MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO Faculty of Social Studies

MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO

Faculty of Social Studies Department of International Relations and European Studies

Theory of the Hybrid warfare. Implementations in Ukraine.

Supervisor: Mgr. Zinaida Shevchuk, Ph.D.

Author: Turkiian Nina (UČO 420442) Study Field: EUP Year of Enrollment: 2013

In Brno, 2016

I, hereby, declare that this thesis is entirely my own work, and has not been taken from the work of others to the extent that such works have been cited, referenced and acknowledged within the text of my own work.

Date: 09.5.2016. Signature______

CONTENT Introduction...... 4 Chapter I. 1.1. Definition of Hybrid warfare...... 18

1.2. Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"...... 18 1.3. The stages of a typical hybrid warfare...... 22 1.4. Western understanding of hybrid warfare...... 27 1.5. Russian vision of the hybrid warfare...... 31 Chapter II 2.1"Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence of Russian troops presence at the territory of Ukraine...... 45

2.2. Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case...... 80

2.3. The first stage of Russia-Ukraine war...... 80 2.4. The second phase of the war Russia-Ukraine...... 82 2.5. The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine ...... 92 2.6. Information component of a "hybrid war"" ...... 94 Conclusion...... 100

Bibliography...... 110

Introduction

Specificity of the armed conflict, as well as the place and role of the military in politics argument, naturally determined by the level of development of society and technology. Process complexity of weapons and methods of warfare is wavy and simultaneously with the process of the evolution of social organization and consciousness. Information society creates unique forms of resistance, and it does not necessarily have to be armed or opened. Analysis of the forms and methods of armed struggle in the current and future wars (conflicts) in domestic and foreign scientific publications on military subjects received considerable attention1. This is how fast their development, which is classified by most experts as the emergence of a new generation of war and the need to define the strategy of armed defense states. Analysis of publications devoted to military theory and practice shows that the traditional understanding of war is changing and requires correction. Actually, there are two extreme views on the issue. According to one, the traditional vision of war (way of war) is out of date and can not contribute to solving the security problems that are posed by the XXI century. Another view argues that transforms the character and nature of war, but the same is its nature. There is no doubt the mere fact that the traditional war as a military collision between two states or blocs with defined political objectives are now obsolete. Thus, there appeared such a thing as «hybrid warfare» or «network centric warfare» - hybrid warfare and war interconnected respectively. These terms are intended to give a definition of new phenomena and phenomena on the battlefields of the XXI century. It should be emphasized that the development of a theoretical framework (or understanding) in

1 Halaka O. M., Ilʹyashov O. A., Pavlyuk YU. M. Osnovni tendentsiyi rozvytku ta ymovirni formy voyen i zbroynykh konfliktiv maybutnʹoho / O. M. Halaka, O. A. Ilʹyashov, YU. M. Pavlyuk // Nauka i oborona.– 2007.– № 4.– S. 10–15.// Галака О. М., Ільяшов О. А., Павлюк Ю. М. Основні тенденції розвитку та ймовірні форми воєн і збройних конфліктів майбутнього / О. М. Галака, О. А. Ільяшов, Ю. М. Павлюк // Наука і оборона.–2007.– № 4.– С. 10–15.// Galaka OM, OA Il'yashov, Pavlyuk N. Main Trends development and possible forms of wars and armed conflicts of the future/ OM Galaka, OA Ilyashov, YM Pavlyuk // Science and oborona.- 2007.- № 4.- P. 10-15.

4 the process, at least in Ukraine. Therefore seems logical to attempt to determine the nature of the hybrid confrontation and its components. The development of the information society forms the new context of the confrontation, including armed, Ukraine and Russia. Features assimilation of norms, values, opportunities postindustrial world post-Soviet societies led to the specifics of Russian aggression and pressure, as well as responses and means opposition Ukraine. Competitiveness in the era of industrial society defined the state's ability to produce heavy weapons, transport it to the theater of operations and to withstand economic pressures. In the information age competitiveness associated with military capabilities to process information and integrate it into military operations, thus ensuring their success. The nature of present and future wars directly determined trends of the forms and methods of warfare.

Among them are worth noting:

1. The growth of non-nuclear strategic significance curb the enemy by mass equipping troops with the latest means of warfare to conduct non-nuclear, non- contact (distance) hostilities;

2. Enhancing the role of agility and maneuverability in the actions of troops in isolated areas of the widespread use of the rapid reaction force, airborne troops and special forces;

3. Expansion of space and scale armed struggle, fighting with the transfer of land and sea surfaces in the air, under water and in space. Simultaneous burn and electronic defeat forces behind objects, economy, communications throughout the enemy;

4. The increasing role of confrontation in the sphere of information and the use of new information technologies;

5. The fight against international terrorism, the creation of expeditionary forces for peacekeeping and antiterrorist operations. The above ranking of most important data trends rather conditional, because it depends on the specific characteristics of specific countries2.

It should be emphasized that the term "hybrid warfare" is not a proper military. Traditionally used in military theory a number of specific criteria typing armed conflict, which enable consideration of all its major aspects. In particular, the criteria for dividing the types of conflicts are: degree of coverage of reality; scope; type parties - parties to the conflict; social and political structure of the parties; nature of socio-political relations; the degree of organization; level escalation and others. The classification of armed conflicts linked to the main forms of manifestation and existence. Depending on the manifestations, defined methods of using military force warring parties apart highlighted the hidden (latent) and apparent conflicts. The combination of qualitatively different elements to the conflict leads to a great variety of forms of its existence, which consist of a combination of three models War - formal, informal and gray war zone. The formal war is considered a collision of armed forces of one state from the other armed forces. This collision is accompanied by a formal act of declaring war. Informal war - is armed conflict, in which at least one or both parties are non- entities. The new threats that have emerged after the Cold War, led to the phenomenon of gray zone, ie the combination of war and military actions against organized. Formal war can acquire traditional and alternative forms. Traditional war - the fighting is regular armed forces of one country against regular and irregular armed forces (guerrilla war) other countries with the use of conventional means of warfare. Traditional war - contact, their further development is associated

2 O. A. Ilʹyashov Viyny maybutnʹoho yak obʺyekt naukovykh doslidzhenʹ / O.A. Ilʹyashov // Nauka i oborona.– 2008.– № 2.– S. 36–40.// Ільяшов О. А. Війни майбутнього як об’єкт наукових досліджень / О.А. Ільяшов // Наука і оборона.– 2008.– № 2.– С. 36–40.// OA Il'yashov future wars as an object of research / O.A. Ilyashov // Science and oborona.- 2008.- № 2.- S. 36-40.

6 with the development of new methods and means of warfare. Combined with the new information technologies they generate forms, such as network and merezhotsentrychni war3. Content network war is to achieve success in armed struggle but by superiority in numbers and firepower of troops, and thanks to their superiority in information and organizational capabilities for building networks. The solid informatization and intellectualization of control of troops and weapons changed the qualitative content of military operations. They were called interconnected operations (wars), held staff in a different types of the tactical groups managed from a single strategic center and simultaneously act as some key elements of the public and military administration - parts and units "forces retaliation" - throughout the enemy. The feature interconnected operations is the application built on new principles intelligence methods, management and security, enabling use of force and means of warfare is not a single line, and soon the entire depth of the theater of military operations in accordance with their fighting and maneuvering capabilities. The combined use different types of groups of troops increases the effectiveness of military operations4. Unconventional War - a clash of the regular armed forces of irregular forces, groups, units that do not recognize the norms and rules of warfare. Formal and informal military conflicts can be symmetric and asymmetric. Asymmetric conflict is the participation of entities that are qualitatively different relation of power capacity and principles of organization and management. Even without going to war phase asymmetric conflict has some

3 Vasylenko O.V. Osnovni svitovi tendentsiyi rozvytku ozbroyennya ta viysʹkovoyi tekhniky dlya vedennya viyn u maybutnʹomu / O.V. Vasylenko // Nauka i oborona. – 2009. – № 4. – S. 18–22.// Василенко О.В. Основні світові тенденції розвитку озброєння та військової техніки для ведення війн у майбутньому / О.В. Василенко // Наука і оборона. – 2009. – № 4. – С. 18–22.// Vasilenko OV Major global trends and arms military hardware to wage war in the future / OV Vasilenko // Science and Defence. - 2009. - № 4. - P. 18-22. 4 Khamzatov M.M. Vlyyanye kontseptsyy setetsentrycheskoy voyny na kharakter sovremennykh operatsyy / M.M. Khamzatov // Voennaya myslʹ. – 2006. – № 7. – S. 13–17.// Хамзатов М.М. Влияние концепции сетецентрической войны на характер современных операций / М.М. Хамзатов // Военная мисль. – 2006. – № 7. – С. 13–17.// Hamzatov MM Effect of War on the concept setetsentrycheskoy nature sovremennыh operations / M.M. Khamzatov // Military thinks. -2006. - № 7. - S. 13-17.

7 specific characteristics that result from the limited arsenal of tools for the weaker members.

In asymmetric relationship strong partner usually requires no additional application of force to impose their will. Therefore, conflict often occurs in a latent form, only occasionally moving to the armed phase in the form of violent and seemingly irrational acts, including terrorist acts. Such action is the limited arsenal of means by which the weaker partner influences (and potentially win) on stronger5. However, traditional terminological and methodological framework for determining the nature and character of the war does not exclude the invention and use of new definitions, such as "hybrid war". Frank Hoffman (Frank G. Hoffman), consultant of the Ministry of Navy, one of the authors of the concept of "hybrid warfare" emphasizes that every era has its own specific forms of war. It requires every new terminological developments. Overall the modern era, according to Frank Hoffman, characterized by processes of hybridization, including in the military sphere. Traditional forms of war are mixed with the activities of organized crime, terrorism and irregular conflicts6. To characterize this new reality, he proposes to use the term "hybrid war", which though not a purely military one, but can quickly grab and display the essence of the changes in the nature of modern warfare. Views on the hybrid nature of war are different options for determining the hybrid nature of war:

1. military strategy that combines conventional war, war and low cyberwar;

2. The attack using nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, homemade guns for terrorist attacks and pressure information;

5 Halaka O. M., Ilʹyashov O. A., Pavlyuk YU. M. Osnovni tendentsiyi rozvytku ta ymovirni formy voyen i zbroynykh konfliktiv maybutnʹoho / O. M. Halaka, O. A. Ilʹyashov, YU. M. Pavlyuk // Nauka i oborona.– 2007.– № 4.– S. 10–15.// Галака О. М., Ільяшов О. А., Павлюк Ю. М. Основні тенденції розвитку та ймовірні форми воєн і збройних конфліктів майбутнього / О. М. Галака, О. А. Ільяшов, Ю. М. Павлюк // Наука і оборона.– 2007.– № 4.– С. 10–15.// Galaka OM, OA Il'yashov, Pavlyuk N. Main Trends development and possible forms of wars and armed conflicts of the future / OM Galaka, OA Ilyashov, YM Pavlyuk // Science and oborona.- 2007.- № 4.- P. 10-15. 6 Hoffman Frank G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges / F.G.Hoffman // Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ). – 2009. – Issue 52, Forth Quarter. – P. 34-39

3. sophisticated and flexible dynamic battle space (battlespace), which provides quick response and adaptation of opposition members;

4. modern kind of guerrilla warfare that combines modern technology and methods of mobilization (Bill Nemett, Colonel United States Marine Corps);

5. The main method of asymmetric warfare, which is contingent on three fronts - the population of the conflict zone, logistics people and the international community (Colonel Jack ArmiyiSShA MakKuen);

6. Frank Hoffman defines hybrid war as an enemy any action that quickly and flexibly using a variety of combinations of permitted weapons, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, crimes on the battlefield, and all for political purposes7.

In 2004, commissioned by NATO Multiple Futures study conducted to identify changes in trends in international security in general and in particular the method of warfare. In the final report it was also about hybrid war. Further, although again it comes down to purely military dimension and definition of war as a hybrid mixture of classical warfare with the use of irregular armed groups. Non- combat missions performers "can do things that the state itself can not do, because every state is bound by the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention on the Laws of War on Land, agreements with other countries. All the dirty work can be shifted to the shoulders of non-state actors"8. Psychological and informational aspects also in sight of the NATO expert. Yes, he stressed that the international community put a fait accompli aggression with complete denial of her own

7 Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 / Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011. 8 Korniyenko S. Putin vede v Ukrayini hibrydnu viynu – heneral Kappen [Elektronnyy resurs]. – Rezhym dostupu: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html// Корнієнко С. Путін веде в Україні гібридну війну – генерал Каппен [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступу: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html// Kornienko S. Putin leads in Ukraine hybrid warfare - General Kappen [Electronic resource]. - Access mode: http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25363591.html

9 aggression. In the short term it is a winning tactic. But most weight control information flows, winning the information war. Information warfare - a coordinated activity on the use of information as a weapon for warfare. The main strategic national resource is the information space, ie information network infrastructure and information technology. Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, NATO chief, at the NATO summit in Wales today even called Russian actions in this area most impressive blitzkrieg that saw any history information warfare. Bridlav also noted that the hybrid approach of the war is trying to use all possible tools to create a problem and then her Pedal, including using military instruments9. Actually, hybrid warfare in general terms can be defined as a set of pre-prepared and quickly realized actions of military, diplomatic, economic, informational nature aimed at achieving strategic goals. Before the war Hybrid components include traditional and unconventional threats, terrorism, subversive acts when used or new unconventional technology to counter enemy superiority in military power. Emphasize that the idea of hybrid warfare is not new. Military history knows many examples of asymmetric war tactics using the non-linear and irregular militias who are older counterparts modern hybrid war. Moreover, the war in general is not solely confrontation on the battlefield, and includes elements of economic, psychological confrontation guerilla's activity. Value and measure the impact of these components on the overall result, their role and place in a particular confrontation on the level of society and the spirit of the era. Wars and armed conflicts are space-time processes, which are based on a variety of contradictions, and the use of different scales military forces in certain areas for certain purposes. Hybrid power successfully use technologically advanced systems so that they work to the limit.

9 Vandiver J. SACEUR: Allies must prepare for Russia 'hybrid war' / J.Vandiver [electronic resource]. - Access mode: http://www.stripes.com/news/saceur-allies-must-prepare-for-russiahybrid-war-1.301464

Therefore hybrid forces have an advantage over traditional army, acting strictly within the statute. Overall, the hybrid threat indicated that blurs the traditional concept and practice of war. There are generally two approaches to understanding the essence of war. The first related to the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz defines war as organized violence that aims to achieve social and political goals. This approach has distanced itself from the moral, legal and ethical aspects of war, or takes them through the prism of military and political interests. The second approach comes from the works of Cicero, who argued that war - is the legal situation and the conditions that legitimize violence and define its limits. Thus the notion of "peaceful state" and "state of war", depending on whether the violence is legitimate. Distinction civilian and military status is critically important thing. War creates a fundamentally different reality, form their own understanding of moral, ethical and legal standards which require determination by means of military law. While the legal framework remains uncertain, we can not speak of organized warfare and violence can become uncontrolled, which nevertheless does not mean war 10. Actually, this hybrid and dangerous threat. In hybrid warfare is difficult to determine an opponent, you're more difficult to talk about the legal, ethical and moral frames. Without them organized violence leads to the degradation of local communities. For example, in Ukraine is still an ongoing debate about the term "anti-terrorist operation" that did not reflect the nature of events in the conflict zone in the Donbass. On the other hand, the second opposition party, Russia formally recognizes their participation. Also erased border war scenarios and the beginning and end. Almost all European political and military history suggests that elites perceive the beginning and end of the war as

10 Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 / Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011.p.39

11 the ceremony, a specific set of actions. But hybrid warfare least one party lacks legitimacy. Then come to the aid promotion or creation of puppet governments. Therefore, the state change from military to peaceful significantly complicated and hostility grows and spreads beyond the conflict.

This war has every chance to develop into endemic and endless violence in the region. Also destroyed traditional "Trinitarian model" Clausewitz, which includes the trinity of government, armed forces and people in war. After World War II this triune model is less applicable. People can fight no government can fight the terrorist organizations or warlords who often merge with the civilian population (for example, as did the militants' Hezbollah"). The way out of this situation could be a return to the legal field, which can be achieved in various ways, which range from strengthening the institutions of statehood party opposition (to take a traditional script ceremonial end of the war) the complete destruction of one party (if, for example, terrorist organizations)11. Hybrid war modernity fact, a classic example of hybrid warfare believe war waged by "Hezbollah" in Lebanon in 2006, using classical warfare, irregular militias and information warfare techniques, causing Israel, according to many experts, the strategic defeat. As rightly emphasize military analysts, the hybrid threat is able to neutralize the technological advantage of any army. "Hezbollah" received psychological victory in 2006, as a fact, right now. Shift the focus in making decisions on military planes in ethical and moral, to make a choice between ordinance, law, morality, ultimately discredit the enemy, let whatever decision was made - that the key points that have achieved superiority "Hezbally"12. Another

11 Kuzʹmovych A.V. Évolyutsyya vz·hlyadov na teoryyu sovremennoy voyny // Armyya y obshchestvo. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Elektronnyy resurs]. – http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Кузьмович А.В. Эволюция взглядов на теорию современной войны //Армия и общество. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступа: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Kuzmovich AV The evolution of views on the theory of modern warfare // Army and Society. - № 1 (33) / 2013 [Electron resource]. - mode access: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya- vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny 12 Davis J.R. Defending Future Hybrid Threats / J.R. Davis // Military Review. – Fort Leavenworth, September-October 2013. – No.5. – P. 25-

12 example of a hybrid war in which a military aggressor powerful state negotiates with non-performers - groups of local people and militants - connection with which it formally denies entirely, a Russian subversive activities in Ukraine in spring 2014. During the conflict, small group of Russian soldiers organized and coordinated rebel armed groups of the local population in eastern Ukraine, avoiding direct entry of his troops through Ukrainian border, allowing Russia to bypass international law. Interests Crimea and its entry into the Russian Federation has been very successful operation of the hybrid war. The friendly "green men" armed with the latest Russian weapons, creating favorable to the Kremlin information background in the Western media, deliberate flooding Ukrainian segment of Internet misinformation (the classic example - elevated above the flagship of the Navy of Ukraine "Hetman Sahaidachny" Andrew's flag, as reported by ITAR-TASS and RIA "News"), Vitaly Churkin diplomatic activity at the UN Security Council - all components of a hybrid war, which was the culmination of a referendum and adoption of Crimea and Sevastopol a part of Russia. Obviously, the pace of action was determined by the weakness of the Ukrainian authorities and admitted earlier errors. Armed Forces of Ukraine for years preparing for war industrial era, making parallel demilitarization of society, getting rid of the Soviet military legacy. Instead, today's "hybrid warfare" revealed not only weaknesses of all Ukrainian army and society, but also articulated a new challenge to the world in general and Eastern Europe in particular. Lack of open confrontation, the use of new tactics, misinformation, creating short time atmosphere of panic and threats, the use of human shields on civilians demonstrate the helplessness of the army in the war of a new type. In Ukraine threatened were virtually all aspects of life - economics, politics, culture and memory consumption information, even identity.

