Peter I's Administrative Reforms in the Hetmanate During the Northern War Author(S): Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol

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Peter I's Administrative Reforms in the Hetmanate during the Northern War Author(s): Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1/4, POLTAVA 1709: THE BATTLE AND THE MYTH (2009-2010), pp. 29-35 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41756496 . Accessed: 19/04/2013 04:26

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This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:26:33 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Peter I's Administrative Reforms in the Hetmanate during the Northern War

Tatiana Tairova-Iakovleva

Whv did Hetmán Ivan Mazepa abandon Peter I and allywith Charles XII of Sweden?There are two standardanswers to thisimportant question. Ukrainianhistorians explain that Mazepa's decisionto severhis relations with thetsar after almost two decades of successful cooperation was due to Russia's policiestoward the Hetmanate. According to traditionalRussian historiogra- phy,Mazepa was a traitor. In lettersthat Mazepa wroteto hiscolonels immediately after his dramatic defectionto theSwedes, the Ukrainian hetmán spoke of "Muscovite tyranny" and TsarPeter's plans to turnthe Cossacks into ordinary soldiers, adding that Russia had begun to assertcontrol over Ukrainiancities. No historianhas everbothered to verifyif these reforms really took place. Could thesestate- mentshave been nothingmore than Mazepist propaganda?Some scholars, forexample Igor Kurukin, one ofthe authors of a recentbook on theNorthern War,have even expresseddisbelief that Peter would launch administrative reformsduring such an arduouswar.1 However,my research at the Russian State Archive of Early Acts has revealed thatfour different reforms of the Ukrainian Hetmanate took place in 1707:(1) a departmentalreform, which transformed the LittleRussian Department (Malorossiiskii prikaz ), the officethat was responsiblefor Ukraine, into the Departmentof Military Affairs (Razriad); (2) a provincialreform, which saw the creationof gubernias;(3) the formationof the companies {kompanii), professional(mercenary) military units that were supposed to compriseone- fifthof the personnel of Cossack regiments;and (4) thetransfer of Ukrainian fortressesto thejurisdiction of the Russian military authorities. The lattertwo reformswere closely connected with the events of the Northern War, whereas thefirst two were part of Peter's plan to createa Russianempire. It has been frequentlyobserved that historians of Russia have little knowl- edgeor understandingof the Ukrainian component of Russian imperial history. Moreover,historians of Ukraine are notvery familiar with the internal affairs

This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:26:33 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 30 TAIROVA-IAKOVLEVA oftsarist Russia. For example, there are dozens ofRussian studies devoted to theprovincial reform. Yet not a singleone ofthese scholars saw fitto devote anyattention to theUkrainian aspect of this reform. Even Ukrainian historians havepaid scantattention to thisreform because it was completedin 1709,after Mazepa's death. Thefirst extant document pertaining to thedepartmental reform is dated17 January1707 (Old Style).This was an orderissued by Peter to theboyar Tikhon Streshnev,the head ofthe Department of Military Affairs, to subordinateKyiv and otherUkrainian fortresses to Belgorodand to appointDmitrii Golitsyn to head theBelgorod voevodship.2 Golitsyn was also grantedthe title of "voevoda of Kyiv"(instead of the traditionaltitle of "voevoda of Belgorod")3and his residencewas to be based in Kyiv.4 On 28 February1707 the secretaryof the SecretCabinet, Pavel Shafirov, gavean orderto moveall booksand registersof Ukrainian cities from the Little RussianDepartment to theDepartment of Military Affairs, to whichall clerks and theirsalaries were also transferred.5Shafirov personally reported about all thesesteps to Peter,who maintainedcontrol over the reform. The departmentalreform began in January1707, but Mazepa learnedof it onlyin March,during a meetingwith the tsar in Zhovkva.6The list of cities that came underthe controlof the Departmentof Military Affairs included Kyiv, Chernihiv,Nizhyn, and Pereiaslav.7These so-called regimentalcities - that is, the capitalsof Cossack regiments-were the centers of the administrative systemin theHetmanate and thusan importantpart of its legal and military structures.Before 1707 Ukrainian cities were under the authority of the Little RussianDepartment, which was subordinatedto the Departmentof Foreign Affairs{Posol'skii prikaz). Thus, in 1707the autonomous state of Ukraine was on itsway to becomingan integralpart of the Russian state. The second administrativereform was the provincialreform, which was initiatedby Peter throughout the Russian Empire, including Ukraine. It began in December1707, when Peter ordered the creation of gubernias, one ofwhich was to includethe Kyivregion. By late December1707 Dmitrii Golitsyn, the voevodaof Kyiv, had drawnup a listof cities that he wantedto includein Kyiv gubernia.8Once certainrevisions were completed in January1708, the list was presentedto Peter.9It containedforty-one cities, including the Ukrainian cities ofPereiaslav, Chernihiv, and Nizhyn,as wellas partsof the Smolensk and Azov regionsand partof Sloboda Ukraine.10The main principlegoverning which citywas to be includedin Kyivand Smolenskgubernias was its proximityto the citiesof Kyivor Smolensk.11Thus, the old administrativeborders of the UkrainianHetmanate were completely ignored. It shouldbe emphasizedhere that when Peter initiated this reform he did not view it as a move againstMazepa or the UkrainianHetmanate; rather, it was partof his overallreform strategy, specifically, the provincialreform.

