviour. We then analyse both the impact of numerous * Jakobson: United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia; Manuel: The new foreign policy actors who have emerged Australian Centre on China in the World, ANU 1. There are of course exceptions to this statement—most College of Asia & the Pacific, Canberra, Australian of the footnotes in this paper refer to these. Probably the Capital Territory, Australia; . Corresponding author: most significant exception is the work of Zhou Qi, a Ryan Manuel, The Australian Centre on China in Chinese academic married to a senior foreign affairs the World, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, official, whose dissertation on the topic, written while Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia. her husband was posted in Washington DC, is the signal email . academic work. See references for Zhou Qi (2008).

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. 102 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 as a result of China’s changing global role and structured way. Orders are passed down from the informal norms of behaviour that have de- level to level. While an individual can make a veloped between these actors. We conclude decision to do something, he/she must have re- by assessing trends in foreign policy decision course to an order from a higher level allowing making under Xi Jinping’s leadership. him or her to act. We draw on an extensive body of inter- The Party’s 87 million-odd members offi- views, case studies, workshops, dialogues, cially communicate according to a structured research of Chinese-language and English- system governing contact throughout different language sources and relationship mapping to levels of the Party hierarchy. Each political shed light on how various actors influence level must coordinate the different interests China’s international behaviour. This method and agencies involved in a given order from is based on a number of previous works sepa- above. Each level can then issue its own orders rately written by the authors. downwards to the next level. There are differ- ent types of orders, and each type of order 1.1. China’s Formal Security Policy has a different level of authority. The rank of Decision-Making Structure the body that issues the order affects the au- thority of the order. This system of authority fi We begin with the assumption that domestic is outlined in an array of of cial documents fl that outline the different ranks and classes of political considerations can in uence foreign 3 policy decisions.2 There are some analytic ad- positions in the Chinese system. These rules vantages in placing the foreign and security de- shape how different actors and interests com- fl cision-making areas in a domestic context. The pete for policy in uence. The following sec- formal rank and authority of different bodies tion will outline the bodies responsible for within Chinese domestic politics are relatively setting these rules and making the most author- well established. Rank consciousness dictates itative foreign policy orders. the way that officials and their agencies interact with each other. 1.2. The Rule-Makers Almost all members of the bodies charged with implementing any policy are first and The Communist Party of China and the foremost members of the CPC. The Party’s Government of the People’sRepublicofChina power is paramount. The Party’s highest body have separate decision-making structures al- ranks higher than the highest State body’s though some entities overlap in function, au- rank; the Party outranks all sectors of the State, thority and even personnel. Therefore, within including government departments; the Party the formal Chinese political system, decisions controls the use of force through the People’s are made along dual tracks: the Party track Liberation Army (PLA), which is an armed and the State track. From the point of view of wing of the Party rather than a conventional understanding how the political system works, state army, and the Party controls the consulta- there are three major coordination bodies of in- tive mechanisms of the state, which are de- terest: one within the Party and two within the signed to reflect popular opinion. State. Within the formal Party decision-making The CPC Central Committee is the leading system, implementation is meant to occur in a Party coordination body. Because the Party

2. As Gourevitch argues, ‘The international system is 3. Party rank is outlined in The Secretariat Bureau of the underdetermining....Theenvironmentmayexertstrong State Council General Office (1998) Zhongyang zhengfu pulls, but short of actual occupation, some leeway in re- zuzhi jigou (The Apparatus of the Chinese Central Govern- sponse to that environment remains. The explanation of ment), Gaige chubanshe: Beijing; state rank is available choice among the possibilities therefore requires some ex- through various state websites and portals. See also Susan amination of domestic politics.’ Peter Gourevitch (1978). V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin (2013), Understanding The second image reversed: the international sources of do- China’s Political System, Congressional Research Service: mestic politics. International Organization, 32, p. 900. Washington DC.

