1 Response to IPART Assessments: Coolamon, Gundagai, Junee And

Response to IPART Assessments: Coolamon, Gundagai, Junee and Temora Councils.

This report provides a response to the IPART Assessment of Council Fit for the Future

Proposals: Local Government Final Report October 2015. IPART found Coolamon to be Fit as a Rural Council, but noted that ‘if Government does not adopt a Rural Council model, it is unlikely the council would be Fit for the Future’ (IPART, 2015, p. 177). The remaining three councils did not satisfy the ‘scale and capacity’ criteria. Junee and Temora did however satisfy the financial metrics. Gundagai failed to meet the ‘sustainability’ and ‘efficiency’

metric benchmarks (IPART, 2015, p. 219). It is important to note that the efficiency metric

does not measure efficiency and provides a misleading indicator of municipal performance in

this area (Drew and Dollery, 2015a).

Fit For the Future Considerations Applying to All Councils

Scale and capacity is a fundamental concern for all four councils with respect to the IPART

assessments based on Fit for the Future criteria. The Independent Local Government Review

Panel (ILGRP), Office of Local Government, TCorp and IPART have failed to provide any

publicly available analysis of scale. The thresholds used by IPART in response to their terms

of reference appear to be opinions without empirical foundation. Drew and Dollery (2015a)

and Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015) have conducted robust empirical analysis of scale in

NSW local government using two prominent empirical methods. The results arising from

multiple regression analysis clearly demonstrate that there are no municipal level economies

of scale for councils outside of the Greater Sydney Region, although there is some evidence

of economies of density (Drew and Dollery, 2015a). ‘Economies of scale’ is a term used to

describe the decrease in average total cost as output increases (based on a proxy for size,

generally population). It is important to note that councils can be over-scaled and thus exhibit

diseconomies of scale: that is, increasing total average costs related to size. Economies of

density relate to decreasing average total costs as population density increases. Economies of

density cannot be manipulated through amalgamation. Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015)

conducted data envelopment analysis using the TCorp 2011 data set and found that 20 of the

23 ILGRP proposed council mergers would result in over-scaled councils exhibiting decreasing returns to scale.

It is clear that there is little reason to believe that most mergers will result in efficiencies arising from economies of scale. When one considers the range of goods and services provided by General Purpose councils it is clear that efficiencies associated with scale are likely to be function specific. Fahey (2015) in his Masters thesis (directed by his Principal

Supervisor, Drew) conducted an analysis of economies of scale on the functional data found

2 in Schedule 1 of the 2014 audited financial statements. Only three of the Schedule 1 functions had evidence to suggest that economies of scale may exist:

• Public Order: the evidence suggests economies of scale up to a population of 244,303

(which is the optimal size indicated by the econometric evidence). For General

Purpose councils in NSW public order expenditure accounts for 3.1% of budget.

• Economic Affairs: the evidence suggests economies of scale up to a population of

36,835. For General Purpose councils Economic Affairs accounts for an average of

5.4% of total expenditure.

• Transport & Communications: the evidence suggests economies of scale up to a

population of 74,810. Transport expenditure makes up, on average, 32.6% of General

Purpose council budgets.

The evidence suggests that the savings from Public Order and Economic Affairs functions are negligible (increasing size of councils will only result in a saving which is a small fraction of the proportion of the existing budget: ie. a fraction of 3.1% and 5.4% respectively). The savings arising from these functions alone could never justify the one-off and ongoing costs associated with amalgamation. However, the potential savings in Transport &

Communications are quite large and therefore worthy of attention. Most of these savings relate to exploiting excess capacity in road maintenance and construction. Amalgamation would capture potential savings in this function however, further analysis would be required to estimate the savings and also – most importantly – estimate likely losses in other functions which may partially negate Transport & Communications savings. The least risky avenue to exploit potential savings in this function is to established shared service arrangements for all

Transport & Communications functions – ideally, entering into arrangements with a number

3 of councils so as to get as close as possible to the optimal size in this function (74,810 capita).

Capacity is an ill-defined concept and owes more to the skills and experience of council officers and the elected representatives than to municipal size. There is a case for entering into strategic arrangements for region-wide matters such as planning and advocacy. However, once again, the least risky option for addressing this criteria is to employ strategic alliances: such as regional planning authorities and lobbying entities made up of representatives of constituent councils.