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Nevertheless,the abolition of the Little Russian Department and thereplace- mentof the Belgorod voevoda by the voevoda of Kyiv destroyed the system of relationsthat had existedbetween the Ukrainian Hetmanate and theRussian borderlands.The provincialreform paved the way for a new reformthat was implementedby Peter after the Northern War: the creation of the Little Russian College (Malorossiiskaiakollegiia), which was answerableto theSenate. Soon afterhis appointmentas voevoda of Kyiv,Golitsyn began exerting his authorityover issues thathad no connectionto war or militaryaffairs. Ukrainenow appeared to be underthe dual ruleof the Ukrainian hetmán and theRussian voevoda. In June1708 Golitsyn wrote to Peter,informing him that he requiredadditional manpower to completethe fortifications in Kyiv. Even afterthe tsar issued Mazepa an orderto dispatchmore workers, Golitsyn kept complainingthat the hetmán had sentonly a coupleof hundred men.12 Golitsyn also beganinterfering in theinternal affairs of the Hetmanate. On 27 May1708 Mazepa was forcedto justifyhimself in connectionwith a letterthat Golitsyn had writtento Peter'sfavorite and confidant,Aleksandr Menshikov. Golitsyn blamedMazepa forthe fact that Ukrainian citizens were reportedly not happy aboutpaying taxes in orderto providethe wages of the mercenary regiments (serdiukyand kompaniitsi).The hetmándeclared angrily that the mercenary regimentsobtained their wages from "rents." In a numberof letters written to MenshikovMazepa explainedthe taxation system of the Hetmanate, including thesystem of rents.13 According to theKolomak Articles, a Ukrainian-Russian treatyconcluded on 6 August1687, internal policy in theHetmanate, as wellas tax collection,was themainstay of the hetman's authority; Russian voevodas had no rightto interferein it.14 The provincialreform is directlyresponsible for Peter's plans to dismissthe Cossack officerstaff (star shy no), whichwas describedin a letterwritten by Mazepa's successorin exile,Pylyp Orlyk, to theUkrainian Orthodox hierarch and thede factohead ofthe Russian Orthodox Church Stefan Iavors'kyi.15 Very likelythere were plans afoot not only to establishthe office of Kyivan voevoda, butalso to introducean entirelynew administrativesystem, including one to replacethe old Cossackstarshyna. Historians are more familiar with the reform thatresulted in the transferof Ukrainianfortresses to thejurisdiction of the Russianmilitary authorities. This arrangement was mutuallyagreed upon by Mazepa and Peter,and on 22 November1707 the hetmánhanded over the newlybuilt Pechersk Fortress to thevoevoda of Kyiv, Golitsyn.16 Henceforward, all decisionson howto defendKyiv (or not to defendit) were made by Golitsyn, notMazepa. Mazepa revealedhis obviousdispleasure with the new systemin a letter writtenin November1707 to GavriilGolovkin. Until very recently the Ukrai- nian hetmánhad reporteddirectly to Peterand receivedinstructions only fromhim. It shouldbe recalledthat in 1689Peter granted Mazepa theright to