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Jakobson and Manuel: Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China 103 reigns supreme, the Central Committee is also change according to the position that the Party the most important body in the Chinese system. places them in, and both individuals and roles The Central Committee’s 205 members are are rotated regularly. Individuals generally de- assigned to the most important positions in rive their rank—and their clout—ex officio. the Chinese government and represent China’s So one’s rank within the system as an individ- most powerful 195 men and ten women. ual is not only the measure of one’s position in The second major coordination body is the the system, but also a powerful indication of State Council to which the Central Committee the power one’s organisation or interest area has bestowed the day-to-day administration of holds within the system. For example, when the country. The State Council—China’s ‘cab- Xi Jinping travels overseas, people who are inet’—is headed by a state premier, who plays from a Western political system’s perspective a role similar to that of a prime minister, and appear to be advisors (such as who, with a number of vice-premiers and and ) rank more highly and are councillors, oversees a government system. treated according to protocol in a more senior The State Council controls a wide array of cen- manner than the highest ranked foreign affairs tral bodies of lower rank, including commis- professional, the State Councillor in charge of sions, ministries, administration bodies and foreign affairs () or the Foreign central organisations (such as hospitals or Minister (). Li, who heads the General state-owned enterprises). Office of the CPC, and Wang Huning, who The third noteworthy coordination body, heads the CPC Research Office and is also a though less important than the Central Com- Politburo member, have greater status, rank mittee or the State Council, is the National and power in the Chinese system than Yang People’s Congress. The National People’s or Wang Yi because of their higher Party rank. Congress is a parliament-like entity that in principle oversees the State Council. In reality, 1.3. Major Bodies in the Foreign Policy its power is limited although in recent years it Decision-Making Structure has become noteworthy as a body that permits a relatively free discussion of important legisla- The ultimate decision-making body on crucial tion under consideration. foreign policy issues (and any other issue of ut- Because each of these major coordination most relevance) is the executive committee of bodies meets rarely, usually annually, they the Central Committee, called the Politburo delegate their decision-making powers to exec- Standing Committee (PSC). The PSC oversees utive sub-committees who meet more regu- consequential decisions affecting China’sma- larly. The overwhelmingly most important jor relationships, including the United States, decision-making body is the CPC Politburo Japan, Russia and North Korea. The PSC also Standing Committee, whose seven members has to deal with emergencies or international derive from the 25-member Politburo, who in crises, such as border skirmishes or interna- turn are the most powerful members of the tional incidents. While one assumes that there Central Committee. are a number of so-called ‘point men’ on the While these major coordination bodies meet PSC covering various strategic issues—Wang in full but rarely, they matter enormously for Qishan on Sino-US relations, two reasons. First, the decisions made by their on the European Union and Zhang Dejiang respective smaller executive groups determine on North Korea for example—with the ex- how the country actually is governed. Second, ception of PSC chair Xi Jinping, none of the the full bodies determine the rank of different other members have specific foreign policy individuals, and thus the degree of importance responsibilities. of different interests within the Chinese sys- Shifts or changes in policy and long-term tem. The importance of an issue often can be decisions that demand lengthier and possibly gauged on the basis of the rank of the person numerous discussions can be taken up in the responsible for it. The roles of individuals Politburo. Additionally, the Politburo has

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 104 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 regular ‘study sessions’; these serve as a plat- and on the rank of the most senior member of form for the leadership to promote new policies the LSG. Again, rank is determined by the indi- or directions. These study sessions are meticu- vidual. So the more powerful the head of the lously orchestrated. The topics of the sessions LSG, the more powerful the LSG is seen to are then publicised widely. The current Polit- be, and the more able it is to prosecute its coor- buro has held 22 study sessions since late dinated interest within the Chinese system. 