Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 1

Student Name: Samuel Ndikumana Student Country: Program: DDIA Course Code or Name: DIP-401 Professor / Assigned Tutor: Roberto RODRIGUEZ This page uses ☐ US or ☐ UK English (for spelling, punctuation rules and formatting of references). The European Commission style ☐ may also be used. Note: This document is in US letter (“8.5”x11”” format) and is submitted by email in DOC or DOCX format.

DIPLOMACY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, 2009-2013

1) Introduction

With the signing of the Charter on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, the international community, creating what became the United Nations (UN), took a firm decision of ensuring that peace and security prevails around the world. The UN Charter’s preamble presents the motivating factor in establishing the UN, reminding the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and their desire of maintaining international peace and security.1

1 UN Charter, Preamble. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 2

Developing farther their rationale for bringing together the peoples of the world, the UN

Charter underlined the belief that military force should never be used except for common interest. These fundamental principles were strongly enshrined in the first article of the

Charter highlighting that the first purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security through diplomatic methods of seeking dialogue and consensus whereas the second article emphasized the obligation from all members to settle their disputes through peaceful means without endangering peace and security, and justice.2

After signing the UN charter, the next seven decades proved that the road toward global peace and security was a long and difficult one. First of all, the break of the Cold

War3 between East and West was devastating in many respects, considering particularly the Korean war as the first hot point of the and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that was about to lead the world to a point of no turning back with a nuclear war. For over four decades, tensions between Eastern and Western major powers never ceased to escalate leading to many proxy wars across the world without ignoring the arms race that endangered global peace and security. Whereas many had believed that the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the ongoing crisis between Ukraine and Russia reminds the international community that the world is still divided and a lot has to be done in order to ensure peace and security prevail

2 See UN Charter, articles 1 and 2.

3 Whereas no scholar questions the existence and negative effects caused by the Cold War, there is no agreement among researchers and scholars with regard to the origins of the Cold War and the responsibilities of powerful nations concerning the outbreak of the Cold War. Currently, there are three schools of thought, namely, the traditionalists who blame the Soviet Union; the revisionists who condemn the United States; and the post-revisionists who accuse both countries. For more details about these categories, see Lundestad, East, West, North, South, pp. 8-34. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 3 in many countries, allowing people to live and enjoy their right to freedom and self- determination.

For whatever reason, independent Africa has most likely outnumbered other continents in terms of armed conflicts in modern history. From Algeria to , from to Sudan, from Nigeria to Somalia, from to Mozambique, the

African continent has recorded an increasing number of armed conflicts not only before independence, but also after most African countries became independent. In recent history, Africa has witnessed acts of genocide and crime against humanity not only in

Rwanda and Darfur (Sudan), but also in many other countries such as Mali, the Central

African Republic, Somalia, and Nigeria, just to mention a few.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the countries that have seriously suffered from armed conflicts for nearly two decades. Actually, it is better known through the atrocities that have been committed since the break of the civil war.

Furthermore, the DRC has witnessed extensive diplomatic efforts attempting to bring an end to conflicts that have claimed millions of lives with a potential of destabilizing the entire Region. This paper seeks to evaluate the role of diplomacy in resolving the Congolese armed conflicts with a particular focus on the 23 March

Movement4 that destabilized the province of North in Eastern DRC. After providing a background of the conflicts in the DRC with subsequent peace negotiations that led to the first multi-party elections since the country attained independence from in

1960, this research will investigate the role played by the United Nations Security

4 Simply known as M23, this is a rebel movement dominated by who originated from the renegade General Nkunda’s Conseil National de la Défense du Peuple. They left the Congolese army claiming that the March 23, 2009 peace agreements were not fully implemented. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 4

Council and the African Union through the International Conference on the Great Lakes

Region in bringing an end to armed conflicts in the eastern part of DRC.

2) Armed Conflicts and Peace Negotiations in DR Congo

Known as Republic of since 1971, the Democratic Republic of Congo attained independence from Belgium on June 30th, 1960 under the leadership of Emery Patrice

LUMUMBA whose party won parliamentary elections. This independence was followed with political crises and instability that weakened governance and the culture of democratization. Under the leadership of Moise TSOMBE, with support from the former colonial power, Belgium, the southern mineral province, Katanga, had declared independence from the Congo less than two weeks after the country achieved independence. The ongoing rivalry among powerful nations as a result of the Cold War contributed in the escalation of the conflict that compelled to United Nations to intervene following a request from the Congolese Prime minister.5 The conflict was only brought to an end in 1963 with a lot of pressure from the UN mission and support for Congolese territorial integrity.6

Furthermore, two months after independence, the head of state, Joseph

KASAVUBU, fired the famous Prime Minister Patrice LUMUMBA, creating a political crisis between the two leaders of the executive branch of the government. LUMUMBA

5 John Dredge, “The secession of Katanga 1960-1965 case study: exploring causation with students,” in Professional Development Service for Teachers, Wexford Education Centre, 2010, pp. 5-6.

