Review: What is and Why Should We Study it? Author(s): Ernst B. Haas Source: International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 707-744 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706824 . Accessed: 03/07/2011 16:41

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http://www.jstor.org What is nationalismand whyshould we studyit? ErnstB. Haas

Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Editions & NLB, 1983. ErnestGellner. Nations and Nationalism.Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Dudley Seers. The Political Economy of Nationalism. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1983. AnthonyD. Smith. Nationalism in the TwentiethCentury. New York: New York UniversityPress, 1979.

Nationalismand modernization

Most essays on nationalismbegin with the lamentthat the conceptis as fuzzyas thestates of mind it is supposedto describeare diverse.Studies of nationalismpose theproverbial elephant problem: the animal's appearance seemsto differdepending on whereit is touchedby a groupof blind persons. Our authorsare no exceptionto thisrule. For Dudley Seers nationalism refersto certaintypes of economic policy, while for Benedict Anderson the termconnotes manufactured linguistic identity. Anthony Smith considers nationalismto be a particularideology of solidaritybased on preindustrial roots.Ernest Gellner treats the phenomenon as a distinctlyindustrial princi- ple of social evolutionand social organization. No singleterm should be madeto bear so heavya burden.As ArthurN. Waldronnoted in a reviewparalleling my effort:

I gratefullyacknowledge the helpful comments received from Robert H. Jackson,Kenneth Jowitt,Peter Katzenstein, Ian Lustick,and WayneSandholtz.

InternationalOrganization 40, 3, Summer1986 C 1986by theMassachusetts Institute of Technology and theWorld Peace Foundation 708 InternationalOrganization

A disproportiondefinitely exists between the way in whichnationalism is used to explainhistory and politics,and theexplanatory capacity of theconcept as outlinedby its theorists.The intellectualfoundations providedby thelatter simply will not support the explanatory struc- turesthat have been placed on them.Nationalism in generalis a power- fuland comprehensibleidea. Yet, whileit definesgeneral situations, it is notvery useful in explicatingspecific events. In cases wheresuch eventshave in thepast been explainedby invokingnationalism, we will have to searchfor another analysis.1 He is quiteright, unless we are carefulto specifywhich aspects of "specific events" we are interestedin explicatingwith the helpof theconcept and which"general situations" the concept is supposedto capture.No concept can covereverything. As ofnow, the elephant lumbers around without doing muchuseful work. The studyof nationalismhas verypermeable boundaries. It overlapsso heavilywith the study of modernization,of modernpolitical ideologies, of economicand social history,and of politicalanthropology as to suggest redundancy.Why study nations and nationalismat all? For me thereis no self-evidentanswer. The descriptionof historicalpatterns requires no spe- cial focus,no theory,apart from and beyond the theories already embedded in therelevant disciplines. A specialfocus is justifiedonly if the purpose of theinquiry somehow differs from what we alreadyknow.

Nationalismand politicalrationalization

My purposein studyingnationalism is to exploreits role as a typeof "rationalization"which helps or hindersdomestic and internationalhar- mony.This purposeenables me to sidestepthe conceptual confusion com- mon to most of the authorsunder review and to attemptthe task that Waldronoutlines. Like mostconcepts we use in thesocial sciences,nation and nationalismare cognitiveartifacts we inventto markoff an intellectual universe.My definitions,which will follow later, have no moreinnate valid- itythan anyone else's; theyare justifiedonly by my basic purpose.My

1. ArthurN. Waldron,"Theories of Nationalism and HistoricalExplanation," World Poli- tics 37 (April1985), p. 427. I agreewith Waldron's core argument that the vague invocation of "nationalism"in explainingevents in thenon-European world is unsatisfactory,because the "adjective'nationalist' has beenattached to people,movements, and sentimentsin a waythat is taken(usually without explanation) as distinguishingeach ofthem meaningfully from some othervariety." Indeed, as he says,struggle comes first, and thennationalism, and to under- standwhy there is a strugglewe mustunderstand its political source (p. 433).That, however, is notwhat interests me. I am concernedwith a singlegeneral situation-patterns ofrationaliza- tionin the post-Enlightenmentworld-and manyspecific events, i.e., the behaviorof self- identifiedgroups in coping with that world. Nationalism is one(and only one) way in which such groupsdo identifythemselves. No moregeneral claim is suggested. Whatis nationalism?709 demarcationbegins with a roughdescription of whatI takenationalism to mean.A statementon themeaning of rationalizationfollows. The twoare thenconjoined in an attemptto inquireinto the relationship between har- monyat thenational, as opposedto theinternational, levels. Nationalismis theconvergence of territorial and political loyalty irrespec- tiveof competingfoci of affiliation,such as kinship,profession, religion, economicinterest, race, or even language.Nationalism is "modern"be- cause it stressesthe individual'ssearch for identity with strangers in an impersonalworld, a worldno longeranimated by corporateidentities. All nationalismsimply a principleof identitybased on impersonalties, remote ties,vicarious ties-all ofwhich are mediatedby a set of commonsymbols embeddedin a certainpattern of communication.Successful nationalism also impliesa minimumof socialharmony, an acceptanceof the values that thesymbols communicate sufficient to maintainsocial peace and peaceful socialchange. Legitimate authority under conditions of mass politics is tied up withsuccessful nationalism; when the is in doubt,one propsupporting legitimacy is knockedaway. Nationalismis also a civilreligion, often in conflictwith but occasionally drawingstrength from real religions. That civil religion contains a setof core valuesthat, whether for objectivist or subjectivistreasons, come to be ac- ceptedby the population of a state;they become the definers of selfhood. In successfulnations they remain in thatrole untilchallenged by the next sourceof tension;no civilreligion is gravenin stone.As longas thecore valuesprovide the framework for social action, people know what to expect oftheir fellows, understand and respectauthority, are securein theirviews of the schemeof collectivelife. Such a societyis temporarilyrationalized despiteits size, impersonality,and vicariousnature of impersonalties. As Webertaught us, rationalizationneed not be thebureaucratic kind (though it usuallyis); butit mustbe in a formulathat fits the conditions of a commer- cializedand industrializedsociety. The kindof identitywe seek to under- standis an issue onlysince the onset of theindustrial revolution.2 The crispestformula for summing up therelevant conception of rationali- zationwould run like this:rationalization refers to modesof behaviorthat reston a materialistontology, a proceduralepistemology, and an empirical