A number of peer reviewed academic publications in highly regarded scholarly journals have cast significant doubt on the validity of the metrics employed in the TCorp (2013) assessments and Fit for the Future assessments (2015) – see Table 1. In short it may not be reasonable to rely on the TCorp (2013) Financial Sustainability Ratings or OLG/IPART Fit for the Future metrics when making decisions regarding the future configuration of councils.

Table 1. Scholarly Research Relating to Fit for the Future

Author Journal Message Drew, Kortt and Dollery Local Government Studies The Queensland amalgamations were (2013) poorly targeted and produce deleterious results for residents. Drew and Dollery (2014) Public Money and ILGRP proposed amalgamations in Management Sydney will not improve overall TCorp measures of financial sustainability. Drew and Dollery Public Administration Demonstrates that the allocation of (2015b) Quarterly the Road component of FAG grants are chaotic and empirically indefensible. Drew and Dollery (2015c Australian Journal of Demonstrates an empirically robust Public Administration method for setting TCorp benchmarks (unlike the apparently arbitrary benchmarks actually used). Drew, Kortt and Dollery Australian Accounting Demonstrates that there is little (2015b) Review relationship between ‘efficiency’ and municipal ‘sustainability’ ie. Government efforts to enhance council efficiency will do little to address financial sustainability. Drew, Kortt and Dollery Administration & Society Uses DEA analysis to demonstrate (2015a) that 20 of the 23 ILGRP proposed merger Groups will actually be over- scaled and thus elicit diseconomies of scale. Drew and Dollery Australian Accounting Demonstrates that the TCorp (2015d) Review financial sustainability ratings were grossly distorted by ‘inconsistent’ depreciation accrual data (bad data). Drew and Dollery Public Administration Demonstrates the TCorp financial (2015e) Quarterly ratings are not in any way ‘facts’ – they owe more to the method TCorp chose to assess councils than actual performance. Drew and Dollery Australian Journal of Details numerous problems (2015a) Public Administration associated with TCorp, IPART and the OLG metrics. Abelson and Joyuex Public Money and Rightly addresses the role of rate (2015) Management pegging on financial sustainability.

Other Important Considerations Relating to Amalgamation

It is important to consider equity, service rate and fee harmonisation and political structure when contemplating amalgamation. With respect to equity an important consideration is the implicit and explicit liabilities which residents will assume from their neighbours in an amalgamation. Explicit liabilities include items such as loans and staff provisions – because these travel to the new merged entity, existing residents effectively assume a proportion of these debts. Implicit liabilities include items such as the estimated costs to bring assets up to a satisfactory condition. After amalgamation residents will effectively contribute towards addressing their neighbour’s backlogs. Clearly, any amalgamation will result in winners and losers thus requiring careful consideration from an ethical perspective.

Municipal goods and service provision will also need to be harmonised following amalgamation. The scholarly evidence suggests that service levels are invariably increased to the highest extant level of merging entities (see Steiner (2003); Dur and Staal (2008)). This, of course, results in additional costs to service residents from council areas which had previously received lower levels of services and may thus erode any projected savings associated with merger proposals. Fee and rate harmonisation will also mean that some residents will have direct imposts on their personal budgets as a result of amalgamation. It is also important to carefully consider the political structure following amalgamation in order to ensure that a merger rather than a takeover, results. Evidence from Canadian amalgamations suggests that, in the short-term, political representatives tend to vote as a block constructed according to pre-merger boundaries (Spicer, 2012). This behaviour can result in the elected body from one pre-merger entity dominating post-merger political decision making.

By far the biggest problem for the future sustainability of rural councils is that the financial assistance grants (FAGs) do not achieve the full horizontal equalisation objectives enshrined

6 in the enabling legislation (Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995). Drew and

Dollery (2015b) have recently demonstrated that the algorithms employed to allocate the road component of the FAGs are chaotic and empirically indefensible. Moreover, the methodology for allocating the General Purpose FAG component is flawed on a number of counts: the standardised revenue adjuster is not compatible with actual revenue raising limitations, the standardised expenditure allowances appear contrary to s 6(3)(b) of the Act and the disability factors lack transparency and robust empirical evidence. When combined with s6(2)(b) of the

Act (30% minimum payment based on population size) it is certain that rural councils are not being provided with sufficient allocations to achieve the legislation’s objective of full horizontal equalisation.

