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Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26, pp. Tg_1-Tg_10, 2009

U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

By E. Joe TOMEI and I-Shih CHANG

The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California, U.S.A. (Received April 17th, 2008) The U.S. human space transportation history from 1961 through 2007 is reviewed. Past and present U.S. human space programs and human space launch vehicles and spacecraft are briefly discussed. Category and chronological list of U.S. human space missions are presented. The emphasis of the study is on the investigation of mission failures and major anomalies encountered in the U.S. human space transportation history. Failures and major anomalies by part, root cause, element, function, domain, and component are analyzed. Failure outcome, failure mode, time of failure, and mission reliability relevant to flight safety analysis are examined. Findings and failure mitigation strategy are summarized.

Key Words: Space Launch, Human Space Flight, Failure and Anomaly

1. Introduction (, Gemini, Apollo, Shuttle) are considered in the study. Related near-space and suborbital flights with X-15 To expand human presence, activity, and habitation and commercial suborbital flights with SpaceShipOne beyond Earth , new launch vehicles and crew (SS1) rocketplanes are also included in the study. The exploration vehicles are being developed by several near-space is in the region between 80.5 and 100 km space-fairing nations for human space transportation. The altitude. U.S. wings are awarded for flights new vehicles will incorporate modern space technologies above 80.5 km (50 miles). to meet stringent requirements for crew safety in space Human space flight requires an expansion of space launch operation and space flight environment. transportation systems. For purposes of this study human Anticipated expansion in space tourism to space flight can be categorized into several transportation would also contribute to increased demand for reliable phases. They are the launch phase, earth and lunar human space transportation systems. Human space launch on-orbit phases, lunar transfer and return phases, surface and flight are dangerous, expensive, and technically exploration phase, entry and landing phases, and lunar challenging. The success of this new endeavor relies upon ascent phase. Human space flight also includes static, the application of knowledge and experience gained from in-situ habitation phases both on the lunar surface and on prior human space programs. board space stations. There are also a variety of related The study is concerned with all U.S. human space topics worthy of investigation, including uncrewed flights missions and is a portion of a continuing effort 1)-14) to in support of human space flights (developmental, investigate the failure causes and corrective actions of the logistics, etc.), animal space flights, and human satellite world space launch and flight systems and to provide deployment. All of these are to be addressed by the larger lessons learned from the past in order to mitigate space project being undertaken. This paper will limit its mission failures in the future. The prior work has been discussion to the primary transportation phases. Several concentrated on failures. The current additional papers would be needed to contain all of the project is intended to examine the failure history of all collected material. human space flights focusing on transportation and is a The paper starts with a brief description of U.S. human subset of overall space missions. space transportation history, followed by category and The focus of the study is on human space mission chronological list of U.S. human space missions and failures and major anomalies in order to better understand identification of space mission failures and major the ramifications of the human space transportation record anomalies. Analysis of mission failures and anomalies by on the new human space programs. The objective of the part, root cause, element, function, domain, and study is to apply knowledge and experience gained from component are presented. Failure outcome, failure mode, prior U.S. human space programs to the development of time of failure, and mission reliability relevant to flight reliable human space transportation systems in the future. safety analysis are examined. Findings and failure mitigation strategy are summarized at end of the paper. 2. Overview 3. U.S. Human Space Transportation History This paper summarizes the history of U.S. human space transportation failures since the inception of the first Human space flight started when the USSR launched human space flight in 1961. Past and present U.S. the vehicle carrying to a low-earth suborbital, orbital, and lunar human space launch systems orbit on 1961-04-12. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. (, , , , Space Transportation launched a Redstone vehicle carrying in a System [STS]) and their associated space flight systems Mercury capsule for a suborbital flight on 1961-05-05 and

Copyright© 2009 by the Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences and ISTS. All rights reserved. Tg_1 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

