Naval War College Review Volume 63 Article 16 Number 3 Summer

2010 The ourF th Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the Army Jon Scott Logel

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Recommended Citation Logel, Jon Scott (2010) "The ourF th Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the ," Review: Vol. 63 : No. 3 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/16

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Logel: The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Futu BOOK REVIEWS 159

their own. They found distinction by A later section in the book reflects the leading the nation through crises, care- application of this lengthy historical fully shaping the direction of national analysis to the current administration security policy and recasting the and to the response of the Bush admin- boundaries of presidential authority. istration to 9/11. Yoo points out that Through careful historical analysis, Yoo President Bush looked to former presi- remindsusthattherelationshipbe- dents for support of his actions. He tween presidential greatness and the states succinctly that “Congress simply exercise of executive power is an does not have the ability to make effec- inextricable link that has always taken tive, long-term national security deci- advantage of the vague contours of Ar- sions because of the difficulty in ticle II of the Constitution, which ad- organizing 535 legislators and the polit- dresses executive authority. In his ical incentives that drive them toward historical analysis, Yoo carefully traces short-term, risk-averse thinking.” the founders’ work at the Constitu- In his closing thoughts, Yoo reflects on tional Convention to accommodate the President Obama’s early determination executive’s energy and decisiveness to close the detention facility at within a workable constitutional Guantanamo, to terminate the CIA’s framework. special authority to question terrorists, In quelling the Whiskey Rebellion and and to suspend military commissions in addressing the Indian uprisings of the middle of the trials of al-Qa‘ida 1789–90, the first U.S. president be- leaders for war crimes. Describing the lieved that Congress having created a new president’s law enforcement ap- military, he had the authority to decide proach to terrorist violence, he asks when and how to use it. In the latter whether this approach, although popu- case, Washington sought no authority lar with his liberal supporters, can be from Congress when he directed an at- successful. He suggests that the new tack on the Wabash and Illinois Indians president may be learning to “draw on 150 miles within their territory. Simi- the mainspring of Presidential power as larly, in the Prize Cases, President Lin- deeply as his greatest predecessors.” coln concluded, and the Supreme Court COL. JAMES P. TERRY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED agreed, that after hostile acts are di- Chairman, Veterans Affairs rected against this nation the president Washington, D.C. is bound to accept the challenge with- out waiting for any legislative authority. President Roosevelt went even farther prior to the Second World War by tak- ing action to assist Britain through the Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. The Fourth Star: Lend-Lease program and to isolate Ja- Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future pan from critical resources without of the United States Army. New York: Crown, 2009. 330pp. $28 congressional approval or consultation, actions that clearly provoked Japan and Journalists David Cloud and Greg Jaffe drew the United States ever closer to have attempted to provide a narrative war. of the U.S. Army from the end of the Vietnam War through the present wars

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160 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 16