Weak diversification of markets for Ukrainian products to the Russian market attachment of basic sectors of the national economy, the lack of alternative sources of resources - all this has become a matter of national security. Industry, infrastructure are energy-intensive and inefficient. Lack of adequate information and cultural policy led occupation of the cultural consciousness of a large part of citizens. Efforts propaganda was imposed artificial problem of discrimination against Russian-speaking population, fear ephemeral threat "Bandera". Ukrainian information space without proper Russian-speaking and English-language content was a closed, non-competitive, not ready to bring Ukrainian position to the international community. Obviously, modern hybrid threat to Ukrainian statehood by Russia requires not just search for adequate responses to everyday challenges. At the time of system development is the answer, strategy in the years ahead. This is not possible without understanding the theoretical and methodological hybrid nature of war and the global experience of confrontation hybrid threat. The course of modern wars suggests the need to consider and take into account not only the purely military aspects, but also the political, socio-cultural, technical, economic and geopolitical military conflict frames. Finally emphasize that despite erasing traditional notions of war, which are based on the work of Clausewitz, his thesis that the war is continuing nature and variable in nature, remains valid (though not all share this view, believing that the nature of war may change during the impact of new technologies and forms of war, that war can be a "second grammar" which will be based on insurgent operations)13. And the analysis of hybrid wars of our time is important to remember and distinguish their nature and character. The key to finding answers to the challenge is a hybrid evaluation of social and

13 Arzumanyan R.V. Opredelenye voyny v 21 veke. Obzor XXI ezhehodnoy konferentsyy po stratehyy Ynstytuta stratehycheskykh yssledovanyy Armeyskoho voennoho kolledzha, 6-8 aprelya 2010 / R.V. Arzumyan. – Erevan, 2011// Арзуманян Р.В. Определение войны в 21 веке. Обзор XXI ежегодной конференции по стратегии Института стратегических исследований Армейского военного колледжа, 6-8 апреля 2010 / Р.В. Арзумян. – Ереван, 2011. // Arzumanyan RV The definition of war in the 21st century. XXI Annual Review Conference on Strategic Studies Institute for Strategy Army War College, 6-8 April 2010 / RV Arzumyan. - Yerevan, 2011.p.31-32

14 technological contexts an understanding of the structure element of the conflict remain unchanged, and that evolutionary14. Therefore, war is always an act of violence, which aims to force the opponent to execute your will. Motives for War, Thucydides formulated, as will be unchanged - fear, pride and profit. The nature and form of the war largely depends on the technology and economy and social development of the actors. For example, the use of drones and robots in combat is already familiar. Non-state actors can also be a party military confrontation, moreover, their share in military conflicts likely to increase. With the development of computer networks cyberwar weapons are terrorist organizations and elements of the hybrid wars.

Hybrid conflict can be described as the simultaneous use of traditional means of warfare with non-traditional.

This combination of classic armed conflict with the guerrilla tactics of war, terrorist acts, directed against a variety of purposes, including against civilians to intimidate him, the use of gangs to destabilize the society, as well as psychological and increasingly dangerous cyber attacks.

To participate may be drawn several types of troops, beginning with the regular units and special units up to the irregular militias and armed men in camouflage with no insignia, so-called "little green men", as in the Crimea. Acting with them in an exciting country, the aggressor can actively foment and support local riots, conduct economic and diplomatic war, to carry out attacks in cyberspace and to conduct an information and awareness campaign.

Therefore, the purpose of the master's work is more acquainted with the current state of international peace influenced by the relentless growth of

14 Hoffman Frank G. Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict / F.G.Hoffman // Strategic Forum. – Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National DefenceUniversity (NDU). Washington, DC, April 2009. – No. 240. – Р. 2 - 8.

15 innovative technologies, development and inhibition of economies of different subjects of international law, strengthen information transmission apparatus data and other modern means undermined as a result of discovery of a new phenomenon of "hybrid warfare".

The author is highlighting a theory of the hybrid warfare and implementation in Ukraine:

- Concept of hybrid warpresentation and analysis history of the Ukraine - NATO' relations, from the 1992 till 2014, including cooperation within the PfP frameworks; - analysis of the geopolitical and strategic tensions and clashes with a position of the Russian Federation; - highlighting benefits and difficulties which will face Ukraine and NATO, in case of membership of Ukraine in the NATO; - Politic of NATO enlargement; - contribution and skills of Ukraine which can be brought to the Euro-Atlantic security system, including geostrategic policy of NATO; - analyze, based on the information given in previous chapters, of future development of Ukraine and NATO relations - changes of the national opinion pull and intensification/decreasing in the relations through the prism of political processes in Ukraine and influence of the Russian Federation on it. - forms of the cooperation, which could be chosen for Ukraine by the NATO - analyze of its preferences and lacks and an analyze of the perspective of the closer cooperation with NATO, will it lead to the stability of the region or no.

This work consists of an introduction, three chapters and conclusions

The study covers the disclosure of the theories and concepts of "hybrid warfare" and its implementations in Ukraine:

Theoretical part:

- Definition of the Hybrid warfare.

- Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"

- Three stages of a typical hybrid warfare

- Western theory of hybrid warfare

- Russian theory of the hybrid warfare

Practical part

- "Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence of Russian troops presence at the territory of Ukraine.

- Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case

- Stages of Russia-Ukraine war

- Information component of a "hybrid war"

- The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine

This work consists of an introduction, two chapters and conclusions

Chapter 1. 1.1. Definition of Hybrid warfare.

Hybrid Warfare - a term proposed in the late XX century in the United States to describe a military strategy that combines a conventional war, small war and cyber war. Also, expression "hybrid warfare" can be used to describe attacks with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, improvised explosive devices and information warfare. This approach to managing conflict is a kind of war.

1.2. Causes and Features "hybrid warfare"

Thus, the characteristics of "hybrid warfare" are: aggression without formal declaration of war; concealment aggressor countries of their participation in the conflict; widespread use of irregular armed groups (including under cover of the civilian population); neglect aggressor international norms of warfare and existing agreements and arrangements achievements; reciprocal measures of political and economic pressure (for formal conservation relations between the two countries); extensive propaganda and counter-propaganda with the use of "dirty" information technology; confrontation in cyberspace.

Today the theme of "hybrid +`warfare" is widely covered in the media, and is the subject of special studies. In particular, these studies were conducted by experts renowned world-class in t. H. Frank Hoffmann, Daniel Lasikom, George Davis (USA) and Frank van Kappen (Netherlands)15.

15 Hoffman F.G. «Hybrid Threats»: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable, available at: http://operationaladaptation.com/unify_uploads/files/Hoffman%202010%20Hybrid%20Threats.pdf.

In this regard, we consider to begin with the causes of the very concept of "hybrid warfare" and explain why it is widely used by different countries to achieve their goals.

According to Hoffman future threats could increasingly be characterized as a hybrid combination of traditional and irregular tactics, this decentralized planning and execution, participation of non-state actors using both simple and complex technologies. Hybrid threats include a number of different modes of warfare, including the standard weapons, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts (including violence and coercion), and criminal disorder. Hybrid War can also be multilevel (conducted and states, and various non-state actors). These multimodal / multilevel actions carried out or different units or the same. In such conflicts, opponents (states, groups of state-sponsored or entities that finance their activities themselves) will use the access to modern military capabilities, including encrypted command systems, portable missiles "ground-to-air" and other modern lethal system; and - promote the organization of protracted guerrilla warfare, which use ambushes, improvised explosive devices and murder. It is possible to combine high-tech features of states, such as anti-satellite protection against terrorism and financial cyberwar, but, as a rule, operational and tactical directed and coordinated within the framework of major combat operations in order to achieve synergies in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict. Results can be obtained at all levels of war16.

16 Hoffman F.G. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, P.72

One of the main reasons is the availability of powerful new weapons (Weapon of mass destruction), making classical war is extremely dangerous for both the aggressor and the entire world. After all, this will lead to massive civilian casualties, there will be large-scale refugee flows, disintegrate transport and industrial infrastructure (including critical and dangerous nuclear and chemical facilities), burst existing trade and economic relations and so on.

An equally important factor is the desire of the aggressor to downplay its role in conflict resolution in order to avoid sanctions by other countries and international organizations as well as to prevent the loss of its prestige and position in the world17.

17 Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009, 1st Quarter, No 52, pp. 34

Another reason for not massive use of military force is aggressor countries attempt to establish control over the objects of aggression (including integration them into their political, economic and security systems) without undue damage to them, which can damage the attackers in implementing their own geopolitical and economic interests.

At the same time driving "hybrid war" requires or create certain preconditions required internal and external nature.

First of all, the aggressor country should have a strong and effective government, able, despite the existing problems, to rally the public around a common national idea.

Second, the successful application of "hybrid warfare" in the aggressor should be an advantage over the enemy in military, economic and information fields that provide it with the necessary leverage (influence) on the object of aggression, exhausting morally and psychologically and economically.

Thirdly, the success of "hybrid warfare" with the object of aggression is possible only if the weakness of his government, international isolation, a split in society, economy degradation and demoralization reduce capacity and power structures.

In any case, the aggressor country must be prepared to repel the aggression of the object, and the fact that the latter will have the support of other countries and international organizations (in terms of providing political, economic, information and military assistance and sanctions against the aggressor).

1.3. The stages of a typical hybrid warfare

Considering all mentioned above, as well as the existing experience, the typical "hybrid warfare" consists of three main stages: preparatory, active and final18.

1.3.1. The first stage - preparatory

At the preparatory stage (which may take several years) leadership aggressor, with the active involvement of special services, taking steps to build ideological, political and military prerequisites for future aggression. These measures include:

- strengthening the system of government in the country, including the strengthening of control over all spheres of life;

18 Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009. p. 57

- indoctrination own population to unite around the ideas of nationalism, chauvinism, protection of so-called "national values and interests" against "external enemy" and in a "besieged fortress", etc., and the maximum weakening the opposition in all its forms;

- capture information space enemy country and use it to their advantage to create a mood in society;

- destruction of the state government, the object of aggression, including bribery: influential government officials, politicians and the leadership of law enforcement agencies; promoting agents of influence for positions in state government; inciting confrontation between political forces and establish control over them (primarily among ideologically close and corrupt parties and movements);

- making a split among the population rival by stimulating internal contradictions of political, interethnic and inter-religious character (in particular in the framework of the creation and support of different parties, movements and organizations relevant, even the extremist ones);

- weakening the country round object of aggression, undermining confidence in the government, and the spread of protests and separatist sentiments in society in a way to provoke social, economic and other problems by applying the elements of trade-economic and energy wars;

- discredit foreign and domestic policy of the enemy to impose its leadership and the population of certain ideas and civilizational values through active

23 information campaign with special methods of "zombie" society with active participation of both public and non-governmental organizations19.

1.3.2 Step Two - active

In the active phase (usually lasting one year) held a hidden aggression against the chosen country for direct implementation of the goals. To do this, include the following steps:

- country-created object of aggression illegal armed groups with representatives of local anti-government forces, which are involved in the security services, mercenaries and militants;

- the country's internal conflict provoked by the political, social, economic, religious and interethnic basis and stimulated processes of its transformation into mass demonstrations population demonstrators, confusion and clashes of protesters with the police;

- positioned (appointed) leaders of protests from representatives of opposition political parties of national or local levels, and they created alternative "authorities";

- protesters seize, involving illegal armed groups and the security services of the country-aggressor, government buildings and important industrial facilities and transport infrastructure and power structures blocking activity (including the use of civilians as "human shields");

- the territory of the object of aggression entered the regular armed forces of aggression under the guise of local armed forces ( "self-defense squads", "militias", etc.) to help the opposition and separatists to seize power in the country or in its

19 Hoffman F.G. Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. Joint Force Quarterly, 2009. p.35

24 individual regions. This possible hidden part of regular armed forces aggressor in the fighting on the side of the opponents of the current government's object of aggression;

- conducted extensive information campaigns in support of anti-forces in the country object of aggression, and to discredit the actions of its leadership to ensure the constitutional order in the country.

1.3.3 Stage three - the final.

At the final stage (unlimited duration) aggressor held the following work to consolidate its position in the country the object of aggression:

- given the full support of the new (the former opposition) authorities in the country of the object of aggression or separatist regimes in some of its regions (including the creation of the authorities and security forces separatists);

- assisted in carrying out "referendum" about the direction of the external and internal policy of the country object of aggression, the status of its regions, etc., and in the conduct of "elections" of central and local, including breakaway authorities;

-legalized self-proclaimed state of education in the country object of aggression tightened processes address the situation in its territory under the pretext of brokering participate in peace talks. In this case, the aggressor country in no way considers himself a party to the conflict;

the conditions for a military presence in the country-aggressor object of aggression on the long-term / permanent basis (in the form of "peacekeeping

25 forces" or separatist militias) and to implement other, for example economic interests20.

The geopolitical system of coordinates of war is controlled chaos is the geopolitical destruction of the State of the victim, the neutralization of its geopolitical characteristics - size of territory, population, the status of the state of the world, economic opportunities, military power, cumulative potential.

In such a war in the State to the victim or in its individual regions initiated by certain political processes which are essentially shares the strategy of controlled chaos. The true role, location, interests and goals of the aggressor state are removed from the sphere of public attention, hiding behind the "information garbage" and demagoguery.

In general, a war, or a hybrid of controlled chaos involves three stages:

• Loosening of the situation and inspiration through the crisis of internal conflict in the country of the victim.

• degradation, destruction and disintegration of the country and its transformation into a so-called "dysfunctional" state.

• Change of political power in a fully controlled by the aggressor.

Starting from the second half of the 90s of last century, components and technology concept of "hybrid warfare" applied by Russia in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as US, NATO and the EU - Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Since the early 2000s similar script actively used the Russian Federation as well as to Ukraine (in the establishment of Russian

20 Freier N. Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe… Don’t Define, available at: http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343- freier.pdf

26 control over the post-Soviet space under the slogan of building a "Russian world")21.

1.4. Western understanding of hybrid warfare

At the West, a new type of war is called "hybrid war". The conceptual justification for this war for the XXI century. engaged primarily American military theorists R. Glenn, J. Gordon D. Kilkallen, John. Makkuen, John. Mattis, James. Matsumura, William Nemeth, E. Simpson, R. Wilkie, N. Freyyer, F. Hoffman, Norwegian specialist H. Carlsen, Netherlands - Frank van Kappen et al.

While some foreign scientists (K. Lowe, P. Mansour, William Murray, H. Yamaguchi and others) believe that this concept has nothing new for the theory of military art, as one or another form of hybrid threats and hostilities have existed in military practice of the past22.

According to Lieutenant Colonel US Marine Corps W. Nemeth, hybrid warfare - a "modern kind of guerrilla warfare," which "combines modern technology and modern methods of mobilization." N. Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (USA) has identified four hybrid threat of war:

1) traditional;

2) non-standard;

3) terrorism;

21 Dugin A. Filosofiya voiny [Philosophy of war]. Moscow, Yauza, 2004, 256 р. [in Russian].

22 Gordon J., Matsumura J. The Army's role in overcoming anti-access and area denial challenges, available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR229/ RAND_RR229.pdf.

4) blasting, which uses technology to counter the advantages of military force23.

Kilkallen D., author of «The Accidental Guerilla», claims that hybrid warfare - a better definition of modern conflicts, but stressed that it is a combination of guerrilla and civil wars and insurgency and terrorism24.

"Hybrid warfare - a hodgepodge of classic warfare using armed groups. The state, which is in a hybrid war, concludes conspired with non-artists - militants groups of local people, organizations, communication some of which is formally denied completely. These artists can do things that the state itself cannot do because any state bound by the Geneva and Hague Conventions on the Laws of War on Land, agreements with other countries. All dirty work can be shifted to the shoulders of non-state actors "- explains Major General Frank van Kappen, retired, former adviser on security in the UN and NATO25.

Some sources indicate that the term was used for the first time and continued to be used in the American 'Reviews on the defensive" in 2006, 2009 and 2014, respectively. Also mentioned in the book in 2007, "Conflict in the XXI century. The emergence of hybrid warfare " ( Hoffman) and in 2009 "Air power for hybrid war "(Institute of Mitchell Association, US Air Force, Michael Ayshervu). Online Defense Technical Information Center March 30, 2007 was placed the report under the name of "Hybrid war: a new paradigm for stability operations in failing states ", compiled under the direction of Dr . Janeen Klinger26.

23 Freier N. The Defense Identity Crisis: It’s a Hybrid World. Parameters, 2009, Vol. XXXIX, Autumn, p. 1.

24 Kilcullen D. The Accidental Guerilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. David Kilcullen. New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.287 25 Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, P.310 26 Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, eds. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012,p.157

Interpretation of the notion hybrid warfare according to Lieutenant Colonel US Marine Corps Nemeth is a "modern form of guerrilla warfare," which "combines modern technology and modern methods of mobilization." 27

Nathan Freier from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was one of the key people initially identified threats which includes hybrid warfare: traditional; custom; catastrophic terrorism; blasting when technologies are used to withstand the advantages of military force28.