2012, five of which have had international rel- Foreign policy has powerful LSGs compared evance. (People.cn 2015) with other groups within the system as foreign All significant changes in direction of strate- policy LSGs are headed by the General Secre- gic policy, or of the rules governing policy tary (Xi Jinping). creation, are to be officially endorsed by the Central Committee. But it only meets once a 1.4. The Warring Entities year. So matters are more likely to be discussed in the PSC (or Politburo), who are presumed to Historically, the military establishment has meet roughly weekly and fortnightly, respec- been an important interest group in the Chinese tively (Cabestan 2009). Decision making re- political system, and it continues to wield sub- mains secretive in China, especially at the stantial clout. Whether the military would like pinnacle of power; for example, the meeting to have a greater role in foreign policy, deci- dates and the agendas of the PSC are very sion making is not the focus of this article. rarely made public. However, what is important to note is that the Some analysts argue that the Politburo and Party leadership upholds a decision-making Central Committee shun challenging a consen- system that keeps the military at arm’slength sus already reached by the PSC. The closed from political decision making. The military door, consensus-based nature of Chinese deci- has a completely different governance struc- sion making, makes the veracity of this state- ture than other areas of the Chinese state. This ment difficult to test. But actors within the provides it with a good deal of autonomy over PSC and Politburo certainly have some unoffi- its own professional and operational activities. cial veto powers. Constitutionally, and in prac- At times, this autonomy can itself influence tise, China follows the process of ‘collective foreign policy. An example can be seen in the leadership’, and so, in theory and presumably 2007 anti-satellite missile test, which was con- in practise too; major decisions can be vetoed ducted by the military without a coordinated should a coalition be formed that is strong Chinese position being agreed upon in advance enough to overturn any dissent from others. with the civilian establishment. The Ministry Further complicating any attempt to under- of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not able to ver- stand the Chinese decision-making system is ify the test or provide any comment until more the existence of ‘Leading Small Groups’ than a week later. (LSGs) ( zhongyang lingdao xiaozu) The military does not necessarily strive to or committees to advise the leaders on how influence foreign policy decision making. they should proceed on any given issue of in- Many depend on the issue at hand, and whether terest. The most important LSGs are attached the issue is related to national security. If we to the Central Committee, and through that, judge the role of the PLA solely based on the report to the PSC. rank and position of the individuals who are Leading Small Groups can be established to members of the LSGs, PLA members are often look into any issue—there were leading small included to relay information, either between groups for the 2008 Olympic Games for exam- the military and civilian foreign policy estab- ple—, and they function both as coordination lishments or within the PLA. For example, mechanisms for different state and Party inter- one of the ex officio military members of the ests, and as bodies to implement central direc- foreign policy-related LSGs is usually an ex- tives. The LSGs rank is usually dependent on pert in dealing with the outside world from a the rank of the body that established the LSG, military perspective.

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Jakobson and Manuel: Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China 105

As its international commitments have international events that appear to fall between grown, the Chinese system has increasingly the cracks of China’s existing foreign affairs had to put more effort into shaping its public system. In the case of these new issues arising, image. Indeed, propaganda bodies play a cen- new bodies can be formed that combine differ- tral role in Chinese foreign policy. All of the ent interests in foreign affairs. An example is major LSGs dealing with foreign or security the State Oceanic Administration, restructured decisions have a representative (or two) from in 2013. This second-tier entity, under the Min- the propaganda organs of the Party. These rep- istry of Land and Resources, focuses on resentatives tend to outrank the members of the China’s maritime environment. Since 2013, it foreign policy establishment within the LSGs. has also been administratively in charge of a The importance attached to propaganda in consolidated Chinese Coast Guard though the the Chinese political system is intertwined with Ministry of Public Security appears to have the CPC’schallengeindealingwitha the upper hand in operational control transforming international environment in (Jakobson 2014, pp. 16–18). The relationship which China is active. These difficulties will between this State Oceanic Administration, be examined more in the following section. the Ministry of Public Security and the foreign But it is important to note here that the Chinese policy system remains unclear. system strives to solicit the skills it needs to un- As China’s international activities have in- dertake its international commitments with the creased, nearly every ministry in the Chinese entities that are already in place. This need to system has developed interests in foreign af- ‘retrofit old organisations’ for new tasks can fairs in some way. For example, a recent report be seen clearly in foreign affairs. For example, by one of the authors noted the following inter- in the foreign affairs arena, there are at least ests in maritime affairs alone: the Ministry of three basic bureaux that are each responsible Public Security; the Ministry of Defence; the for elements of foreign policy. Fishing Administration under the Ministry of The first is the Party’s own