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The Legacy of the Oslo Accords for Current Peace Talks

By Steven Dishler

As peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (finally) resume, the 20th anniversary of the Oslo Peace Accords provides relevant lessons.

On the White House lawn on September 13, 1993, President Bill Clinton cajoled a reluctant Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to shake hands with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, dressed as always in his ubiquitous military fatigues. Arafat, the puppeteer of countless acts of violence against Israelis and other nationals, including U.S. diplomats, was now being diplomatically embraced by the same man who had spent decades fighting him, and still regarding him with animosity and distrust.

While the Oslo Accords did not bring about an agreement ending the decades-long conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, there were important accomplishments that are instructive if additional progress is to be realized.

First, the talks removed the façade of Israel not talking to the PLO. Prior to Oslo, Israeli law prohibited contact between Israelis and the PLO. Breaking that taboo ushered in a new reality of mutual recognition by two national movements; the corollary being, from that point on their disagreements would be resolved through peaceful means.

Oslo did not call for two states for two peoples, that came later, but its eventual acceptance by the majority of Israelis and Palestinians is certainly part of its legacy. Even today, after Israelis endured scores of bus and café bombings, and Palestinians cite their own long list of grievances, the overwhelming majority on both sides – close to 70% – still support a two state solution.

The alternatives – maintaining the status quo, a regional solution that would include Egypt and Jordan, or a bi-national state – are simply not realistic or feasible. If a diplomatic track is not pursued, both Israel and the Palestinians will face growing diplomatic isolation and donor fatigue, particularly by the EU. Proponents of a regional solution advocate a return to pre-1967 when Egypt controlled Gaza and Jordan controlled the West Bank, but both states reject any thought of restoring control of the Palestinians to Egypt, nor would the Palestinians countenance it. The one state or bi-national idea is also not conceivable. For Israel it would mean the end of

Summer / Fall 2013 Volume 22, Issue 3 www.nationalstrategy.com 2 the Jewish State, and no Israeli leader from any party would ever consider it. Just as important, both the Palestinians and the Israelis established national movements in order to achieve national sovereignty.

For the Palestinians, the Oslo agreements established the Palestinian Authority (PA) with all its accompanying political, economic, and security bodies. Today, the PA rules over half the geographic area of the West Bank, including all its major cities and close to 95% of the population. This in turn has opened the spigots for massive international aid intended to support the infrastructures needed for a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Accords also allowed for vital cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, which has, not always successfully, disrupted the growth of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, benefitting both Palestinians and Israel. In Gaza, if the PA were to replace the terrorist group Hamas, not only would the threat of missile attacks against Israel be removed, but the yoke of living under a tyrannical regime would be lifted from the Palestinian residents.

For Israel, Oslo brought a flourish of new diplomatic and economic opportunities. Dozens of countries recognized Israel and hundreds of multinational corporations that had hitherto avoided entering the Israeli market, began to invest in Israel. This in part, led to the development of Israel’s hi-tech industry and fostered impressive economic growth. The peace treaty with Jordan was also a direct outcome of Oslo, as was the establishment of quasi-relations between Israel, several Gulf countries, and Morocco.

Of course, there were many areas where the Accords fell short. There was no declaration of what the final arrangements would look like. Decisions on the major core issues, including borders and refugees, were deferred to an unspecified future date. Accountability for implementing commitments was not established. Educating for a change in public attitudes, what is commonly referred to as “public diplomacy,” was not mandated. The PA’s failure to stop its own entities from promulgating incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of so-called “martyrs” continues to have deadly impact and deepen Israeli distrust.

Similarly, the reluctance of Palestinian leaders to speak candidly to their public – those in the West Bank, Gaza and the millions living elsewhere – about the difficult compromises inherent with any peace deal, particularly regarding refugees, both weakens their negotiating “wiggle room” and the necessary public support for such compromises. Israelis also charge with good reason that the Palestinians and the Arab world in general have never accepted the Jewish People’s historic and religious connection to the Holy Land.

The “New Middle East” as envisioned by Oslo supporting star Shimon Peres, now Israel’s President, began to unravel with each new wave of violence. The tragic assassination by an Israeli fanatic of Yitzhak Rabin, the icon of peace and security, and several electoral defeats of the Left in Israel, stymied any future progress on the Oslo track.