Amalgamating councils will not address the deficiencies in FAG allocations. Moreover, amalgamation may well result in lower FAG allocations in the medium to long term. Indeed the Proclamation under subsection 6(4) of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act

1995 was made in response to the fact that some merged councils had received lower FAG

(with respect to the sum of previous pre-merged allocations) subsequent to amalgamation.

The Proclamation stipulates that merged entities must receive no less than the sum of individual allocations (based on pre-merged boundaries) for a period of four years following amalgamation. It is important to note that whilst the FAG freeze does represent a risk to the financial sustainability of councils the major problem is that FAGs are not being allocated according to the full equalisation objective. Amalgamation will not address this core funding problem and may indeed exacerbate same.

The final matter which must be considered is the cost of amalgamation. The Queensland

Treasury Corporation (QTC, 2009) received claims following the 2007/08 amalgamations for an average of $8.1 million. In 2012 the QTC estimated the one-off costs for the de- amalgamation of Sunshine Coast Regional Council to be $11.02 million (Drew and Dollery,

2014). Moreover, there are on-going unquantified costs which should be considered.

Accordingly, it is unlikely that the compensation provided by the NSW Government will come close to meeting the actual expenditure associated with amalgamation. This cost must be set against the projected savings arising from any amalgamation – but in many cases it appears that this has not occurred.

I now consider matters specific to the individual IPART assessments for the individual councils to which this report is addressed.

Coolamon

Coolamon was deemed ‘fit as a rural council’ and ‘satisfies the financial criteria overall’

(IPART, 2015, p. 177). However, the IPART (2015, p. 177) provided a caveat whereby ‘if

Government does not adopt a Rural Council model, it is unlikely the council would be Fit for

the Future’. Therefore, given the uncertainty regarding whether the Rural Council model will

be progressed, it is important to consider the matter of Coolamon’s ‘scale and capacity’. As

noted earlier, ‘capacity’ is an ill-defined term which relates more to the skills and experience of council staff and representatives than to size of the council. Moreover, strategic capacity can be enhanced through continued participation in the Riverina Eastern Regional

Organisation of Councils (REROC). Indeed the IPART (2015, p. 177) report endorses the scale and capacity outcomes arising from REROC:

REROC demonstrates its success in increasing the scale and capacity of its member

organisations on a range of measures and plans to become the pilot JO for the region.

It is thus extremely surprising that IPART deems other members of REROC (including

Junee, Gundagai and Temora) to be lacking scale and capacity! One can only imagine that the analyst writing the report for Coolamon was different to the analysts employed on the Junee,

Gundagai and Temora assessments. This inconsistency appears to be symptomatic of the rushed assessment process.

In point of fact data envelopment analysis (DEA) suggests that Coolamon is close to optimal

scale in its current configuration (scale estimate based on 2013/14 financial data has been

calculated at 0.953904, with increasing returns to scale1). It is thus quite likely that

1 DEA scale estimates range from 0 through to 1, where 1 represents optimal scale. For instance, a council with a scale estimate of 0.9 is closer to optimal scale than a council with an estimate of 0.5. Scale may either be IRS (Increasing Returns to Scale) or DRS (Decreasing Returns to Scale). IRS councils will initially realise greater efficiencies as size increases. DRS councils are already experiencing relative inefficiency owing to the fact that they are currently too large. See Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015a) for a detailed explanation of the DEA model. 9

amalgamation of Coolamon would create an over-scaled council. Careful DEA scenario testing would be required to estimate the efficiencies or inefficiencies arising from different merger configurations.

Gundagai

Gundagai Shire fails on the ‘scale and capacity’ criteria in addition to the ‘sustainability’ and

‘efficiency’ criteria. Council is best advised to disregard assessments relating to ‘efficiency’

for the simple fact that the metric employed certainly does not measure efficiency. Efficiency

relates to the conversion of inputs into outputs. The IPART/OLG metric assumes that a

council’s output can be proxied by population size. This erroneous metric implicitly assumes

that Council does not provide goods and services for (i) business, and (ii) road and transport

infrastructure (which is negatively correlated with population size). It is therefore clearly an implausible and inadequate metric which fails to measure efficiency in any way and does not warrant serious consideration.