2. Theconcept of rationalization, ofcourse, is adaptedfrom Max Weber.The best discussion of Weber'soften confusing and contradictorytreatment of theconcept is StephenKalberg, "Max Weber'sTypes of Rationality:Cornerstones for the Analysisof RationalizationPro- cesses in History,"American Journal of Sociology85 (March1980). Kalberg is especially helpfulin showingthe relationshipWeber established between his fourtypes of rationality (theoretical,practical, formal, substantive) and the fourtypes of social action(traditional, affectual,value-rational, means-end rational) (p. 1161).Strictly speaking, we are concerned withthe types of socialaction. What matters for nationalism is thatit combines, in itsvarious types,all fourtypes of social action in variousvolatile mixtures that call intoquestion the final victoryof any rationalization formula. I am indebtedto KennethJowitt for the crisp definition ofthe combined value rationallend-means rational formula of socialaction. 710 InternationalOrganization methodology.Magical and prescientificviews of the natureof thingsare banished;causal connectionsamong phenomena are sought,not assumed; ends-meanschains are subjectto verificationby standardizedmethods. An- dersonand Gellneropt for much the same idea in distinguishingthe modem worldof nationalismfrom the past. Weber'spremodern rationalization for- mulasand theassociated forms of social action remain relevant even though onlythe "formal-rational"type is giventhe pivotal role. Nationbuilding, infusinga sense of nationalidentity, depends, in myargument, on thevic- toryof thelegal-rational form over its potentialcompetitors. The factthat thisvictory may, in practice,never be completegives us thestuff of studies of nationalism. Ourtask is theexploration of how and whya vicariousprinciple of trans- personalidentification can give shape and orderto a societyunder stress. The underlyingidea is thatnationalism can hold a societytogether while peopleare being buffeted by the strains of modernization. Rationalization by wayof nationalism,of course,can taketwo forms: people under stress can seekto resolveit by identifying with the existing state, but they can also look forhelp by secedingfrom it. Each course is predicatedon principlesof rationalchoice. The desireto live in an orderedsociety with predictable rulesthat sustain one's demandscalls forreciprocal actions on thepart of one's fellowcitizens. Whether one identifieswith the existing state or not, thechoice implies the deliberate search for links of interestand valuewith otherssimilarly situated. The "bargaining"involved in the searchevokes thespecification of core valuesof orderand predictabilityfor the collectiv- ity.Each "bargain"is based on theexpectation that benefits will come, but notnecessarily at thesame time for everybody. Some actor may well have to delaygratification in the shortrun in orderto gainacceptance for a set of rules,which will produce other benefits for the one whomakes the conces- sionsat a latertime. Eventually, of course,that person's or party'sprefer- ences also have to be met. A rationalizedsociety is a societythat orders itself on thebasis ofrecip- rocalexchange relations among its members. Its membersaccept a common normof basic fairness.They practice contingency, that is, theyexpect that good behavioris rewardedwith good, and bad withbad. In addition,these featuresdepend on the furtherexpectation that rewards can be delayed, thoughnot indefinitely, and thattruly equivalent concessions in socialbar- gainingare not necessary.3The bargainsrefer to the rearrangementof wealth,status, and powerwhich characterizes the modem world. A society is rationalizedif it managesto practiceinternal bargaining that results in theserearrangements without blowing itself apart; it practicesreciprocity

3. Myreasoning owes a lotto Robert 0. Keohane,"Reciprocity in International Relations," InternationalOrganization 40 (Winter 1986). Whatis nationalism?711 whenit resolves internal strain by continuous adaptation. Nationalism refers to theparticular legitimating principle that makes such adaptation possible, theperhaps unique principle each modernsociety seeks to agreeon forits memberswhile also markingitself off from other societies. The formal- rationalvariant of this construct is by no meansthe only possible one, but it maywell be themost successful type.4 Now comesthe paradox. Is a worldmade up ofrationalized societies-of successfulnation-states-an inherently bellicose world? Since thevarious nationalselfhoods are arrivedat bymutual exclusivity and outright hostility, theanswer would seem to be yes. Is nationalrationalization therefore incon- sistentwith international harmony? Is it impossibleto conceiveof an inter- nationallyrationalized society? The paradoxcan be resolvedonly if we breakopen thebox labeled "nation" and inquireabout the various beliefs thatmake up thecivil religion at variouspoints in itshistory. If we discover someevidence of an evolutionarypattern, the paradox can be laidto rest.In short,a dominantconcern with internal and internationalharmony (or its absence), under modernconditions, justifies a scholarlyconcern with nationalismdespite its permeableintellectual boundaries. Spottingsuch an evolutionarypattern is not easy. Whattime horizon shouldone adopt,a hundredyears or twenty?One mightsurmise, as the literatureof "social turbulence"suggests, that a breakpointfor the success- fulnation-state is reachedwhen no additionalinternal deals can be struck. Domesticlegal-rational formulas for further adaptation which satisfy impor- tantgroups may no longerbe possiblewhen a certainthreshold of interna- tionaltechnological and economicinterdependence is crossed,though we cannotspecify the threshold. At that point we maybe entitledto speakof the obsolescenceof nationalismand thenation-state. It is thisreasoning that leads me to thestudy of nationalism:to discover how rationalizationmay come aboutin timesof rapidsocial changeand to explorethe limits of nationalismas a successfulrationalizer.

4. In Weber'swork the "formalrational" type is usuallyjuxtaposed to othertypes of rationalizationwhich feature tradition and religion as corefeatures of legitimate authority. One (overlysimplified) way of reading Weber is totreat "rational" principles of social order as flatly opposedto religious ones. Does itfollow that religion is totallyincompatible with rationalization thatrelies on nationalism?Terrance G. Carrollexamined four ideal-typical nation-states (lib- eral,Marxist, social democratic, and conservative) in order to determine whether each is ableto practicethe kind of adaptation I discuss,if its population is stronglyidentified with one ofthe majortraditional religions. He concludesthat nations strongly identified with liberal and/or Marxistvalues cannotat the same timepractice adaptation while traditional religions hold sway.He confirmsthe strong version of Weber's thesis. However, he also confirmsthe weak versionby showingthat modernization can be compatiblewith Shi'a Islamand Catholicism. SunniIslam offers more difficulties, Hinduism is neutral,while Buddhism is heldto be incom- patiblewith modernization. Carroll, "Secularization and Statesof Modernity," World Politics 36 (April1984). 712 InternationalOrganization