6 Maud Jullien, “Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo’s cash cow to secede,” in BBC Africa, Lubumbashi, 11 August 2013. Accessed on 13 March 2014 through http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23422038 Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 5 was later arrested, tortured, shot, and killed in January 1961, seemingly with complicity from Western nations who accused him of working with the Soviet Union. The Prime

Minister’s death had serious repercussions on the leadership of the country as it became difficult to establish a legitimate and acceptable government for all political actors. There is no question that LUMUMBA’s death fueled a volatile situation as Congo was already facing secessionist movements both in Katanga and .7

A combination of factors including but not limited to political instability at the top of the government, secessionist movements that broke into outright civil war, and influences of the Cold War in the region led to the rise of MOBUTU SESE SEKO who received significant support from the United States and was able to lead a military coup both in

1960 and in 1965.

After MOBUTU took over power in 1965, the following three decades were characterized by a dictatorship that violated basic human rights, developed a personality culture, and became increasingly corrupt leading to the collapse of the country’s economy. With the end of the Cold War, MOBUTU lost the support he enjoyed from

Western countries and he was compelled to launch a democratic process with multiparty system. Nevertheless, his regime had no political will to undertake the needed reform and to open the political space for other stakeholders. Tensions kept increasing, undermining the authority of the government and its power to lead and control the country.

7 Timothy Scarnecchia, “The , the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960-1963,” in African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 11, No 1, 2011, pp. 64-65. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 6

To make things worse, the 1994 greatly contributed in destabilizing the geopolitical situation in the African Great Lakes region in general and the DR Congo in particular. As the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in July

1994, the former Rwandan Armed Forces, the militia , and many civilians left the country and found refuge in the neighboring DR Congo, precisely in its eastern part (North and provinces). Military activities, with the purpose of attacking Rwanda, were conducted in refugee camps and other areas without any attempt to stop them. Besides, there were also military activities by some Burundian rebels since the last quarter of 1993. As a result, in 1996, a rebel movement with massive support from the Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan governments launched attacks against DR

Congo in a seven months war which ousted President Mobutu and handed the leadership of the country to Laurent Desire Kabila in 1997.8 This change of power in brought hope for many people in the region who expected the new leadership to usher in a period of good governance, freedom, and progress for all.

After one year in office, the new government in Kinshasa disappointed even the most hopeful observers. President Kabila had conflict with his former Rwandan and Ugandan allies whom he suspected of attempting to overthrow him. As he ordered all Rwandan and Ugandan officials9 who had been helping his government to leave the country, these two countries sent troops in Eastern Congo in order to help rebels who started fighting

8 Christopher Williams, “Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis,” in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 37:2, Summer 2013, pp. 86-87.

9 Kabila’s government was having experts from these countries. For example, General , currently Rwandan Defense Minister, was serving as the Army Chief of Staff in the Congolese Army. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 7 against the Congolese government.10 This second war started in August 1998 in violation of all international laws and treaties just as it had happened with the previous war.11 The conflict involved eight countries, namely Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and whose armies supported the Congolese government on the one side and Rwanda,

Burundi, and Uganda whose armies supported the rebels on the other side. In addition, there were at least 25 militias. This conflict has rightly been considered as the Africa’s

First World War.12 Each country involved in the conflict had its own reasons including mineral exploitation, revenge or fear for its own security.13

The regionalization of the conflict caused enormous challenge in the diplomacy of peace negotiations and all stakeholders understood that peace talks had to be held among countries in conflict as well as the Congolese government and rebel forces. Interesting enough, negotiations started between countries involved in the conflict which signed first a declaration in Sirte, Lybia, on the 18th of April 1999 in which the DRC and Uganda were signatories. Nevertheless, this agreement was not a significant breakthrough not only because it was boycotted by Rwanda, but mostly because it counteracted in some ways ongoing talks in Lusaka under the leadership of the Zambian President. However, it

10 Christopher Williams, p. 87-89.

11 It is argued that Kabila’s unpopularity was caused by many factors such as his failure to establish a broad-based transitional government, the Butembo massacre in February 1998, and the mutiny in early 1998, among others. For more details, see Christian R. Manahl, “From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Order in Centreal Africa,” in African Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies.