In relation to the ‘sustainability’ criteria, I note that Council plans to review fees for goods and services. This is a very important step for Council to take – not only will it increase revenue, but it will also address fiscal illusion (whereby residents demand greater quantities of services because the price signals are not adequate for them to appreciate the true cost of the services). IPART have suggested that Gundagai’s revenue projections are overly optimistic and have re-calculated same. I note that Council has engaged a Chartered

Accountant – Teresa Boyd – who refutes IPART’s assertions based on the information

provided to her by Council. It is possible that IPART may have re-classified some of the

grant money (from ‘operating’ to ‘capital’ grants) and that this may explain some of the

difference in calculations. I am prepared to accept the professional judgement of Ms Boyd in

this instance. Moreover, it should be noted that PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006, p. 9) in its

Report - National Financial Sustainability Study of Local Government - specifically drew attention to the inadvisability of excluding ‘capital grants’ from financial ratio analysis of municipalities:

‘It is important to note that the Access approach excluded capital grants from the

operating results, which paints a more urgent picture of the sustainability of local

government. In this PwC study, capital grants are viewed as an ongoing and important

revenue source, the exclusion of which can overstate the extent of sustainability

difficulties of local government’.

I note that the NSW State government includes grants obtained from the Commonwealth for capital purposes in its headline budget surplus statements. Moreover, councils in Queensland and Victoria also include capital grants as a fundamental component of revenue.

Revenue effort (based on extant 2012) calculations do suggest that there is considerable scope to increase rates, fees and charges (see, Drew and Dollery 2015 or Ladd and Yinger

1989 for a discussion of revenue effort which is the most appropriate metric for assessing resident’s capacity to pay). Gundagai’s revenue effort for 2012 was just 0.87% against a state average of 1.427%. Further analysis using more up-to-date data could be undertaken and this may provide evidence to support a higher SRV application. It is acknowledged that

Councillors and residents may resist large increases to rates and charges. However, it must be remembered that should Gundagai merge with the preferred partner, Tumut, there will likely be considerable increases to residential and business rates in addition to rises in domestic waste charges. Moreover, it is important to note that this conclusion has been reached by me in the absence of econometric analysis on depreciation accrual rates and debt capacity, which is beyond the scope of this report.

The question remains as to whether a merger with Tumut would materially enhance the sustainability metrics. This type of analysis is also beyond the scope of the present report.

Moreover, there are important equity, harmonisation, and political structure questions which must be explored prior to committing to a merger with Tumut (see ‘Fit for the Future

Considerations Applying to All Councils’ above). I also stress again, that this report is no substitute for due diligence and should council consider a merger proposal I strongly recommend that it is subject to a caveat of favourable due diligence.

Data envelopment analysis suggests that Gundagai is slightly under-scale when compared with the cohort of NSW councils. However, the scale factor (0.899579)2 is not terribly low and it will be important to select merger partners carefully in order to avoid a merged entity which is significantly over-scaled (with concomitant inefficiencies). Refinement of REROC participation could also achieve requisite enhancements to scale without the risks associated with merger. Gundagai has requested further DEA including scenario testing.

2 DEA scale estimates range from 0 through to 1, where 1 represents optimal scale. For instance, a council with a scale estimate of 0.9 is closer to optimal scale than a council with an estimate of 0.5. Scale may either be IRS (Increasing Returns to Scale) or DRS (Decreasing Returns to Scale). IRS councils will initially realise greater efficiencies as size increases. DRS councils are already experiencing relative inefficiency owing to the fact that they are currently too large. See Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015a) for a detailed explanation of the DEA model. 13

Junee

Junee Shire satisfies all Fit for the Future financial metrics but fails the ‘scale and capacity’ criterion. It is important to note that membership of REROC was applauded by IPART for helping Coolamon to meet the scale and capacity benchmarks. It is thus extremely surprising that Junee’s membership of the same organisation (REROC) is not deemed to meet the same benchmark. Moreover, IPART (2015, p. 247) state that: ‘we do not have sufficient evidence to evaluate the costs and benefits of the merger option compared to the stand-alone proposal’.

Yet IPART (2015, p. 247) proceeds to endorse merger as allowing the council to ‘enable provision of more cost-effective services to the local communities, advocating credibly and managing strategic issues in the region’.