This content downloaded from 195.209.247.163 on Fri, 19 Apr 2013 04:26:33 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 32 TAIROVA-IAKOVLEVA issueorders concerning military affairs to Russianvoevodas. Now everything was reversedand Golitsynhad the finalsay. He was the one who decided the numberof Cossacks Mazepa could have in Kyiv,and the hetmánhad no choicebut to followhis orders.17The new dual-rulesystem in Ukraineled to much confusion,many examples of whichemerged in the summerof 1708, withMazepa receivingorders from Dmitrii Golitsyn, Aleksandr Menshikov, and Golovkin. Besides Pechersk,another important fortress transferred from Mazepa's administrationto Golitsyn'swas Novobohorodyts'ka(Novobogoroditsk) on the Samara River.This fortress was builtby Mazepa in 1688as partof a new lineof defense against the Tatars. At the same timeit helped maintain control overthe ZaporozhianSich, with which Mazepa did not have good relations. Initially,the fortresshad been underMoscow's authority,but afterthe Azov campaignsof 1701 it was transferredto Mazepa's control,18one ofseveral gifts fromthe tsarto the hetmán(including the Orderof St. Andrew).That same yearPeter granted Mazepa fullauthority to protectthe southern boundaries ofhis state. Butby 1707 the hetmans authority was significantlyeroded. On 20 July1707 Shafirovreceived an orderfrom the tsar to assignNovobohorodyts'ka Fortress to theDepartment of Military Affairs.19 During the Northern War Ukraine was increasinglysubordinated to the authorityof high-rankingRussian officers. In May 1708Vasilii Dolgorukii, a majorin thePreobrazhenskii Regiment, was appointedchief commander of all troopsin Ukraine,including Russian forces, thehetman's registered Cossacks, and Ukrainianmercenary regiments.20 The dual-rulesystem was alreadyfunctioning in Ukrainein thesummer of 1708.1 will cite several examples of this practice, which gave rise to all sortsof inconsistenciesand sparkednumerous misunderstandings. On 17June Mazepa receivedan orderto build some bridgesnear Kyiv;meanwhile, an identical orderwas sentto Golitsyn,the voevoda of Kyiv.21On 25 JuneMazepa wrote to Menshikov,informing him thathe had receivedhis orderto marchwith his armyto Prypiat.The very next day Golovkin countermanded Menshikov's order,instructing the Ukrainian hetmán to head forKyiv.22 The last of Peter'sreforms, but by no means the least important,was the creationof "companies," or mercenaryunits, that were supposed to be formed of one-fifthof the personnel of Cossack regiments.On 10 August1707 Peter senta letterto Mazepa inwhich he insistedthat these units be organizedduring thewinter to be readyby spring. The tsar fumed about the Cossack regiments, callingthem inefficient and irregular,adding that the only activity in which the Cossackshad engagedduring the last campaign was robbery.23Mazepa, who understoodthe crucial need to reorganizethe old Cossackregiments because theydid not meetmodern requirements, agreed to formthese units.24 How- ever,he soon realizedthe difficulties in implementingthis reform. I recently uncovereda fascinatingletter written by Mazepa to Golovkin,in whichthe