12 Christian R. Manahl, From Genocide to Regional War.

13 For instance, Angola got involved in the conflict because it feared a new Government in the DRC could support UNITA in Angola; Sudan wanted to revenge Uganda’s support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement; and Zimbabwe and Namibia had interests in the mining industry. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 8 has the merit of being the first agreement which served as a foundation for other peace negotiations for the DRC and its neighboring countries in which a commitment for peace and security was made for the region.

A few months later, on 10 July 1999, a major milestone was made as countries involved in the Congolese war signed a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka. Three elements underline the significance of this Lusaka agreement on DRC. First of all, for the first time, all countries that were actively fighting in the DRC, namely, Angola, Namibia, and

Zimbabwe on the Congolese government side and Rwanda and Uganda on the rebels’ side, took part in the negotiations and signed the agreement. Then, this agreement addressed major concerns presented by the warring parties such as regional security and stability, territorial integrity, withdrawal of foreign forces, and most of all the cessation of hostilities on the ground. Finally, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement recommended the organization of inter-Congolese political negotiations in order to make peace within after making peace without.14

In accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on the DRC, the inter-

Congolese political negotiations were organized in Sun City, , with the facilitation of Sir Ketumile Masire, the second President of . For 19 months, the

Government of the DRC and rebel movements met in South Africa and negotiated about their countries problems and solutions. On 2 April 2003, The Final Act of the Inter-

Congolese Dialogue was signed at Sun City between the Government of the DRC,

14 See Peter L. Kasanda, “Ceasefire Agreement,” in Letter dated 23 July 1999, United Nations Security Council, New York, USA. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 9

Rwandan and Ugandan backed rebel movements, the political opposition, and the Forces

Vives with the Facilitator, the African Union, and the United Nations signing as witnesses of the agreement which paved the way for ending the armed conflict, launching the democratization process, reorganizing the national army, establishing a transitional government, and preparing the first multiparty elections since independence.15 Despite some weaknesses and challenges of the agreement, it served the purpose of resurrecting a country which was almost collapsing as a result of atrocities that were being committed and the danger of spreading in neighboring countries.

Following the after de inter-Congolese political dialogue, the second war in DR Congo was ended in 2003. As a result, the government of the DRC and other parties to this agreement started a transitional period with the purpose of leading the country to peace, stability, and development. It was with this objective that a transitional government was sworn in in Kinshasa under the leadership of President J. Kabila assisted by four vice-presidents, each one representing a party to the dialogue; a process of forming a national army, a new police force, and the demobilization of combatants was launched, and a national reconciliation process was started. The DRC organized a referendum in 2005 for approving the constitution before holding, in July 2006, the first multi-party elections since independence. These elections were applauded by Congolese and the international community as democratic, fair, and transparent.

15 The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue comprises four articles. The first article names the content of the agreement, the second article emphasizes the commitment to adhere to the agreement and to establish a transitional government, the third article expresses gratitude and thanks to the facilitation, and the last article clarifies the date of entering into force of the agreement. Annexes of The Final Acts consist of 36 resolutions adopted by the parties. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 10

Although the 2005 multi-party elections were expected to bring an end to instability and usher in a new era of peace, security, and development, this hope was short-lived.

Laurent NKUNDA, a former rebel who became General in the Congolese army, mutinied and established his base in . He organized the Conseil National pour la

Défense du Peuple (CNDP) in 2007 as his political party established its headquarters in

Masisi, North Kivu. His main purpose was to protect his fellow whom he claimed were being attacked by who committed the genocide in Rwanda before fleeing to

Congo in 1994. In what has been called the North , Nkunda’s forces attacked Congolese forces and threatened to take over , the capital of North Kivu; causing a humanitarian crisis of catastrophic dimensions according to the United

Nations.16 Nevertheless, a leadership conflict erupted within CNDP between General

Nkunda and his ally General Ntaganda. The former fled to Rwanda and was subsequently arrested before being put under house arrest in January 2009. General Ntaganda took over the leadership of CNDP and, with the facilitation of the former Presidents of Nigeria and

Tanzania, Olusegun Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa, he negotiated peace with the

Congolese government before signing an agreement in Goma on March 23, 2009.