International Agriculture; the State Oceanic Administration Department (CPC ID), formerly the Interna- under the Ministry of Land and Resources; tional Liaison Department. Initially, this depart- the Maritime Safety Administration under the ment solely managed relations with overseas Ministry of Transport; the Ministry of Environ- communist and socialist parties. However, with mental Protection; General Administration of the opening and reform of China in the 1970s Customs; the Ministry of Science and Technol- and 1980s, the CPC ID’s role changed. Today, ogy; the National Tourism Association; the it manages links to foreign political parties and Ministry of Industry and Information Technol- movements. The CPC ID is instrumental on de- ogy; and, senior to them all, the National De- cisions pertaining to China’s relations with velopment and Reform Commission that is North Korea, Cambodia and Vietnam. responsible for economic development gener- The major state bodies are the MFA, and the ally and resources in particular. To that could Taiwan Affairs Office. The MFA is responsi- also be added the Ministry of State Security ble for government-to-government relations and the State Asset and Supervision Adminis- with other states around the world. It fulfils tration Commission, which oversees the major the usual role of a foreign ministry in a govern- state-owned enterprises, including the oil ment, with the caveat that the dominant posi- firms. tion of the Party at the expense of the Chinese State makes the MFA weaker than in most na- 1.5. Old System, New World: Problems tions. The Taiwan Affairs Office is in charge of of Chinese Foreign Policy Making preparing policy, negotiations and agreements with what calls the ‘Taiwan Within this plethora of different actors and in- authorities’. terests lies the heart of problems with China’s Despite these three bodies that all work on foreign policy decision making. Nominally, foreign affairs, new issues regularly arise in each agency understands that its work

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 106 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 represents only a fraction of China’s broad na- regulatory bodies under the State Council as tional interests, but when it comes to creating ‘a fractious, highly competitive group of insti- policy, each agency sees itself as the only (or tutions with sometimes overlapping jurisdic- the most important) representative of the whole tion’ (Lawrence 2013, p. 30). picture. Foreign affairs are not immune to this All foreign policy actors claim to operate in infighting. Indeed, the fact that so many differ- the name of China’s national interests—and ent types of actors are able to influence foreign thus almost all actions can be justified. The policy may actually exacerbate the problem. Ministry of Commerce promotes China’spros- These actors include senior CPC officials who perity; the People’s Liberation Army defends hold no government position, senior officials China’s sovereignty; the oil companies ensure in ministries, agencies and provincial govern- China’s energy security; local governments ments, senior officers in various PLA units raise living standards; netizens uphold China’s and CEOs of large state-owned resource com- dignity, and so on. When this is combined with panies. Five provincial leaders are Politburo the natural bureaucratic instinct of ensuring members and outrank all senior Chinese gov- sufficient resources for one’s department, con- ernment foreign affairs officials. People with flations of interest can emerge. For example, regular personal access to the Party General the PLA is prone to exaggerate the tensions Secretary or his aides—senior military leaders, over maritime interests to ensure sufficient CEOs of large state-owned enterprises, aca- funding for new vessels and aircraft; and in do- demics or even personal friends—can all seek ing so, it is likely to find a natural ally in the to have their voices heard. And this is but a one or more of the national oil companies as- shortlist of what is an ever-growing group of piring to explore resources in contested waters. actors; indeed, provincial leaders, fishermen, Many of the actors within the foreign policy tourist agencies and dumpling factories have system hold similar ranks, which mean they all had an impact on China’sforeignpolicy cannot issue orders to each other.4 So while over the past decade. the MFA can make its own rules and expect These internal politics are complicated by all MFA staff to follow these rules, that has the lack of status accorded to the State Council- no impact on any other ministry—who are able lor on Foreign Policy (currently Yang Jiechi). to make their own rules. Only an order from As a State Councillor, Yang may be the highest above, from a higher-ranking body, can over- foreign policy professional, but he is outranked ride a decision. Consequently, many actors in in general Party status by at least 30 other peo- the Chinese foreign policy system compete ple and is at the same rank as around 20 other for the favour of higher-ranking bodies. In the people. case of major issues with regard to foreign af- Interestingly, the rank and status given to fairs, that often means competing for the favour foreign policy professionals have diminished of the Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping. as China’s foreign policy obligations have This competition can be vicious. Other ana- grown. State Councillors in charge of foreign lysts have described the wide array of commis- policy are today unlikely to