an Atlas LV-3B carrying for an orbital flight ascent to earth orbit and as a spaceplane for the rest of the on 1962-02-20. In addition to low-earth-orbit flights, the mission. The is still in use today, but is U.S. is the only country that has conducted human lunar planned to be retired in 2010. In addition, the X-15 flights with the mighty rocket and Apollo rocketplane program started in 1955, flew its first human spacecraft and landed the first humans, Neil Armstrong near-space flight in 1962, suborbital flight in 1963, and and Buzz Aldrin on the Moon launching on 1969-07-16. ended in 1968. Recently, the first privately developed The U.S. human orbital space programs include human rocketplane SS1 successfully completed three Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle. The Mercury suborbital flights in 2004. program started in 1958. The first human suborbital Other than the successful programs mentioned in the mission with a Mercury/Redstone was carried out in 1961. previous paragraph, there were also cancelled human The orbital mission with a Mercury/Atlas was carried out space programs, namely Man-In-Space-Soonest in 1962; and the last Mercury/Atlas occurred in 1963. The (1957-1958), X-20 Dyna-Soar (1957-1963), Manned Gemini program started in 1962 and extended the U.S. Orbiting Laboratory (1963-1969), X-30 NASP human space program to two-man space flights to develop (1990-1993), and X-33/Venturestar (1996-2001). multi-human capsule, extravehicular operations, and Currently, there are new human space programs under rendezvous and docking techniques critical to the Apollo development in the U.S.: NASA Constellation program, lunar program. The first Gemini/Titan II human orbital Virgin Galactic (U.K.) sponsored SpaceShipTwo project, mission was carried out in 1965; and the last occurred in and XCOR Aerospace Lynx program. The space 1966. Gemini included dual launches of Gemini habitation programs involving Skylab (1973-1974) and spacecraft from Titan II launch vehicles with Atlas/Agena International Space Station (1993-present) are part of the target vehicles to allow on-orbit rendezvous operations. overall project, but will not be considered in this paper. The started in 1961 and was devoted to Fig. 1 shows the U.S. human space launch systems and land humans on the Moon and bring them safely back to spacecraft. The Redstone rocket was used for suborbital Earth. The first human orbital mission with an and the Atlas for orbital space launches of the Mercury Apollo/Saturn IB was carried out in 1968, and the first spacecraft. The Titan II rocket was used for orbital space lunar orbital mission with an Apollo/Saturn V occurred in launches of the Gemini spacecraft. The vehicle 1968. The first lunar landing mission with the Apollo 11 was used for suborbital, and the Saturn IB and V for was conducted in 1969. The Apollo program ended after orbital space launches of the Apollo spacecraft. The the launch of a Saturn IB vehicle in 1975. The Space Apollo spacecraft included a Lunar Module for Shuttle program started in 1972 and was dedicated to landing/habitation/ascent and a Lunar Rover for surface develop a space transportation system (STS) that can exploration. The STS consists of Space Shuttle, External shuttle repeatedly from Earth to orbit and back. The first Tank, (SRB) and was used to launch human orbital mission with shuttle Columbia was carried the Shuttle to low-earth orbit. The Shuttle payload bay can out in 1981. The Space Shuttle is a unique dual mode accommodate upper-stages for delivering satellites to vehicle that serves as part of the launch vehicle during higher . Shown also in the figure are the X-15 and

Fig . 1. U.S. human space launch vehicles, spacecraft, lunar module and rover (drawings reprinted courtesy of NASA)

Tg_2 E. J. TOMEI and I-S. CHANG: U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