In accordance with the Goma Agreement, CNDP ceased to exist as a politico- military movement and committed itself to becoming a political party that would pursue its objectives through political means and renounce any resort to violence. The

Government of the DRC offered amnesty and promised to integrate the rebels into the political system and the national army. Although some steps were taken to implement the

16 BBC News, “Rebels force Congolese from town,” 6 November 2008. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 11 agreement, some disagreements on the full implementation of this agreement led to the creation of the Movement of 23 March (M23) that rebelled against the government of the

DRC in 2012, attacking Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and taking control of the town for several days in November 2012 before withdrawing under unprecedented international and regional pressure.17 This became a turning point in the North Kivu conflict as the UN mission was strongly criticized for failing to protect civilians while having the biggest peacekeeping force in the history of the United

Nations. This humiliation, added to other factors18 and the danger of spreading the conflict across the entire region, compelled the international community to act strongly and decisively through the use of multilateral diplomacy beyond what had been done before. In attempting to resolve this crisis, the regional and international community kick started multilateral efforts that are investigated in the following sections of this paper.

3) Multilateral Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in DRC

The conflict in the DR Congo has attracted the attention of the international community for a number of reasons, of which three deserve to be noted. First of all, conflicts in the DRC started in 1996 as a contamination from Rwanda. After the 100 day genocide in Rwanda, about two million Rwandans from the Hutu ethnic group including

17 Mike Pflanz, “M23 rebels withdraw supplies and weapons from Goma,” in The Telegraph, 28 November 2012.

18 The capturing of Goma by a rebel movement threatened the credibility of the fragile government in Kinshasa and its ability to foster peace and security, created a humanitarian crisis in Eastern Congo, escalated tensions between Rwanda, Uganda, and DRC, and amplified ethnic tensions in Eastern Congo especially against the Tutsi. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 12 the former Rwandan armed forces and the militia Interahamwe found safe havens in eastern DRC. The new Tutsi dominated government in Kigali considered them as a major threat to Rwanda’s national security, pushing Rwanda, with support from Burundi and

Uganda, to attack the DR Congo and topple the regime in Kinshasa. Having failed to act in order to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda, the international community felt guilty and sympathized with Rwanda’s claims, falling short of supporting its invasion in the DR Congo.

The DRC is a very huge country that enjoys enormous reserves of natural resources.

In fact, DRC is two-thirds the size of Western Europe and the second biggest country in

Africa,19 after Algeria, and it shares its border with nine countries. The eastern and southern parts of the DRC are very rich in precious minerals such as copper, and diamond, among others. The DRC also has oil and natural gas without ignoring its immense forests that provide quality wood. As the conflicts lasted longer, it became clearer that beside political claims the conflict in DRC was also about the control of natural resources.20 Congo’s geographic location and economic potential can hardly be ignored in today’s capitalistic world.

Finally, the civil war in the DRC has involved several armed forces and militias, creating humanitarian crises of catastrophic dimensions, contributing to the killing of over five million people, and turning the Eastern DRC into the world capital of violence

19 The DRC used to be the third biggest countries until 2011 when South Sudan attained independence from Sudan.

20 See Christian R. Manahl, “From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Order in ,” in African Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies.

Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 13 against women especially the use of rape as a weapon of war. By all standards, this situation is totally unacceptable in today’s world order after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

The above mentioned factors indicated that the Congolese conflict was far beyond what Congolese could have solved on their own. Whereas Congolese rebels were fighting a against their governments, informed observers understood that the DRC had no chance to achieve peace without putting things in order with its neighbors especially

Rwanda and Uganda. As earlier mentioned, the Inter-Congolese Political Dialogue in Sun

City, South Africa, was preceded by the Lusaka Peace Agreement among the countries that were involved in the conflict. With the emergency of the Movement of 23 March, the same pattern was used with more force this time. In attempting to resolve this crisis, the

Congolese government resorted to multilateral diplomacy involving regional bodies and the United Nations. The next subsections explore the role of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the UN intervention brigade.

a) The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is an inter- governmental organization inaugurated in 2007 following years of preparation after the

United Nations resolutions 1291 and 1304 called for the establishment of an International

Conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the Great Lakes region.

The conference has 12 member countries, namely, Angola, Burundi, Central African

Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 14

South Sudan, Sudan, , and . The ICGLR is structured around an

Executive Secretariat, National Coordinations, a Regional Interministerial Committee, and a Summit of the Head of States. The organization runs programs in four major areas, namely, peace and security, democracy and good governance, economic development and regional integration, and humanitarian and social issues. Additionally, there are cross-cutting issues which include gender, environment, human rights, HIV/AIDS, and human settlements besides genocide prevention and natural resources.