be able to ensure sions, ministries and state administrative and that senior decision makers heed their advice in internal disputes over policy direction. Yang is more likely to be able to gain sway through 4. For example, the five so-called super-ministries, formed out of a 2008 administrative reform, although some argue his role as the head of the Foreign Affairs that the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology Office, which is responsible for managing the was the only true winner from this reform. Another exam- affairs of the Foreign Affairs and National ple can be seen in the creation of the Ministry of the Envi- Security Leading Small Groups. The responsi- ronment out of the former State Environmental Planning bilities of the Foreign Affairs Office, which in- Agency, with the new ministry going up a rank. In a less positive vein (for him, anyway), see the role of Chen clude drafting meeting agendas and controlling Deming as Minister of Trade but only an alternate member the flow of documents to senior leaders, may of the 17th Central Committee. provide Yang with greater bureaucratic power

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Jakobson and Manuel: Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China 107 than if he was only a State Councillor. How- the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Yet both of ever, even given Yang’s ability to set the these LSGs have the same office (the Foreign agenda of foreign policy discussions, his role Affairs Office), have the same secretary (the in decision making is likely to be limited. For- State Councillor for Foreign Affairs) and have eign affairs professionals appear to be placed the same staff writing briefings and managing within senior decision-making bodies largely documentation.6 It is hard to imagine that the to provide information and, following a deci- briefings and information provided to either sion, manage policy implementation (Jakobson leading small group is substantially different & Knox 2010, p. 8).5 or that one group would be any quicker in There are myriad competing bodies feeding reacting to events. information into the Chinese foreign policy de- This inefficient process of internal informa- cision-making system. Each agency involved tion provision creates complications in how in national security and foreign policy provides China’s foreign policy system deals with the regular reports that reflect concerns specificto outside world. The time it takes to provide in- that agency’s work focus. For example, the formation through ‘authoritative’ processes, General Office of the Central Committee pre- time magnified by the many actors involved pares a daily summary for leaders on major is- in China’s foreign policy, allows other actors sues and intelligence information. The watch space and time to attempt to influence policy centre of the General Staff Department of the through public opinion and informal channels. PLA delivers a daily intelligence summary China’s media is far livelier and in some re- and a report on the threat environment to the spects open to outsiders’ commentary than Politburo and the Central Military Commis- when China’s foreign policy decision-making sion. The government’s public media arm, bodies were established. Public commentators, , produces daily reports including a number of uniformed senior mili- and a number of ‘Reference Materials’,both tary officers, publish comments in print media, public and private (Qi 2008). The Foreign television or in online forums. Most commen- Ministry’s diplomatic posts send through re- tators have the explicit permission of their su- ports and cables. periors to provide media commentary or All of this information can be used by for- submit opinion pieces. A person who has a per- eign affairs professionals to brief senior sonal connection to a senior leader—in some leaders. Urgent or important issues (as decreed cases through a family member—can weigh from earlier) involve a process of delegation in with a stance on foreign policy events, while and briefing before a discussion is made. Often the senior leaders are waiting for the system to this is done through the State Councillor for provide them with information on the events. Foreign Affairs, who can order his office (the Opinions and information published by Chi- Foreign Affairs Office) to summon research re- nese official media undoubtedly influence the ports, analyses, opinions and data from rele- prism through which many people view vant government agencies, think tanks and China’s foreign policy. For example, a few academia. The State Councillor is then briefed, military officers regularly express uncompro- and then the State Councillor or his delegate mising views about China’s territorial claims briefs the senior leader. in the Chinese media. While these officers This collation of information can be highly may or may not have sought permission to ineffective. The National Security LSG, for ex- speak out, they clearly believe that their senti- ample, is presumed to have been set up because ments are shared by their superior officers the Foreign Affairs LSG was seen as being not and that they will not be punished for speaking proactive enough during the 1999 bombing of out. And these officers’ hawkish views in turn tend to spur on media commentators and 5. See also A. Doak Barnett (1985), The Making of For- eign Policy in China: Structure and Process.Westview 6. Known usually as being ‘one office, two signs’ or Press: Boulder CO, p. 45 ‘hanging out two shingles’ (gua liang ge paizi).