SS1 rocketplanes. The X-15 was air launched from a B-52 and an assortment of other historical data references aircraft at 14 km for conducting hypersonic research and published by The Aerospace Corporation and other evaluating pilot performance and physiology during exit organizations 15)-43). A significant part of the database from and reentry to the atmosphere. The SS1 was air compilation process consists of reviewing and comparing launched from the White Knight carrier vehicle at 14 km the various sources, identifying conflicts and resolving and was the first successful privately funded human inconsistencies. The data entries have been populated for suborbital reusable rocketplane. The SS1 won the the small launch vehicles 9)-10), heavy launch vehicles 13), $10-million Ansari X-prize by reaching 100 km in altitude and human space transportation vehicles 11). The database twice in a two-week period. for human space transportation has been expanded to comprise crew module, service module, re-entry module, 4. U.S. Human Space Missions lunar module, and lunar rover of space transportation systems, in addition to solid motor stages, liquid engine As of 2007-12-31, U.S. human space exploration stages, hybrid motor stages, payload fairing, and ground mission count is 168, which includes 11 near-space, 7 equipment of space launch systems. For each system, suborbital, 141 orbital, and 9 lunar missions. The 168 mission failures and major anomalies are identified and human space flights consist of 2 Redstone/Mercury, 4 examined. As mentioned previously, the database also Atlas/Mercury, 13 B-52/X-15, 10 Titan II/Gemini, 13 includes entries for space station, docking module, fueling Saturn/Apollo, 3 Saturn/Skylab, 3 White Knight/SS1, and module, extravehicular unit, and uncrewed support 120 STS/Shuttle missions. Table 1 lists all the U.S. human missions. These data will be incorporated into future space missions. For the U.S., the human-cost of access to papers and in the overall project report. The following space includes one X-15 pilot during near-space flight in sections will analyze the U.S. human space mission 1967, seven STS crew members during launch in 1986, failures and anomalies. and seven STS crew members during reentry in 2003. In addition to these casualties, three died in 1967 5. U.S. Mission Failures and Major Anomalies when a fire swept through the Apollo 1 crew module on the launch pad in a pre-launch test. The Apollo 1 mishap A space mission failure is an unsuccessful attempt to is also included in Table 1 as the failure occurred in an place a payload in the intended orbit or to perform a attempt to carry out an orbital mission. planned space activity or mission. A major anomaly is a A comprehensive database has been developed at The near miss in launch or flight even when the mission was Aerospace Corporation to log the entire space launch and considered successful. Out of 168 U.S. human space flight history. Data is collected from multiple sources missions since 1961, there were 1 pre-launch, 1 launch including journal papers, public access sites, publications and 8 in-flight mission failures. Failures are categorized Table 1. U.S. human space launch log No. Launch Date LV SC No. Launch Date LV SC No. Launch Date LV SC No. Launch Date LV SC Near-Space Flights (50-62.15 miles altitude) 22 1981-04-12 STS- 1 Columbia 66 1992-01-22 STS- 42 Discovery 110 1998-01-23 STS- 89 Endeavour NS1 1962-07-17 B-52/X-15 X-15 23 1981-11-12 STS- 2 Columbia 67 1992-03-24 STS- 45 Atlantis 111 1998-04-17 STS- 90 Columbia NS2 1963-01-17 B-52/X-15 X-15 24 1982-03-22 STS- 3 Columbia 68 1992-05-07 STS- 49 Endeavour 112 1998-06-02 STS- 91 Discovery NS3 1963-06-27 B-52/X-15 X-15 25 1982-06-27 STS- 4 Columbia 69 1992-06-25 STS- 50 Columbia 113 1998-10-29 STS- 95 Discovery NS4 1965-06-29 B-52/X-15 X-15 26 1982-11-11 STS- 5 Columbia 70 1992-07-31 STS- 46 Atlantis 114 1998-12-04 STS- 88 Endeavour NS5 1965-08-10 B-52/X-15 X-15 27 1983-04-04 STS- 6 Challenger 71 1992-09-12 STS- 47 Endeavour 115 1999-05-27 STS- 96 Discovery NS6 1965-09-28 B-52/X-15 X-15 28 1983-06-18 STS- 7 Challenger 72 1992-10-22 STS- 52 Columbia 116 1999-07-23 STS- 93 Columbia NS7 1965-10-14 B-52/X-15 X-15 29 1983-08-30 STS- 8 Challenger 73 1992-12-02 STS- 53 Discovery 117 1999-12-20 STS-103 Discovery NS8 1966-11-01 B-52/X-15 X-15 30 1983-11-28 STS- 9 (41A) Columbia 74 1993-01-13 STS- 54 Endeavour 118 2000-02-11 STS- 99 Endeavour NS9 1967-10-17 