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Ukrainianhetmán, alarmed by "rumors" that were circulating among the Cos- sacks,insisted that the planned changes not be made precipitously.His advice was to commencethe reformwith the Staroduband Chernihivregiments, whichwere the "quietestones" in his opinion,and situatedfar enough from Zaporizhia.Mazepa, who was perturbedby the behavior of his colonels,was concernedabout a possiblerevolt among the Cossacks ifthe changesto the regimentsproceeded too quickly.When the Cossack colonels learned of Peter's orderabout the kompanii (that is, the reform of the regiments) they called it a violationof their liberties and blamedMazepa forit.25 Thus, in 1707-8Mazepa facedstrong opposition from the Cossack officerstaff, and he did his best to delaythe reform of the Cossack regiments. The launchof Peter'scomplex and multilateraladministrative reforms in 1707significantly eroded the authorityof the hetmánand was a step closer towardthe abolition of the Hetmanates autonomy.The voevoda of Kyiv acquiredcomplete authority in all militaryand administrativematters, and thehetmán found himself on theverge of forfeiting his positionas Ukraine's ruler.There is littledoubt that Mazepa was extremelydispleased by this turn of events.From his pointof view,everything that he had achievedthrough hislong and faithfulservice was suddenlyabolished by the tsar without cause (thehetmán initiated contact with the Swedes only in thespring of 1707). But the reformshad nothingto do withPeter's personal attitude toward the het- mán. Theymarked the beginningof the completereconstruction of Russia's administrativesystem - the creationof an empire,a processthat was greatly stimulatedby the Northern War.

Notes

1. V.A. Artamonov,K. A. Kochegarov,and I. V.Kurukin, Vtorzhenie shvedskoi armii na Getmanshchinuv1708 g. (St.Petersburg, 2008). 2. 1.1. Golikov, Deianiia Petra Velikago, mudrago preobrazovatelia Rossii, sobran - nyiaiz dostoviernykhistochnikov i raspolozhennyia po godam, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1837-43),3:224-25. 3. Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (hereinafter: RGADA), fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 2, file 101, fols. 48r-48v. 4. Ibid.,fol. 48v. 5. Ibid.,fols. 48v- 49r. 6. Ibid.,fols. 83v-84r. 7. Opisaniedokumentov i bumag, khraniashchikhsia vmoskovskom arkhive minister- stvaiustitsii , vol. 5 (Moscow,1888-), 7. 8. E.G. Avsharov,"K istoriioblastnoi reformy (1707-1709 gg.)," in Russkii gorod : Issle- dovaniiai materialy, Moscow State University Series (Moscow, 1982), 94-95. 9. Ibid.