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 108 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016

‘netizens’ (citizens using online media) who the domain of the Party General Secretary— insist on China being ‘strong’. So the military and the problems highlighted earlier can only officers—who nearly without exception have be resolved with the General Secretary’s impri- no operational experience as uniformed offi- matur. In the final part of this article, we turn to cers but are PLA propaganda specialists— examine the role of current General Secretary make inflammatory statements, stimulate fur- Xi Jinping. ther commentary calling for China to be ‘strong’ and then claim to have ‘public opinion on their side’ in a way that foreign affairs 1.6. The Ultimate Decision-Maker: Xi Jinping professionals cannot. Other systems of government balance multi- Xi Jinping is the ultimate decision maker on ple competing voices by establishing guide- foreign policy issues. This leadership role be- lines on how competing opinions should be gan before Xi ascended to the very top of resolved (elections) and documents (such as China’s power hierarchy in November 2012. constitutions) that provide a framework to help Already in mid-2012, he was reportedly put differentactorsknowwhattoprioritiseand in charge of a new senior leaders group tasked what to ignore. This is very difficult in the Chi- to focus on maritime security—the Protection nese foreign policy system. There is no guid- of Maritime Interests LSG. In September ance within the Chinese Constitution as to 2012, Xi was reportedly also made head of an how different foreign policy actors should in- ‘Office to Respond to the Diaoyu Crisis’ teract with each other, or to what the goals of (Jakobson 2013). On becoming General Secre- China’s foreign policy should be. China has al- tary, Xi took the chair of most of the influential most no legislation binding the actions of na- LSGs, including on Taiwan affairs, foreign af- tional security decision makers. fairs and national security. Xi also heads the Another method of balancing competing new State Security Committee announced in voices is to rely on official pronouncements October 2013 (Li & Yanzhou 2015). to shape the behaviour of actors. Thus, when Not only has Xi Jinping amassed more for- the delegation of power is unclear among sim- mal power than either of his two predecessors, ilarly ranked entities (as described earlier), var- Hu Jintalo (2002–2012) and Jiang Zemin ious actors can look to official statements for (1989–2002), but Xi also appears to have taken guidance. China has not made such official a strong personal interest in foreign policy is- statements in most areas of foreign policy. sues. Such a personification of policy has been The foreign policy process has been described rare in the Chinese system after Deng Xiaoping as ‘unclear, un-institutionalized and unregu- retreated into retirement some 25 or so years lated’ (Sun 2011). ago. In essence, Xi is now the sole coordinator Because there are no definitive guidelines or of Chinese foreign and security policy. rules guiding the behaviour of actors in the for- By personifying foreign policy decision eign policy sector, actors often use informal making, Xi is taking a risk. In the event of mis- channels to promote their interests. Much de- steps, he will likely be held accountable by his pends on the issue at hand. For example, mari- fellow PSC members, and possibly by the po- time security actors involved in the South litical establishment more broadly. Public China Sea are said to have greater freedom opinion, while at present clearly favourable to than those involved in the East China Sea be- Xi Jinping, could also turn against him. More- cause senior leaders are more attentive to rela- over, the top-down nature of the Chinese sys- tions with Japan than to smaller Southeast tem means that Xi does not have any other Asian nations. person or group as a check on his power. By This somewhat obscure information envi- moving further from ‘’ ronment does not necessarily mean that foreign when it comes to foreign policy decision mak- policy is unimportant. Rather, it is a reflection ing, Xi is minimising the opportunities for his of foreign policy being traditionally seen as decisions to be modified.