B-52/X-15 X-15 31 1984-02-03 STS- 11 (41B) Challenger 75 1993-04-08 STS- 56 Discovery 119 2000-05-19 STS-101 Atlantis NS10 1967-11-15 B-52/X-15 X-15 32 1984-04-06 STS- 13 (41C) Challenger 76 1993-04-26 STS- 55 Columbia 120 2000-09-08 STS-106 Atlantis NS11 1968-08-21 B-52/X-15 X-15 33 1984-08-30 STS- 16 (41D) Discovery 77 1993-06-21 STS- 57 Endeavour 121 2000-10-11 STS- 92 Discovery 34 1984-10-05 STS- 17 (41G) Challenger 78 1993-09-12 STS- 51 Discovery 122 2000-12-01 STS- 97 Endeavour Suborbital Flights 35 1984-11-08 STS- 19 (51A) Discovery 79 1993-10-18 STS- 58 Columbia 123 2001-02-07 STS- 98 Atlantis S1 1961-05-05 Redstone Mercury 7 MR-3 36 1985-01-24 STS- 20 (51C) Discovery 80 1993-12-02 STS- 61 Endeavour 124 2001-03-08 STS-102 Discovery S2 1961-07-21 Redstone Mercury 11 MR-4 37 1985-04-12 STS- 23 (51D) Discovery 81 1994-02-03 STS- 60 Discovery 125 2001-04-19 STS-100 Endeavour S3 1963-07-19 B-52/X-15 X-15 Flight-90 38 1985-04-29 STS- 24 (51B) Challenger 82 1994-03-04 STS- 62 Columbia 126 2001-07-12 STS-104 Atlantis S4 1963-08-22 B-52/X-15 X-15 Flight-91 39 1985-06-17 STS- 25 (51G) Discovery 83 1994-04-09 STS- 59 Endeavour 127 2001-08-10 STS-105 Discovery S5 2004-06-21 White Knight/SS1 SS1 F-15 40 1985-07-29 STS- 26 (51F) Challenger 84 1994-07-08 STS- 65 Columbia 128 2001-12-05 STS-108 Endeavour S6 2004-09-29 White Knight/SS1 SS1 F-16 41 1985-08-27 STS- 27 (51I) Discovery 85 1994-09-09 STS- 64 Discovery 129 2002-03-01 STS-109 Columbia S7 2004-10-04 White Knight/SS1 SS1 F-17 42 1985-10-03 STS- 28 (51J) Atlantis 86 1994-09-30 STS- 68 Endeavour 130 2002-04-08 STS-110 Atlantis 43 1985-10-30 STS- 30 (61A) Challenger 87 1994-11-03 STS- 66 Atlantis 131 2002-06-05 STS-111 Endeavour Orbital Flights 44 1985-11-27 STS- 31 (61B) Atlantis 88 1995-02-03 STS- 63 Discovery 132 2002-10-07 STS-112 Atlantis 1 1962-02-20 Atlas LV-3B MA-6 45 1986-01-12 STS- 32 (61C) Columbia 89 1995-03-02 STS- 67 Endeavour 133 2002-11-24 STS-113 Endeavour 2 1962-05-24 Atlas LV-3B Mercury 18 MA-7 46 1986-01-28 STS- 33 (51L) Challenger 90 1995-06-27 STS- 71 Atlantis 134 2003-01-16 STS-107 Columbia 3 1962-10-03 Atlas LV-3B Mercury 16 MA-8 47 1988-09-29 STS- 26R Discovery 91 1995-07-13 STS- 70 Discovery 135 2005-07-26 STS-114 Discovery 4 1963-05-15 Atlas LV-3B Mercury 20 MA-9 48 1988-12-02 STS- 27R Atlantis 92 1995-09-07 STS- 69 Endeavour 136 2006-07-04 STS-121 Discovery 5 1965-03-23 Titan II Gemini 3 49 1989-03-13 STS- 29R Discovery 93 1995-10-20 STS- 73 Columbia 137 2006-09-09 STS-115 Atlantis 6 1965-06-03 Titan II Gemini 4 50 1989-05-04 STS- 30R Atlantis 94 1995-11-12 STS- 74 Atlantis 138 2006-12-10 STS-116 Discovery 7 1965-08-21 Titan II Gemini 5 51 1989-08-08 STS- 28R Columbia 95 1996-01-11 STS- 72 Endeavour 139 2007-06-08 STS-117 Atlantis 8 1965-12-04 Titan II Gemini 7 52 1989-10-18 STS- 34 Atlantis 96 1996-02-22 STS- 75 Columbia 140 2007-08-08 STS-118 Endeavour 9 1965-12-15 Titan II Gemini 6 53 1989-11-23 STS- 33R Discovery 97 1996-03-22 STS- 76 Atlantis 141 2007-10-23 STS-120 Discovery 10 1966-03-16 Titan II Gemini 8 54 1990-01-09 STS- 32R Columbia 98 1996-05-19 STS- 77 Endeavour 11 1966-06-03 Titan II Gemini 9 55 1990-02-28 STS- 36 Atlantis 99 1996-06-20 STS- 78 Columbia 12 1966-07-18 Titan II Gemini 10 56 1990-04-24 STS- 31R Discovery 100 1996-09-16 STS- 79 Atlantis Lunar Flights 13 1966-09-12 Titan II Gemini 11 57 1990-10-06 STS- 41 Discovery 101 1996-11-19 STS- 80 Columbia L1 1968-12-21 Saturn V Apollo 8 14 1966-11-11 Titan II Gemini 12 58 1990-11-15 STS- 38 Atlantis 102 1997-01-12 STS- 81 Atlantis L2 1969-05-18 Saturn V Apollo 10 15 1967-01-27 Saturn IB Apollo 1 59 1990-12-02 STS- 35 Columbia 103 1997-02-11 STS- 82 Discovery L3 1969-07-16 Saturn V Apollo 11 16 1968-10-11 Saturn IB Apollo 7 60 1991-04-05 STS- 37 Atlantis 104 1997-04-04 STS- 83 Columbia L4 1969-11-14 Saturn V Apollo 12 17 1969-03-03 Saturn V Apollo 9 61 1991-04-28 STS- 39 Discovery 105 1997-05-15 STS- 84 Atlantis L5 1970-04-11 Saturn V Apollo 13 18 1973-05-25 Saturn IB Skylab 2 62 1991-06-05 STS- 40 Columbia 106 1997-07-01 STS- 94 Columbia L6 1971-01-31 Saturn V Apollo 14 19 1973-07-28 Saturn IB Skylab 3 63 1991-08-02 STS- 43 Atlantis 107 1997-08-07 STS- 85 Discovery L7 1971-07-26 Saturn V Apollo 15 20 1973-11-16 Saturn IB Skylab 4 64 1991-09-12 STS- 48 Discovery 108 1997-09-26 STS- 86 Atlantis L8 1972-04-16 Saturn V Apollo 16 21 1975-07-15 Saturn IB Apollo 18-ASTP 65 1991-11-24 STS- 44 Atlantis 109 1997-11-19 STS- 87 Columbia L9 1972-12-07 Saturn V Apollo 17