A retired colonel of the US Army John McCuen defined hybrid warfare as the main method of action in asymmetric warfare waged on three sample types battlefield: the population of the conflict zone; logistics population; international community29.

David Kilkallen, author of " «The Accidental Guerilla) claims that hybrid warfare - this is the best definition of modern conflicts, but stressed that it includes a combination of guerrilla and civil wars and insurgency and terrorism30.

Journalist Frank Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as any action the enemy which instantly and consistently uses a complex combination of permitted weapons, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and criminal behavior on the battlefield to achieve political goals.

Deputy Secretary of the Navy Robert Orton Vork says that enemy forces could use "hybrid soldiers" are in conspiracy among the civilian population.

27 Nemeth W.J. Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002, available at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/ theses/2002/Jun/02Jun_Nemeth.pdf.

28 Freier N. Hybrid Threats and Challenges: Describe… Don’t Define, available at: http:// smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/343- freier.pdf 29 McCuen J.J. Hybrid Wars. Military Review, 2008, April-May, pp. 107–113 30 Kilcullen D. The Accidental Guerilla. Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. David Kilcullen. New York, Oxford University Press, 2009

In the editorial preface guide Military Balance +2015 «hybrid warfare" is interpreted as "the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign aimed at achieving surprise, delight and initiatives receiving psychological benefits of using diplomatic opportunities; scale and rapid information, electronic and cyber-pirates; cover and concealment of military and intelligence operations; combined with economic pressure. "31

Examples

Lebanon. One recent example is the hybrid war actions of Hezbollah in the Lebanon war of 2006. During the conflict, Hezbollah neutralized the efforts of the Israeli army, using the hidden underground tunnels and position (same actions Vietcong), or using infantry maneuvers in Lebanese villages. The result of this tactic is that the IDF failed to win any of the villages along the border between Lebanon and Israel two weeks for all the attacks on Hezbollah positions. All the benefits of the Israeli army - the availability of modern and efficient aircraft and ground forces - has been reduced to zero Hezbollah members who used the fortified bunkers and modern Russian antitank guided missile, capable of destroying all known types of armored vehicles. In one case, Hezbollah has used anti-ship missiles C-802, seriously injuring an Israeli navy corvette «Hanit» and killing four sailors on board. This is supplemented by successful attempts to break Hezbollah on Israeli communications and mobile military to get the latest information about the behavior of the enemy, their interaction and losses.

Resonant world events of recent years, including the revolutionary change of power and armed conflict in North Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet

31 The Military Balance http://www.freepaperdownload.us/1519/Journal0459-7222Page1.htm

Union suggest the emergence of new forms and methods resorted to the major powers trying to achieve its foreign policy goals and settle inter-state differences.

Therefore, to replace classical military aggression when applied forces, come the so-called "hybrid war". They are hidden and observed mainly in the political, economic, information and special areas. Host for specific tasks involved in small quantities. The essence of this approach is the shift of the center of effort of the physical destruction of the enemy as part of a major war to use tools of "soft power" against enemy countries with the aim of disintegration and changes to its management, including its sphere of influence32.

1.5. Russian vision of the hybrid warfare

The very genesis of the Russian phenomenon "hybrid war" refers to the period of Russia to rethink its place in the world and the region. The main characteristic of the Yeltsin era losses geopolitical position, international political influence of status and would reformat the European geo-strategic space, which ended with a significant expansion of NATO and the EU. In this case, even the objective components of the relevant geo-economic and geopolitical trends all the more perceived predominantly through the subjective lens of resentment and nostalgia for the lost. In concentrated form, this nostalgia back in 2005 Vladimir Putin expressed in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: "... We must recognize that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For the Russian people, it became a real drama. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves outside Russian territory.33"

32 Deyvi M. Evolyutsiya voyn [Evolution of war]. Moscow, ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, p. 282 33 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931

We could even say that in many respects the geopolitical revanchist mood Putin and his hard-line attitude to any "revolutionary" political changes due to his personal experience: he saw the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which destroyed the entire world, which, as Vladimir Putin understood and considered.

It is the coming to power of Vladimir Putin can be considered the beginning of the search for Moscow's own "geostrategy revenge", the aim of which is a complex task, the key of which - a gradual but steady restoration of Russian influence and importance in the international arena. However, more than difficult international context, and given the significant shortage of necessary resources (from the purely economic to military information and communication), the base of the Russian "geostrategy revenge" could only be an asymmetric approach34.

The period from 2001 to 2014. It can be attributed to the time of search forms and methods that would help to implement the relevant geopolitical intentions. This was carried out in parallel and the "geopolitical mobilization" of the population of the state. It is implemented through the classic mechanisms of imposing their own people the images of the "external enemy", a sense of Russia as a "besieged fortress" and the total recovery of the anti-Western (mainly anti-US) rhetoric.

The change of political regimes in the CIS (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan), most likely, Russia perceived as a threat to its externally imposed ideas of geopolitical revenge. This forced the Russian Federation intensively preparing for the next big confrontation. Especially since the idea of a "big war",

34 Kuz'movich A.V. Evolyutsiya vzglyadov na teoriyu sovremennoy voyny // Armiya i obshchestvo. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Yelektronniy resurs]. – Rezhim dostupa: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// Кузьмович А.В. Эволюция взглядов на теорию современной войны // Армия и общество. – № 1 (33) / 2013 [Електронний ресурс]. – Режим доступа: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov-nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny// 12. AV Kuzmovich The evolution of views on the theory of modern warfare // Army and Society. - № 1 (33) / 2013 [Electron resource]. - Access: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/evolyutsiya-vzglyadov- nateoriyu-sovremennoy-voyny

32 which recently said presidential advisor S. Glazyev, obviously, is really dominant in the present Russian establishment. And the conclusion Glaziev also, most likely, the dominant among these circles: Russia is not ready for a new war (and willing to not be), and therefore, should provoke her before, and achieve their objectives even now35.

Obviously, the problem for some time remained the question of how to implement your own ideas in a rather limited (and in many respects ostentatious) readiness, the constraints of international law, the geopolitical status quo and as a consequence - the unavailability of real starting full-scale war. It can be assumed that approximately in the middle of the 2000s. a solution was found:. "asymmetric responses" part of a larger "hybrid war"

It is pertinent to note that the Russian Federation has not established its strategy from scratch. Here there is a certain continuity of Soviet practices. Some researchers attribute the origins of Russian practices "hybrid warfare" to the 20-th years of XX century. (Methods of "active intelligence"). However, in our opinion, it is better to pay attention to the final stages of the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. Then, in response to the announced US program for strategic defense initiative (SDI) Gorbachev 12 October 1986, during a press conference in Reykjavik, said: "The answer to the SDI will be asymmetrical. At the same time we do not have to sacrifice significantly. "

In January 2013, Moscow hosted the general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences, which was addressed by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov. It was a peculiar result of long work of military analysts and experts of the General Staff, who for some time have

35Glazyev S."Good war" in Europe// "Khoroshaya voyna" v Evrope//"Хорошая война"в Еропе http://www.specnaz.ru/articles/214/2/2070.htm

33 conceptualized the problem and looking for mechanisms to address it. That report General Gerasimov - a kind of "point of no return" in the manifestation of Russian views on modern war. It was pointed out, should be developed as a modern military-political conflict, what elements it should be involved and at what stages. The report emphasized the growing role of non-military methods of pressure on the enemy, primarily through political, economic and humanitarian elements. Information confrontation is generally defined as a cross-cutting activity in all phases of conflict: its origin, maintenance and post-conflict period. Pay attention to the "asymmetrical measures", which have been ranked as the activities of special forces, the development of the internal opposition, as well as a steady increase in the influence of the information on the object of attack36.

Much of what he was talking in his speech, General Gerasimov (this, in particular, the importance of non-military methods of pressure, information warfare, etc.) has already been used first in the Crimea, and then in the east of Ukraine. Thus, we can say that Ukraine is full against the war - "hybrid" in the form of "asymmetrical" in content.

In addition to purely military methods of classical, Russia within the framework of "hybrid war" Do not just used on a large scale for the first time the concept of "war three quarters." Its essence boils down to the fact that the modern soldier must be prepared: in one quarter - to conduct combined arms battle in the second - to carry out police functions, in the third - to carry out humanitarian missions37.

36 Valeriy Gerasimov Tsennost' nauki v predvideni// Валерий Герасимов Ценность науки в предвидении// Valery Gerasimovi Value of Science in prevision http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 37 Shmitt K. Ponyatie politicheskogo [The concept of political] Voprosy sotsiologii, 1992, Vol. 1, № 1, pp. 40–53 [in Russian] 126 ISSN 1681- 116Х. Український соціум. 2014. №3 (50)

Ukraine for the first time directly confronted with this phenomenon. At the same time military experts with this type of warfare known for a long time.

The problem is, in its modernist sense began to be developed in the years 1960-70 in the writings of the "rebellion-wars" Yevgeny Messner - a former colonel of the General Staff of the Russian tsarist army.

He, in particular, wrote: "In previous wars of conquest of the territory was regarded as important. Henceforth, the most important will be honored winning souls in the Warring States. Fighting will not be a two-dimensional surface as of old, not in three-dimensional space, as it was during the time of the birth of military aviation, and four where the mentality of warring peoples is the fourth dimension ... "; " rebels, saboteurs, terrorists, saboteurs, propagandists take huge size in the future ...38"

In this new war, the emphasis is on the use of the civilian population for the injection of mass hysteria and legitimate power and resistance as "human shields" to cover armed militants.

At the same time the main component plays perhaps the most important role for the formation of the "correct" in terms of the image of the victim of the aggressor in this war more important than getting the actual victory. Murder foreign soldier ceases to be the main goal - to kill enough hybrid war his soldiers and to ensure at the same time the required information support.

During this war, the aggressor is the victim attributes to what he does.

38 Messner E.E. Vsemirnaya myatezhevoina [World war of the rebellion]. Zhukovskiy; Moscow, Kuchkovo pole, 2004, 512 р. [in Russian]

The main object of the impact of the war in a hybrid is not the enemy, and a population that is "exempt." Objectives and method of such a war - the motivation of citizens to change their own state and support the aggressor.

Also use all the means for forming the preferred pattern for the invader of events in the perception of the international community.

Non-standard kind of war is in the non-involvement of the aggressor state non-state actors - "volunteers".

An important characteristic of a hybrid war is the active use of asymmetric warfare, which are characterized by significant differences in military power, and the strategies and tactics of the parties involved.

Such a scheme of warfare is extremely difficult to deal with because there are no formal reasons to fight with the aggressor country, which is only informally (but overactive) support the militants and terrorists.

Russia actively uses methods of information-psychological war, seeking to destroy the morale of the troops and the civilian population of our country.

Using Russian Life News channel, Russia Today, and the like are "dual-use arms", acting as the formation of the "right image" for propaganda purposes and reconnaissance and subversive function as agents of the Russian secret services.

Russian military experts and scientists for a long time and quite deeply develop the theme of information and information-psychological wars39.

39 SIPRI 2013: ozbroennya, rozzbroennya ta mizhnarodna bezpeka [SIPRI 2013: armament, disarmament and international security]: Shchorichnyk; per. z angl. Stokgolm. mizhnar. in-t doslidzhennya myru; Ukr. tsentr ekon. i polit. doslidzhen im. O. Razumkova; Redkol. ukr. vyd.: L. Shangina (editor-in-chief) ta in. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2014, 520 р. [in Ukrainian]

In particular, it is extremely thoroughly modern phenomenon of information warfare investigated in his monograph "State information policy in special circumstances," the Russian scientist, a graduate of the Academy of the Federal Security Service Manoilo.

The author defines the status of a new war, "information-psychological war [...] at the moment it is the most dangerous form of social [...] warfare carried out by violent means and methods of influence on information-psychological sphere of the enemy with the purpose of solving strategic tasks."40

Here are a few more common in expert media-related definitions of information warfare as an integral component of a hybrid war

Information warfare (Information Warfare) - targeted actions to ensure information superiority by damaging information, information processes and information systems of the enemy, while ensuring the protection of their own information, information processes and information systems. It is "information- psychological" part of the information war (information and psychological warfare) and "cyber war» (cybernetic warfare).

Information-psychological warfare - focused on the implementation of a specific impact on the military and the civilian population of the country - the impact of an object through the dissemination of the information provided in the information and psychological operations.

Cyber War - part of the information war, aimed at causing damage to or destruction of the enemy information infrastructure (including hardware and

40 Malysheva E.M. Mirovye voiny i lokalnye voennye konflikty v istorii: posledstviya, uroki [World wars and local military conflicts in history: consequences and lessons]. Vestnik Adygeyskogo gos. un-ta, 2005, № 1, pp. 69–78 [in Russian]

37 software) through operations to access this infrastructure, including the method of unauthorized access41.

Information weapons - a set of technical and other means, methods and technologies, which is determined not so much by their own properties as properties of the object against which it is applied. Information weapons - a concept that integrates all means of influence on the basis of any society - information.

To understand the policies and actions of the enemy it is expedient to specify the main approaches to the implementation of the information war.

Russian specialists define the information war as a confrontation between the states in the information space for the purpose of damaging information systems, processes and resources, critical structures, undermining political, economic and social systems, as well as the massive psychological manipulation of the population in order to destabilize society and the State.

The basic training of the Russian power structures experts stated:

- The main form of event information war are secret information and psychological operations carried out by the managed information impact on the individual, group or mass consciousness, the will of the citizens of another country, their feelings, misinformation subjects of political, economic and other management decisions of the undermining of the information infrastructure the opponent and the media in these countries;

41 Deyvi M. Evolyutsiya voyn [Evolution of war]. Moscow, ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, 382 р. [in Russian]

- The aim of these measures is the implementation of a negative impact on the consciousness and system knowledge and understanding the target country and the formation of the desired information influence beyond its borders;

- For the implementation of these steps must act reconnaissance and Information Centre, operated by the real-time;

- Hostilities should precede the ability to provide fast disabling infrastructure of political and economic control of the enemy, as well as communication systems and electronic warfare;

- An important component of modern warfare (not just an information war) is a moral factor. Creating a system of moral and psychological training of the Russian Federation armed forces and development of algorithms to undermine the morale of the enemy - the decisive factors in modern warfare.

The objects of destruction while determined:

- Information infrastructure of the state;

- Consciousness, will and feelings of the various military and civilian segments of the population, especially during the election and crisis situations;

- Management decision-making system in the political, economic, social, scientific and technical spheres and in the sphere of national security and defense;

- Critical contingent (the opposition, dissidents, criminals, etc.) as a means of strengthening the crisis in the society of the enemy.

The latent (hidden network) measures the enemy. When a certain stabilization of the situation, and false statements about a peaceful settlement of the war of Russia is actively using the religious factor42.

A separate area, which is actively used, is the spread of rumors. Distribution tool are not only individual active persons, Russian TV, and informational messages that are submitted in the written press, postcards and programs of local cable operators.

Lack of implementation of the necessary measures: the internal nature of the threat is resistance inherited bureaucratic system that does not meet the challenges of the time.

Hybrid warfare can be interpreted as a model of war, which is trying to hide its military character, as well as the participation of the state structures.

This is why it greatly increases the role of the information component as real physical contexts they are replaced by inadequate information, and closing hiding the real situation more intensively than is the case in conventional war order.

Unfolding situation does not, as a rule, unparalleled in history, so it allows for a multiplicity of interpretations. And this again requires hard work is information mechanisms that are trying to send in the wrong direction, as the consciousness of the enemy and their own population.

Hybrid war is a small portion of the actual fighting, but spreads throughout the space of peace connecting to conflicts absolutely all resources, including artists, writers, politicians of other countries.

42 Popov I.M. Voyna budushchego: vzglyad iz-za okeana. Voennye teorii i kontseptsii sovremennykh SShA [The war of the future: a view from across the ocean. Military theories and concepts of modern USA]. Moscow, AST, 2004, P.444

Hybrid warfare is likely to be defined as non-military war, because a large amount of activities carried out on a joint military - civilian population.

Military begin to disguise themselves as civilians and civilian, in turn, are in arms.

An example of a pair of "military - civilian" can serve as a "green men" in the Crimea, where the Russian propaganda refused for a long time to recognize the armed forces, as they did not have identification marks.

However, the weapon was, but they tried not to use it, it served as a deterrent.

J. Bertolini adds in such a war and infiltration -Infiltration includes connecting both human and imaginary objects.43

This also should include and diligent support of the Russian diaspora. For ideological support Russia attaches a set of virtual structures. He includes European political parties from the extreme right to the extreme left, commercial organizations, lobbies and more fragmented network.

While the concept info-war is stronger than it was during the Cold War, infiltration is significantly weaker.

The latter observation can be explained by the fact that infiltration takes a long time for its implementation, as is the effect on foreign soil, where it is required to rely on foreign citizens, that is a definite need for an active position of citizens. At the same time, the information war is aimed at programming the same people from the outside, that is required passive response.

43 Bertolin G. Conceptualizing Russian information operations: InfoWar and infiltration in the context of hybrid warfare // IO Sphere. - 2015.

Hybrid War - a network wars. Typically, the network war has been described as a struggle against a network hierarchy. However, there is a slightly different between the hybrid war

- The inclusion of a variety of networks, instead of one,

- State models as well as their occurrence one of the networks or any of its components, for example, in the form of arms supplies or making trainers

- People in order to survive and are forced to unite in their own networks.

In general we can say that in this case the military is hiding peaceful. Therefore, it becomes an important component of the denial of the state's military involvement in the conflict. State begins to pretend to be a detached observer.

All this requires the participation of the most powerful propaganda. On the one hand, it inflates guilt other parties to the conflict, on the other hand, most denied their own involvement. That is, we face a completely different rhetoric than the rhetoric of the war in its purest form.