These apparently incompatible conclusions formed by IPART (2015) raise a number of problems. First, if sufficient evidence is not at hand then it should have been collected. In this regard DEA scenario testing would seem to be the most robust technique. Second, if sufficient evidence is not at hand it is difficult to understand how any competent conclusion could be reached regarding the benefits of merger as compared with the stand-alone scenario.

Third, it has yet to be explained why a larger entity might be a more ‘credible advocate’ than a smaller entity. If there is indeed a credibility ‘issue’ then surely the problem lies with higher tiers of government which must (we may infer) be discriminating against residents in low population areas. Moreover, even after the amalgamation there will be significant discrepancies in population size – for instance, the proposed Botany Bay, Randwick, Sydney,

Waverly, Woollahra merged entity has a projected population of 669,400 (ILGRP, 2013, p.

104). Yet should Junee merge with Cootamundra (as advocated by the ILGRP, 2013, p. 115) it will only have a combined 2031 projected population of 12,900. Under the reasoning of

‘advocating credibility’ advanced by IPART (apparently predicated on population) the new

Junee merged entity would have about 52 times less ‘credibility’ than its Sydney peer! Indeed

Junee would probably need to merge with the entire cohort of rural councils to attain the

same ‘credibility’ as the Sydney metropolitan councils under this flawed reasoning. In short,

it is hard to accept that the implicit argument proposed by IPART - that higher tiers of government should be more receptive to the advocacy of councils with larger population size

– is either logical or compatible with Australian democratic and egalitarian values.

Data envelopment analysis suggests that Junee is slightly under scale relative to its NSW municipal peers (scale is 0.892094)3. Thus there is some reason to believe that further

expansion of REROC participation or a carefully selected merger may improve scale.

However, merger partners would need to be selected very carefully in order to avoid an over-

scaled merged entity with concomitant inefficiency. If council wished to pursue a merger it

would be very important to conduct DEA scenario testing.

3 DEA scale estimates range from 0 through to 1, where 1 represents optimal scale. For instance, a council with a scale estimate of 0.9 is closer to optimal scale than a council with an estimate of 0.5. Scale may either be IRS (Increasing Returns to Scale) or DRS (Decreasing Returns to Scale). IRS councils will initially realise greater efficiencies as size increases. DRS councils are already experiencing relative inefficiency owing to the fact that they are currently too large. See Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015a) for a detailed explanation of the DEA model. 15

Temora

IPART (2015, p. 353) found that Temora satisfied all financial metrics but that ‘the Council

only meets one element of scale an capacity’ and fails or only partially meets other elements.

This is a surprising conclusion given the assessment provided to Coolamon which is a

member of the same REROC collaboration. Setting aside this inconsistency the question

remains to be addressed: would merger result in an optimal scale entity. This is a question

which has not been adequately addressed by IPART.

In point of fact data envelopment analysis (DEA) suggests that Temora is incredibly close to

optimal scale in its current configuration (scale factor is 0.998667)4. Therefore merger would

be ill-advised and almost certainly reduce efficiency owing to an over-scaled entity being formed.

IPART appears to question Temora’s assumptions regarding the quantum of depreciation accruals over forward-estimates and seems to suggest that depreciation might be expected to

‘increase at the same rate as income’ (IPART, 2015, p. 353). These statements represent a fundamental misconception regarding the nature of depreciation and indeed, the potential distortion of Fit for the Future metrics arising from inconsistent depreciation practice (Drew and Dollery, 2015). Depreciation is related to the size of the depreciable IPPE asset base, the depreciation schedules of the respective assets and the written down value of assets. It has little or no association with income. It is somewhat surprising that an ‘expert’ Panel would fail to understand this. Moreover, there is no publicly available evidence that IPART and its fellow ‘experts’ conducted the rudimentary depreciation econometric modelling required for sensitivity analysis on the metrics. The ‘expert’ Panel seem to recognise that depreciation will

4 DEA scale estimates range from 0 through to 1, where 1 represents optimal scale. For instance, a council with a scale estimate of 0.9 is closer to optimal scale than a council with an estimate of 0.5. Scale may either be IRS (Increasing Returns to Scale) or DRS (Decreasing Returns to Scale). IRS councils will initially realise greater efficiencies as size increases. DRS councils are already experiencing relative inefficiency owing to the fact that they are currently too large. See Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015a) for a detailed explanation of the DEA model. 16 distort the metrics (as shown by Drew and Dollery 2015) but have failed to conduct the necessary empirical analysis to ensure that subsequent conclusions formed on the basis of the metrics are indeed sound.