launch failure in-flight failure on-pad failure The date is Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).

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as catastrophic (5), mission abort (3), and unsuccessful subsystems, can shed light on precise areas that might be satellite delivery (2). The causes of the human space at the root of many problems. This type of study can also mission failures are listed in Table 2, which includes the help suggest what actions to take to address those Apollo 1 on-pad catastrophic failure. The large number of problems. Where data is available, failures and anomalies anomalies prevents all causes to be listed in the present are further identified by the defective part. Table 3 shows paper. Research has identified 273 U.S. human space failures and anomalies by part for U.S. human space flight major anomalies (not including space habitation missions. Thermal protection, thruster, and case joint seal events). The major anomalies are distributed: X-15 (7), defects appear to be major sources of anomaly. The Mercury (11), Gemini (17), Apollo (33), Space Shuttle database is developed to assess launch vehicle failure and (203), and SS1 (2). Analysis of space mission failures is anomaly data and to understand causes and trends of flight critical to a space program’s future success. A systematic failures and anomalies. Table 4 defines the legends used look at mission successes as well as failures, including in the database and in the figures of this paper. scrutiny of various launch vehicle and spacecraft Table 2. U.S. human space mission failures No. Launch Date Failure Date Orbit LV SC Mission 1 1966-06-03 1966-06-05 LEO Titan II Gemini 9 Gemini SC9 2 1967-01-27 1967-01-27 None Saturn IB Apollo 1 AS-204; Apollo CSM 012 3 1967-11-15 1967-11-15 NS B-52/X-15A X-15A Atm. Sample; Solar Astro. 4 1970-04-11 1970-04-13 Lunar Saturn V Apollo 13 Apollo CSM 109/LM 7 5 1984-02-03 1984-02-03 LEO STS-11 (41B) Challenger Westar 6; Palapa B2 6 1985-04-12 1985-04-12 LEO STS-23 (51D) Discovery Leasat 3 7 1986-01-28 1986-01-28 LEO STS-33 (51L) Challenger TDRS 2; Spartan-Halley 8 1996-02-22 1996-02-22 LEO STS-75 Columbia TSS-1R 9 1997-04-04 1997-04-08 LEO STS-83 Columbia Spacelab MSL-1 10 2003-01-16 2003-02-01 LEO STS-107 Columbia Spacehab DM; FreeStar

No. Failure Cause 1 Docking with the target was cancelled, because the augmented target docking adapter (ATDA) failed to separate. 2 During pre-launch test, a electrical short in oxygen rich environ. resulted in crew module fire. The crew was killed. 3 Pilot killed when X-15A deviated in heading from distraction, yawed out of control at 15G, and broke up at Mach 5. 4 LOX tank ruptured during translunar flight due to heater circuit wiring overstressed. The crew returned safely. 5 Failed to deliver two satellites (Westar VI and Palapa B2) to GEO because the two PAM-D AKMs failed to ignite. 6 Satellite was delivered to low-earth orbit when Perigee Kick Motor failed to ignite. 7 Hot gas leaked through O-ring at SRM joint & vehicle exploded during launch. All 7 crew members perished. 8 Tethered Satellite System connecting tether broke during deployment. Satellite was lost. 9 Shuttle returned 12 days early due to fuel cell failure; Reflight as STS-94. 10 Orbiter broke up during reentry due to breach of thermal protection system. Vehicle and crew perished.

Table 3. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by part Part Failure Anomaly Part Failure Anomaly Part Failure Anomaly Case joint seal 1 16 Yawdamper 2 Laser attack 1 Exit cone 1 1 Acoustic overpressure system 1 Lightning strike 1 Fuel Cell 1 4 Actuator 1 Limit switch 1 LO2 Tank 1 Autopilot 1 Motor performance 1 Motor controller 1 Ball nose servo 1 Multiplexer 1 Pilot 1 Ballon seam 1 Navigation system 1 Target vehicle 1 Cable damage 1 Nozzle 1 Tether 1 Cabling 1 Nozzle ablative ring 1 TPS 1 60 Circuit breaker 1 Ordnance firing circuit 1 Wiring 1 1 Compressor 1 Position counter 1 Thruster 42 Connector 1 Power supply 1 Igniter joint seal 8 Control software 1 Propellant utilization 1 Window 8 Coolant valve 1 Quick disconnect 1 WSB 6 Cooling loop 1 Radar 1 Brakes 5 Cooling tubes 1 Reaction wheels 1 APU 4 Crew sickness 1 Relay 1 Hatch 4 CRT 1 Response timing 1 Unkown 4 Dump line 1 Rudder sevo 1 Valve 4 Electrical motor 1 Sensor 1 Wing RCC 4 End flap 1 Software upload 1 Condenser 3 EVA Restraints 1 Solenoid valve 1 Docking system 3 Feed valve 1 Squib valve 1 Nozzle joint seal 3 Fender 1 Steering 1 Switch setting 3 Fluid valve 1 Structural dynamics 1 Wiring 3 General pupose computer 1 Switch 1 Computer 2 Gimbal joint seal 1 Thermal paint 1 Environmental pressure 2 Guidance computer 1 Tire 1 Fitting 2 Heater 1 Transmitter 1 Insulation 2 Horizon scanner 1 Umbilical 1 Management software 2 IMU 1 Umbilical connector 1 MDM 2 Initiator 1 Umbilical door 1 Parachutes 2 Injector 1 Vent fitting 1 RMS 2 Inverter 1 Visor 1 Suit mobility 2 Lanyard 1 Water spray boiler 1

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Table 4. Human space transpo rtation database legends