In parallel, left active anti-Western propaganda, which the injection was not so fit.Russia generally leaves from the recognition of their active participation.

Hybrid war propaganda needs the support of a number of reasons.

Firstly, it has a constant need for interpretations and reinterpretations, as it happens quite fast change of events.

Secondly, the actual happening at odds with the propaganda picture that requires constant strengthening advocacy support. Third, in a hybrid war is a complex situation in which a lot to hide, and a lot of effort, for example, there is a clear division into / another, but they are also localized on the area.

It appeared in a quasi-military taxonomy military purposes, since there is not a military operation, but rather a rebel, a revolutionary. And nobody really focused shift priorities in the grips on the mainland Ukraine - is the administrative building, the police and the Security service of Ukraine. The last two to capture weapons44.

Actively simulated seizure of power would like the citizens, in which other people act as military intimidation factor. Thus the rhetoric becomes another: one is the protection of the population against another. A military take on the role of liberators in the internal confrontation. That is, external intervention is closed by internal strife.

Galeotti prefers the term nonlinear war. He takes his Surkov. Peter Pomerantcev extends the use of the principle of non-linearity, leaving on its application in international politics: "Nonlinear Kremlin's logic is clearly manifested in manipulating the Western media and politics45.

If in the twentieth century, the Kremlin could lobby for their interests only through the left parties sympathetic to the Soviets, now he uses a kaleidoscope of contradictory messages to forging an alliance with the different groups.

European ultra-nationalist parties, such as "Jobbik" in Hungary and the National Front in France, seduced by the rhetoric, directed against the European Union, the ultra bribe words about the fight against hegemony of the United States, religious conservatives in America are impressed by the fact that the Kremlin does not accept homosexual propaganda.

44 Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–65 [in Ukrainian]

45 Peter PomerantsevNon-Linear War http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/03/28/peter-pomerantsev/non-linear-war/

The result is a polyphonic ring tone or acting on the Western audience with different positions and creates the overall effect of the Kremlin's support. "

P. Pomerantcev says a new type of promotion the following "The essence of this new promotion is not the belief of someone, and capture and hold the viewer to interrupt the Western narrative, rather than offer a counter narrative. It is a perfect genre for conspiracy theories, which are well represented on Russian television. "46

It should be remembered, and to himself, and does not slip into another conspiracy. After all, the conspiracy theories provides the most simple and comprehensible explanations, connecting with the existing situation and separate objects.

Dominance of ideology is present everywhere, but it becomes dangerous intensity of dominance when using ideology not begin to solve strategic and urgent tasks. S. Samadashvili, for example, uses the term, as an ideological engineering.

She writes as follows: "In addition to creating the news Russian TV channels are also widely used entertainment genres for propaganda purposes. Military victories and triumphs of Russia became the central theme of ideological engineering of Putin. "47

But many are inclined to believe that hybrid warfare combines the old components, for example, regular, irregular and terrorist. It is their combination creates complexity.

Western analysts in this respect more clearly articulate the situation:

46 Peter PomerantsevNon-Linear War http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/03/28/peter-pomerantsev/non-linear-war/ 47 Salome Samadashvili Muzzling the Bear http://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/information-warfare-europe-defence- russia_0.pdf

"Hybrid warfare, known as non-linear war in Russian, is a simultaneous combination and the use of numerous military and non-military instruments of government in the conflict, but their successful use is based on an effective information campaign for the conduct of the operations supported by the coordinated special operations, leading an irregular war. Nonlinear War includes various elements of conventional warfare, irregular warfare, political and even economic resources, but its success is based on the original information operation, which was later used special operations forces, when it reaches a certain level. "48

However, there is a pattern that does not happen linear solutions to solve nonlinear problems. And all our institutions are built exclusively for the generation of solutions is linear, this feature of the bureaucracy.

In a hybrid war is not one person, it changes all the time, including in terms of information. Therefore it is necessary to introduce a so-called proactive management to operate with it as future situations start to play in advance. Otherwise, the reaction to what is happening will always be delayed.

Another characteristic of a hybrid war - it is not part of fighters from the state. States may also turn their ordinary units in irregular and apply new tactics.

Hybrid warfare adopts any methods. This is possible because the main player is hidden behind the "small players." His power is just manifested to try not to show. And it is not the fire itself, and "small players", which is activated struggling.

The main attacks as a result, they need to reflect, and not he. And all this requires a maximum voltage of "information power".

48 Vasilenko O.V. Osnovn sv tov tendents rozvitku ozbro nnya ta v ys kovo tekhn ki dlya vedennya v yn u maybutn'omu / O.V. Vasilenko // Nauka í oborona. – 2009. – № 4. – P. 18// Василенко О.В. Основні світові тенденції розвитку озброєння та військової техніки для ведення війн у майбутньому / О.В. Василенко // Наука і оборона. – 2009. – № 4. – С. 18// 1. Vasilenko OV Osnovnі svіtovі tendentsії rozvitku ozbroєnnya that vіyskovoї tehnіki for conducting vіyn in maybutnomu / OV Vasilenko // Nauka i defense. - 2009. - № 4. - p 18

Massive cyber war. It should be noted that in 2004, Russian Defense Minister announced the beginning of the development of empowerment of the cyber war and bringing to realization of the strategy of the leading IT-companies, scientific and educational institutions in the US example.

Russian structures involved in the event of cyber war, disguised as "anonymous hackers", individuals and organizations.

Chapter II

2.2. "Hybrid war" of Russia against Ukraine. Timeline. Facts. Evidence of Russian troops presence at the territory of Ukraine.

The main goal of Russia concerning Ukraine - to weaken and decentralize our country, to bring to power pro-Russian leadership under control, disrupt its European course, turning Ukraine under Russian control. Thus the strategy and tactics of action against Ukraine in Moscow includes successive steps for the implementation of the above approaches.

Since the 2000s in Ukraine launched a large-scale information policy of the Russian anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda and agitation active doctrine of "Russian World" about reunification supposedly most of the divided nation in the world - "n". The ideological basis of the doctrine serves Russian revanchism for the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is the restoration of the borders of the Soviet Union until 1991 and restoration of the former "zone of influence within the Soviet bloc" countries of Europe and Asia.49

According to the doctrine of "Russian World", "n" are three categories of the world:

1. Ethnic Russians, regardless of where they live;

2. The Russian-speaking population, regardless of nationality;

3. countrymen who ever lived in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and other public entities, and their descendants;50

49 Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html 50 Dugin A. Filosofiya voiny [Philosophy of war]. Moscow, Yauza, 2004, 256 р. [in Russian].

Since November 2013, with locking Viktor Yanukovych legislated course of European integration and the outbreak of the country's Revolution dignity Kremlin propaganda evolved into openly chauvinistic, aggressive imperial, false and fascist information war against Ukraine, which was aimed to prepare public opinion in the world to external aggression the Russian Federation to Ukraine.

Since the beginning of resistance Ukraine military aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and occupation and annexation of Crimea, the information policy of re-trained in all-out military aggression deceptive, intended to demonize in the eyes of Russian society and global leadership of Ukraine.

2.2.1. Export blockade of Ukraine by Russia

On 20th July 2013 the numbers on the Ukrainian-Russian border customs of the Russian Federation initiated a total review unfounded vehicles Ukrainian producers. July 29, at the conclusion of Rospotrebnadzor, the Customs Service of the Russian Federation was a ban on imports of the Customs Union of chocolate and other products of the Ukrainian company «Roshen». According to the independent expertise health services Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Tajikistan Office of claims were refuted and reduced supply of confectionery companies to their countries, bypassing Russia.

14 August Customs Service of the Russian Federation to the list of "risk" was included without exception Ukrainian exporters and effectively blocked their products to Russia for an indefinite time, in consequence of which at border checkpoints were formed queues of several hundred trucks and rail cars of Ukrainian goods. Presidential adviser Sergei Glazyev Russia following authorities

48 were associated with the association Ukraine and the European Union, and stressed the strengthening of customs administration in the case of Ukraine signed an association agreement with the European Union. August 19 between the Ministry of income and charges of Ukraine and the Federal Customs Service of the negotiations, the results of which were announced suspension of export Ukraine blockades Russia. However, in practice the "additional control procedure" by Russian customs was stopped51.

2.2.2. The occupation by Russia of ARC

20 February 2014 Russia launched an intervention to Ukraine Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with subsequent occupation of the peninsula. February 27 Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the form of unmarked captured and locked office buildings, airports, communication agencies, media in Simferopol and Sevastopol and the Crimean Parliament, which were taken hostage of deputies and forced to ads to hold a May 25 referendum on the extension of the Crimean autonomy. Soon after the referendum date was changed twice: first postponed to March 30, and then - on March 16. In a referendum was attended by about 30 per cent of citizens with the right electoral vote. According to organizers announced the results of the referendum for joining to Russia in Crimea allegedly voted 96.77% of the vote in Sevastopol - 95.6%. Online Council under the President of Russia on the development of civil society and human rights briefly appeared that the referendum was attended by no more than 30%, of which 50% voted for joining Russia., Information about 30-40 interest and turnout unveiled

51 Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–68 [in Ukrainian]

Majlis of Crimean Tatar people. In Sevastopol held a separate referendum because the city is formally not part of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea52.

There have been changed and the wording of the question - instead of expanding the autonomy announced accession to Russia.

March 11, 2014 under the pressure of Russian security forces Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Crimea, whereby the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, including Sevastopol is a sovereign state, which for the relevant results of the referendum may apply to Russia's inclusion territory of the federation on the rights of the subject. March 16 psevdoreferendum held on the status of Crimea, which according to official figures attended 96.77% of the inhabitants of the Crimean Peninsula, including 123% of the inhabitants of Sevastopol. March 17 the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea proclaimed independence of the Republic, and on 18 March in St. George Hall of the Kremlin Russian President Vladimir Putin together with the self-appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea Sergey Aksenov, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea Volodymyr Kostantynovym and head of SSGA Alexei Chalym signed an agreement on adoption Republic of Crimea to Russia. March 21 the Federation Council of Russia passed the law on ratification of the Agreement of 18 March and the law on the formation of new Federation - Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city of federal significance53.

2.2.3.The first wave of international sanctions and restrictions on the Russian Federation

52 Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html 53 Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену// Magda Є.M. Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

March actions of the government of the Russian Federation with the occupation of the territory of a neighboring sovereign state and interference in its internal affairs, have caused massive discontent and subject barrage of criticism of the world community over the last year that called military aggression of the Russian Federation, international crime against peace and security of mankind, and annexation of Crimea - a violation of applicable law sovereign Ukraine, fundamental norms of international law and a number of international agreements, including:

• Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the inviolability of borders in Europe;

• 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances Ukraine;

• Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia in 1997;

• Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian- Russian state border on 28/01/2003.

March 27, 2014 at the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution number 68/262 confirmed "the territorial integrity of Ukraine internationally recognized borders." Resolution supported by 100 countries, 58 - abstained and 11 voted against. Later, it was suspended the membership of Russia in the international club of advanced economies "Big Eight" and introduced the first stage of the three-tier plan personal and economic sanctions against the banking system of the Russian Federation and citizens of Russia and Ukraine directly involved in the occupation of the peninsula, mostly in the form of asset freezes and bans on entry.

2.2.4. Russian energy blackmail

March 31, 2014 the State Duma of the Russian Federation unilaterally was denounced by the Kharkiv agreements, which allowed to extend Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol from 2017 to 2042 by $ 100 million a year and provided a discount Ukraine the price of gas up to 100 US dollars per thousand cubic meters of installed current contract between NJSC "Naftogaz of Ukraine" and "Gazprom". The next day, "Gazprom" Russia raised the price of natural gas for "Naftogaz Ukraine" from 485 to 268.5 US dollars per 1,000 m3 each54.

In order to settle claims Russian gas during April - May 2014 with the participation of Ukraine, European Union and Russia held nine rounds of talks. June 9 Russian government announced an ultimatum to reduce the price of 485 to 385 dollars per 1000 m3 in exchange for recognition and payment of Ukraine to 16 June gas debt with customs duties assessed after the annexation of the Crimea $ 4.5 billion. US dollars. Ukrainian and European sides called Kremlin extortion demands, unreasonably overstated the amount of debt, and the price much higher than the market, in consequence of which the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine filed a lawsuit on "Gazprom" in the Stockholm arbitration.

2.2.5. Pro-Russian propaganda action in southern and eastern Ukraine

During March-April 2014 with the participation of Russian special services in the eastern, central and southern regions of Ukraine organized a series of promotional actions for the separation of the south and east of Ukraine and joining these regions of the Russian Federation, a referendum on a federal structure in the country, the Russian language status second state and against the Ukrainian government.

54 Putin vede v Ukraini gibrydnu viinu – general Kappen [Putin leads a hybrid war in Ukraine – General Kappen], available at: http://geostrategy.org.ua/ua/komentari/item/409-putin-vede-vukrayini-gibridnu-viynu-–-general-kappen [in Ukrainian]

The occupation of the Crimea and the Russian Federation displays Ukraine- phobia pro protesters in southern and eastern Ukraine caused great indignation of the population in the country, which in many days turned into mass protests and led to the persecution non-uktainians in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odessa. March 2 antimilitary protest against the aggression of the Russian authorities in Ukraine were also in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kaluga, in which the Russian authorities had detained 285 members, most of which are charged with the article "disobeying a lawful order of a police officer."55

March 15, 2014 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Samara, Magadan and other cities of the first anti-war "March for peace and freedom" military aggression directed against Russian President Vladimir Putin to Ukraine, hatred and forcing the closure of free media. The number of participants in Moscow alone is officially estimated at about 50 thousand people.

2.2.5.The military invasion of the Russian Federation to the east Ukraine

March 1, 2014 the Federation Council of the Russian Federation adopted the appeal of Russian President Vladimir Putin for permission to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. In mid-March 2014 Ukrainian-Russian border in the Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk, Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory of the Russian Federation was stationed over a hundred Russian military bases on the territory of which focused heavy military equipment and a contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in an amount of 30-40 thousand people.

55 Trebin M. Informatsiine suspil’stvo. Viiny novoi epokhy [Informational society. Wars of new era] Viche, 2015, № 4, pp. 64–68 [in Ukrainian]

During April - May 2014 by the Federal Security Service, the Central Intelligence Agency of the Russian Federation and the illegal armed groups among the mercenaries of various nationalities while wearing military weapon systems was carried out an armed attack on local authorities and key infrastructure and mass -MEDIA in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

According to the Central Intelligence Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Donbass placed 9.1 thousand of Russian forces soldiers and one army corps in the NPT and the FSC, under which there are 33.4 thousand terrorists. In major command and staff positions in them are Russian staff officers. Ranks by more than half equipped with contractors and mercenaries from Russia. Support for armed units engaged in the Donbas group of Southern Military District in Rostov- on-Don and Novocherkassk total of 50.5 thousand soldiers.

The immediate organizer of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the head of all armed groups in Donbas became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, First Deputy Defense Minister Army General Valery Gerasimov.

By command of Russian-terrorist forces are also included Chief of Staff of the Land Forces of Russia, first deputy chief of JI, Colonel-General Alexander Lyentsov, who replaced Colonel General Sergey Istrakov, Colonel-General Alexander Galkin. Delivery of weapons and equipment deals at Donbass Lieutenant-General Andrei Serdyukov.

In November 2015 Sergey Istrakov personally led a commission of 40 officers of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, which conducted inspections readiness units to the resumption of hostilities in Donbas.

Russian Armed Forces involved in the military aggression against Ukraine

1. The military forces of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

2. The General Intelligence Agency

3. The 14th separate brigade of Special purpose CPD Defense Ministry

4. 22nd Separate Guards special purpose brigade CPD Russia

5. 33rd separate reconnaissance group

6. 100th separate reconnaissance group

7. Army

8. Airborne troops

9. Part 76 Guards landing-assault Chernigov Red Banner Division

10. 234 Guards landing-assault regiment the Black Sea Kutuzov Order of the Alexander Nevsky

11. 104th Guards Red Banner landing regiment assault

12. Part 98 Red Guards Svirsky Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree Airborne Division

13. 331 Guards Parachute Regiment commando

14. Parts of the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree division

15. 137th Guards Parachute landing Kuban Cossack Regiment of the Order of the Red Star

16. 11th Separate Guards landing-assault brigade VAT

17. 31st Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov II Degree Assault Landing Brigade

18. 45th Separate Guards Order of Kutuzov Order of Alexander Nevsky Regiment, Special Purpose VAT

19. Motorized troops

20. 8 th Separate Guards Motorized Brigade

21. 9th Motorized separate Vislenska Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Brigade

22. The 15th separate motorized rifle brigade of Russian peacekeepers

23. 17th Separate Guards Motorized Orders of Suvorov and Alexander Nevsky brigade

24. The 18th separate motorized rifle brigade

25. 21st Separate Guards Red Banner Omsk-Novobugsky Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 2nd degree motorized rifle brigade

26. 23rd Separate Guards Motorized Brigade

27. The 34th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 49th Combined Arms Army of Southern PA

28. 138th Separate Guards Red Banner Order of Lenin Krasnoselsky Motorized Brigade

29. 200th separate Motorized Brigade of Pechenhska

30. Rocket Forces and Artillery

31. 439th Guards Artillery Brigade Perekopskaya Order of Kutuzov

32. 1140 Guards Red Banner twice artillery regiment

33. armor

34. 4th Guards Tank Division

35. The sixth Czestochowa Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree separate tank brigade

36. Special troops

37. The 59th separate brigade Sivashsky Chervonopraporna management of the Central Military District

38. Navy

39. Coastal troops

40. 336th Brigade Marines

41. The 159th detachment SF BPDSS Pacific Fleet56

2.2.6. Announcement in Ukraine of "special operation"

During April - June 2014 to avoid military sabotage on the territory of Ukraine was strengthened protection of strategic facilities, social infrastructure, public authorities, state border node communications, railways and highways, and brought law enforcement system , government security forces and other institutions in Ukraine full alert in case of direct military aggression by the Russian Federation.