After the M23 launched its attacks against the government of the DRC and captured the town of Goma, presumably with support from Rwanda and Uganda, the ICGLR activated its network in two major lines. On one hand, it coordinated peace talks between the government of the DRC and the M23 under the facilitation of Uganda whose

President was chairing the organization.21 On the other hand, it worked with member states in drafting and signing what became to be known as the Peace, Security, and

Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region.22 The ICGLR has been offering a platform to different countries in the region, especially the DRC due to the conflict in its eastern part to address issues of concern and build pressure on countries that violate signed agreements and international laws.

21 Negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 were dragging feet for nearly a year until the movement was defeated militarily and capitulated on 8 November 2013. A peace agreement that was to be signed in Kampala on 11 November 2013 was not signed although the two parties issued different declarations in Nairobi on December 12, 2013 declaring the end of hostilities. See BBC News Africa, “DR Congo ‘signs deal with M23 in Kenya,’” 12 December 2013.

22 David Zounmenou, “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC: hopes and challenges,” Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 8 March 2013. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 15

b) The Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC

and the Region

The fall of the city of Goma, capital of North Kivu in eastern DRC in the hands of the M23 and the experts’ reports that the rebels were being supported by Rwanda and

Uganda threatened peace and security in the DRC with fear that the escalation of the conflict would endanger the entire region. The international community decisively responded through the ICGLR in negotiating a framework agreement for the DRC and the region with the member states. After three months of intense negotiations with a lot of pressure from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African

Union, and the United Nations, eleven countries23 signed on 24 February 2013 in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia, the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region. Although there were a lot of doubts concerning the implementation of this agreement, time proved that its main clauses played a significant role in ending the .

The Addis Ababa Framework established responsibilities for the DRC, the region, and the international community. It called the DRC and its neighboring countries to respect one another and to work together for peace to prevail. Among other things, the

Congolese government was asked to pursue reforms that seek the improvement of democratic governance and to respect the interest of its neighbors. The remaining countries were asked to cooperate fully and to restrain from supporting persons that disturb the security of their neighbors. The international community was asked to

23 Signatories to the Addis Ababa Framework are Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia. Witnesses of the agreements are the ICGLR, the African Union, the UN, and SADC. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 16 continue supporting the DRC and a strategic review of the UN Stabilization Mission

(MONUSCO)24 was recommended to address ongoing issues.

A review of the UN Mission in DR Congo paved the way for a special offensive force that would operate in the country against negative forces. Four weeks after signing the Addis Ababa Framework, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2098 on 18

March creating an intervention brigade, consisting of 3069 troops, with the mandate of conducting offensive operations against rebel groups. It is important to note that two months earlier, the UN Security Council had approved “the use of drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to provide reconnaissance of militia activity.” It was expected that these decisions had the potential of changing the situation in the DRC for better.25

Within a few months the intervention brigade was operating in eastern Congo with blue helmet from Malawi, Tanzania, and South Africa. A General from Tanzania was appointed to lead the force which was and still is in the country “to reverse the trajectory of one of the world’s most horrific and complex conflicts, one that has killed more than 5 million people since 1998, the deadliest war since World War II.”26 A few months after the force was deployed, this hope started to materialize as the Congolese army, heavily backed up by the intervention brigade, successfully defeated the M23 in a fight that lasted for 12 days. This victory over the M23 restored the authority of the government in many

24 Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilization du Congo (The United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Congo).

25 Lansana Gberie, “Intervention brigade: End game in the Congo?,” in Online Africa Renewal, August 2013, p. 10.

26 Sudarsan Raghavan, “In volatile Congo, a new UN force with teeth,” in , 1 November 2013. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 17 towns of North Kivu that had been occupied by the rebels for more than year.

Furthermore, they restored the image of the UN peacekeeping force, which was humiliated several times as they failed to protect civilians and watched from their camp as the city of Goma was falling in the rebels’ hands one year earlier. This move was unanimously greeted by world leaders as it signaled a new change of direction for a country that has suffered.27

After its military defeat, the M23 announced to have brought an end to its insurgence in the DRC and declared its readiness to pursue its goals through political means. This was indeed an end of an era in the DRC thanks to diplomatic efforts and new ways of operating by the United Nations.