Embedded conventionsin discussionsof nationalism

My purpose in studyingnationalism is not everybody's.The studyof nationalismhas been so elephantinebecause students acknowledge no com- monpurpose. Instead, they have been dividedby a numberof underlying conceptualdichotomies. These also characterizethe four books underre- view. As long as these dichotomiesmonopolize scholarly attention, the elephantproblem will remainwith us. Beforecommenting on the books themselves,I summarizethe unresolved debate. First,there is the naggingquestion of whethernations, the beliefs that inspiretheir citizens, the policies that derive from the beliefs, are good or bad. In the 19thcentury liberals advocated nationalism as progressiveand Marxistsdecried it as reactionary;in ourera theroles are reversedup to a point.Liberals still denounce Gaullists for being nationalistic; but Marxists, whileagreeing with this judgment, laud thenationalism of LatinAmerican opponentsof dependencyand of Africanfreedom fighters. Yet theyde- nouncethe nationalismof Mussolini,Hitler, and Tojo, of the Argentine militaryjuntas, of MargaretThatcher and RonaldReagan. Why is one ex- pressionof social solidaritybad and anothergood? The qualityof the histor- ical processis judgedin termsof the outcomes it produced or is expectedto produce.The issue,therefore, is notnationalism as such,but capitalism as opposedto socialism,democracy, and popularparticipation as opposedto authoritarianrule. Ideologyconfuses the issue, not onlyin the sense thatthe ideological preferencesof studentsdefine the phenomenon of nationalism, but because scholarsdo not agree whetherthe phenomenonrefers to the beliefsof a movementor a party,or whetherit is theproperty of an entire"people" (whoeverthat may be). For one setof scholars, Anthony Smith among them, nationalismis an ideologythat competes with , socialism, ; it is theproperty of movementsin conflictwith other movements. For an- othergroup, however, nationalism sidesteps or subsumesother ideologies by focusingon what a givenunit-a "people" or a "people claiminga state"-believes of itselfin distinctionto otherunits. Anderson goes to greatlengths to show how Marxistscan be good nationalistsonce they transcendrigid class analysis. Scholarsfavoring nationalism-as-ideology thengo on to commenton particularpolicies rather than social processes, as does Seers. But confusionis by no meansbanished if we optfor the nationalism-as- group-identityformula. We mustthen confront the deep divisionamong thosewho findan "objective" basis forthis identity, as opposedto those whosee identityin self-consciousacts ofindividual identification, the "sub- jective" basis of nationhood.The objectivistschool definesa nation(in Stalin'sfamous formulation) as "a historicallyevolved, stable community of language,territory, economic life and psychologicalmakeup, manifested in Whatis nationalism?713 a communityof culture." Unless a givenpeople possesses all thesevirtues, it cannotlegitimately be considereda nation., on the other hand,coined his famous "daily plebiscite" as thedefiner of the subjectivist approach.People choose to identifywith a givenunit moved by incentives and disincentives;exit, voice, and loyalty,as AlbertHirschman says, definethe options, an approachalso favoredby Gellner. Most writerson nationalismlike to workwith an objectivistformula of somekind. For someit provides a handlefor distinguishing the good nations fromthe bad. For others,however, a preferencefor structural theorizing overcognitive and voluntaristicconstructs accounts for the choice. A struc- turalistlikes to explaina "nationalist"policy response as a reactionto deeplyembedded stimuli located in theinternational economic division of labor;voluntarists prefer to findtheir explanations in domesticupheavals. Whateverthe reason, the choice of formula entails further controversy. Suppose we opt for nation-as-groupidentity. How did thiswe-feeling originate?The literatureis dividedin its answer among those who urge some primordialties-usually labeledculture if the writer is skepticalabout the entirecatalog of objectivist criteria-and others who are fascinated with the artificialityof this feeling.The second school stressesthe manipulative policiesused by statesto inculcateit, the importance of marketsand com- municationchannels in facilitating it, and thesheer accidents that resulted in a givenregion winding up in one nationrather than another. The distinction has additionalimplications. Arnold Toynbee remarked that "that havoc whichthe applicationof the westerninstitution of 'nationalstates' has workedin [Africaand Asia] whereit is an exoticimport is incomparably greaterthan the damage that the same institutionhas done in Britain, ,and theother west European countries in whichit has been,not an artificiallyintroduced innovation, but a spontaneousgrowth." "Early" (i.e., WestEuropean liberal) nationalism is natural;"late" nationalismis artificial in additionto beingtainted by authoritarianism.Primordial-cultural features legitimatethe early Western nations; the absence of such features denies the restof theworld the same legitimacy. The wideacceptance of these dichotomies has takenits toll in explanatory rigorand normativeprediction. Concern over which entities are or should become nationshas resultedin a scholarlyemphasis on nationbuilding (sometimesconfused with state building) at the expenseof treatmentsof nationmaintenance. The literaturetakes for granted that old and successful nationalismsprovide the proper explanatory model. Newer entities that are notyet successful nations are studiedin terms of their ability to live up tothe model; and since theylack the objectivequalities urged by some, their successis heldto be in doubt. Commitmentto thisdichotomy compels the student to deal withthe pres- entexclusively in terms of the past. It neglectsthe search for novel modes of manipulationby elites that might bring about nationhood despite the absence 714 InternationalOrganization ofthe historically validated conditions. In addition,it stacksthe energies of scholarsin the directionof explainingthe rise of nationhoodbut not its decline.Fortunately, the growth of "micronationalisms"in Europeduring the1970s has once moreriveted the attention of some scholars on thefragil- ityof erstwhile successful nations. This phenomenon forces us to studywhat went"wrong" withFrench and Britishnationalism to makepossible the growthof movementschallenging its finality.Studies of the policies,at- titudes,and processesthat maintain a nationbecome salient. All thismeans that the outcome of thedaily plebiscite remains in doubt. Variousclaimants to nationalistlegitimacy, whether for the entire popula- tionof the state or forsome region within it, continue to compete.National- istsstruggle against cosmopolitan visions as well.And there is goodreason to supposethat these struggles overlap with the ordinary ideological compe- titionof socialistsagainst liberals, secularists against the religiouslycom- mitted,authoritarians against populists.

Four authorsin search of a singletheme

How do our fourauthors respond to theprevalence of thesedichotomies? Do theymake efforts to transcendthem and to recognizethe eternally prob- lematicnature of identity formation? In manyways they do. Allfour authors are outto demystifythe concept, to demonstratethat claims to "authentic" nationhoodare untenable,that there are no "true" or "legitimate"nations. Thatis a stepforward. At leastit makes possible the integration of national- ism withstudies of modernizationand withchanges in interculturaland internationalrelations, even if none of our authors carry this integration very far.Finally, all fourauthors concede that nationalism may well be a rational responseto certainsocial upheavalsand frustrations,not a throwbackto barbarism.This insightmakes it possibleto treatthe phenomenonas a speciesof rationalization.Gellner does thisexplicitly, Anderson somewhat hesitantly.Seers would see his workin the same spirit.But Smithwould stand the argumenton its head and equate nationalismwith failed rationalization. Thatis thegood news.The bad news,however, is thatour authors fail to makeany seriouseffort to acknowledgeor use, leave alone integrate,the plethoraof existingwork on the subject.They write,each fromhis own perspective,as ifno previouswork had been done on thedynamics of social solidarityand fragmentation.One cannothelp wondering,since all four authorsare British,whether a smatteringof nationalismkept them from usingprevious theories and empiricalstudies largely of Americanprov- enance,or at leastmethodological inspiration. Whatis nationalism?715

The mostglaring omission is the neglectof Karl Deutsch. Anderson, Seers,and Smithcould have enrichedtheir treatments ifthey had acknowl- edgedDeutsch's treatment of therelationship between sentiments of iden- tityand massive socio-economicchange. Gellner'sneglect of Deutsch is even moreserious because Gellner'simpressive theory is based on the same cyberneticassumptions as Deutsch'sand makescopious use of the Deutschianmobilization-assimilation balance/imbalance without ever using the label. Smithfailed to take advantageof the exhaustivestudies of nationalistideologies which contrasted the Western "liberal" variantwith Easternnot so liberalones.6 Anderson's treatment of Third World national- ism ignoresthe seminalwork of RupertEmerson and otherson the same subject.7All theauthors disdain the use of statisticalseries elaborated by othersin orderto maphistorical sequences and patterns.8None makesuse ofthe elaborate and quitesatisfactory comparative and historicalstudies of nationalistthought.9

5. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); Nationalism and Its Alternatives(New York: Knopf, 1969). 6. The typologyof nationalistideologies developed by CarltonJ. H. Hayes influencedthe one used in thisreview. See his Essays on Nationalism(New York:Macmillan, 1926); The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: R. R. Smith, 1931); Nationalism: A Religion(New York: Macmillan,1960). Among the many works of Hans Kohn,The Idea of Nationalism(New York:Macmillan, 1944) pioneered many of the dichotomies that still charac- terizethe literature. The sharpestjuxtaposition of Western (early) and of non-Western national- ismis Elie Kedourie,Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960), and Nationalismin Asia and Africa(New York:Meridian Books, 1970). 7. RupertEmerson, From Empire to Nation(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Self-DeterminationRevisited in the Era of Decolonization (Harvard University,Center for InternationalAffairs, Occasional Paper No. 9, 1964);Lloyd A. Fallers,The Social Anthropol- ogy of the Nation-State (Chicago: Aldine, 1974); CrawfordYoung, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism(Madison: University of WisconsinPress, 1976).The classic statementof Third Worldnational identity in terms of cultural encounters between Western settlers and indigenous intellectualsis AlbertMemmi, The Colonizer and theColonized (Boston: Beacon, 1967). 8. Typicalworks include: Karl W. Deutsch,"Social Mobilizationand PoliticalDevelop- ment,"American Political Science Review (September 1961); Karl W. Deutschand William Foltz,eds., Nation-Building(New York:Atherton, 1963); Leonard W. Doob, Patriotismand Nationalism(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1964); S. N. Eisenstadtand S. Rokkan,eds., BuildingStates and Nations, 2 vols. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973); InternationalInteractions 11, 2 (1984),entire issue. Publicopinion data on issuesrelating to nationalismare publishedregu- larlyin Eurobarometre (Brussels: European Communities). For examples of studies combining quantitativeand qualitativetreatments most effectively see Eugen Weber,Peasants into Frenchmen(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976),and MichaelHechter, Internal Col- onialism(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1975). 9. For example,Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality(New York:Harcourt Brace, 1955); Louis L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dry- den, 1976)and Global Mininationalisms:Autonomy or Independence(Westport, Conn.: Green- wood, 1982).The problemof thecompatibility of socialismand nationalismis exhaustively explored by J. L. Talmon, The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution(Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1981), and HoraceB. Davis, Nationalismand Socialism(New York:Monthly Review Press, 1967). 716 InternationalOrganization

The puzzle overwhat nationalism "really is" can be illustratedwith the confusionthat permeates Smith's Nationalism in the TwentiethCentury. It is impossibleto tell whethernationalism refers to an "ideal," the actual modalbeliefs of a "movement,"a typicalhistorical pattern of development, or an inescapablestate of affairs, because the author uses all thesemeanings interchangeably.He says thatnationalism is "a doctrineof thehistory and destinyof the 'nation', an entityopposed to otherimportant modern collec- tivitieslike the 'sect', 'state', 'race', or 'class'" (p. 13; italicsmine). Smith'snotion of the "real" nationalism-ascontrasted with other doc- trinesthat merely look like it-is an amalgamof the writingsof Herder, Burke,Jefferson, and Rousseau: nationalism is a doctrineof fraternal ethnic ,according to Smith.He extractsthis meaning from the writings of ideologists;he is less concernedwith what nations and nationalistmove- mentsactually do. The task Smithsets himselfis the explorationof the compatibilityof nationalism(as an ideal,a modalbelief system, a historical pattern?)with the major political ideologies of the modern era. He devotes separate chaptersto religiousreformism, fascism, communism, pan- Africanism,the contemporary ethnic movements in Europe, "beaureaucrat- ism," and internationalism. Religiousreformism, fascism, and communismand the modembureau- craticwelfare state make use of nationalistthemes, but theyare in fact inconsistentwith the real thing and actuallyabuse it. Populist-participatory religiousprotest movements are otherworldly,escapist, and chiliastic;they appealto sects. Fascismoverlaps with nationalism, but its typical clientele is notthe same as thenationalist public. Fascism stresses race, nationalism the ethniccommunity. Fascism veneratesthe heroand the use of force, nationalismremains neutral on thissubject. Communism, of course,is at bottomcosmopolitan and appealsto classes,not nations, though pragmatic Communistswill bend the rules occasionally to advancethe revolution by exploitingprimordial ethnic feelings among the comrades. Nationalism, by contrast,is revolutionaryand harksback to ethnictraditions. The Western bureaucraticstate, finally, abuses nationalism by pretending to speakfor the entirepeople even thoughits citizensresent its impersonality,coldness, elitism,and excessiverationality. Because mostpeople seem to preferthe emotional reassurance of irration- ality,Smith considers the current movements for cultural and politicalau- tonomyin Scotland,Wales, Brittany,, and Corsica (amongothers) to be authenticexpressions of nationalism.So are pan-Africanismand ne- gritude.To thebenighted liberals and Communistswho stillthink that the modernworld's increasing interdependence implies the demise of national- ism,Smith has thisto say: The veryattempt to eradicatenationalism actually helps to entrenchit further,and to provokeits periodic resurgence, and it wouldappear Whatis nationalism?717

moresensible and appropriateto tryto live withit, taming its excesses throughmutual recognitions and legitimations.... More importantly, nationalism'spersistence and appeal mustbe derivedfrom the conjunc- tionof thethree sets offorces that shaped it originally:long-standing ethnictraditions, the birth of new secularideals, and thepeculiar char- acteristicsof modernizationand its social concomitants.(p. 196) The veryinternational system today guarantees and legitimatesnations. Externaland internalforces reinforce each other,ensuring that nationalism remainsalive and well. Smithwants to separateauthentic from those that are phony. He comes close to wantingto discoversome mysticalUr-template that reemergesin timeof peril, like the Emperor Barbarossa, to shakeother and moreephemeral ideologies into line. He failsto ask himselfabout the origin ofthese alleged primordial traditions. Nor does he inquirewhy some survive and othersfade away. He avoidsthe fact that modernization is notjust an evil thatthe authentic nationalist combats in orderto escape fromformal- legalrationality, that the very origin of nationalist thought is also associated powerfullywith the demand for such a rationalityand retainsthis quality in manyplaces. Nor does Smithrecognize that the appeals of nationalism have demonstrablyfaded in otherplaces. Nationalismis Janus-faced:itis usedto advocateas wellas to obstructmodernity. Solely for this reason one should not separatenationalism from other ideologies. Instead one shouldstudy these ideologiesin orderto discoverwhich type of nationalisminfuses them.10 The bestthing about Anderson's Imagined Communities is thetitle. In an anthropologicalspirit, then, I proposethe following definition of thenation: it is an imaginedpolitical community-and imagined as both inherentlylimited and sovereign.It is imaginedbecause themembers of even thesmallest nation will never know most of theirfellow-members, meetthem, or even hearof them;yet in theminds of each livesthe image of the communion.... In fact, all communitieslarger than primordialvillages of face-to-facecontact ... are imagined.... The nationis imaginedas limitedbecause even the largestof them . . . has finite,if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie othernations. No nation imaginesitself coterminous with mankind. (pp. 15-16;emphasis in original)

10. In a reviewof Smith's earlier work, Theories of Nationalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1972),Gale Stokesargues that although Smith succeeded in erectingthe most complete and sophisticatedtypology of nationalistideologies, he fallsshort of exploitingthis success by statinga theory.Stokes, as I do too,finds Gellner's Thought and Change(Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1963)to be closerto theory.Stokes is stillconcerned with identifying the featuresor attributesthat characterize the "true" nation and thatdistinguish nationalism from otherpolitical ideologies, a taskI deliberatelyforeswear. See "The UndevelopedTheory of Nationalism,"World Politics 21 (October1978). 718 InternationalOrganization

Bravofor this eloquent reminder that size, vicariouscommunication by way of sharedsymbols, and exclusivenessmark the nation off from other polit- ical constructs. The author'spurpose in writingthe book is importantfor understanding theargument. He wishesto instructhis fellow Marxists by tellingthem that nationalismis not inconsistentwith commitment, is not a bourgeoisanachronism, and oughttherefore to be takenseriously as an omnipresenthistorical phenomenon with an uncertainhalflife. His taskis to explainhow revolutionary Marxist states (China, Kampuchea, Vietnam) can fightold-fashioned imperialist wars against each other.This, to be sure,may notbe newsfor non-Marxists. The argumentgoes as follows.The possibilityof imaginingthe nation arises onlywhen three ancient cultural traits weaken: a particularscript- languageloses its monopolyon conveyingthe truth,monarchs lose the statusof semidivinities,and conceptionsof time cease to confoundcosmol- ogyand history.The one developmentmost responsible for the breakup of culturesbased on theseideas was movabletype in the handsof private- enterprisepublishers seeking a mass marketfor their wares among people not versedin the universalsacred language.Anderson continues with a conventionalaccount of theindependence movements of thelate 18thcen- turyin thewestern hemisphere, linking incipient nationalism to discrimina- tionagainst colonials by themetropolitan country, yet making little use of the neat propositionabout language and "print-capitalism."But language remainsthe core ingredientof theargument he makesfor Eastern Europe. Here, by the middleof the 19thcentury, "marginalized vernacular-based coalitionsof theeducated" (p. 78), lookingwestward, found a "model" to be emulated.The designof the nation-state was thereto be seenand copied. Rulersresponded to thepressure by convertingvernacular languages into officiallanguages, the sole legitimatemedium of publicdiscourse in multi- ethnicstates. While this pleased some coalitions and alienated others, it had theeffect of extending the scope ofthe political community by encouraging hithertoinert groups to participatepolitically, if only to protest. At this point two paths could be taken: the furtherdevelopment of the modelinto a democratic-populistone, or an alternatethat Anderson labels "officialna- tionalism,"invented in Russia and Englandand widelycopied everywhere since.Official nationalism deliberately selects key themes of nationhood and foiststhese on thepopulation by appropriatepolicies of education,recruit- ment,reward, and punishment,always making use ofthe official language. Linkedwith notions of racism and appropriateeconomic incentives, official nationalismbecomes the practiced by Europeafter 1870. (Yes, dearreader, I am confusedtoo. Anderson'sargument is nota restatementof thethesis about the "good" and "early" WestEuropean variety of national- ismas againstthe "bad" and "late" East Europeanvariety, the argument madeby Hans Kohn,Arnold Toynbee, and Elie Kedourie.The WestEuro- Whatis nationalism?719 peanvariety is "bad" too. In whatsense could it have provided a preferable model?)When the intellectuals of Asia andAfrica came into their own in the 20thcentury they mostly chose officialnationalism, especially the Marxist .Each newlyindependent intelligentsia, determined to build its own state,follows similar policies, including imperialism. The futureis evokedbut not clarifiedby Anderson;he impliesthat nationalism will be aroundas longas thestate remains with us, buthe hedgeshis arguments. ImaginedCommunities does notclaim to offera theory.It is moreevoca- tivethan systematic. It reliesmore on highlysubjective interpretations of nationalistpoetry than on statisticsof social mobilization.Some ofthe vig- nettesof SoutheastAsian nationalistsand theirthoughts are marvelous,as are tidbitsof information on languagepolicy. But the ensemble does notadd up to a coherentargument. Next to nothingis said aboutnationalism in the countriesthat provided the firstmodels-France, America,Britain, Ger- many.Only the imitatorsare treated,and Andersonfails to explainwhy certainfeatures of the exemplar nations were chosen and notothers. Point- ing out historicalcontinuities is a legitimatetask, thoughit providesno specialwarrant for focusing on nationalism. The lateDudley Seers, as behoovesthe leader of the major bridgehead of thedependentistas in Europe,the Sussex Institutefor Developement Stud- ies, equates nationalismwith self-reliant development, delinked from the world's core. In The Political Economy of Nationalism, an ephemerallittle tract,he recantshis formercommitments to orthodoxMarxism and Key- nesianismand atonesfor decades of-he thinksmisguided-work as a de- velopmenteconomist for the United Nations. Nationalism, true to thecreed ofthe Cepalistas (he workedclosely with Raul Prebisch and Osvaldo Sunkel), is developmentplanning that seeks autonomyfor the statefrom the world economyand catersto egalitarian-populistdemands. Marxism and Keynes- ianism,in his words. bothfail to takedue accountof non-materialmotives, especially nationalism-theurge to promotethe presumed interests of a group withcultural coherence, probably showing at least a degreeof linguistic and ethnichomogeneity, and usuallyinhabiting a political unit, or nation-state(though sometimes applied to a groupof thesame kind sub- mergedwithin one or morenation-states).

Untilthe 1960s,I too tooklittle account of nationalism.As an econo- mist,I naturallyconcentrated on materialmotives: people worked to earnmoney, and thelevel of our incomedetermined how we spentit. Moreover,like many of thoseeducated in theAnglo-Saxon cultural tradition,I saw nationalismas fundamentallyirrational. Fortunately, withthe spread of internationalcontacts, of mediasuch as newspapers and television,and of educationthere was a growingrealisation of "in- terdependence",which would be completewhen all foreignerssensibly learnedsome English.(pp. 9-10) 720 InternationalOrganization

Now, he believes,talk of interdependenceis merelycode forthe global hegemonyof the superpowers. Internationalism, he argues, is anotherword forAmerican domination, latterly mediated by thelegitimacy of monetarist economicdoctrine as well as by politicaland militaryintervention. The argumentis too familiarto requirefurther elaboration. How can the nationalistliberate himself if he is saddledwith "a small population,serious ethnic divisions, location close to a superpower,few naturalresources, a culturallysubverted bureaucracy, high consumer ex- pectations,and a narrowtechnological base?" (p. 91). HereSeers talks hard sense thatdeparts from the orthodoxy of dependencythinking. Nationalist leaderscan diversifytheir trade contacts and exploitthe geopolitical needs ofthe superpowers. Dom Mintoff'sMalta is hisexemplar. The International MonetaryFund is not onlythe executive committee of internationalcapi- talism:its staffcan be arguedwith and persuadedin manycircumstances, becausethe old canonsof Bretton Woods are in disarray.Across-the-board planningis a waste of time.So are nationalaccounts that are based on Keynesianassumptions. Patriotic appeals can be used to persuadethe populace to put up withhard times.Appeals to patriotismshould take the place of irresponsibleand incompatiblepromises made by nationalist leadersto theirdiverse followers (Allende's Chile is his exemplarof what notto do). And-heresy of heresies-hard-headedfiscal policies are abso- lutelynecessary! Nationalismfor Seers thenreally means "as muchautarky as youcan get away with." He meansnot onlyeconomic but also culturaland linguistic autarky.Since intaste and attitude means being a lackeyof a superpower-andentails lack of economicdevelopment-a self-reliant cultureis also likelyto be an economicallysuccessful one. He seriously weakensthe punch of thisargument by constantlystressing the seductive wilesof cosmopolitanism. So muchfor the Third World. What about Europe and Britain?He advo- cates "extendednationalism." In fact,the tripartite division of the world is no longeraccurate, he says,with the waning of the neocolonial consensus in WesternEurope which,until recently, had succeededin perpetuatingthe defunctempires by other means. A newlegitimate protectionist consensus is forming;the EuropeanCommunity should become a geschlossenerHan- delsstaat;British Labor shouldEuropeanize its legitimate protectionist im- pulses.Other culturally cognate clusters of countries should follow suit. The worldshould be made up of more or less closed economicblocs, each followingits own extendednationalist holy grail. In contrastto our otherauthors, Gellner in Nations and Nationalism offersa full-fledgedtheory of nationalism,embedded in a theoryof the universaltendency toward industrialism. Nationalism and the nation-state providethe sole legitimateform of politicalorganization within the global trendtoward industrial societies. "Nationalism is primarilya political princi- Whatis nationalism?721 ple, whichholds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. Nationalismas a sentiment,or as a movement,can bestbe definedin terms ofthis principle. Nationalist sentiment is thefeeling of anger aroused by the violationof the principle,or the feelingof satisfactionaroused by its fulfillment.A nationalist movement is one actuatedby a sentimentof this kind"(p. 11; emphasisin original).Again: "nationalism is a theoryof polit- ical legitimacy,which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across politicalones, and,in particular,that ethnic boundaries within a givenstate ... shouldnot separate the power-holders from the rest" (p. 1). The theoryuses threevariables: (1) thedistribution ofpolitical power in a society(access limitedto geneticallydefined or quasi-hereditarystatus groupsversus upward mobility); (2) easy access to a "highculture" of literateand sophisticatedcommunication via a systemof publiceducation versusvertically segmented social groupseach attachedto a local "low culture";(3) ethnichomogeneity as opposed to ethnicheterogeneity, as definedby language. The combinationin whichthese variables occur in any givensociety will determine what kind of nationalidentification-if any- willcome to prevail.Agrarian societies are innocent of nationalism; the push and pull comes onlywhen the trend toward industrialism manifests itself. The differencebetween agrarian and industrialsocieties is bothcybernetic and semantic.Agrarian societies are prerationalbecause they feature "the co-existencewithin them of multiple, not properly united, but hierarchically relatedsubworlds, and theexistence of specialprivileged facts, sacralized and exemptfrom ordinary treatment." In industrialsocieties, "all factsare located withina single contiguous logical space . . . statementsreporting them can be conjoined and generallyrelated to each other . . . one single language describes the world and is internallyunitary. . . . there are no special,privileged, insulated facts or realms,protected from contamination or contradictionby others,and livingin insulatedindependent local spaces of theirown" (p. 21). The differencebetween the two is also expressedin thecontrast between beliefs that not only claim to be "true" butthat also providethe sole criteriafor judging all "truth"(i.e., dogmaticuniversalist religion),and beliefsthat admit the contingentnature of truthclaims, the possibilitythat truth is not revealedfor all timebut unfoldsgradually in conformitywith relativistic cognitive criteria (i.e., thepost-Enlightenment scientifictradition). Nationalism is typicalof thetransition to therational tradition.It expressesthe societalthrust toward homogeneous perception and homogeneoussocial organizationand behavior.It can be triggeredby religiousreformism that strives for coherence and universality, though it will eventuallycome intoconflict with religion. Nationalists may make use of prerationalsymbols, but they will reject them as soon as theytake power. Nationalismis not the resurgenceof submergedprimordial longings for ethniccommunity. Nationalism is a consequenceof the "objectiveneed" forindustrial rationality. 722 InternationalOrganization

This pointis crucial.Gellner rejects theories of nationalismthat stress eitherthe objective or thesubjective schools of thought because he consid- ers themcomplementary rather than contradictory. Modernization causes thelongings and adjustmentsthat produce nations, not the objective criteria ofcultural identity or assertionsof personal will. Not everypotential nation becomesa realone becausemost people deal withtheir longings and frustra- tionsby simplyassimilating with others initially unlike them, individual determinationto "pass" and priorcultural affinities permitting. The theorycan be summarizedschematically. The schemeis mine,not Gellner's. Situation1. Agrariansociety is nonrationaland nonnationalbecause its social structureis characterizedby discontinuouscommunication patterns and heterogeneoussymbolic content. A few specializedhereditary status groups,organized horizontally, profess a commonhigh-literate culture and ruleover a verticallyorganized illiterate and isolatedpeasantry attached to variouslow cultures. Situation2. An exogenousforce (foreign conquest, a new religion,a suddenincrease in the availabilityof capital,a technologicalchange) trig- gersindustrialization/modernization. Peasants are "mobilized"by moving intoarmies, factories, cities; theyacquire a tastefor middle-class amen- ities.They aspire to some of theperquisites of thehigh culture but fail to achieveanything like political and economicequality during the early stage of industrialization. Situation3. The newlymobilized but unassimilated begin to act outtheir frustration.Conditions permitting, they succeed eventually in acquiringthe linguisticand numericskills needed to pass intothe high culture, thereby losingwhatever cultural factors distinguished them earlier from the ruling groups,after succeeding in theirdemands for greater educational and polit- ical participation.A successfuland reasonably contented nation is born.The patternfollows the "state first, nation second" sequenceof West European experience. Situation4. Thingsare muchas in thepreceding case. Educationalaccess improves,the lower orders succeed in gainingaccess to politicalpower, the societyas a wholeis characterizedby muchcultural homogeneity. How- ever,the people live in manysmall states, which though similar in termsof themain variables, nevertheless because of theirsmallness and weakness are unableto representthe culture to therest of theworld; dispersion into manystates fails to givethe culture a symbolicroof. A nationalistsentiment existswhich expresses itself in the form of national unification by force. This is theGerman and Italiancase, "nationfirst, state second." Situation5. The newlymobilized but unassimilated begin to act outtheir frustration.But preexistingcultural and powerconditions prevent easy as- similation.Culturally differentiated but mobilized people are excludedfrom thebenefits of industrialism.They respond by rejectingthe high culture of Whatis nationalism?723 the rulersand creatinga rivalhigh culture by drawingon theirown low culture.This takesthe form of a nationalismchallenging the beliefs of the rulers,secession, or thedisplacement of rulers now seen as alien.This is the "nationfirst, state second" patternfamiliar from the modernhistory of EasternEurope. Situation6. In certaincases (Gellnermentions the Islamicworld and Africa)things do notwork out that crisply. What if the frustrated, mobilized, butunassimilated are unableto optfor the high culture of the rulers because theyreject portions of it on culturallyand religiouslyconditioned grounds, and yetthey cannot go back to theirprior low cultureseither? What if the culturalheterogeneity is so greatthat portions of the alien highculture appearnecessary as a meansto holdthe societytogether, as in Africa?In sucha situationthe nationalisms that develop are notrational because they cannotcome to termswith the homogenization of truth-findingnorms that prevailin industrialsociety. Religious-cultural absolutism and rationalrel- ativism,because they are compelledto coexist,cannot resolve the conflict. Situation7. In someotherwise rationalized societies in whichthe logic of situation3 has largelyprevailed, certain groups remain whose members cannotassimilate because theircultural distance from the majorityis too greatand the majoritywould not permitthem to assimilateeven if the minoritywished it. Such situationsrepresent flawed nations that are infor a lot of trouble. Whatdoes all thisportend? Gellner, in a turgidchapter on typologiesof nationalism,concludes that only three "typical" nationalist situations mat- terwhen his three-variablemodel is put to work.Situations 5, 6, and 7, because theythrow into doubt the universaltendency toward rationaliza- tion,are thesalient ones forGellner. He deniesthat there are fundamental differencesbetween late and earlymodernizers-nation-builders, that the WestEuropean pattern is uniqueand all theothers different. But his very modelsuggests the opposite. He exploressmooth as well as discontinuous rationalizationvia nationalizationbut comes to theambivalent conclusion thatwhile nationalism everywhere ought to becomeweaker and even disap- pear,maybe it won'tafter all because of thecontinued viability of pseudo highcultures which are onlydressed up low cultures.Perhaps he shouldnot have dismissed"primordial" cultural self-definitions so completely before makingthe sweepingargument that all nationsare artifactsof modernity, owingnothing to theiragrarian origins and everythingto theimperative of assimilation. Havingsummarized Gellner's argument, I now wishto commenton it. First,however, I wantto makeclear thatI am in agreementwith his ap- proach;though I wantto extendthe examination to thefurther question of thequality of internationalrelations implied by thecoexistence of various kindsof nationalism. Gellner is on theright track; but the theory (sometimes he calls it a model,sometimes a scheme)is morea hintthan a persuasiveor 724 InternationalOrganization completeset of propositions. He maybe forgiven(with the rest of us) forthe inabilityof the theory to predictmuch; he shouldnot be so easilyabsolved forhis failureto providecoherent explanations of thepast. The theorylacks clarity at crucialpoints. Gellner leaves us in doubtas to whetherthere are one, one-and-a-half,or two separatemodels of national development.He distinguishesbetween a lateand an earlystage of industri- alization,and also a "verylate" stage.It is notat all clearhow the models relateto thestages. Part of the trouble lies in hisresolute refusal to quantify anyof his statementsabout rates of change. Hence we cannotbe surewho and whatis identifiedwith each stage.Nor is it clearwhich model can be appliedto whichcountry. Further,I cannot tell whether the same model explains all sevensituations or whethersituation 6 is a specialcase notcovered by the same model.If so, the exceptioncovers all of Africa and the Middle East. Japan and Latin Americaare hardlymentioned; China not oftenenough. Is thereno nationalismto be foundthere or is it irrelevantwith respect to rationalization?Situation 4 strikesme as extrinsicto the modelbecause "culture"is heregiven a differentmeaning than in theremaining situations. In situation4 it meansintercultural comparison (Germans against French- menor Englishmen),not conflict among cultural symbols within the same society.More seriousstill, the theory cannot explain why, after a country goes throughthe experience of situation2, it shouldtilt toward situation 3, as opposedto 4 or 5, exceptin terms of unique historical circumstances. The retrodictionis episodicrather than systematic. The theoryis also incomplete.It worksbest forthe "nationfirst, state second" pattern;it explains the secession of the mobilizedbut unas- similated.Gellner loses interestin situationsin whichthe mobilizedare assimilatedbut by beingengulfed in a singlehigh culture come to identify witha politythat is aggressivelyexclusive and demanding.Why is French, British,and Americannationalism (leave alone Japaneseor Russian)no longerinteresting after everybody becomes a happynationalist? In short, Gellnerneglects the phenomenonof successfulsymbol manipulation in rationalizedsocieties. Although fascinated with communication patterns duringthe early stages of mobilizationand industrialization,he shows little interestin how the sameprocess can be used to explainthe persistence of nationalsentiment in thelater stage. The differencescaptured by the seven situationsrequire more nuance. The situationsimply that there are degreesof rationalization,as Gellner freelyadmits. If so, thedegrees ought to be describedand explained.To do so, however,requires attention to doctrinesand ideologies,the various and competingsymbolic means the mobilizeduse to come to termswith their newcondition. Gellner pays attention to thisonly when he discussesIslam. He insistsin a chapterdevoted to ideologythat it is all "falseconsciousness" (despitethe anti-Marxist thrust of the book), not worthy of seriousstudy or Whatis nationalism?725 attentionbecause ideologiesare merelythe sillyjustifications nationalist troublemakersdream up tojustify their existence. It is apparentlythis con- victionthat enables him to ignorethe later nationalism of the West European statesand of Japan. It justifies his ignoring the substantial ideological debate in thesecountries as to theidentity, purpose, and characterof thenation. The debate in turnimplies serious internal disagreement about that very identityand suggeststhe absence of the kind of coherent that situation3 implies. His muddlingof modelsand stagescasts theargument as a gestaltrather thanas sequentialmacrohistory. On theother hand, Gellner adds a number offeatures that Deutsch neglects. He does a wonderfuljob ofdescribing how religioncan defineidentity; he shows how religiousidentities shade into culturalones and howethnic identities acquire religious form. The typology ofnationalism is a laudableeffort to showthe differences between historical processes,a step Deutschdid not take. Finally,Gellner avoids the iden- tificationof languagewith ethnicity which tends to giveDeutsch's version a monocausalcharacter that was not reallynecessary for making credible thecore constructof themobilization-assimilation balance. How can we buildon thework of Deutsch and Gellner?We musttake as centraltheir anchoring of nationalismin thelarger study of how people's perceivedidentities change during the process of modernization, how people become carriersof highcultures extending beyond their purely personal experiences.Like Deutschand Gellner,we mustreject romantic notions of Urvolkerwhose unchangingnature reasserts itself from time to time.We mustaccept their insistence that nationalism, though manufactured and in- ventedin theform of doctrines, ideologies, and policies, is a rationalway of organizingimpersonal societies after mass social mobilizationgets under- way. Hence the identificationof nationalismwith this or thateconomic policycan be ignored,as can theinsistence on thedomination of class over nationas an organizingconcept. And specificnationalist ideologies can be studiedas potentialrationalizing agents instead of being taken at facevalue or merelydebunked. But thistask remainsto be done. I now sketchan approachfor doing it.