56 Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

March 13, 2014 decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was restored National Guard of Ukraine as a military force of the law enforcement and military service and functions based on Internal Troops of Ukraine.

March 17 order of the Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov launched the first wave of mobilization in the special period of 45 days, during which the call was made conscripts and reservists to the Armed Forces, National Guard, Security Service, State Border Service, State Special transport service and other military formations of Ukraine.

April 18, 2014 Chairman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arsen Avakov was decided to establish a regional Corps special forces of public order Interior Ministry of Ukraine, subordinated to the relevant Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the fields - regiments, battalions and mouth patrol special police.

April 30, 2014 in the areas of structural Ukraine started forming military units of territorial defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the respective regional administrations - territorial defense battalions Ukraine.

May 6, 2014 order of Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov launched a second wave of partial mobilization lasting 45 days, during which the battle was brought into the state of 53 units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and parts of 18 other military formations.

June 16 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine initiated staffing and training special military units operating Corps Reserve and Special National Guard of Ukraine, made up of volunteers:

• Special Purpose Regiment National Guard reservists Ukraine "Azov";

• 1st Battalion operational purpose reserve them. General Kulczycki National Guard of Ukraine;

• 2nd Battalion of special purpose of National Guard reservists Ukraine "Donbass";

• 4th Battalion operational purpose reserve National Guard of Ukraine "Crook".

2.2.7.The Geneva agreement and revitalization of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission

April 17, 2014 in Geneva with the participation of senior diplomatic representatives of Ukraine, the EU, US and Russia held quadripartite talks on de- escalation of armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The position of the Ukrainian side demanded the implementation of the 5 basic requirements:

1. Stop supporting terrorists in the eastern regions of Ukraine;

2. Revoke their commandos from there;

3. Revoke their special troops;

4. Cancel the Duma decision about permission to use troops on the territory of Ukraine;

5. Turn annexed Crimea.

Following the six-hour meeting, the parties agreed to a series of diplomatic agreements. Russian Federation is obliged to disarm his illegal armed formation and return of illegally seized property of their legal owners. In turn, the Ukrainian

59 side is guaranteed amnesty to protesters, except those who will be found guilty of committing a serious crime; and pledged to provide a comprehensive, transparent and accountable constitutional process in the country. The meeting strongly condemned and rejected all manifestations of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including anti-Semitism and ordered the parties to the conflict to refrain from any form of violence, intimidation or provocation. The issue of the return of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and Ukraine withdrawal of Russian troops on the eastern Ukrainian border had not been resolved.57

For the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the above steps, negotiators initiated the establishment of the Special OSCE monitoring mission consisting of international observers to 57 countries, including representatives of the Russian Federation.

Proclamation of the "People's Republic" and the second wave of international sanctions and restrictions on the Russian Federation

During the military intervention in Ukraine, Russia Bolshevik widely used type of warfare, after an ideological split in the population, in some areas of the state created a parallel illegal alternative government, which had close ties with the Kremlin. To further maintain the life of such a pro-government and avoid direct violation of international law in the field of war, the Russian Federation carried out a gradual erosion of public trust in official government through active information, advocacy flushing of the local population, combined with sabotage committed by the illegal groups of criminals, mercenaries and radical people, organized and managed by special services of Russia.

57 Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену// Magda Є.M. Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

2.2.8. Countries that imposed sanctions and members of the European Union

Within 7 - 27 April, like "Crimean scenario", "green men" was proclaimed "Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic". May 15, 2014 the Prosecutor General of Ukraine terrorist's data was classified as terrorist organizations by armed violently-terror exercise in eastern Ukraine.

On 28 April 2014 the governments of European, North American countries, Oceania countries and international organizations introduced additional and expanded existing sanctions against individuals and entities from Russia and Ukraine are directly involved in military aggression against Ukraine, as well as enhanced economic blockade of the Crimea.

2.2.9.Anti-terroristic operation in Ukraine

Given the military superiority of the Russian Federation, a position of leadership on the classification of foreign military aggression of Russia as an internal threat to Ukraine in order to prevent further introduction of regular Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine covered with "peacekeeping mission" and implement "the Abkhaz-Ossetian scenario", 14 April 2014 in Ukraine was initiated anti-terrorist operation without imposition of martial law. Zone of the antiterrorist operation covered Donetsk and Lugansk regions and Izyumsky district and the city. Raisins Kharkiv region58.

2.2.10. Armed conflict

April 13, 2014 Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov said that in order to stop the rampant terrorism, organized by the Russian special services in

58 Rokovyny ATO. Dumky, tsyfry, mohyly// Роковини АТО. Думки, цифри, могили// Anniversary ATO. The opinions numbers grave http://kyiv1.org/news/rokovini-ato-dumki-cifri-mogili-041353/

61 the eastern regions of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council launched a large-scale anti-terrorist operation involving the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He said that

April 14, 2014 Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov has appointed Lieutenant-General Vasyl Krutov first deputy head of the Security Service and head of anti-terrorist center at SBU. In March 2014 he recorded a personal appeal to the Russian government to stop the escalation of the situation in Ukraine, which could lead to war.

According to one of the leaders counterintelligence SBU Vitaly Naida, Russian troops have the task to kill hundreds of people in Ukraine, and then enter the military forces on the territory of Ukraine.

According to the head of the SBU Valentin Nalyvaychenko as of May 19 in Donetsk region has 500-600 separatists, including about 50 of their leaders who control Donetsk, Gorlovka and Slavyansk and about 300 - in the Luhansk region, which in the hands of a counter-terrorist operation killed 24 Ukrainian soldiers.

May 15, 2014 special battalion "Donbass" employed Velyka Novosilka Raion, Donetsk region, and started patrolling with local volunteers, and after storming his local police precinct local staff was brought to re oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. At the same time Novosilka chairman of district council and head of the local police precinct fled in an unknown direction. However, to the village of Velyka Novoselka pushed battalion "Vostok" unrecognized Donetsk People's Republic.

May 11, 2014, according to Acting Head of Presidential Administration of Ukraine Serhiy Pashinsky, anti-terrorist operation in the cities Krasny Liman, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk region moved to the final stage. Later on

May 15 hosted the final stage of the antiterrorist operation Ukrainian security forces near the village. Starovarvarivka, near the city of Kramatorsk and near Kramatorsk.

May 21, 2014 after being in positions of acting anti-terrorist operation President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov set the task before the Ukrainian security forces "to completely clear the region from terrorists" and "restore peace and tranquility in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions."

As of May 21 under the control of Ukrainian security forces units were 6 districts of Donetsk region, including the city. Dobropole, Dobropilskiy, Alexander, Velykonovosilkivskyy areas controlled special battalion "Donbass", and Velykonovosilkivskyy, Volnovakha, and Maryinsky Starobeshivskiy areas controlled by units of the National Guard. The next day one of the units of the battalion "Donbass" took custody of the office buildings in Volodarsky district.

June 3 during the antiterrorist operation was completely cleared of terrorists north of Donetsk region, destroyed bases and military camps of militants in the region and captured their main fortified area in the village Semenovka, established control over the city of Krasny Liman. In battles over 500 militants killed near the village Semenovka in Slavic. Losses of Ukrainian soldiers made three dead and 50 wounded.59

2.2.11. The attacks on border outposts on the border between Ukraine and Russia

May 19, 2014 near Amvrosiyivka Donetsk region near the checkpoint of the state border of Ukraine "Uspenka" group of pro-Russian militants carried out an armed attack on a checkpoint of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result of

59 Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

63 conflict, the perpetrators were destroyed, part of them arrested and brought to criminal responsibility.

At midnight on June 2 pro-Russian militants carried out the assault Luhansk border basis and during the 6-hour fight enthusiastically building collateral.

June 5th a group of armed militants crossed the Russian border and attacked a border checkpoint Marinovka of the Russian Federation, resulting in the wounding of five border of Ukraine. In order to prevent the penetration of military units and import of military equipment from the Russian Federation was involved unit is connected to the State Border Service and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the operation, according to pro-terrorist groups that tried to break through in the Ukraine, suffered two devastating airstrikes, resulting neutralized 15 militants destroyed their armored personnel carriers, car "Ural-375" and two KAMAZ trucks. Some insurgents fled back to Russia freely and were based there and the rest were strengthened in snowy Donetsk region and to monitor the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and adjustments shelling from Russia, created a fortified point at the height of Saur-Tomb.

Needing to regain control over the state border of Ukraine, to stop the uncontrolled movement of people from the Russian Federation and further preventing penetration into the territory of Ukraine military equipment, the same day the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to close eight border crossing points and during the following days organized reinforced protection of strategic facilities and patrol roads on the state border of Ukraine in Donetsk and Lugansk regions, particularly in the interval-Uspenka-Marinovka Dyakov-Zelenopillya Dovzhansky-border, National Guardy and Ukrainian military.

June 12 by the National Guard and the Armed Forces of Ukraine blocking the columns of Russian military equipment and militants in the south-eastern and southern Amvrosiivskyi Shakhtarsky areas. During the operation was also an attempt to regain control over the mound Saur-Tomb, the strategic importance of which is associated with a traceable surrounding area radius of 30-40 kilometers and a large section of the border Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As a result of the armed conflict killed 3 and wounded 12 soldiers 79th separate airborne brigade Mykolaiv and 3 special purpose regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On the night of June 17 the city of Donetsk region Snow pro-Russian militants made another driving military equipment from the Russian Federation, the species structure which includes tanks, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, heavy machine guns and mortars. During the smuggling of weapons near the village Alekseevskoe Amvrosiivskyi Donetsk region pro-Russian militants attacked on Border Protection division of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result of injuries soldiers were killed.60

May 5 armed pro-Russian militants attempted to break with Ukrainian security forces surrounded the city Slavyansk. During the raid, terrorist group was liquidated, the remains of offenders back into the city. As a result, opposition fighters killed 4 Security Service and Interior Ministry of Ukraine, one man received serious injuries.

May 13, about 30 pro-Russian militants ambushed on the outskirts of the village Oktjabrskoe Slavic area and attacked the convoy of Ukrainian paratroopers. As a result sentry armed opposition fighters killed 7 95th separate airborne brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 9 troopers received injuries of varying severity

60 Prykordonnyky vkotre fiksuyutʹ fakty rosiysʹkoyi prysutnosti v zoni ATO// Прикордонники вкотре фіксують факти російської присутності в зоні АТО// Border guards once again captures the fact russian presence near ATO http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/08/prikordonniki-dali- fiksuyut-fakti-ro/

65 and concussion. After inspecting the site, the site of the ambush early detection feature position containers on Russian launchers RPG-18 «Fly» RPG-26 "Aglen" and the barrel of sniper rifles. Militants moved several minibuses and cars.

May 24 about 17:00 on the northern outskirts of Slavic near the village Karpovka near the intersection of highways E40M03 and T 0513 pro-Russian militants using mortars and grenades attacked the checkpoint in the National Guard of Ukraine. During the firing the militants damaged homes and psychiatric hospital in Slavic. As a result, two-hour armed opposition killed a soldier of the National Guard of Ukraine, an Italian journalist and Russian translator 4 soldiers wounded.

June 4 pro-Russian militants damaged water supply, thus temporarily left without water Slovyansk, Druzhkivka, Dzerzhinsk, Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk.

June 6 at pro-Russian militants from the territory of the church with mortars shelled checkpoint of Ukraine. One person was killed, two police officers were seriously injured.

June 13 and a half kilometers from the pro-Russian Slavic militants fired Ukrainian military convoy. 2 Killed soldier 25th Airborne Brigade Airborne Forces of Ukraine

On the night of June 26 to June 27 near the Slavic village in the area of peaceful pro-Russian militants using mortars and tanks made 8 assault checkpoint Armed Forces of Ukraine. One tank and one mortar Ukrainian servicemen were killed, another captured enemy tank, 4 Ukrainian BTR suffered damage. Due to the attack killed five paratroopers Airborne Forces of Ukraine and one National Guard soldier Ukraine, 5 people were injured.

June 28 near the intersection of highways E40M03 and T 0513 pro-Russian militants carried out a second mortar attack checkpoint Armed Forces of Ukraine. 3 Killed soldier 95th separate airborne brigade Airborne Forces of Ukraine.61

2.2.12. Aviation terroristic acts and troops clashes at the East of Ukraine

April 25, 2014 at the airport of Kramatorsk Donetsk region because of pro fighters shot with PTKR was destroyed by a helicopter of the Armed Forces Ukraine Mi-8.

May 2 near Slavyansk Donetsk region of portable anti-aircraft missile system gunmen shot down two helicopters of the Armed Forces Ukraine Mi-24, killing five people, one person was injured and taken prisoner by criminals.

May 5 at the Slavonic by gunfire from pro-Russian forces heavy machine gun was damaged helicopter of the Armed Forces Ukraine Mi-24. The helicopter landed in the river, the crew survived and was evacuated.

May 29 near Slavyansk pro-Russian militants helicopter was shot down National Guardy of Ukraine Mi-8 after unloading food and rotation of personnel returning from the area Karachun Mountain. 12 people were killed, six soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine, including two crew members and six helicopters - Interior Ministry special forces personnel Ukraine, among them - Major General SP Kulchytsky; one person seriously injured.

June 4 at the Slavyansk by gunfire from militants was crushed Armed Forces of Ukraine helicopter Mi-24. The damaged helicopter was able to land, the crew managed to leave the car before it caught fire. Both crew members were injured.

61 Book of memory http://memorybook.org.ua/index1.htm

June 6, about 17:00 Slavyansk pro-Russian militants from the city center was fired airplane aircraft of Armed Forces of Ukraine AN-30B that flew from city to Nikolayevka Izyum and performed reconnaissance flight. In consequence of engine damage plane almost fell on the city. Five people were killed, three injured crew member.

June 21 in Zmiiv district crashed helicopter of State Emergency Service of Ukraine Mi-8T. The accident killed three crew members.

June 24 at the pro-Russian Slavyansk troops downed helicopter of Armed Forces of Ukraine Mi-8, shortly after takeoff from the area Karachun Mountain. A helicopter returning from a checkpoint with specialists that installed the equipment for the purpose of monitoring and recording space armistice violations in the area of anti-terrorist operations. Killing all 9 people who were on board.

April 17, 2014 near the Donetsk region Slavyansk forces reconnaissance and commando units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was captured TV radio reproductive center on Mount Karachun then made its disconnection from the Ukrainian TV and radio channels and established the first multiplex broadcast digital TV of Russian Federation.

May 3 Airborne Forces of Ukraine has resumed control of the TV tower and increased patrols organized strategic object. May 15 Ukrainian military forces were abolished newly strengthening of Russian fighters in the five kilometer zone around a television tower.

Because of the strategic importance of the mountain, its dominant height over the city and the location of her TV tower, pro-Russian militants in May-June 2014 were carried out repeatedly attempts to assault the mountain and its regular

68 shelling. May 19 fighters was made an unsuccessful attempt to re-capture facility: as a result of shelling by Russian militants from the territory of large-kindergarten weapons checkpoint landing troops Ukraine died of wounds paratrooper Armed Forces of Ukraine. 29 May and 24 June Russian militants near Mount Karachun committed two aviation crashes, killing 21 people.62

In the night from June 30 to July 1, when a massive fire attack of Karachun Mountain by Russian military special troops, TV tower was destroyed.

During 3-4 June the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine conducted a special operation to arrest the criminals pro in Krasny Liman, during which were eliminated fortified military equipment stronghold of insurgents captured in mid-April in the city hospital. As a result of the operation killed one person. June 5 was recovered City Council and the police.

June 19 Armed Forces of Ukraine Russian fighters destroyed fortifications in the South District Krasnolymanska. During the raid of criminals were detained and brought to criminal responsibility. However, the majority of Russian fighters moved the city Slavyansk. As a result of the operation killed 16 paratroopers 24th mechanized, the 25th Airborne and 95th separate air crews and Airborne Forces of Ukraine.

May 11, 2014 in Krasnoarmeysk, Donetsk region near the city council pro- Russian militants carried out the attack on the police. As a result of the fight one person was killed and another was wounded.

On the morning of May 23 in the village Karlivka Maryinsky district pro- Russian militants, equipped with armored personnel carriers, heavy armament and sniper, ambush committed an armed attack against a convoy of National Guard

62 Book of Memory http://memorybook.org.ua/units/terbat.htm

69 transport Ukraine. As a result, 4-hour battle killed 5 and wounded six soldiers of the battalion of special purpose of National Guard reservists Ukraine "Donbass". Part of National Guard Of Ukraine soldiers were caught by pro-Russian militants captured and subjected to inhuman torture.

On the same day near the village Novopavlovka Volnovakha district pro- Russian militants with automatic weapons shelled the ambulance car, in consequence of which killed a soldier of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one person was injured

23 May and 21 June near the village Dobropolye pro-Russian militants from firing a sniper rifle carried checkpoint Armed Forces of Ukraine. 3 Killed soldier 93-th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

May 22, 2014 at approximately 4:30 am near Volnovakha Donetsk region there was an attack on pro-Russian militants Ukrainian military checkpoint 51st Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In an attack by pro-Russian militants killed 18 people, 32 people were injured.

April 16, 2014 at 20.30 am pro-Russian militants armed with automatic weapons, grenades and bags of incendiary mix, in order to capture military weapons attacked the military in the city of Mariupol, Donetsk region. Security Forces and the city Police Department Ukraine militant assault was repulsed. As a result of the confrontation killed 3 and wounded 15 people, burned the vehicle and two buildings63.