Element Component Failure Outcome 0-H Strap-on - Hybrid motor A/E Avionics/Electronic B Breakup 0-L Strap-on - Liquid engine C Crew De Death 0-S Strap-on - Solid motor E Electrical DP Damaged Payload 1-H First stage - Hybrid motor EC Environmental control E Explosion 1-L First stage - Liquid engine EN Engine EL Emergency Landing 1-S First stage - Solid motor FP Fluid/Pneumatic F Fire 2-H Second stage - Hybrid motor H Hydraulic I Impact 2-L Second stage - Liquid engine M Mechanical In Injury or Illness 2-S Second stage - Solid motor O Ordnance MF Mission Failure 3-H Third stage - Hybrid motor P Propellant N No Launch 3-L Third stage - Liquid engine S Structural NR No Recovery 3-S Third stage - Solid motor SM Solid motor O Wrong Orbit or Trajectory 4-H Fourth stage - Hybrid motor SWA Software computational algorithm R Reentry 4-L Fourth stage - Liquid engine SWD Software data input RD Range Safety Destruct 4-S Fourth stage - Solid motor SWL Software timing/memory control logic SD Self Destruct 5-H Fifth stage - Hybrid motor T Thermal protection U Unknown 5-L Fifth stage - Liquid engine U Unknown 5-S Fifth stage - Solid motor CM Crew Module DM Docking Module ER Escape Rocket Domain Failure Mode EV Extravehicular Unit ENV Environment CO Checkout test FM Fueling Module H/W Hardware F Fallback G Ground system S/W Software L Landing LM Lunar Module U Unknown MFT Malfunction turn O Operations OO On orbit failure PAF Payload Attach Fitting OT On trajectory failure PLF Payload Fairing P On pad failure RM Re-entry Module PF Failed to program (flies straight up) RoV Rover Vehicle SO Surface operation SM Service Module U Unknown SP SpacePlane SS Space Station SV Space Vehicle U Unknown

Root Cause A Analysis: An engineering error or flaw in the definition of the system design characteristics (hardware and/or software), or incorrect/insufficient analysis of system behavior that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. D Design: An engineering error or flaw in the definition of the system design characteristics (hardware and/or software), other than incorrect/insufficient analysis of system behavior that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. P Process: An engineering error or serious omission in the definition of manufacturing, installation, test, or operating procedures or criteria, or inaccurate communication of engineering intent that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. Or: A manufacturing/assembly error or misapplication of the system of checks and balances designed to screen out errors. R Random: An undectable fault that occurs randomly due to the inherent reliability characteristics of the hardware. W Workmanship: Hardware or software technicians missapply or ignore proper procedures by commission or omission resulting in error or defect that is the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. Can occur in manufacture, assembly, installation, inspection and test. Includes software data entry and pilot errors. U Unknown

Function C&C Ground command and control system: elements designed to command and control the launch vehicle operations prior to and during flight. ECLSS Environmental control: crew cabin, life support systems and equipment, flight suits, space suits, manned maneuvering units. ENV Environmental protection: elements designed to control or protect from launch or reentry induced environments; includes vibration, shock,acoustic, aerodynamic and thermal environments protection. EPDC Electrical: elements designed to provide electrical power generation, conditioning and distribution; includes power supplies, batteries, converters, inverters, sequencers, switches, relays, diodes, cabling and harnesses for carrying electrical power. GN&C Guidance, navigation and control: elements designed to measure position, velocity and attitude, determine motion necessary to reach desired positon or attitude, and issue steering and attitude commands; includes gyros, inertial measurement and navigation units, computers and associated software. GSE Ground support equipment: elements designed to support, interface, service, supply, restrain and release the vehicle prior to flight. LAND Landing systems: parachutes, drag brakes, impact bags, floats, tires. MECH Mechanism: docking adapters, holddown and release arms, remote manipulator system, landing gear. PROP Propulsion: elements designed to produce thrust and manage propellant supply; includes liquid engines, solid motors, propellant conditioning, feed and pressurization, propellant utilization, engine conditioning, controllers and igniters. SEP Separation: elements designed to perform vehicle staging and jettison; includes separation ordnance, springs, thrusters, motors, clamp bands, tiedowns, connecting devices and controllers. STRU Structures: elements design to carry or react vehicle loads or environments, provide mounting interfaces and environmental protection; includes skirts, thrust structures, bulkheads, interstages, adapters, shrouds, shields, covers, tanks and pressure vessels. T&FS Tracking and flight safety: elements designed to track, safe and destroy vehicle for public safety; includes transponders, receivers, ordnance, antennas and destruct and thrust termination devices. TLM Telemetry: elements designed to measure vehicle activity, condition data and transmit to ground stations; includes sensors, transducers, signal conditioners, instrumentation converters, multiplexers, combiners, transmitters and antennas. TV&AC Controls: elements designed to control direction, position and attitude; includes thrust vector control, engine gimbals, position actuators, position controllers, attitude control systems and devices, spin, despin and nutation damping elements. U Unknown