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Jakobson and Manuel: Foreign Policy Decisions Made in China 109

One should not, however, on the basis of a China should show a determined response, few years of Xi’s leadership, exaggerate the ex- nor how China should do more without endan- tent to which Xi’s more forthright style, and gering stability. Consequently, agencies that formal power has changed decision making in wish to ‘stand up for China’srightsmore foreign policy more generally. Reaching a con- actively’—actors who do not include the sensus—or at a minimum, the perception of MFA—state that they are ‘greatly strengthened consensus—among the senior CPC leaders by Xi’s leadership’. But other actors can coun- continues to be extremely important for the terclaim that their actions are better suited to maintenance of political unity and stability. ‘not endangering stability’. Furthermore, the PSC Chair has been and still One can presume that Xi’sdecisiontotake is the final authority on major foreign policy charge of all of these different small groups decisions. Even during the era, when and offices at least in part reflects an acknowl- collective leadership was emphasised more edgement that China needs to better coordinate than now, Hu was the ultimate decision maker its foreign policy decision making to ensure on important issues. For example, after North that implementation of agreed-upon policies Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006, Hu is more consistent. was said to have been compelled to personally Whether or not Xi can possibly manage to edit the wording of China’sofficial reaction be- keep all these bureaucratic reins in his hands cause no one else wanted to take responsibility is an open question. Can one human being be for such a sensitive issue (Jakobson & Knox responsible for so much and still operate 2010, p. 5). effectively? Moreover, Xi has continued in his predeces- Xi’s ability to weigh up costs and benefits is sors’ footsteps by mostly resorting to vague hindered by the same problems with regard to language when formulating guidelines. In au- information, which were discussed in the pre- tocratic systems, vague statements are espe- vious section. An objective assessment of the cially important for senior leaders as they consequences of any given foreign policy deci- provide room for manoeuvre. Vagueness keeps sion may not always be the highest priority for the bureaucracies and various constituencies the many actors competing for Xi’slimitedat- competing for benediction and allows the tention. According to an analyst at a prominent leader to avoid being held accountable for Chinese think tank, ‘I am a producer of infor- anypolicymissteps.7 mation. The senior leaders are my customers, For example, Xi has insisted on ambiguous and their written comments/instructions are formulations on the issue of what measures the purpose of my existence.’ (Sun 2011) Ana- China should adopt to defend its (perceived) lysts who think it is their task to try to persuade sovereignty over disputed islands in the East Xi are likely to factor in what they think of Xi’s and South China Seas. Tensions with neigh- own interpretation and interests. Xi has already bours over maritime rights have increased un- been stung by a lack of independent analysis, der Xi’s leadership, markedly complicating being caught off guard by the failure of his China’s foreign policy objectives in the region. own Taiwan analysts to accurately predict the Accordingtoanofficial involved in the prepa- results of local elections in Taiwan (Hornby ration of meetings of the LSG on maritime af- 2015). fairs, at one point Xi made it clear that he In sum, by taking personal command of all favoured ‘adeterminedresponse’ to provoca- of the foreign policy bodies, Xi needs to also tions to China’s sovereignty and maritime in- personally arbitrate the many conflicting inter- terests while taking care to stress that ‘doing ests within the system. But Xi is unlikely to un- more’ should not endanger stability (Jakobson tangle the confused policy making structure 2014, p. 29). But Xi did not articulate how that exacerbates these conflicting interests, as that would create bureaucratic losers. Yet in 7. See for example Gordon Tullock (1987) Autocracy. personifying foreign policy, Xi faces the di- Kluwers Academic Publishers: Amsterdam, p. 20. lemma that any decision he makes will be used