May 9, 2014 dozens of pro-Russian militants armed with sniper, automatic, heavy weapons and grenades, blocking the streets and committed attempt to capture the city office of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine and National Guard

63Book of Memory http://memorybook.org.ua/units/ngu.htm

70 military unit Ukraine. Given the scale of the attack, the movement of public transport in the city was stopped and engaged armed forces of Ukraine with the use of armored vehicles in the resulting conflict killed 9 and injured 42 people, damaged water supply, buildings Mariupol City Council, prosecutors, military units, houses and building of the city police station police burned to the ground. Among those killed 1 soldier National Guard of Ukraine, 3 members of Territorial Defence of Ukraine "Dnepropetrovsk" and "Azov" and 2 workers Mariupol city department of the Interior Ministry of Ukraine, including the head of Mariupol City Department of Traffic Police Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Sayenko and commander of Dnipropetrovsk battalion of territorial defense, Colonel Sergei Demidenko, which Russian militants cut off his ears and gouged out his eyes.

June 13 at 4:50 am involving soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and Ukraine territorial defense "Azov" and "Dnepr-1" anti-terrorist operation launched by terrorist cells to total elimination of the pro-Russian criminals in Mariupol. During the operation, law enforcement bodies of Ukraine were destroyed strongholds of pro-Russian militants eliminated their military equipment, neutralized the attackers themselves and restored control of all the illegal seizure of the city.

June 14 on the outskirts of town, near the plant "Azovstal" pro-Russian militants ambush with a sniper, and large-automatic weapons fire columns made cars of the State Border Service. 5 Killed border, another 7 people were injured64.

May 22, 2014 near the city of Lugansk region Rubizhne pro-Russian militants ambushed got 30th detached mechanized brigade Novograd Volyn 8th Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which moved across the bridge

64 Book of Memory http://memorybook.org.ua/units/ngu.htm

71 highway towards the city Novodruzhesk. The militants, mostly Chechen, were appointed to positions on the banks of the Seversky Donets River and attacked a column of mechanized platoon with the use of small arms and grenades. As a result of clashes killed 3 people, 5 more people - seriously injured.

June 2 in the city of Luhansk pro-Russian militants carried out the shelling of MANPADS Ukrainian aircraft that performed reconnaissance flight. One of the shells militants released was assigned to Luhansk regional state administration, killing 8 and injuring 28 people.

June 17 Metalist, near the village, 10 kilometers from Luhansk pro-Russian militants ambush crossfire of large-weapon military convoy was attacked by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, moved to the checkpoint on the outskirts of the village. During the 20 hours of clashes killed 16 soldiers 128-th separate Guards mountain infantry brigade Turkestans'ko-Zakarpattia, 80th separate airborne brigade of the 13th Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defense battalion Ukraine "Aydar". At noon the next day by the ATO for the reinforcement of some units of the National Guard Ukraine the village has been completely cleared of the pro-Russian militants destroyed several of their block-posts and two amphibians. During the fighting killed two journalists from the Russian Federation illegally crossed the Ukrainian-Russian border and were part of the pro-Russian militants.

June 18 urban villages near Stanitsa Luhansk pro-Russian militants have fired units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During the armed confrontation was surrounded by Russian mercenaries and corrupt Ukrainian T-64B. The two man crew died, severing a grenade in the middle of the tank. 21 August settlement was liberated from the militants.

2.2.12.1.Whipping IL-76 in Luhansk

June 14, 2014 at approximately 1 hour 10 minutes a night landing at the airport "Lugansk" pro-Russian militants was hit with "Igla" and heavy machine gun military transport aircraft of the 25th military transport wing of the Air Force of Ukraine Il-76MD. On board were 40 paratroopers of 25th separate Dnepropetrovsk Airborne Brigade and 9 crew members. The shelling entire crew that was aboard the downed aircraft was killed. The tragedy was the largest since the beginning of the antiterrorist operation and the largest simultaneous loss of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period of Ukraine's independence.

On the night of May 18, 2014 near the city of Kharkiv region Raisins pro- Russian militants attacked the camp soldiers Ukraine. As a result of armed clashes injured two soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine.

May 22 near the city Barvinkove pro-Russian militants carried out the shelling checkpoint of the National Guard of Ukraine.

May 29 near the village of Kamenka region Kharkov region Izyum attack took place pro-Russian militants military convoy Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukraine Natshvardiyi soldiers and volunteers after the delivery of food and household items at checkpoints near the Slavic Donetsk region back to town Raisins. As a result of a terrorist act killed soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine65.

2.2.12.2. Boeing 777 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17

July 17, 2014 in the controlled zone of the terrorist organization "DNR" between the villages of Hornbeam and loose Shakhtarsky Donetsk region Ukraine as a result of the crash Boeing 777 airline Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH17

65 Spysok voyakiv, yaki zahynuly cherez pidbyttya litaka u Luhansʹku // Список вояків, які загинули через підбиття літака у Луганську // List of soldiers who were killed by summing the plane in Luhansk http://expres.ua/news/2014/06/15/107985-spysok-voyakiv-zagynuly-pidbyttya-litaka-lugansku

Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur, killing 298 people - citizens of Australia, Belgium , Great Britain, Vietnam, Israel, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, Romania, USA and the Philippines.

Following the investigations conducted during July-September 2014 by the Security Council of the Netherlands, the National Bureau of investigation of aviation accidents and incidents of civil aircraft, The Boeing Company, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the European Commission, the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, the International Criminal Police Organization, European police, the European aviation safety agency, the National Council on transport safety, as well as experts from Australia, Great Britain, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Germany, Russia, USA, France revealed that the cause of the crash was his destruction warhead model 9N314M missiles "ground-to-air" series 9M38, which are equipped with anti-aircraft missile systems "Buk" at a distance of about one meter from the front left upper fuselage airliner at 13:20:03 at 10, 1 km and fired from pro-Russian militants occupied territory to the southeast from the town of Torez. Instead versions of involvement in the incident Ukrainian military attack on board an aircraft piloting errors and technical problems of the aircraft implicitly refuted.

Since July 17, the airspace over the territory of Ukraine controlled by pro- Russian troops to support operations against terrorism for civil aviation was closed.66

2.2.13. The third wave of international sanctions and restrictions on food and Russian embargo

66 Rozsliduvannya katastrofy litaka Boeing 777// Розслідування катастрофи літака Boeing 777// Investigation of the crash Boeing 777 http://www.nbaai.gov.ua/news.html?id=6&lang=ua

Terrorist attack in Ukraine July 17, 2014 caused a wide resonance in the world, was the immediate cause "of international economic isolation of Russia from the civilized world," proclaimed 41 countries and several international organizations, led the third wave of sanctions against individual sectors and tightened restrictions on cooperation and technological support of.

August 6, 2014 order of the President of the Russian Federation "On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of" a ban on the import to Russia of certain agricultural products, raw materials and food, countries that have applied economic sanctions against Russian businesses and individuals. American, European and Russian experts actions of the government of the Russian Federation condemned and called politically motivated and not reasonable, which, to a greater extent hurt Russia itself, as a country that officially declared "trade war" is about 3% of world GDP, instead, States opponents have a total weight of more than 40% of world GDP. Over the next half of Russia is suffering a deep economic crisis, the collapse of the ruble, the jump in prices, falling real incomes and the reduction of the state budget.67

2.2.14.Cattle of Ilovaisk

Since mid-August 2014 offensive Ukrainian security forces gradually blocked due to counter remnants of illegal armed groups backed by army personnel of the Russian Federation. During the military confrontation, pro-Russian forces increasingly used the second Chechen war tactics with devastating bombardment of settlements sighting massive fire from heavy artillery, mortars and howitzers. However, the most critical was the situation near Ilovaisk. During 24-30 August armed terrorist formations and units of the regular army was surrounded and

67 Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

75 shelled approximately 600 soldiers of the Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry of Ukraine. 186 people died, hundreds of soldiers were wounded and captured by terrorists captured68.

2.2.15. The rapid reaction force in Europe and the European shaft

The tragedy near Ilovaisk temporarily paralyzed the antiterrorist operation in Ukraine significantly complicated the already not simple Ukrainian-Russian relations and led to the adoption in North America and Europe collective protective measures against Russia. From 4 to 5 September 2014 in Newport South Wales UK during the 26th Summit of Heads of State and Heads of Government of member countries of NATO, in addition to representatives of the Russian Federation, it was decided to create a rapid reaction force in the territories of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia , Lithuania, Poland and Romania, and the main base and command center of power in the UK. The system aims to increase the combat readiness of European countries in the case of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance Russian Federation.

In order to improve security at land border between Ukraine and Russia, September 3, 2014 the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk presented fortificated project "Wall." 10 September draft was approved by the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and started building fortifications. The project envisages the construction of two defensive lines, about 1,500 kilometers of trenches and communication trenches, over 8,000 trenches for equipment, more than 4,000 dugouts and 60-kilometer fence without Explosives. In connection with the control of the border area Ukraine illegal armed pro-Russian forces and Russian troops, the

68 Viyna na skhodi Ukrayiny// Війна на сході України// The war in eastern Ukraine http://energy.gift/viyna-shodi-ukraini_4733981.html

76 project is in two phases: the first phase of the construction of fortifications on Ukrainian-Russian border in Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv regions; the second - in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. As of October 1, according to the State Border Service of Ukraine carried out the implementation of the first phase of "The Wall".

2.2.16. De-escalation of the conflict

2.2.16.1. Minsk agreement

September 5, 2014 in Minsk in the building "President Hotel" hosted the third meeting Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, in which the parties to the conflict agreed performance "plan of peaceful settlement of the situation in the east of Ukraine" PA Poroshenko, given initiatives of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The agreement entered into force on the same day from 19:00 p.m.

September 20, 2014 decision of the fourth meeting of the Contact Group adopted a memorandum on bilateral cease use of weapons, which interpreted the ways of implementation of decision 1 point protocol.

Since September 2014 started the Working Group Joint Center for monitoring and coordination of the ceasefire and the gradual stabilization of the boundary sides in eastern Ukraine, composed of representatives of the Ukrainian side, the monitoring group of the OSCE and 76 servicemen of the Armed Forces headed by the Deputy Chief of the Land Russian troops, Lieutenant-General A. Lentsov.69

EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy Federica Mogherini at the hearing on October 6 in the European Parliament said that he sees no

69 Minsk agreement http://web.archive.org/web/20150213142137/http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true

77 military solution to the conflict. Speaking about the situation in Ukraine, Mogerini also stressed the need for full implementation of the Minsk agreements.

As for Russia, depending on developments as possible the introduction of new sanctions and mitigation: "We can soften sanctions if the situation will improve, but also can and deepen them. This effectiveness of this mechanism - its flexibility. " In terms of the EU, "Russia remains a strategic country for the international community", though not currently a partner of the EU. This position differs from the position of the US president, who in 201 * year took place of a regional leader.

Federica Mogherini also stressed the need for daily diplomatic support for the peace plan of President of Ukraine: "We have the day to day work with the Ukrainian side, helping President Poroshenko, who is trying to make their own steps to address this situation." According to her, Ukraine can expect full support in terms of institutional reforms, as well as answers to "economic and energy challenges."

Since the agreement on its implementation actually worked only Ukrainian side. The top of and managed its militants showed continuous sabotage their obligations.

2.2.16.2. Changes to Minsk II Agreement

During 11 -12 February 2015 at the Palace of Independence in Minsk took place while the third meeting of leaders of the Normandy format Ukraine- Germany-France-Russia Poroshenko, Merkel, Francois Hollande, Putin and fourth trilateral meeting of the Contact Group on peaceful settlement of the situation in the east Heidi Tagliavini Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, Mikhail Zurabov, Igor carpenter, Alexander Zakharchenko and other senior people. February 12 during a

16-hour negotiations the Minsk summit, the parties to the conflict had agreed a set of additional measures to implement the Minsk agreements of September 5, 201470.

2.2.16.3. The agreement on the withdrawal of weapons in eastern Ukraine

September 29, 2015 the parties Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine prepared "agreement on the withdrawal of weapons in eastern Ukraine."

October 2, 2015 in Paris during the fourth meeting of the leaders of the Normandy format Ukraine-Germany-France-Russia discussed ways to implement the Agreement and agreed to a number of questions:

• Diversion of weapons of all caliber smaller than 100 mm both sides at a distance of 15 km from the boundary line for 41 days.

• Clearance areas in parts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

• Extension of the mandate and increase the number of OSCE mission in Ukraine.

• The extension of the international and humanitarian organizations to freely carry out their activities throughout the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

• Holding local elections in some regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine under the existing laws of Ukraine and to ensure the smooth and efficient monitoring and verification of the electoral process by international observers of the OSCE.

70 Minsk agreement on Ukraine crisis: text in full http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11408266/Minsk-agreement-on- Ukraine-crisis-text-in-full.html

• Release Ukrainian hostages in the temporarily occupied territories and Ukrainian political prisoners held in the Russian Federation.

• Prohibition to use Russian facilities warfare against the OSCE.

The issue of Ukraine's sovereignty over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea were not resolved.

During 3-19 October 2015 the Armed Forces of Ukraine implemented the first stage of the Agreement diversion of arms in the sector "North", which covers part of the Luhansk region, October 3-6, pulled tanks 9-11 October - artillery guns and mortars.

October 20, 2015 the Armed Forces of Ukraine started the second phase of the agreement withdrawal of armaments sector "South", covering the Donetsk region and the western part of Luhansk region, and has to continue 24 days.

2.3. Implementation of the hybrid warfare theory in Ukrainian case

2.3.1. The first stage of Russia-Ukraine war

The first (preparatory) stage - from the early 2000s to mid-2013, included the following:

- during the second presidential term of Leonid Kuchma - strengthening Russian influence on the leadership of Ukraine and through it making favorable for Russia. The consequence of this was the refusal of the Ukrainian government on course to join NATO and the EU (in 2003 after the so-called "Kolchuga scandal") and "determination" "heir" of Kuchma protégé Viktor Yanukovych. However, because of the "orange" revolution, Russia has not achieved the desired;

- under President Yushchenko - large-scale measures to discredit the ideas of "orange" revolution and the leadership of Ukraine and its European and Euro- Atlantic course; destabilization of the situation in Ukraine and deepening the split in Ukrainian society into supporters of the West and Russia; undermine the Ukrainian economy a reduction of trade and economic relations with Russia and use the energy factor as an instrument of pressure on Ukraine (in t. h. under t. called. "gas wars"). This paved the way for the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential election and to "swing the" motion vector of our country from West to East;

- during the reign of Yanukovych regime - consolidation of the achievements of the Russian Federation to Ukraine and its final shift to Russia in a way, bribery and corruption of the Ukrainian authorities; implementing agent of Russian influence in the leadership of Ukraine; weakening and demoralization of the Ukrainian security forces, especially in Crimea (almost all heads of law enforcement agencies in times of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych were Russian citizens); strengthening Russian presence in the Ukrainian economy; dissemination of ideas in our country joining the Russian integration initiatives in exchange for loans and economic preferences; deployment of large-scale pro-Russian movements in Ukraine and its specific regions (primarily in the Crimean peninsula and the eastern and southern regions).71

The consequence of this policy was the refusal of Moscow leadership of Ukraine Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and re-orientation of Russia and the Customs Union, which sparked a "revolution of dignity."

71 Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko- nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna- vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya- voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

2.3.2 The second phase of the war Russia-Ukraine

In the second (active) phase - from approximately early November 2013, the following measures:

- in preparation for the seizure of Crimea and further disintegration of Ukraine:

- deployment of large-scale information campaign to discredit the "revolution of dignity" in Ukraine (as "fascist rebellion") and the new government of our country (as "military junta"), and imposing ideas on "the need to protect the Russian-speaking population in the Ukrainian territory";

- organization in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine v. BC. "Self-defense units" among locals and Russian citizens in t. H. Special services, military special forces members and other Cossack paramilitaries;

- creating groups of troops intended to invade the ARC and a show of force near the borders of Ukraine under the guise of training and safety of the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in January and February 2014.72

Thus their active actions in Ukrainian Crimea Russia started in the most favorable moment for her, which was characterized by the weakening of the Ukrainian authorities through an objective temporary absence of the president, prime minister and heads of law enforcement agencies (who fled to Russia) and personal demoralization of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in terms of revolutionary events in our country;

72 Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko- nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna- vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya- voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

- during the annexation of the Crimea:

- seizure of Russian security services (under the guise of "unknown persons") government buildings in Simferopol and removal from power management ARC;

- deployment in Crimea so. called. "Self-defense groups" ( "little green men"), which took control of the power structures of the Crimean peninsula and the key features of its infrastructure, security forces blocked the departments of Ukraine in the Crimea;

- introduction of Russian troops in the Crimea under the guise of military exercises and related articles under cover of the Agreement on the conditions of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine;

"Legalizing" the fact of occupation of Crimea through "referendum" on the status of Crimea and decision-making by the Parliament and the President of the Russian Federation for inclusion of Crimea to Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation;

Final disposition of Ukrainian authorities in Crimea and the displacement of Ukrainian troops from the Crimean peninsula.

Thus Russia annexed Crimea and established a "reason" for its integration into the Russian Federation. At the same time Russian Crimean annexation was not recognized by the overwhelming majority of countries and caused a negative reaction of the USA, the EU and its partners have introduced sanctions against Russia;

when creating "New Russia" and resolution of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine:

- destabilization of eastern and southern regions of Ukraine by organizing mass anti govermental protests, clashes with police and supporters of the unity of Ukraine, as well as the seizure of administrative buildings;

- implementation of "Crimean" scenario in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, t. h. establish control over part of their territories, the creation of "militias" made up of representatives of the Russian special services, law enforcement and criminalized local pro-Russian forces;

"Legalization" sp-called. Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) through appropriate "referendum" and "elections" their "government";

Russia to provide comprehensive support to the separatists, in t. ch. on the financing of their activities, training militants and supplying them weapons, military equipment and ammunition, as well as the introduction of Russian troops on the territory of the NPT and FSC;

- the implementation of Russia's political and economic pressure on Ukraine, as well as increasing group of Ukrainian Armed Forces near the border;

- discredit Ukraine military operation against the Russian-terrorist groups and the disintegration of the country, attempts to apply this operation as "punitive against its own population."73

The use of military force, not given opportunities to fully implement the "Crimean" scenario in the east of Ukraine. In fact, "hybrid warfare" against Ukraine Russia has turned into an armed conflict between two countries with direct

73 SIPRI 2013: ozbroennya, rozzbroennya ta mizhnarodna bezpeka [SIPRI 2013: armament, disarmament and international security]: Shchorichnyk; per. z angl. Stokgolm. mizhnar. in-t doslidzhennya myru; Ukr. tsentr ekon. i polit. doslidzhen im. O. Razumkova; Redkol. ukr. vyd.: L. Shangina (editor-in-chief) ta in. Kyiv, Zapovit, 2014, 520 р. [in Ukrainian]

84 troops on both sides. However, despite the efforts of the Russian side to hide part of their armed forces in that conflict, this fact has been recognized by the overwhelming majority of the international community, leading to increased US and EU sanctions against Russia.