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10. RGADA,fond 9, pt.2, bk. 89, fol. 104r. 11. Ibid.,fols. 104r-104v. 12. "A OTreTMaHa paóoTHMKOB npncAaHO 200 neAOBeKm b ohmxpaóoTHMKax ynnpaeTiâmnniiieT, öyaymee, hto npncAaHbi 6yAyT. Ilponiy Bac, Moero rocyAapn, ameBOAH Baina 6yAeT, npnKa>KM koMHe HanwcaTb nwcbMO mcnpocMTb: nenepcKaa KpenocTbAeAaeTiâ Ab m CKOAbKO paöoTHMKOB ot rocnoAMHa reTMaHa npMCAaHO, Aaöbih to nMCbMOMor noKa3aTb reTMaHy. M naio,hto no OHOMyBac, Moero rocyAapn,nncbMy paóoTHMKOB BCKope npMiiiAeT." SeeSevernaia voina 1700-1721 : Sborníkdokumentov, vol. 1, 1700-1709 (Moscow, 2009-), doc. no. 322, [p.] 348. 13. Archiveof the St. Petersburg Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sci- ences(hereinafter: IH RAN), fond 83, list 1, file 58, fols. lr-2v. 14. "YambmachTaKOM nAeBoceHTeAHoii ajkh, [ko]topoio Bauiy KHH^cyio CBeTAocTb HanpacHOflKMMCb HecnocTOHHHOM A>KMBeu[ noTypôoBaA, a a M3BecTByioBanioíí KHHÃeííCBeTAOCTM HMCTOK) COBeCTÌK) MnpaBAOK) XpMCTÌaHCKOK), HTOHa CepAK)KOB mHa KOMnaHiK)HMKorAa hm c Koro3Aecb b MaAopocciiícKMXpeiiMeHTy Moero ropoAaxhm no camhom KonewKe HeBwónpaeTiâ, moöbiKHOBeHMH TaKoro w3ApeBAe He6biAO, mTenepb HeT. .." (I wassurprised by such an incipient lie, with which some fickleliar vainly troubled your princely highness, but I aminforming your princely highnesswith a pureconscience and Christian truth that not a singlekopeck has everbeen taken for the serdiuks and the kompaniitsi here in theLittle Russian regimentsof my cities, and since the earliest times there has neverbeen such a custom,nor now...). IH RAN,fond 83, list 1, file 58, fols. lr-2v. 15. See"Pys'mo P. Orlyka S. Iavors'komu,"inOrest Subtelny, Mazepyntsi : Ukrains'kyi separatyzmna pochatku XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1994), 163-64. 16. "OcTaHOBMAeMnpe3MAnaAHoro peiiMeHTy Moero BoiicKa noAKy CTapoAy6oBCKoro 500 HeAOBeKAiOAeii HaAeÂHwx m c cbommmóopoineHHWMM 3anacaMn c noAKOBHMKOMMXHaKa3HbiM, cTapiiiMHOK) mc coTHMKaMM" (I have left behind the presidingregiment ofmy army, 500 reliablepeople of the Starodub regiment, and withtheir supplies of flour and their acting colonel, Cossack officers and their captains).RGADA, fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 4, file137, fols, lr-lv. 17. RGADA,fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 4, file137, fol. lv. 18. RGADA,fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 2, file 86, fol. 118r. 19. RGADA,fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 2, file 101, fols. 184r-184v. 20. Pis'ma,i bumagiimperatora Petra Velikogo, vol. 7, bk.2 (Moscow;Leningrad, 1946),681. 21. RGADA,fond 229 (Malorossiiskiiprikaz), list 1, file 62, fols. lv-2r. 22. "riMCMOBarnen khh>kom cbctaoctm bchkoíí necTM AOCToiiHoe BoenpiflA h c noAoöaiomMMroHopoM Bnepacb miohh 24 nepe3HapoHHoro Kypiepa c TaKOBbiM b HeMM3o6pa>KeHbiM npeAAO)KeHieM, Aa6w h no HMHeuiHeMyHenpijiTeACKOMy AeíícTBiK)npMKa3aA noAKOBHMKy Crap0Ay60BCK0My npMÓAM^cMTiâ c noAKOM K Awenpyaah ocMOTpeHian[acco]B, a caMnoAaACH 3 boííckom k FIpMneTM.A HbiHeb 25 mk)hhnoAyHMA hnMcaHie ciHTeAHeiimero rpa(j>a ero mmaoctm TaBpMAa

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MßaHOBHHa,hto6 MHe caMOMy MTMTb k Kießy, a ÖAn>KaMniieiioakm ot Amtbm nocAaTbk Anenpy." IH RAN,fond 83, list 1, file 63, fol. Ir. 23. Pis'mai bumagiimperatora Petra Velikogo, voi. 6 (St.Petersburg, 1912), doc. no. 1901,[p.] 44. 24. Ibid.,287. 25. "KTOMy )KMTO roBopHT, HTO rpaMOTa ao hmxoÖHaAe>KMBaTeAHafl npnapcbhmx npaBaxm boahocthx mx npeóbiBaTb npncAaHa. A Hbme&e naneHa a^hhh mx mhomyKa3 npwcAaH. O neM Ha Hero reTMaHa cío BMHy HapeicaiOT." RGADA, fond 24 (Malorossiiskiedela, 1703), no. 5, fols. 113r-113v.

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