in Iraq and Afghanistan by tracing the strategy of 2007 and 2008 represent an careers of four Army officers. example. Using biographic sketches of Generals However, Cloud and Jaffe do succeed in John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter chronicling four generals whose careers Chiarelli, and , The began at the end of Vietnam and have Fourth Star seeks to show how the culminated in the present. Petraeus is Army has changed doctrinally and de- portrayed as the overly competitive veloped its leaders. Cloud and Jaffe de- Francophile infantryman, Abizaid as liver a story that is engaging, although the international soldier-student of short on analysis, explaining how as an Arab culture, Casey as the hard-charging institution the Army adapted post- armor officer, and Chiarelli as the ca- Vietnam. As a result of their approach, reer tanker of Cold War Europe. While the story of the “epic struggle” for the Reagan’s military readied itself for tank Army’s future between fighting coun- battles with the Soviet Union, these of- terinsurgencies and conventional bat- ficers were going to graduate school tles is anecdotal at best. The scholarly and thinking seriously about the next opinions that have shaped the debate war. In the post–Cold War years, all overthefutureArmydoctrineare four men gained promising reputations missing. during crises in Kurdish Iraq, Haiti, and Cloud and Jaffe argue that the Depart- Bosnia. ment of Social Sciences (“Sosh”) at West The chapters on Iraq are the most inter- Point was instrumental in shaping the esting. Abizaid, as commander of U.S. strategic thinking of these Army leaders Central Command, seems to under- as well as of the Army as an institution. stand the challenges of a post-Saddam The book attributes the unconventional Iraq but is powerless to stop the rush thinking of Petraeus and Chiarelli to toward de-Baathification. Petraeus, for their experiences as Sosh instructors. hispart,appearsastheimperiouscom- Cloud and Jaffe explain how Petraeus mander, acting as a statesman and com- collaborated with Andrew Krepinevich mander in creating a post-Saddam (author of The Army and Vietnam, government in Mosul. Conversely, 1988), to place the blame for the ser- Casey seems overwhelmed, coming to vice’s failures in Vietnam directly on the terms with his errant assumption about Army. Throughout the text, the authors defeating the insurgency through elec- are careful to note Sosh alumni who tions and politics by the end of 2006. By serve with or under these generals. Yet the end of the book, Abizaid and Casey the emphasis on the role of the Sosh fac- have become the older, ineffectual ulty in this story is somewhat misleading model of the post-Vietnam Army, while —especially since both current and for- Chiarelli and Petraeus are the newer, mer Sosh faculty are the main sources progressive model—the Army that em- for much of the narrative. One could phasizes protecting the people over pro- have easily looked to West Point’s De- tecting the force. partment of History to find similar con- The Fourth Star offers additional under- nections and influence. The roles of Dr. standing to events already described by Fred Kagan and Brigadier General H. R. fellow journalists , Tom McMaster in shaping the “surge” Ricks, and Linda Robinson. However,

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Logel: The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Futu BOOK REVIEWS 161

the book about this epic struggle for the diplomatic dance that occasionally future of the Army doctrine is still yet delves into comedies of the absurd to be written. would merit a smile, were it not for the countless lives—and, as Miller demon- LT. COL. JON SCOTT LOGEL, U.S. ARMY Naval War College strates, diplomatic careers—that have been wrecked while the band plays on. Miller’s vivid, usually empathetic de- scriptions of the cast of characters alone are worth the price of admission. This is Miller, Aaron David. The Much Too Promised diplomatic history at its most accessible Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli and enjoyable. Miller’s lively work is Peace. New York: Bantam, 2008. 407pp. $26 thoroughly researched, including inter- This interesting book aims at unravel- views with almost all the dramatis per- ing a significant mystery that has lain at sonae, so this is much more than a the heart of international diplomacy for you-are-there account. The author’s more than a generation: Why and how analysis of the problems that he, like so has America failed to bring lasting many others, failed to unravel fully is peace to the Middle East? Specifically, candid and detailed, and it will be a ref- why, despite so much expended Ameri- erence source for future generations of can money and political effort, does scholars. peace between the River valley Moreover, The Much Too Promised and the Mediterranean look as far off Land deserves high praise for finding today as in the last forty years? Answers paths through all the major minefields, to this question have never been lack- not least the vexing issue of the Israeli ing, yet few authors have tried to tackle lobby, the alleged den of limitless Jew- it comprehensively and fairly. ish money and aggressively neocon in- There are few individuals better placed fluence on U.S. foreign and defense to answer this question than Aaron Da- policy. While not all readers will accept vid Miller, a scholar-diplomat who was Miller’s answers, the fair-minded will an eyewitness to much of the drama he appreciate the care and tact with which recounts, having served as an adviser on he addresses them. In this sense, this the Middle East to six U.S. secretaries of work is a polite refutation of such re- state. Miller’s prose is accessible and cent academic writings as those of Pro- more, as he draws the reader into behind- fessors John Mearsheimer and Stephen the-scenes vignettes that make the most Walt, who have perhaps indulged in an of a topic that is potentially mind- overdrawn analysis of Israeli influence numbing, given its complexities and in Washington, D.C. nuances. The author is refreshingly In his conclusion, Miller offers some open about his biases as an American thoughtful guideposts to thinking about Jew whose emotions about the plight of this never-ending problem and what it the Palestinians are sincere, as are his means for regional and international not-infrequent frustrations with the Is- security. Considering that the Arab- raelis. His notion that both Israelis and Israeli dispute looks as intractable as Palestinians are caught in a macabre ever (and that the Jewish state is facing

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