Fast forward to today. After a failed attempt in his first term, President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry are determined – investing much time, effort, and political capital – to make substantive progress this time around. Their determination is paired with an optimism that is hard to find among Israelis and Palestinians who view the talks with equal measures of cynicism

Summer / Fall 2013 Volume 22, Issue 3 www.nationalstrategy.com 3 and disinterest. The disinterest, to be sure, is not totally unfounded given what else is happening in the neighborhood, i.e., revolutions in Libya and Egypt, Syria’s civil war, and the looming Iranian nuclear threat.

There are many reasons to be pessimistic about the chance of success for this latest round of negotiations. The instability which has penetrated every Arab country means they will be focused on containing their own domestic problems and less on providing vital “cover” to the Palestinians on critical issues like Jerusalem and refugees. Reflecting and fueling the dysfunction in the Palestinian body politic is Hamas ruling Gaza while the PA rules in the West Bank. Thus, any agreements will pertain only to the West Bank. Some analysts speculate that a scenario like that could bring the Gazans to reject Hamas rule. Given the isolation and economic problems facing Hamas, especially following the removal of their ally Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, that’s not an impossible scenario.

There are also other reasons for at least cautious optimism:

• Both the Palestinians and the Israelis are represented by veteran politicians and experienced negotiators who are well versed on the issues and have dealt with one another for years. • The American administration has already shown willingness to put in the effort and apply the necessary pressure to overcome obstacles. Active engagement by Secretary Kerry to keep both parties at the table and put forward bridging proposals when the negotiations stall will be critical. Also, Kerry’s insistence that neither side speak to the media was a wise if daunting demand. Leaks to the media in the past created an opening for public opposition, weakening the resolve of leaders to make difficult decisions. • Regional geo-politics pose both challenges and opportunities. The traditional spoilers– Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas – all have their own domestic headaches. While that makes them even more motivated to undermine the negotiations, their capacities to do so are diminished. • Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen have agreed to enter negotiations despite domestic political opposition. In particular, Netanyahu incurred political blowback for ordering the release of over 100 convicted terrorists while Abbas reopened talks minus the quid pro quo of a halt in Israeli settlement activity earlier demanded by President Obama. • Less reported were decisions by the Israel government to increase the number of Palestinian workers allowed to work in Israel, and allow more goods and building materials into Gaza, all important confidence building measures meant to strengthen Abu Mazen.

Finding solutions on the major issues of final borders between the two states, how to share Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, and water rights is probably not a feasible short term objective. Changing the newly adopted negotiating paradigm whereby everything is agreed upon or nothing is agreed upon, needs to be revisited if it is proving to stall any progress from being made. Despite not achieving all of its lofty if unspecified, goals, Oslo did allow for meaningful incremental advances, laying some seeds of hope and building confidence among the people.

Various plans to move the process forward incrementally have been proposed. Gilad Sher, Chief Israeli Negotiator at the 2000 Camp David and Taba summits, is promoting a plan to relocate

Summer / Fall 2013 Volume 22, Issue 3 www.nationalstrategy.com 4 willing Israeli settlers from outlying areas to west of Israel’s security fence, while maintaining an Israeli military presence in parts of the West Bank. Others have promoted a borders first idea, whereby a permanent border is mutually agreed upon, thus removing the thorny settlement issue. Afterwards, other more contentious issues can be tackled.

For Israel, any proposal must include comprehensive security: securing the borders (including the Jordan valley), counter-terrorism, and intelligence-gathering. A military pact between the United States and Israel should also be implemented guaranteeing Israel’s qualitative military advantage.

No lasting peace can be achieved without mutual recognition of both peoples’ legitimate right of national self-determination. The continued denial by the Arab world of the Jewish People’s deep and historic connection to their ancient homeland is self-defeating. The modern State of Israel will not disappear. What remains to be seen is if the Muslim world will finally accept its legitimacy.

The issues on the table are not easy to resolve. There are reasons why it took over 45 years to get from the 1947 UN resolution calling for two states – Jewish and Arab – to the Oslo Accords. But perhaps Oslo’s greatest legacy will be how diplomats apply the lessons so that additional decades of summits and UN resolutions won’t be needed before both sides enjoy the peace and security they deserve.

Steven Dishler is Director of International Affairs for the Jewish United Fund/Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, and is a Lieutenant (ret.) in the Israel Defense Forces.

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