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 110 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies January 2016 by actors throughout the system to justify their internal actors with similar interests, rather than own implementation of the decision. While Xi seeking to influence a nebulous Chinese grand may take the credit for any successes, he may strategy. also have to take the blame for any failures. And, finally, Xi has to juggle all these interests References while accepting that he will have conflicting sources of information on any decision. Cabestan J-P (2009) China’s Foreign- and Xi appears conscious of walking this fine Security-policy Decision-making Processes line. While he has made far more foreign pol- under Hu Jintao. Journal of Current Chinese icy speeches and pronouncements than previ- Affairs 38(3), 63–97. ous leaders, he has stuck thus far to Hornby L (2015) China to let 100 think-tanks motherhood statements, classical aphorisms bloom. Financial Times 4, 2015. and modern euphemisms in a way that as- Jakobson L (2013) China’s Foreign Policy suages any public doubt while still avoiding Dilemma.LowyInstitute,Sydney. the creation of bureaucratic losers (Zou ). The Jakobson L (2014) China’s Unpredictable wording of China’s foreign policy objectives, Maritime Security Actors.LowyInstitute, currently expressed in Xi’sspeechesasthe Sydney. building of a community of ‘common destiny’ Jakobson L, Knox D (2010) China’sNew with ‘one belt and one road’ and a focus on Foreign Policy Actors. Stockholm Peace China’s ‘periphery’, are in a fine tradition of Research Institute, Stockholm SIPRI policy rhetoric that is sufficiently lacking in specific- paper no. 26. ity that it is possible for actors to justify many Lawrence S (2013) Understanding China’s different kinds of action. Political System, pp. 30. Congressional Xi presumably would prefer to keep tread- Research Service, Washington DC. ing this fine line. However, he might be forced Li X, Yanzhou X (2015) The problems with to make hard decisions and express himself China’s Foreign Policy Bureaucracy, US more explicitly sooner than he would like be- China Perceptions Monitor,20April,avail- cause of external events in the Asia-Pacific able online: http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/ region. 2015/04/20/the-problems-with-chinas-for- There are also implications for international eign-policy-bureaucracy/ actors who need to interact with Xi and the Manuel R (forthcoming) Analysing rank in Chinese foreign policy apparatus. Rather than China, Working Paper, Australian Centre being able to assume that China can be de- on China in the World: Canberra scribed solely as a ‘rising power’ (and thus Shibajie Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Jiti Xuexi confining internal concerns to what structural (18th central Politburo collective study ses- realists traditionally term the ‘black box’ of in- sions), People.cn (2015), http://politics. ternal politics),8 our analysis makes clear that people.com.cn/GB/8198/385219/. dealing with China’s foreign policy requires Qi Z (2008) Organization, structure and image dealing with a number of actors who each have in the making of Chinese foreign policy different interests. There is a possibility that de- since early 1990s, PhD dissertation, Johns cisions that weaken international security are a Hopkins University: Maryland. byproduct of these competing interests, rather Sun Y (2011) Chinese national security than as a byproduct of a ill-defined Chinese decision-making: processes and challenges, ‘grand strategy’, if one exists at all. Similarly, Brookings Institution, Working Paper, it is likely that Chinese behaviour will be more August 2011 easily influenced through targeting Chinese Waltz K (1979) Theory of International Poli- tics.McGrawHill,NewYork. 8. Most famously by Kenneth Waltz, although examples Zou W (forthcoming) Classical Rhetoric and can be seen throughout the work of other structural realists Reason in Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy such as John Mearsheimer. Speeches. Morrison Foundation, Canberra.

© 2016 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd