Today February 1982 17

imposition of the ban and a three day work- ing week was enforced by law creating industrial chaos and social consequences far greater than a strike could have done. There was no objective basis for such a reaction for, The Miners on the Move after all, the miners had simply decided to work a normal week. The strike in 1974, Even the Thatcher government has bowed before the miners. which followed yet another overtime ban But it has not always been the same. Until the 70s, the miners and propelled the Prime Minister into a were on the defensive. So what has changed? general election which he lost to the Labour Party, consolidated the fear which govern- ments had of the miners. The Social Con- tract was designed by the 1974 Labour government to contain the miners' wage demands; wage incentive schemes were re- introduced in 1978 as a means of breaking the miners' unity. Then, in February, 1981, the present Conservative government responded to a partial, unofficial miners' strike against pit closures by agreeing to meet the strikers' demands. This response contained all the elements of hysteria which had marked Heath's behaviour in 1973. It was unexpected, dramatic, an unashamed reversal of policy for the benefit of miners only. It was as if Mrs Thatcher had suddenly recognized the route which Mr Heath had followed in 1974.

During the last decade the National Union ing but by 1970 this figure had fallen to A further confrontation? of Mineworkers has established itself as the 41%. The post First World War history of The apprehension with which governments most politically potent union in Britain. miners was characterised by the extraor- have viewed confrontation with miners This is not because its industrial power is dinary solidarity in 1926 but even more by makes the present developing confrontation greater than any other union. Electrical fractured unity, industrial defeat, collabora- difficult to understand. The government power workers could have a more immediate tion with private employers, the National could be excused for not anticipating the pit impact upon power supplies than miners Coal Board and governments, and demorali- closure strike last February because miners but they are not high in the ratings. Water sation following the dramatic contraction of had given no sign of militancy over that workers or gas supply workers could cause the industry in the 1960s which reduced the issue. Indeed the evidence pointed towards immediate industrial and social disruption if numbers of miners from more than 700,000 the NUM being compliant. But during the they exercised their collective power but nei- in 1956 to 296,000 in 1970. There was little autumn of 1981 the government and miners ther of these groups is influential either in in this history to support the mythology snowballed into confrontation position. At the movement or the wider about miners' solidarity. Even when their any time during October and November the political scene. The explanation lies partly, propensity to strike was at its height their parties could have stopped, dusted them- of course, in the actual industrial power strikes were largely confined to single col- selves down and sorted out their differences. miners wield but also in the determination lieries and were over parochial wage issues. The miners were demanding a minimum with which they collectively use their indus- wage of £100 a week, amounting to a 25% trial strength and in the solidarity which A new paranoia wage increase compared with the 4% public their actions evoke from other groups of Notwithstanding the reality of miners' expe- sector norm insisted on by the government. workers. riences the image of a powerful collective Between those two limits there was The influence of miners stems also from presence persisted. There was always some- undoubtedly a price at which confrontation the perception which the government, polit- thing awe-inspiring about miners' actions. could have been dissipated. ical parties and other unions have of them. Then in 1972 the myth came to life when the Both the government and National Coal This perception is rooted in the actual miners took the government on in a wages Board relied on the NUM president, Joe behaviour of miners but it has an element of confrontation and shattered its n-1 incomes Gormley, to handle the issue in their inter- mythology about it. The miners struck with policy in a seven week strike. est. Gormley made it clear that he thought frightening determination in 1972 against There were many examples following the wage claim was excessive and that he did all odds but that was their first national 1972 of the sensitivity of governments to the not intend to leave office as he came in, with official strike since 1926 when they were changing collective mood of miners. The a major strike on his hands. His timing of the painfully defeated. And although their prop- government of Mr which had negotiations and his handling of the union's ensity to strike had been the highest amongst conceded defeat in 1972 reacted with virtual National Executive Committee were vital, industrial workers in Britain that was no hysteria in November 1973 when the NUM therefore, in this 'avoidance of confronta- longer the case. In 1956 as many as 78.4% of imposed an overtime ban. A state of emer- tion' process. all strikes in Great Britain occurred in min- gency was declared the day following the It is often believed that there is a pecking 18 February 1982 Marxism Today

order in the annual struggle for wage in response to the union's demand. This was of January 1982. increases. Namely, that the first major union rejected by the union NEC at its meeting on The carefully drawn-out negotiations to make its demand sets a ceiling for the 12 November but it decided to resume nego- could not isolate the wages issue from either remaining claims. If the NUM were prompt tiations on 25 November. At this meeting the implications of the British Leyland set- in submitting its claim and anxious for a the Board's offer included an increase of £1 tlement or the election campaign. The Brit- settlement by its customary date of 1 on the bonus rate and amounted to 8.47% ish Leyland settlement was portrayed by November then it would be likely to be a for surface workers and 8.99% for face work- some miners' leaders as a defeat caused by 'price-leader'. Gormley did not want the ers. The union negotiators rejected this offer division and collaboration. It was projected miners to make the pace. It so happened that too but agreed to a meeting between the full by as an example of weak- the British Leyland workers had submitted NEC and Board representatives on 8 ness. The miners' wage issue was affected by an early wages claim so Gormley prolonged December, after the ballot vote for the presi- the election campaign in a much more the negotiations with the NCB and made no profound way. attempt to settle by 1 November. It was also The media identified him the government's immediate interest to sep- The Scargill campaign arate the settlements and to deal with the with and engaged The presidential election campaign started fractured British Leyland workers first. in a joint character- as soon as it was announced publicly, more The British Leyland workers settled their assassination than 18 months ago, that Arthur Scargill wages claim in disarray and in a manner was to be the sole left wing candidate for satisfactory to both the management and dent had been completed. Gormley did not Gormley's post. The Scottish miners presi- government. The miners' claim, it was then want the crucial stages of the wages negotia- dent, Michael McGahey, made the felt, could be processed without complica- tions to coincide with the final stages of the announcement and immediately initiated a tions. The delay, however, took the negotia- election campaign with the possibility of coalfield election campaign with Scargill's tions into the campaigning period for the having to hold two ballots simultaneously. It active participation. From that moment election of the NUM president. The final was preferable he believed, to get the elec- Scargill moved around the left wing date for nominations for the election was 2 tion over first and the NEC agreed with him. coalfields addressing meetings and visiting November; the ballot was to be held on the The NCB rejigged its offer up to 9.1% for miners' clubs. He knew that in order to win 2, 3 and 4 of December with the result the meeting on 8 December but it was he had to maximise his vote in the tradition- scheduled to be announced on Thursday, 10 rejected by a 3 to 1 majority. The NEC then ally sympathetic coalfields. Later in 1980 December. decided to convene a delegate conference to Scargill began addressing meetings in Dur- The had offered an debate the issue on Friday, 18 December ham and Nottingham. By the time the elec- increase of just less than 8% on the basic rate and to hold a strike ballot during the middle tion was held he had spoken in all the areas Marxism Today February 1982 19

of the union except for a couple of small leader, owed something to Daly's election. It ones. Wherever he went he spoke to mass was during that election that Scargill made meetings. Miners clamoured to hear him. his first impact in the Yorkshire area as the No miner in Britain was unaware of his organiser of the Forum, a debating presence, his personality and the policies for society addressed by all the leading left wing which he stood. leaders in the industry. The mass media portrayed the election as a competition between personalities with Consciousness differing, contrasting political styles and Consciousness raising does not proceed policies. Scargill was the political extremist, along a continuum, reflecting changes as strike-happy and irresponsible. The media more and more effort is contributed. The identified him with Tony Benn and engaged consciousness of people is the result of the in a joint character-assassination. In contrast interaction of politicising activities and his electoral opponents were moderate, rea- actual experiences and it responds to sonable, sensible and trust-worthy men, changes in the relationship between these standing in the spectrum of trade union poli- two elements. Intensive political activity cies very much as Denis Healey stood in the may produce no tangible changes in the con- Labour Party. sciousness of workers whereas in other situa- became obvious. Early in November they tions workers may suddenly, with little The campaign and the mining issues stated that there was little interest in the pits prompting, express a heightened awareness But the media presentation was not as it was for a wages struggle. By the end of that of their political position. Workers' con- seen by working miners. Scargill stood con- month they exclaimed with some surprise sciousness, therefore, fluctuates, sometimes sistently for policies which related to mining that a transformation had taken place in the uncannily and seemingly unpredictably. conditions. Whenever and wherever he attitude of miners. Gormley was compelled There is one thing, however, about which spoke he enunciated these policies, empha- to reassess his view about what the miners one can be sure. That is that an increased sising them differently as circumstances var- would be prepared to accept by the rank and political awareness does not occur simply ied, but always projecting what he thought file expression of dissatisfaction. The offi- through changes in situations. The domi- needed achieving. The election issue of The cials of the right wing areas reflected the nant ideology, which effectively depoliti- Yorkshire Miner listed ScargilPs main emerging militancy by voting for a strike cises people through both encouraging an demands as follows: ballot. acceptance of deprivation and diverting 'No pit closures other than on the None of these officials ought to have been attention from its structural causes, contin- grounds of exhaustion' 'A minimum of £100.00 a week wages' 'A four day week' 'Retirement at 55 on full pay for all mineworkers' 'Wage protection so that a man who's downgraded doesn't suffer a drop in pay' 'Controls on imports of coal and oil so that we can burn our own coal' 'Realistic subsidies for our industry. In Britain we get £2.00 a tonne while the West Germans get £40.00 a tonne' 'Democracy within the union so that con- ference decisions are carried out' 'An efficient day-to-day union that deals A member of the NUM at work in a less-publicised area of the industry. promptly with all the bread and butter surprised at the consequences of Scargill's ues to dominate unless challenged by alter- issues that never hit the headlines' electioneering for they had followed a simi- native analyses and explanations. The The core policies concerned wages, hours, lar, though less spectacular, campaign in catalyst for a rising awareness is a sustained, retirement and wage protection and cen- 1968 when beat Joe Gor- cohesive, logically consistent and effectively trally placed within these was the wages mley in an election for the general secretar- disseminated alternative ideology which issue. Scargill's campaign then, which yship. Daly, like Scargill, campaigned over counters conventional explanations point by intruded into the right wing areas of Dur- policies and set in motion a mood which led point and makes sense to the people con- ham, Nottingham, North Wales and the to the unofficial strikes in 1969 and 1970 cerned. Without this people will remain Midlands where campaigning was rarely and the national official strike in 1972. Law- oppressed but with it they will not neces- practised, was, in effect a wages one. Scarg- rence Daly never had access to the right sarily seek freedom for other conditions have ill's view about wages was conveyed to wing areas as Scargill has had, yet his cam- to be present. miners in his pamphlet Miners in the Eighties paign caused miners in many coalfields to This statement about the nature of con- and later in his election address, both of discuss their conditions and to question the sciousness can be illustrated by the British which had mass circulations. conventional explanations given about miners' own experiences since the coal Even some of the leaders in the left wing them. All that followed in the 1970s, includ- industry began to contract in the late 1950s. areas of the NUM failed to see the political ing the political transformation in Yorkshire From then until the 1970s coalfields were significance of Scargill's campaign until it and Scargill's emergence as a national ravaged by closures; the number of miners 20 February 1982 Marxism Today was halved in a decade; many moved to other provided unity between the coalfields on the president of the large Nottingham area and coalfields; pit villages became deserted. wages issue was replaced in 1978 by incen- 3.3% for Bernard Donaghy from Lanca- Miners' relative wages declined and their tive schemes which divided miners. An shire. He achieved a majority in every working conditions deteriorated. Yet miners intensive media campaign was directed coalfield. The result was announced during accepted the degrading consequences of pit against left wing miners, supporting any a break in the meeting between the full closures as an inevitable consequence of the device to frustrate their intentions. The union NEC and National Coal Board repre- operation of market forces. Then, from behaviour of miners was unpredictable in sentatives on 8 December instead of the Daly's election campaign which lasted as these changing circumstances. scheduled day on 10 December. It clearly long as Scargill's an organised movement to Miners had not protested against pit clo- influenced the attitude of all NEC members politicise miners began. Pamphlets and leaf- sures in the 1960s nor did they effectively to the Coal Board's offer when they resumed lets were distributed throughout the protest against them in the 1970s when their negotiations and helped to create a unani- coalfields presenting alternative political union policy was to accept closures only mous vote for a strike ballot later in the explanations for the causes of the problems when caused by the exhaustion of coal week. miners faced. Meetings were held in miners' clubs organised by local Labour Parties, the Communist Party and miners' lodges at which miners were urged to emancipate themselves.

The impact of leadership A small coterie of miners gave this move- ment its initiative and resources. From Kent came Jack Dunn; from Scotland, Michael McGahey, Lawrence Daly and Bill McLean; from South Wales, Emlyn Wil- liams and Dai Francis; and from Yorkshire, Jock Kane, Sammy Taylor and Arthur Scargill. As the movement made its impact so it widened its membership both within and among the coalfields. The material con- ditions of mining altered in the early 1970s. Unemployment increased, a severe fuel reserves. Whenever a movement of protest The result gave a quality of euphoria to crisis occurred and widespread industrial against a closure was initiated, as in the cases the Delegate Conference on 18 December action was used to oppose Heath's Conserv- of Langwith in Derbyshire and Teversal in which endorsed an Executive recommenda- ative government. These changes undoubt- Nottinghamshire, even the miners con- tion to strike, if necessary, in the New Year, edly made miners' protests more likely but cerned opposed using industrial action. by a majority of 109 votes to 3. The momen- they could not have occurred in their par- Then when in February 1980, the Executive tum it created is unlikely to be halted by an ticularly victorious way without the organ- of the South Wales Area decided to call a objective assessment of coal stocks which are ised ideological impact of Dunn, McGahey, strike against possible widespread closures high, coal imports or the government's pick- Williams and the rest. of Welsh pits, as many as 22,000 out of the eting laws. Only the size of the wage offer It could not have been foreseen in 1970 27,000 South Wales miners turned its rec- can do that. and 1971 that within three years the miners ommendation down. Against this back- It has been commonly assumed that the would take on the government twice and win ground the spontaneous strikes against return to piecework in 1978 destroyed the each time. Nor, once the miners had ret- closures in February 1981, which compelled unity which the day wage system had cre- rieved their pride and achieved a position of the government to alter its policy and the ated around wages. Indeed it is speculated political eminence in the labour movement National Coal Board to renounce its closure that the guileful introduction of area incen- after 1974, could it have been forecast that list, were unexpected. Of course there is an tive schemes at an initial great cost to the they would acquiesce for six years in policies explanation but it is a post-hoc one concern- National Coal Board was aimed at breaking which lowered their living standards or ing the continued left wing exposure of the the unity which had characterised the 1972 accept an accumulation of unfulfilled resolu- visible injustice of closures caused by subsi- and 1974 strikes. The basic rate in many tions about wages and conditions of work in dised imports from the USA, South Africa instances has now become a fall-back rate. the mines, despite the intensification of poli- and elsewhere. Actual average earnings ranged between ticising activities among them. £40.00 and £50.00 on top of the rate during The combination of relevant variables The immediate effects 1981. But there is a wide disparity in earn- altered in significant ways. A Labour gov- The long term consequences of the Scargill ings between coalfields and between pits ernment was elected in 1974 in circum- election campaign cannot, then, be pin- within coalfields. In some areas there is stances which exposed and reinforced the pointed with any accuracy. The immediate growing dissatisfaction with incentives not traditional solidarity of miners for the effects, however, are indisputable. Arthur simply because of low earnings but also Labour Party. Joe Gormley revealed after Scargill was elected with an unprecedented because of the manner in which they are 1974 an incredible facility for interpreting majority over his three opponents. In an operated by management. The and manipulating his union's rules to defeat 80% poll he obtained 70.3% of the votes miners, for instance, could readily rebel the purpose of progressive policies. The compared with 17.3% for his closest rival, against the schemes. day-wage system, introduced in 1966, which Trevor Bell, 9.1% for Ray Chadburn, the The point is that there is no evidence that Marxism Today February 1982 21

incentive schemes since 1978 have dis- be the manner in which miners linked their wing areas. An indication of this is that so rupted the unity of the miners or that they failure to obtain wage increases and to fulfil many of these areas supported Scargill in the would do so in 1982. It is not necessary, their own resolutions about working hours election. But there is also a growing organ- however, for all miners to be directly impli- and conditions with the nature of British ised opposition to right wing policies and cated in a wages struggle in order to achieve capitalism. methods. It is a fact that the most democratic solidarity. A widespread unofficial strike in The all-important issue, then, is about the areas are the left wing ones for it is not 1969 was about the working hours of a miners' perception of a worsening crisis in possible to sustain left wing policies without minority of surface workers. This time the Britain and this depends not simply on wor- sustained argument and membership partic- basis of the wages demand is a minimum sening material conditions, but on discredit- ipation. The officials of left wing areas have wage for the lowest paid