Now Russia is trying to implement the second phase of "hybrid warfare" against Ukraine and at the same time (since September. after reaching Minsk agreements) to perform some elements of the third stage. For example, Russia is trying to "freeze" the conflict in eastern Ukraine, forcing us to recognize separatists " The negotiators "and start negotiations with them on their, in fact - Russian conditions. To this end, Russia increases pressure on Ukraine, by increasing the number of its troops near the Ukrainian border and in our occupied territories. Russia denies its involvement in the conflict and simultaneously conducting a large-scale information campaign anti-Ukrainian orientation.

Based on the above, it should be borne in mind that Russia will try to implement their plans in the form of a continuation of "hybrid warfare" (creeping spread of instability to other Ukrainian regions), and the open aggression of large- scale use of military force.

Armed aggression against the Russian Federation, Ukraine has become a long-term factor of influence on the Ukrainian political, economic, military and social reality. Due to the actions of the Russian Federation in 2014 it was deformed system of global and regional security, as well as the existing system of international law. Almost all international security guarantees for Ukraine (in particular in the framework of the Budapest Memorandum) proved ineffective in an environment where the aggressor was made by one of the guarantors - the Russian Federation. Russia used against Ukraine the concept of "hybrid war",

85 which in many ways is unique to the structural and functional point of view: it is in the form "hybrid", but by the content - "asymmetric". Most clearly the nature of a new type of war, demonstrated first annexation of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2014 the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and then - to support local radical elements and full-scale invasion of Russian troops in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Although each specific element of this "hybrid war" is not new per se and has been used in almost all the wars of the past, but the unique consistency and the relationship of these elements, the dynamism and flexibility of their application, as well as the growing importance of the information factor. Moreover, the information factor in some cases, becomes an independent component and is no less important than the military. Although many scientists and researchers point to the "hybrid" nature of this war, conceptualization in this sense, is ambiguous and incomplete. So, there is the concept of "hybrid warfare" in the western scientific thought roughly since the mid-2000s, but in many cases it is interpreted in different terms and concepts than there is now. To characterize the modern conflict between Ukraine and Russia may be used such terms as "unconventional war" (unconventional warfare), "irregular warfare" (irregular warfare) or "mixed War" (compound warfare), or a state-sponsored "hybrid war" ( State-Sponsored Hybrid). In all these points to the "hollowing out" the outlines of the military conflict and the involvement in it of non-military means, which in the normal state are not directly related to the classic military confrontation74. However, the measures that are used to implement the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in their entirety and were not fully conceptualized neither domestic nor Western scholars. The very genesis of the formation of the Russian concept of

74 Bachmann, Sascha-Dominik Oliver Vladimir and Gunneriusson, Hakan, Hybrid Wars: The 21st-Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security (September 16, 2014). Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 43, No. 1, 2015, pp. 77 – 98 -http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506063

"hybrid war", the stages of its deployment, components, state of implementation of the "hybrid" confrontation in Ukraine and possible ways of countering the plans of the Russian Federation in this field should be further explored and developed. Geopolitical revenge: from the idea to the main strategy in the current confrontation between Ukraine and Russia is that it is the logical conclusion of a long-term "geo-strategy of revenge", which for a long time to turn out Moscow. The very genesis of the Russian phenomenon "hybrid war" refers to the period of Russia to rethink its place in the world and the region. The main characteristic of the Yeltsin era losses geopolitical position, international political influence of status and would reformat the European geo-strategic space, which ended with a significant expansion of NATO and the EU.

In this case, even the objective components of the relevant geo-economic and geopolitical trends all the more perceived predominantly through the subjective lens of resentment and nostalgia for the lost. In concentrated form, this nostalgia back in 2005 Vladimir Putin expressed in his message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: "... We must recognize that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century for the Russian people, it became a real drama Tens of millions of our fellow citizens.. and countrymen found themselves outside Russian territory. " You could even say that in many respects the geopolitical revanchist mood Putin and his hard-line attitude to any "revolutionary" political changes due to his personal experience: he saw the destruction of the Berlin Wall, which destroyed the entire world, which, Putin understood and considered his. It is the coming to power of Vladimir Putin can be considered the beginning of Moscow's own search "geostrategy revenge", which aims to complex problems, the key of which - a gradual but steady restoration of Russian influence and importance in the international arena. However, more than

87 difficult international context, and given the significant shortage of necessary resources (from the purely economic to military information and communication), the base of the Russian "geostrategy revenge" could only be an asymmetric approach. The period from 2001 to 2014. It can be attributed to the time of search forms and methods that would help to implement the relevant geopolitical intentions. This was carried out in parallel and the "geopolitical mobilization" of the population of the state. It is implemented through the classic mechanisms of imposing his own people images "external enemy", a sense of Russia as a "besieged fortress" and the total recovery of the anti-Western (mainly anti-US) rhetoric75. The change of political regimes in the CIS (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan), most likely, Russia perceived as a threat to its externally imposed ideas of geopolitical revenge. This forced the Russian Federation intensively preparing for the next big confrontation. Moreover, the idea of "big war", which recently said presidential advisor S. Glazyev, obviously, is really dominant in the present Russian establishment. And the conclusion Glaziev also, most likely, the dominant among these circles: Russia to a new war is not ready (and willing to not be), and therefore, should provoke her before, and achieve their objectives even now. Obviously, the problem for some time remained the question of how to implement your own ideas in a rather limited (and in many respects ostentatious) readiness, the constraints of international law, the geopolitical status quo and as a consequence - the unavailability of real full-scale war. It can be assumed that approximately in the middle of the 2000s. a solution was found: "asymmetric responses" part of a larger "hybrid war". It is pertinent to note that the Russian Federation has not established its strategy from scratch. Here there is a certain continuity of Soviet practices. Some researchers attribute the origins of Russian practices "hybrid warfare" to the 20-th years of XX century. (Methods of "active

75 Belov A.K. Iskusstvo partizanskoi voiny [The art of guerrilla warfare]. Moscow, Grand: FAIR-press, 2003, 303 р.

88 intelligence"). However, in our opinion, it is better to pay attention to the final stages of the US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War. Then, in response to the announced US program for strategic defense initiative (SDI) Gorbachev 12 October 1986, during a press conference in Reykjavik, he said: "The answer to SDI will be asymmetric, but will Here we do not have to sacrifice significant.." . In January 2013, Moscow hosted the general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences, which was addressed by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov. It was a peculiar result of long work of military analysts and experts of the General Staff, who for some time have conceptualized the problem and looking for mechanisms to address it. That report General Gerasimov - a kind of "point of no return" in the manifestation of Russian views on modern war. It was pointed out, should be developed as a modern military-political conflict, what elements it should be involved and at what stages. The report emphasized the growing role of non-military methods of pressure on the enemy, primarily through political, economic and humanitarian elements. Information confrontation is generally defined as a cross-cutting activity in all phases of conflict: its origin, maintenance and post-conflict period. Pay attention to the "asymmetrical measures", which have been ranked as the activities of special forces, the development of the internal opposition, as well as a steady increase in the influence of the information on the object of attack. Much of what he was talking in his speech, General Gerasimov (this, in particular, the importance of non-military methods of pressure, information warfare, etc.) has already been used first in the Crimea, and then in the east of Ukraine76.

76 1Iskusstvo voyny: Antologiya voennoi mysli [The art of war: anthology of military thought]. Sost., podgot. teksta, predisl., komment. R. Svetlova. St-Petersburg, TID «Amfora», 2004, 542 р. [in Russian]

Thus, we can say that Ukraine is full against the war - "hybrid" in form, "asymmetric" in content. The Ukrainian-Russian "hybrid warfare": the practice of a new concept in general, the correct conclusion Chief of Staff General Gerasimov wars of a new type - namely, that in such wars military forces are used only in the final stages - provided a well-designed campaign was justified in the Crimea, however, it was not confirmed in the Donbas. The annexation of the territory of Crimea was largely successful due to not only develop an action plan in detail, but the right to choose the moment for its implementation. This, in particular: - the weakening of the central government and a partial "anarchy" on the background of the change of government; - The growth of differences (or rather - Update existing) between the center and the regions; - Poor psychological and logistical Ukrainian state security structures; - The antagonism between the different law enforcement agencies; - Especially active outreach Russia was in the Crimea in all the years of Ukraine's independence. All this has caused, if not ideal, it is very close to them the conditions of a special operation by the annexation of the Crimea. However, in the events unfolding in the regions of eastern Ukraine, a significant number of these conditions are not met, forcing Russia to move to the format of a conventional military invasion. And it is a large-scale introduction of military equipment in different forms (direct transfer across the border, through the delivery of "convoys"), but the complete denial of such administration, distinguishes the Ukrainian-Russian conflict from all others. Of course, the tactics of the terrorists of weapons, fighting against your enemy is not new. However, the current situation is unique and virtually unprecedented. This manifests itself primarily in the military and military-technical plans. Priority actions of the Russian character acquired reconnaissance and sabotage groups, terrorist acts and use guerrilla methods to control engagement of the so-called militia of the local people and criminals, as well as Russian mercenaries. They are used against the Ukrainian army and

90 battalion tactical groups of Russian troops. In particular, it was observed in the battles of Ilovaiskaya in the second half of August. Quite high is the threat of a second front in the south of Ukraine (in particular, with the southern Rostov region) to the west in order to create a land corridor to the Crimea, and under favorable conditions - even get a connection with the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. Russia has used the conflict in the east of Ukraine and to test new weapons, excercise new tactics of warfare and receive military units fighting experience. In the Donbass war special forces from almost all regions of Russia.77

By rotational scheme operating in the conflict zone and units of airborne troops, marines. Thus, Russia is using the Eastern Ukraine as a large landfill, which hones in practice new methods and means of warfare. And it is difficult not to agree with the President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite, said: "Ukraine is struggling for the sake of the whole world, for all of us if a terrorist state, which is an open aggression against its neighbor, do not stop, it will spread to Europe and beyond.". In addition to purely military methods of classical, Russia within the framework of "hybrid war" is hardly the first time a large scale used the concept of "war three quarters." Its essence boils down to the fact that the modern soldier must be prepared: in one quarter - to conduct combined arms battle in the second - to carry out police functions, in the third - to carry out humanitarian missions. Even in 1991, the Israeli polemology M. van Creveld defined characteristic of modern "post postmodern" type war period "because they do not fit in the triple scheme: the government - the army - the population". About the change of paradigm of war in the sense of engaging in non-military structures and F. van says Kapp: "hybrid warfare" - a mix of classical type of war using irregular military

77 Kaftan V.V. Partizanskaya voyna i terrorizm: k proyasneniyu sushchnosti ponyatiy [Guerrilla war and terrorism: towards clarification of the concepts]. Prostranstvo i vremya, 2012, № 3 (9), pp. 88–93 [in Russian].

91 formations. The state, which is "hybrid war", implementing an agreement with non-artists - militants, local community groups, organizations, and the relationship is completely negated. These artists can do things that make the state itself can not ... All the dirty work can be passed on to non-State actors ". The concept of" war three quarters ", which implements the Russian in Ukraine demonstrates the validity of these arguments. This was particularly evident in during the annexation of the Crimea. However, it said the concept was not implemented in the "spatial" and in a "temporary", the same "reverse" its dimension. at first "green men" appeared in the Crimea as a mission to ensure the "Russian / Russian-language rights population. "But gradually shifted to the performance of the functions of this mission to ensure the desired Moscow of the" referendum ". Soon they were carried out and military function to forcibly impose the implementation of the results" a referendum ". However, the Russian" military crime "company took place in Crimea is almost bloodless, in eastern Ukraine has become a real tragedy. An attempt to repeat the success of the Crimean drowned in a full-scale armed confrontation. Accordingly, Russia is forced to return to the classic scenario of "frozen conflicts" such as Transnistria or Karabakh. 78

2.4. The energy component of the "hybrid war" in Ukraine

An important element of conducting a "hybrid war" that has demonstrated the Russian aggression, is the impact on the functioning of society. This energy infrastructure has become a subject of special attention on the part of the aggressor, because its capture (or destruction) not only causes considerable economic damage, but also threatens the sustainable functioning of society life-support

78 Vladimir Gorbulin Gibridnaya voyna: vse tol'ko nachinayetsya http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna-vse-tolko- nachinaetsya-_.html// Владимир Горбулин Гибридная война: все только начинается http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya-voyna- vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html// Vladimir Gorbulin Hybrid War: everything is just beginning http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/gibridnaya- voyna-vse-tolko-nachinaetsya-_.html

92 systems as a whole. It should be noted that the use of energy as a potential "energy" weapon was openly proclaimed in 2003 in the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020 .: the document noted that a powerful fuel and energy complex of Russia "is the basis of economic development tool for the implementation of internal and foreign policy." And this is not just a declaration of intentions, but a real instrument of influence that Russia has repeatedly taken advantage of (including through the weakening of all the ways of the energy infrastructure of potential adversaries). An example of this is the almost simultaneous explosions of energy infrastructure, which stopped supplying natural gas and electricity to Georgia in January 2006, which was an element of further pressure on Georgia. An explosion on a gas pipeline in Turkmenistan in April 2009, helped Russia to suspend inconvenient for her agreement with Turkmenistan and virtually eliminate a competitor from the European market. So in 2006 it was stopped to repair the pipeline, to ensure the supply of oil to the refinery in Mazeikiai in Lithuania, and it is at a time when Lithuania decided to sell the factory of the Polish company. It is obvious that Russia deliberately use attacks against critical infrastructure, in particular energy, how to achieve their goals in the political and economic spheres, as well as to reduce the military and economic potential of the state in the shortest possible time. All of this can be seen in the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation. This energy infrastructure (due to its geographical dispersion) can indirectly threaten objects located far away from the immediate attack. 79Thus, annexing Crimea, military units of the Russian Federation actually gained control of the Ukrainian energy facilities, which are located outside the administrative borders of the Crimea. As a result of the

79 Magda Ê.M. Gíbridna víyna: sutníst' ta struktura fenomenu// Магда Є.М. Гібридна війна: сутність та структура феномену// Magda Є.M. Gіbridna vіyna: sutnіst structure that phenomenon http://journals.iir.kiev.ua/index.php/pol_n/article/viewFile/2489/2220

93 annexation of Ukraine has not just been captured and energy facilities in the Crimea, and by capturing energy infrastructure (pipelines and compressor stations) actually stolen oil producing fields offshore and natural gas directly in the amount of 2 billion cubic meters. m annually. In the future, this element of conducting a "hybrid war" even on a large scale the aggressor used in some areas of Lugansk and Donetsk regions. Targeted actions many coal mines were actually destroyed, blocked and destroyed transport infrastructure. In turn, this has led to problems with the supply of already mined coal to consumers, primarily - on the thermal power plant, which was a challenge for the stable functioning of the unified energy system of Ukraine. As a consequence of deteriorated and socio-economic situation not only in the eastern regions, but in the whole Ukraine. In addition, it has formed a long-term challenge to the energy security of the state as a whole. Further work has gone into the information component of a "hybrid war": the Ukrainian government adopted anti-crisis solutions in the energy sector have been actively used to form a negative attitude to the state authorities, officials and the leadership of the state. The same information and actively used to form a negative image of Ukraine among the neighboring countries and partners of Ukraine.

2.5. Information component of a "hybrid war" in Ukraine

While the military component of the conflict objectively remains the main factor of its deployment, the scale of the use of the information component more increase. The scale information war launched by Russia against Ukraine, most accurately said Commander of NATO forces in Europe F.Bridlav: "This is the most amazing information blitzkrieg that we have ever seen in the history of information warfare." Info Front "hybrid war" takes place on several fronts. First of all: 1) the population in the conflict zone; 2) among the population of the country, against which the aggression, but the area which is not covered by the

94 conflict; 3) among the citizens of the aggressor country and 4) among the international community. 80Although the information component has indeed become a cross-cutting theme of "hybrid warfare", but it does not perform an independent and auxiliary role, mostly accompanying the military phase of the operation. However, in the Ukrainian case, we are dealing not just with the hostile propaganda, and that experts rightly described as "a war of meanings" (the beginning of which could be related to 2006-2007.). Relay For these senses involved the whole set of channels to deliver information. The main structural element in this war become simulacra - images of what in reality does not exist. An example of such simulacra are "fascists in Kyiv", "atrocities destroyer battalions", "crucified boys", the use of prohibited weapons by Ukraine. The strategic goal of the operation of these simulacra - replace objective representation of target groups about the nature of the conflict, "phantoms information" necessary aggressor. The active phase of military confrontation, which began with the end of February - beginning of March 2014, was accompanied by tactical information support, which just used the techniques of construction and operation of simulacra. Ukraine managed to quickly adapt and respond in part to this challenge. "Crimean campaign" showed the weakness of the Russian version of the information component of a "hybrid war" - it does not stand the constant nagging media view. Accordingly, almost the first thing that made various "militias" and "green men" in the occupied territories - is disabled Ukrainian TV channels and massively including Russian. Formation of a single and fully controlled information space - a clear strategy for the deployment of information component of the conflict on the part of the aggressor. So it is not surprising that already at the time of the events in selected cities of Donetsk and Lugansk regions militants have established the

80 Military review. Events in the field of defense and safety in a mirror of mass media. Monitoring of mass media in a week with 25 till 31.01.2016 http://csef.ru/en/articles/print/6539

95 process of finding pro-Ukrainian streamers and systematically obstructed their activities (for example, the situation with streamers Luhansk journalists or Internet TV). It is important to note that the Russian Federation has deployed one of the fronts of "hybrid warfare" against the citizens of the state, forming there a model of behavior that is largely responsible message of the Federal Press (her complete trust in almost 60% of Russians). The reluctance of a significant number of Russian citizens to look at things from a different point of view and due to the fear of occurrence of cognitive dissonance between reality formed by the Russian media, and real events. So what is really in many ways about the Russians can say what about the people who "first fell under the pressure of its own TV." Another important information front - outside. The scope of activity of "funds", "cultural communities", "think tanks" and just "experts" pro-Russian orientation in Europe as well as the activities of the RT channel, is really significant. However, even then it affects the overall concept of "hybrid war" "in Russian": the part of such experts simply invent, and on their behalf, publish the necessary comments and conclusions - the last such case was a fictional German expert.