Finally, Temora council is referred to our critique of the Junee Shire IPART assessment with respect to some rather obvious flaws in the reasoning advanced on ‘credible advocacy’ and suggestions that merger might provide better outcomes despite a dearth of ‘sufficient evidence’.

Conclusion

In summary, after reviewing the existing evidence, my professional judgement is that there

are significant problems and contradictions with the IPART assessments provided for

Coolamon, Temora and Junee. In the case of Coolamon and Temora the councils are already

very close to optimal scale. Thus any mergers for these two councils would in all likelihood

lead to an over-scaled entity with concomitant inefficiencies. In the case of Junee there is

some scope to increase efficiency through either (i) a very carefully selected merger (without

scenario testing it is impossible to determine whether a suitable merger partner exists) or (ii)

careful refinement of the REROC participation. Councils wishing to remain as stand-alone

entities should continue to develop REROC as a JO for strategic planning, co-ordination of road maintenance and construction functions and lobbying activities. However, I find that the

argument that size should somehow determine credibility in advocacy lacks logical

foundation and is contrary to the egalitarian foundations of our nation.

Gundagai’s problems are far more complex and require further analysis. My

recommendation is that Gundagai apply to the Government to receive an extension so that a

careful analysis can be made regarding whether there might be benefits in pursuing the

ILGRP proposed merger. In the meantime Gundagai has commissioned a data envelopment

analysis scenario test which will be able to provide some indication as to whether a merger

would achieve scale and efficiency objectives. However, financial ratio analysis and

econometric analysis geared towards sensitivity testing must be considered absolutely

essential tasks prior to considering a merger proposal. In addition, equity, harmonisation

and political structure matters must be carefully considered (see, ‘Fit For the Future

Considerations Applying to All Councils’). It is also imperative that adequate community consultation is conducted on the basis of the aforementioned analysis – ideally all facts

should be presented to the residents of affected councils and the residents should then be

given the opportunity to cast an informed vote in a referendum. This is a basic principle of participatory democracy. Finally, due diligence would take many months and must be completed prior to an unconditional agreement to merge. It is not at all certain whether the proposed merger would produce the desired outcomes. What is certain, however, is that the

requisite analysis simply cannot be done in the exceptionally short amount of time remaining

to Council. Thus, an extension will be necessary should council wish to conduct an adequate

assessment of the merger proposal. Failure to conduct a thorough assessment of a merger

scenario would put the residents of both councils (Gundagai and Tumut) at considerable risk

of significant and deleterious outcomes.

This is an independent critique of the IPART assessments based on a desk top analysis of

IPART reports, audited financial statements, and Fit For the Future proposals. I have no

conflict of interest to declare and had no part in the IPART assessment process, nor in

compiling the various Fit For the Future proposals of the cited councils. Advice has been

prepared following a request by James Davis, General Manager of Junee Shire Council on

behalf of Junee, Coolamon, Temora and Gundagai councils for the purpose of informing

decision making in relation to possible mergers.

The advice provided is based on my professional judgement after reviewing various

documents associated with the IPART assessment. I have taken source documents at face

value and have not made efforts to verify the accuracy of financial statements or other

documentation as this was outside of my brief. It must therefore be stressed that this report is

in no way to be considered as a substitute for due diligence. Moreover, any council

contemplating merger should seriously consider:

(i) Undertaking a comprehensive analysis of efficiency, scale, equity, strategic and

harmonisation considerations

(ii) Conducting thorough due diligence, particularly in relation to the written down

value of assets, estimates of required maintenance and accuracy of non-current

liabilities.

I stress that a caveat should be included in any merger proposal that it is subject to satisfactory outcomes arising from due diligence.

Please see Curriculum Vitae appended for qualifications.

Dr Joseph Drew

B Ed (Mathematics), University Medal, Dip (Theol),

Masters Commerce (Accounting), Ph D., Justice of the Peace (Qual).

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