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For this study, human space transportation failure and anomalies for human space missions. Overall, at least anomaly data are combined into a single analysis. Due to 96.11% of all failures and anomalies have been caused by the large quantity, the anomaly data dominates the results. hardware. The 5 unknowns are associated with 1 Titan The anomalies addressed in this paper are those II/Gemini and 4 STS/Shuttle mission anomalies. determined to be significant enough to be considered Failures and anomalies caused by hardware and major. In the database each major anomaly is weighted as software malfunctions have also been categorized by an estimate of severity but for the purposes of this paper component type shown in Fig. 6. In the figure, A/E stands all anomalies are treated equally. In addition, those for Avionics/Electronic, C for crew, E for electrical, EC considered minor or out-of-family anomalies are not for environmental control, EN for engine, FP for addressed. Judgment and historical evidence are used in fluid/pneumatic, H for hydraulic, M for mechanical, O for assigning anomaly weight. ordnance, P for propellant, S for structures, SM for solid Failures and anomalies can have their roots in any motor, SWD for software data input, SWL for software phase of launch vehicle and spacecraft development. The timing/memory control logic, T for thermal protection, root causes (design, analysis, process, random, or WE for weather, and Unk for unknown. While thermal workmanship) of mission failure and anomaly are shown protection (22.61%) defects have the greatest single in Fig. 2. The figure shows that 35.0% of all human space impact on human space mission failures and anomalies, mission failures and anomalies are attributable to engine (15.90%), mechanical (15.55%) and solid motor engineering process errors with design defects next (12.72%) malfunctions are also major contributors to highest at 34.3%. The 17.3% unknown root causes are failures and anomalies. The 3 unknowns are associated associated with the mission failure of the STS/Shuttle on with 1 STS/Shuttle and 2 SS1 mission anomalies. 1997-04-04 and 2 Redstone/Mercury, 1 Atlas (target launch for Gemini), 3 B-52/X-15, 5 Titan II/Gemini, 5 6. Flight Safety Data Saturn/Apollo, and 32 STS/Shuttle mission anomalies. Failures and anomalies can occur at any stage of launch Flight safety analysis uses failure outcome, failure and flight. Fig. 3 shows failures and anomalies by element. mode, time of failure, and mission reliability to assess The number on the abscissa stands for the stage number, S future potential risk of like systems. In addition to data for is for solid motor stage, H for hybrid stage, L for liquid mission failure and anomaly analysis shown in the engine stage, CM for crew module, EV for extravehicular previous section, data relevant to flight safety analysis is unit, G for ground system, LM for lunar module, O for included in the study. Fig. 7 shows the outcomes of U.S. operations, PAF for payload attach fitting, RoV for rover human space mission failure. In the figure, failure vehicle, SM for service module, SP for spaceplane outcomes are categorized as breakup (B), explosion (E), (orbiter), SS for space station (docking system in this fire (F), impact (I), mission unaccomplished (MF), no case), and SV for space vehicle. Because of Shuttle’s launch (N), wrong orbit (O), reentry (R), range safety frequent flights, failures and anomalies for the spaceplane destruct (RD), self destruct (SD), damaged payload (DP), (46.64%) stand out among all the others, followed by and unknown (Unk). Overall, mission unaccomplished solid motor booster (14.49%), liquid rocket first stage (30%), wrong orbit (20%), and reentry failures (20%) (11.31%), and crew module (8.83%). constitute most of the observed outcomes. Fig. 8 shows Failures and anomalies are usually attributable to the modes of failure. In the figure, failure modes are problems associated with a functional subsystem. The defined as fallback (F), landing (L), malfunction turn sources of launch vehicle failures are defined into a (MFT), on-orbit (OO), on-trajectory (OT), on-pad (P), and comprehensive set of functional areas in order to unknown (Unk) failure. On-trajectory failures (50%) are determine the distribution of failures and anomalies due to observed to be the most commonly occurring failure mode, various sources. Fig. 4 shows failures and anomalies by followed by on-orbit failures (30%). Fig. 9 shows the function. In the figure C&C stands for command and times of failure. Eight out of 10 failures occurred near the control, ECLSS for environmental control and life support, end of mission. One failure (Apollo 1) occurred on-pad, ENV for environmental protection, EPDC for electrical and the other within the first 100 sec of the mission. power, GN&C for guidance, navigation and control, The yearly mission success and failure data and the LAND for landing system, MECH for mechanical, PAF demonstrated mission reliability of all U.S. human space for payload attach fitting, PROP for propulsion, SEP for missions are shown in Fig. 10. It can be seen from the separation, STRU for structures, TLM for telemetry, figure that no human space missions were conducted from TV&AC for thrust vector and attitude control, and Unk 1976 through 1980 during the development of STS/Shuttle for unknown. Overall, ENV (29.33%) caused the greatest system. The U.S. human space programs attained an number of human space mission failures and anomalies, impressive 93.70% mission reliability with 158 successes followed by TV&AC (23.67%) and propulsion (16.25%). out of 168 attempts as of 2007-12-31. The unknown is for an STS/Shuttle anomaly. Fig. 5 shows failures and anomalies by domain 7. Summary and Conclusions (hardware, software, or environment). Problems in hardware caused the majority of the failures and The results of investigation of human space

Tg_6 E. J. TOMEI and I-S. CHANG: U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

140 130 Anomaly 120 1.06% Failure 5.65% 110 6.71% 100 90 Process 80 Design 70 35% Unknown 60 17.3% Wmanship 50 Random 40 Analysis 30 Number of Failures/Anomalies 20 34.3% 10 0 Process Design Unknown Wmanship Random Analysis Root Cause F+A

Fig. 2. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by root cause

140 130 0-S Anomaly 120 1-H Failure 1.06% 2.47% 110 14.49% 1-L 2-L 100 3-L 90 0.71% 3-S 80 CM 70 11.31% EV 60 G 50 46.64% 0.71% LM O 40 0.71% 1.06% PAF 30