27 Nicholas Kulish and Somini Sengupta, “New UN Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa Brings Success, and Risks,” in The New York Times, 12 November 2013. Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 18

4) Conclusion

The United Nations, whose charter was signed after the Second World War, is by far the most important platform for multilateral diplomacy. The founders of this global organization envisioned a world of peace, stability, and development in which the UN

Security Council would play an unprecedented role in ensuring that these values prevail over the use of force. It was hoped that nations would promote bilateral, multilateral, and friendly relationships instead of rising against one another.

Nevertheless, several decades after the establishment of this world institution, the fondest hopes have been disappointed. A growing number of armed conflicts have been witnessed by many countries, genocides and acts of genocides have been committed mostly in Africa and Asia challenging the 1945 the “Never again” slogan, and crimes against humanity and rape as a weapon of war have characterized many regions of the world. Considering the failure of the United Nations Security Council to act in some of the most horrific acts of violence that the world has known in modern history, some experts and activists have advocated for a change of global governance principles and structures.

In recent times, the Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the countries that have witnessed horrendous crimes committed on its soil in violence of human rights principles.

In a civil war that has involved nine countries and claimed over five million lives, this country has seen the ups and the downs of the international system in terms of peace negotiations and peacekeeping missions. With support from regional blocs, the African

Union, and the United Nations, Congolese leaders have managed to sign a series of peace agreements with neighboring countries while at the same time engaging with national Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 19 rebels around the negotiation table. Interestingly, all agreements signed between the

Congolese government and the rebels were always based on previous agreements with neighboring countries.

Furthermore, one can hardly imagine how far the M23 could have gone without pressure from the international community through the Addis Ababa Framework between member countries. This agreement opened the door for a special offensive brigade that has played a significant role in backing up the Congolese army and finally defeating the

M23 rebels. A small force with only 3000 troops has accomplished in less than a year what the biggest peacekeeping force in the history of the United Nations failed to accomplish in over 14 years. The success of the intervention brigade with an offensive mandate has restored the UN image in Congo and has possibly signaled a new orientation of peacekeeping missions around the world where hard power would be added to soft power in conflict resolution.

Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 20

5) Bibliography

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BBC News Africa. “Rebels force Congolese from town.” 6 November 2008. Accessed on 17 March 2014 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7710467.stm

Dredge, John. “The secession of Katanga 1960-1965 case study: exploring causation with students.” In Professional Development Service for Teachers, Wexford Education Centre, 2010.

Gberie, Lansana. “Intervention brigade: End game in the Congo?” in Online Africa Renewal, August 2013. Accessed on 16 March 2014 from http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game- congo

Jullien, Maud. “Katanga: Fighting for DR Congo’s cash cow to secede,” in BBC Africa, Lubumbashi, 11 August 2013. Accessed on 13 March 2014 through http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23422038

Kasanda, Peter L. “Ceasefire Agreement.” In Letter dated 23 July 1999, United Nations Security Council, New York, USA.

Kulish, Nicholas and Somini Sengupta. “New UN Brigade’s Aggressive Stance in Africa Brings Success, and Risks.” in The New York Times, 12 November 2013. Accessed on 16 March 2014 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/africa/new-un-brigades- aggressive-stance-in-africa-brings-success-and-risks.html?_r=0

Lundestad, Geir. East, West, North, South: International Relations since 1945. 7th ed. Oslo: Sage Publications, 2014.

Manahl, Christian R. “From Genocide to Regional War: The Breakdown of International Order in Centreal Africa.” In African Studies Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies. Accessed on 16 March 2014 from http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a2.htm#Ref20

Pflanz, Mike. “M23 rebels withdraw supplies and weapons from Goma.” In The Telegraph, 28 November 2012. Accessed on 17 March 2014 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicof congo/9708093/M23-rebels-withdraw-supplies-and-weapons-from-Goma.html

Raghavan, Sudarsan. “In volatile Congo, a new UN force with teeth.” in The Washington Post, 1 November 2013. Accessed on 16 March 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with- teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html Samuel Ndikumana DIP-401 21

Scarnecchia, Timothy “The Congo crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960-1963.” In African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 11, No 1, 2011.

United Nations Charter. Accessed on 5 March 2014 from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml

Williams, Christopher. “Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis.” in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 37:2, Summer 2013.

Zounmenou, David. “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC: hopes and challenges.” Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 8 March 2013. Available from http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/peace-security-and-cooperation- framework-for-the-drc-hopes-and-challenges (Accessed 16 March 2014).