surface workers. ing the dominant ideology, for a system always had to campaign consistently Many underground workers anticipate end- which cannot be legitimised in the minds of amongst their own members. New, young ing their working lives as surface workers. people cannot survive. Miners identify branch officials in the right wing areas are They easily identify with them. closely with their union. How it operates demanding more discussion, a greater par- therefore and the purposes to which it is put ticipation in the union affairs and a stricter have an important bearing on the miners' own perceptions. The future for miners A strike would have intense unquestionably hinges on the extent and nature of democracy in the NUM and, in the political implications because process therefore, on the quality of lead- of the facility of miners both ership. The NUM leadership after 1974 provided no initiatives. Its task was the nega- to generate fear in politicians tive one of stifling action by sitting on nego- and inspiration in fellow trade tiations, complicating issues, compromising unionists to the point of defeat and generally avoiding action. It acted as a buffer. accountability of their area officials. This The NUM is a difficult union to lead. It is process will result in a qualitative change in not a centralised national union except in its area leaderships. Durham, for instance, will constitution. In practice it is a federation change in much the same ways as Yorkshire with its various areas acting with the menta- changed in the early 1970s. The Midlands lity of autonomous county unions, which area and Nottingham will follow suit. Dur- they were until 1945. The areas possess their ing the there will be a left wing con- A strike would have intense political own considerable funds; they retain their sensus on the NEC. But this will raise more implications because of the facility of miners own policy-making machinery. The deci- tests or Scargill than it will remove. both to generate fear in politicians and inspi- sions of the national union prevail on impor- ration in fellow trade unionists. All manner tant industrial issues but areas can rebel and The Scargill presidency of grievances emerge during a strike and the can use their own resources to oppose Joe Gormley had to contend with an intelli- general resentment against the government national policy. The transformation which gent, volatile minority. Scargill will have to could be one of these. The laws occurred in the attitudes of miners in the cope with an intelligent, questioning major- could be broken. Trade unions engaged in 1970s did so because of the politicising activ- ity. He will not be able to impose himself as sympathetic action might prosecute their ities of some areas. The composition of the Gormley did. The great quality in an effec- own grievances. There are various possible National Executive Committee reflects tive democracy is that nothing is taken for permutations, depending in large part on these area differences for its members go to granted; all policies have to be explained and the reactions of the government, for at the London as leaders of the South Wales, Scot- all acts justified. The new consensus in the present the extent and intensity of govern- tish, Yorkshire, Derbyshire miners and not NUM will cover a spectrum of viewpoints ment intervention is the factor which gives as representatives elected by a given propor- and Scargill will have to identify with one of industrial action its political characteristics. tion of members divided on geographical them, isolating the more demagogic leftist If the government itself suffered through a basis. They descend on London as plenipo- ones despite their populist appeal. The pres- miners' strike it would be, as in the case of tentiaries. They are not, therefore, easily ident, of course, is not a free agent. Scargill Heath's government, through its own controlled. They cannot be browbeaten or will have to work within real constraints; he incompetence and not because of the direct imposed upon. They sit, moreover, on the will be confronted by painful options which intentions of the miners. Irrespective of basis of equality, for each member on the are not always apparent to the ordinary their dislike of the present government the NEC has his own vote irrespective of his members. In this situation he could easily miners are not trying to achieve political membership. take a course which separated him from the change; they are merely demanding a wage union membership. If this happened he increase. The leftward shift would have to resort to the methods of his The present NEC has a small majority predecessor and the whole process of demo- The NUM which favours right wing policies and which cratisation, and, in consequence, politi- The real question concerning miners is not sanctioned Gormley's activities. That cisation would be held back. No previous whether they will strike in 1982 but whether majority is likely to disappear soon after NUM leadership has tried to pursue a they will achieve a political awareness which Scargill takes office for there are always dynamic leftwing course. Scargill's ability to would lead them to shape their own des- some members who prefer to be on the offi- encourage this and to work within the pres- tinies in and beyond the coal industry. Evi- cial side irrespective of its policies. In any sures it creates will be the measure of his dence of this quality of consciousness would event, changes are taking place in the right- success. •