Number of Failures/Anomalies RoV 8.83% 20 SM 10 2.47% SP 0 1.06% SS 2.12%

G O 1.41% EV SP SS SV SV LM 1-L 2-L 3-L SM 0-S 3-S CM 1-H

PAF RoV 0.35% Element 4.24% 0.35%

Fig. 3. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by element

140 130 Anomaly 120 0.71% Failure 0.35% 3.18% C&C 110 ECLSS 100 ENV 90 EPDC 80 23.67% GN&C 70 29.33% LAND 60 MECH 50 2.83% PAF 40 1.06% PROP 30 1.06% SEP Number of Failures/Anomalies 16.25% 20 STRU 10 6.01% TLM 0 TV&AC 4.59% Unk PAF SEP TLM C&C ENV Unk LAND

STRU 0.71%

EPDC 0.35% PROP GN&C MECH ECLSS

TV&AC 9.89% Function percent

Fig. 4. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by function

280 260 Anomaly 240 1.77% Failure 1.77% 0.35% 220 200 180 160 140 Environment 120 Hardware 100 Software 80 Unknown 60 96.11% Number of Failures/Anomalies 40 20 0 Environment Hardware Software Unknown Domain percent

Fig. 5. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by domain

Tg_7 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

140

130 1.41% 1.06% 0.35% T Anomaly 0.35% 120 1.41% 1.06% Failure 0.35% EN 110 1.77% 3.89% M 100 SM 90 A/E 5.30% 22.61% 80 FP 70 E 7.42% 60 EC 50 C 8.83% 40 15.90% O SWL 30

Number of Failures/Anomalies 12.72% S 20 15.55% Unk 10 H 0 T S P E H C O M P FP EC EN SM A/E Unk SWL SWD SWD Component

Fig. 6. U.S. human space mission failures and anomalies by component

20

18 Failure 10% 16

14 10% 12 20% B 10 E F 8 10% MF

Number of Failures 6 20% O 4 R 30% 2

0 B E F I MF N O R RD SD Unk Outcome percent

Fig. 7. U.S. human space mission failure outcome

20

18 Failure 10% 10% 16

14

12

10 MFT OO 8 30% OT

Number of Failures 6 P 50% 4

2

0 F L MFT OO OT P Unk Mode percent

Fig. 8. U.S. human space mission failure mode

20

18 Failure 10% 16

14 10% 12

10 P

8 0-100 End/Mission Number of Failures 6

4 80% 2

0 P 0-100 100-200 200-300 above 300 End/Mission Unknown Failure Time (sec) percent

Fig. 9. U.S. human space mission time of failure

Tg_8 E. J. TOMEI and I-S. CHANG: U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

transportation history shown in this paper helps to reveal Second: The rate of occurrence of major anomalies is the most common causes of U.S. human space mission approximately 1.6 per flight on average. This reduces to failures and anomalies and should be useful to implement 1.1 per flight when the repeated Space Shuttle thermal strategies to avoid similar failures in the future both for protection system (TPS) and solid motor leak anomalies new and existing programs. The study shows that (which did not involve crew action) are not included. This engineering design and process errors are the greatest rate of occurrence appears manageable based on the threat to U.S. human space mission success, which success rate of the US human space missions. Pre-flight requires engineering checks and balances with additional training of the flight and ground crews and flight testing mission assurance and flight test. of the vehicles can also help enhance mission success. Human data reviewed in this paper covers a Lastly: Ignoring clear evidence of a design defect on wide span of years and vehicle types. The earliest otherwise successful flights can be catastrophic to human missions were flown nearly 50 years ago, were of short space missions. For example, process and design errors duration, and used fairly primitive flight systems resulted in many observed Shuttle TPS anomalies, but compared to today’s vehicle, the Space Shuttle. A review were not corrected, before the reentry failure of Shuttle of the human space mission failure and anomaly trends Columbia on 2003-01-16. Moreover, SRB joint gas leaks suggest the following lessons can be learned for future had been a recurring problem with the large segmented applications: solid motors, but less prevalent after the design changes First: Complex missions, such as the Apollo moon following the Shuttle Challenger failure on 1986-01-28. landing and return, or complex human space vehicles, Additional analysis of this data is planned to investigate such as the reusable Space Shuttle, can be expected to flight results as a function of vehicle type and trends over encounter numerous unexpected events. Results of this time, but this will be the subject of a future report. An paper clearly suggest that fault tolerant, redundant accompanying paper 44) will address non-U.S. human systems with backup capabilities are necessary for crew space transportation failures. safety and mission success. The study also shows that catastrophic failures have occurred in different flight phases so there is no evident trend, but system redundancy and back-up capabilities have clearly kept flight anomalies from propagating to failures.

100 40

U.S. 90 35

80 30

70 25

60 20 Country Reliability Success Rate U.S. failure U.S. 93.70% 158 / 168 = 94.05% U.S. success 50 15 Number of Launches Mission Reliability (%) 40 10

30 5

20 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Calendar Year

Fig. 10. U.S. human space mission reliabilities

Tg_9 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

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