Now about the extent of penetration of the Russian information display and Europe. In 2014, Latvian Center for Strategic Communications NATO (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence) was established, among whose tasks - to provide an adequate response to the attempts of other countries to influence the information environment of NATO members. The importance of strategic communications was highlighted after the NATO summit in Wales. In particular, it explicitly states that the established center should deal with the "hybrid war". At the center of power to counter Russian propaganda hope in some countries, in particular Poland and the Baltic countries. For several warnings to the Russian TV channel RT foreign language did media regulator British Ofcom for

96 violations during the lighting of the Ukrainian crisis. An important cross-border space of conducting information warfare has become the Internet. Various real and imaginary "hacktivists", "cyberpartisans", as well as special units of the various security agencies to conduct confrontation in cyberspace - they are an important element of cyber attacks, as well as for special psychological operations in the social networks and the Internet in general, (organization of the Russian special services of protests internal troops near the presidential administration in October 2014), however, is completely to win the information space of Russia failed - many advocacy statements by Russian television on Ukrainian topics quickly denied themselves Internet users, who are increasingly becoming "ordinary information warfare. " Implications for Ukraine early as 1975, a British scientist in international E.Makk made an important conclusion: in most contemporary conflicts are not a strong country suffered a military defeat, they were defeated in the political sense - have not been able to impose his will on the enemy. Political weak side victory lay in the fact that she - through the use of asymmetric methods of warfare (mostly partisan) - managed to drain the will of a strong enemy to continue the war and achieve their goals. Accordingly, the double task of Ukraine in the current asymmetrical confrontation - dimensional. In the external dimension - not to succumb to the imposition of external us, unquestionably destructive to our state, the Kremlin's political will, but at the same time - to drain the enemy. And in the internal dimension - to ensure the domination of our political will in problem regions, not allowing them to have exhausted economically and politically. At the same time, the current priority - provide effective and meaningful response primarily to the military, as well as information on the aggression against our country.81

81 Limonov D. Partizan – voin ili mstitel’? [Guerrilla – warrior or an avenger?] Spetsnaz Rossii, 2010, № 5(165), available at:

In the military sphere, much will depend on external factors (in particular, international assistance). Probably, Ukraine will continue to need substantial support from its partners in the military sphere is to be ready to resist the military in the event of a further escalation of the military components of the "hybrid war". Equally important is the task of forming a system of risk analysis and protection of critical infrastructure. So, it is obvious that the protection of energy infrastructure (particularly in the area close to the ATO) should be a priority for the state. Given the importance of energy infrastructure for the life of society and its protection system must have the proper level. Because now the majority of business entities in the energy sector private, responsible for ensuring the protection of critical infrastructure of the country should be held as corresponding to public authorities and the private sector (energy infrastructure operators). However, other stakeholders, in particular local authorities and the population should also be involved in activities in this area. A more coherent response and should be on the information aggression. 82Already a number of measures mainly restrictive, but whether it can hardly be a comprehensive response to such challenges. Much will depend on the media sector, and civil society activists, since the lion's share of the Russian state propaganda limit often fail. However, we must create the conditions under which it will replace all the information quality domestic product. It should be strengthened and the implementation of state information policy in the occupied territories by Russian troops. It not fully used the potential of the information resistance in the international arena: Foreign Minister of Ukraine, and even doing a lot, but is unlikely to be able to close all the problem areas. Accelerated

http://www.specnaz.ru/article/?1680 [in Russian]

82 Malysheva E.M. Mirovye voiny i lokalnye voennye konflikty v istorii: posledstviya, uroki [World wars and local military conflicts in history: consequences and lessons]. Vestnik Adygeyskogo gos. un-ta, 2005, № 1, pp. 69–78 [in Russian]

98 implementation requires the establishment of an effective foreign broadcasting - should be recognized that at present there is more than de jure than de facto. Activity must use the tools of public diplomacy. We have to stop ignoring the complexity of the work in the Russian information space, although the latter Russia actively shuts off any third-party participants. An example of this - the last legal decision to limit foreign ownership in the media. In the online space, active unfolded Roskomnadzor, which is directly involved in the censorship. However, despite this, the Ukrainian state should find mechanisms of information exchange with the Russian audience. Confront Russia in "hybrid war" it will be difficult. The enemy was preparing for this confrontation for years and clearly knows what he wants. However, the government must learn to resist calls "hybrid war". If this confrontation will not be won, we will always have to deal with self-healing hydra, which appears in place already supposedly defeated enemy.

Conclusions

Considering such a concepts as "hybrid," "nonlinear" or "war of controlled chaos" we came to the conclusion that this war combines military, information, terrorism and other aggressive actions, coordinated from a single center and designed to achieve the strategic goal.

In geopolitical coordinates entity controlled chaos of war is geopolitical destruction of a victim, neutralizing its geopolitical characteristics - size territory, population, the status of state in the world, economic opportunities, military power, cumulative potential.

During this war victims in the country or in certain regions initiated some internal processes that, in fact, shares strategies is controlled chaos. True role, location, interests and goals of the aggressor State derived from the field of public attention, hiding the "information trash" and demagoguery.

Overall controlled hybrid warfare involves three stages:

• undermining the situation, the crisis and internal conflict in the country of the victim,

• degradation, devastation and disintegration of the country from turning it into a so-called "incapacitated" state.

• Changes in political power entirely controlled by the aggressor.

Objectives and methods of such a war - Encouraging citizens to betray their own state and support the aggressor.

100

Also, all the means utilized to form the desired pattern for the invader events in the perception of the international community.

An important characteristic of hybrid warfare is the use of asymmetric active hostilities, characterized by significant differences in military power and strategy and tactics of the participating parties.

This pattern of warfare is extremely difficult to deal with because there is no formal grounds to fight against the aggressor country, which only unofficially (but overactive) supports militants and terrorists83.

Ukraine for the first time directly confronted with this phenomenon. For more than two years, Ukraine has confronted Russian-terrorist forces and large-scale Russian aggression in the form of a hybrid war. For that Ukraine is faced with all of its key forms, highlighted earlier in this article, - direct military aggression, the use of DRGs, attacks quasi military structures (such as "militia" or "Cossacks"), constant replenishment of separatist movements in Ukraine, economic pressure, diplomatic pressure on all levels (local, regional and international), permanent psychological war and now, perhaps, the world's first successful cyber attack on critical infrastructure (Prykarpattya regional energy department).

We should not forget that the aggression itself was made possible not only because Russia had the physical capability to carry it out. The weak reaction of the West in 2008 to Russian aggression in Georgia has created the Russian leadership a feeling of permissiveness and impunity. However, when talking about the Russian hybrid war in Ukraine, often overlooked, that the aggression unleashed against Ukraine a country with nuclear weapons and from time to time to remind the rest of the world

83 Ol'shanskiy D.V. Psihologiya terrorizma [Psychology of terrorism]. St-Petersburg, Piter, 2002, 288 р. [in Russian]

101 about it. Again, it is difficult to ignore the purely quantitative superiority of Russia over Ukraine in manpower and weapons. The objectives of the Russian Federation with regard to Ukraine can be defined as the creation of the Ukrainian state in the uncontrolled territory of the Ukrainian leadership, the overall destabilization of the socio-political situation, the economic exhaustion of Ukraine, Ukrainian pulling resources away from current problems, block the European integration processes.

However, it should be noted that Ukraine still has an active resistance, which, however, does not mean reducing the threats posed by the Russian Federation. And direct military aggression is still a real and tangible threat to Ukraine (and it is quite possible - and many Eastern European countries). In the first place, in line with Gerasimov abstracts, there is a gradual transition from a mass mobilization army to high levels of permanent readiness and improvement of inter-service cooperation. Become more focused efforts to create a professional army. interspecific coordination has been improved through the creation of five strategic commands - it allowed the commanders on the ground to monitor all types of sun in his area of responsibility.

As already noted, Ukraine is in its own way in a unique situation - Ukraine has not just become the first country in which the full-bodied (as previously it tried to do in Georgia) tried a new aggression of the model used by the Russian Federation. Ukraine was able to defend itself and to develop mechanisms to counteract the most aggressive methods of hybrid attacks and still positional struggle with a much more powerful enemy. Ukrainian experience not only worthy of scrutiny (as it is already doing, NATO structures or representatives of certain Eastern European countries) - it only in terms of assessing the threats the world (primarily Europe) will face in the near future.

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As part of its "hybrid strategy" and a course on the anarchy of global security space we can expect from the Russian-conscious re-entry of a number of "frozen conflicts", particularly in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh and other regions.

Hybrid operation Russia transform the entire area into a single international security "risk zone", it creates a situation where the hybrid aggression can be implemented resolutely against any country or group of countries (that we can see by the actions of Russia in the EU's information and political space). Including military (quasi military) methods. Returning to the Ukrainian context, it should be clearly understood that even if the military action will not be renewed (to acquire a full-scale in nature, as it was during the summer of 2014 - winter 2015th), even if the Russian side will perform absolutely all points of the Minsk agreements and return control of the borders of Ukraine, even in the case of hybrid warfare will not stop and will only partially transformed. It is already clear that in addition to strengthening of informational pressure and turning "DNI" - "LNR" in the long- term destabilizing factor of Ukrainian life, Russia, as well as in Europe, uses tactics against Ukraine to provoke radical events.

Hybrid warfare in Ukraine is an indicator of the system, not just a system to guarantee the national security of Ukraine, but also of regional and global security - that as a premise, which has taken advantage of for aggression against Ukraine and undermine the existing system of world order. The situation is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, that this state of their relationship when conflict between them (in particular on European and Eurasian integration projects) cannot be solved except by using "soft" or / and "hard" power.

The name "hybrid warfare" did not fully disclose the nature of the conflict, as covering a broad class of complex conflicts using non-traditional, diverse

103 capabilities in the political, military, information, economic, energy, humanitarian spaces. Each of these conflicts accurately characterize not only the name "hybrid" as extent and form of hybridity. The names of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict - secret, hidden, shadow war, the war of controlled chaos, etc. - are also conditionally correct, as describing only some of its aspects.

Speaking of hybrid warfare as the specifics of international relations, it should be noted that it appears not only involved in the space of capabilities but also in space receptors, values, strategic and tactical objectives consequences. And all these spaces and processes they do not exist separately, but closely interrelated, making only the landscape of world order.

2. hybrid warfare causes difficulty in estimates of early aggression identification aggressor in understanding the interaction of different elements within a single technology to achieve goals. It should be noted that Russia, despite some progress after its war with Georgia, this technology is not yet perfected.

If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict political, economic, energy, information tools are used almost exclusively, the purely military means used varied, but the limited extent necessary to achieve tactical objectives.

In turn, from the Ukraine and the international community have not perfected the technology counter latent aggression. Countermeasures are implemented with a delay, not always intentionally, without proper coordination.

Today there is sufficient evidence of Russian aggression against Ukraine. Feeling humiliated by losing the Cold War, phantom pain from the collapse of the USSR, the inability to effectively promote their neo-imperial claims in the existing world order, namely Russia threw an open challenge to international norms, global and regional centers of power in the face of the US, EU, NATO

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• choosing this some of the weakest victims (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Baltic and Balkan countries)

• bought using the support of radical political forces in developed countries in order to reduce their resistance,

• trying to win over the country s authoritarian government, which is the same as Russia threatens a general trend of democratization and liberalization within it natural - and not just imposed from the outside - the results of the discontent of the people rule applicable modes (another thing that the results of protests and revolutions are the third force in their own interests).

Statements Russia over the fact that it is the object of aggression hybrid of the West, is no more than a propaganda, an attempt to create a Russian zone of "information room" and look poorly justified.84

One of the main challenges for the party victims of modern wars is generated by the hybrid uncertainty (objects, time strikes, the range of capabilities, methods of use, etc.). To minimize this effect, it is necessary the introduction of a fundamentally different crisis management based on a qualitative analysis of the stages of escalation of conflicts (conflicts preconditions appearance, display the most controversy, aggravation of tension, conflict, its solving and overcoming the consequences). Each of these phases is characterized by specific capabilities, their method of use and, accordingly, specific means and methods to counter. Moreover, based on the cross-border nature of many threats seem most appropriate transnational system of forecasting, monitoring threats and crisis response.

84 Trebin M.P. Teroryzm yak destruktyvnyi modus buttya [Terrorism as a destructive modus of existance] Suchasnist’, 2003, № 2, pp. 77– 89 [in Ukrainian]

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One of the manifestations of hybrid warfare is the network nature of modern conflict, a combination of regular party aggressor forces and collected in the network (as active nodes) self-assembled structures. It requires sacrifices party involvement in combating not only regular armed forces and other state security forces, but also the creation of similar network structures, including "vigilance committees", volunteer organizations and groups information resistance.

We should consider that the statement that a military solution to the Russian- Ukrainian conflict does not exist. It should recognize that there is not a diplomatic, economic or any other single solution. It should also be recognized that any war - it is the defeat of diplomacy. Hybrid aggression, if it failed to prevent it through diplomatic and other means requires complex asymmetric reactions, which include:

• sanctions able to convince the aggressor in the pointlessness of continuing aggression;

• tough, active defense, which makes little sense for the enemy offensive;

• diplomacy with a focus not only on finding appropriate format of negotiations as - and above all - the content of the negotiating positions, forming countermeasures and mechanisms of influence on parties to the conflict;

• International support country-sacrifice and isolation of the aggressor country, eliminating sources last resource, political and moral support;

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• stabilization and consolidation of forces in the country for victims of grounds increasing confidence in the government, which is derived from the impact of social and economic policy.85

Given the range of activities and resource opportunities in Ukraine, such a reaction to aggression should be based on broad participation of representatives of the international community and activities in accordance with international law.

An important condition for the effectiveness of complex reactions to hybrid aggression - as one of the elements mentioned above crisis management - is to coordinate activities for the mentioned areas, over time, results, performers resources. One of the conclusions of this statement reads as follows: a truce in armed conflict, which could be used for diplomatic negotiations, defined by offensive and defensive capabilities of the parties on the contact line.

The reaction of the West is not decisive and effective because of the special relationship of Western countries to Russia (fear provoking of Putin's reluctance to lose the Russian market concerns critical limit energy sources, etc.).

In turn, the inability of modern Western institutions quickly and efficiently on the basis of existing international law to resolve conflicts themselves these questions the rules and attractiveness of these institutions. Requirement of international agreements, including the Budapest memorandum undermines the nuclear disarmament process, encouraging countries to purchase their own deterrence as the only guarantee of security you can trust.

85 Tyushkevich S.A. Zakony voiny: sushchnost’, mehanizm deistviya, faktory ispol’zovaniya [Laws of war: the nature, mechanism of action, factors]. Moscow, Kniga i biznes, 2002, 360 р. [in Russian]

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The existing world order has reached the limits of effectiveness in combating international conflicts synergistic and requires revision. Basis, native new world order will be a coalition of interested in it actors - states, international organizations, non-state actors. Countries that are on the "border" integration projects suffer the most tension and danger zones are potential conflicts.

Most international integration is conditioned externally and internally processes. Internal criteria for the possibility of creating coalitions and efficiency are:

• proximity values;

• consistency interests and ways of their implementation;

• consistency of positions in assessments of threats and ways to counter;

• the availability of resources, their willingness to pooling and sharing; it is important to note that one of the types of resources include trust between partners.86

The existing world order has reached beyond which Westphalian paradigm and built on the basis of norms of international relations system are not effective - neither in terms of development, either in terms of security. This is a challenge for humanity, a crisis of international relations and requires the coordinated efforts of all the progressive application of force. In general terms, it provides:

86 Hofmayster H. Volya k voyne, ili Bessilie politiki: Filosofsko-politicheskii traktat [The will to war, or political impotence: philosophical political treatise]. Per. s nem. i poslesl. O.A. Koval. St-Petersburg, Gumanitarnaya Akademiya, 2006, 288 р. [in Russian]

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• comprehensive assessment of new trends generated by their sources and catalysts problems, weaknesses in the existing system of international relations and the reasons hindering its adaptation to new conditions;

• defining the desired state of international relations and a perspective view of international institutions, norms and rules that ensure this situation;

But until the realization of the desired (ideal) state of the world and all subjects of international relations always stay in the transition, experiencing instability, difficulties, difficulties related to the changes that take place87.

The hybrid nature of contemporary conflicts are not always tangible links between elements of technology and escalating implementation, determine the need for thorough study, a comprehensive study and take immediate changes in the structures and methods of use of national, regional and global security. Particular attention should be paid to the implementation at all levels of qualitatively new crisis management structures and network security, which would be able to effectively respond not only to the conflicts themselves, but also - and above all - the processes of escalation and prevent them.

87 Simpson E. Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims. Erin Simpson. Conference paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 2005, available at: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84945_index. html.

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