How to studynationalism

The enterpriseof nationbuilding and nationmaintenance is farfrom final andcomplete. How thencan we talkabout the achievement of domestic and internationalharmony? The studentsof "early nationalism"could confi- dentlyengage in the enterpriseof retrodictionbecause theywere not yet compelledto faceup to theintellectual challenge of ethnic stirrings in West- ernEurope; nor did theyfeel obliged to commenton theglimmers of na- tionalobsolescence implicit in the movementfor European unification. I 726 InternationalOrganization

wishto exploitthe competing ideologies of nationalismas clues to patterns of domesticand internationalrationalization, and I mustpay attentionto pastand future uncertainties. Yet, predictionis notfeasible. My aimcannot be higherthan Otis Dudley Duncan's: As ingredientsof ourforecasts we will,with increasing methodological sophistication,continue to prepareprojections, trend extrapolations, modelsimulations and developmentalconstructs so as to provideas broadan arrayas maybe usefulof thelogically possible pathways to hypotheticalfutures.... There will be no pretensethat we can gradu- allymove forward to theperfection of methodsof anticipatingwhat will actuallyoccur, for such perfectability [sic] is notlogically possible, aes- theticallyappealing or morallyinspiring. What we mayhope to im- prove,if not perfect, is our sense of responsibilityfor making known theimplications of our knowledge.1" The thoughtsoffered here are hypothesesabout possiblerelationships betweenrationalization and nationalism,not predictions.The research necessaryfor demonstrating such relationshipsin thepast is notyet com- pleted.Were it complete it stillwould not suffice to predictthe future, either in termsof thedomestic tranquility of new and old nations,or forecasting theshape of future international orders. The resultsof that research will, at best,open up reasonablespeculation about possible futures and about pasts thatwere far from inevitable. I shall offerdefinitions of the core termsnation, nationalism, nation-state, nationalistideology, and national myth.I shall then develop a typologyof nationalistideologies, followed by a discussionof indicatorsand measures forobserving the existenceof a successfullyrationalized nation-state. To concludeI shalldiscuss how the various can be usedto anticipatedomestic and internationalharmony.

Definitions12 A nationis a sociallymobilized body of individuals, believing themselves to be unitedby some set of characteristicsthat differentiate them (in their own minds)from outsiders, striving to createor maintaintheir own state. Theseindividuals have a collectiveconsciousness because of their sentiment of difference,or even uniqueness,which is fosteredby thegroup's sharing

11. "Social Forecasting:The Stateof the Art," as quotedwith approval by LloydFallers, Social Anthropology,p. 134. Fallers offers contrasting studies of nation building in Turkey and Ugandain orderto isolatethe patternsof syncretismthat emerged when traditional values collidedwith Western ones. He illustratesnicely the discipline required to avoidretrodiction thatmerely tells the history of the country and to escape thehubris of predicting the future. 12. Fora morefully articulated but similar set of definitions linked to propositions consistent withmy general argument, see E. K. Francis,Interethnic Relations (New York: Elsevier, 1976),pp. 381-405. Whatis nationalism?727 of core symbols.A nationceases to existwhen, among other things, these symbolsare recognizedas nottruly differentiating thegroup from outsiders. A nationis an "imaginedcommunity" because thesesymbols are shared vicariouslywith fellow-nationals over long distances, thus producing expec- tationsof complementary and predictablebehavior from fellow-nationals. A governmentis not consideredlegitimate unless it is thoughtto represent such a group.A nationis a groupof people who wish to practiceself- determination.Nationalism is a beliefheld by a groupof peoplethat they oughtto constitutea nation,or thatthey already are one. It is a doctrineof social solidaritybased on thecharacteristics and symbolsof nationhood.A nation-stateis a politicalentity whose inhabitantsconsider themselves a singlenation and wishto remainone. I call attentionto the factthat this set of definitionsrests on the prior notionof social mobilization.Nation and nationalismimply a situationin whichpopular awareness of, and some degreeof popularparticipation in, politicsprevail. I emphasizethat manyof the 160-oddstates currently in existenceare notnation-states. Nationalsentiment is a beliefamong intellectuals and other literate groups thatthey constitute a nation and ought to practiceself-determination at some timein thefuture, even though the condition of even partial social mobiliza- tionhas notyet been attained. The conceptis necessarybecause we haveto recognizesentiments of solidarity-perhapspotential solidarity would be more accurate-in situationsof literaryself-consciousness, as in Eliz- abethanEngland, the earlyrisorgimento, in Russiaunder Alexander II, or in Brazilin the 1820s. Such an elite sentimentmust be sharplydistinguished from nationalist ideologies.A nationalistideology is a bodyof arguments and ideas abouta nationadvocated by a groupof writersand acceptedby a specificpolitical movement.Nationalist ideologies embody political programs. They arise onlyafter social mobilization has goneon longenough to haveresulted in the availabilityof mass publicsattentive to the message.They referto the specifically"nationalist" content of whateverideologies are in political competition.Hence theyprovide an additionaldimension for talking about thecontent of liberalism, , socialism, and fascism. There were no nationalistideologies prior to thelate 18thcentury. Typically,nationalist ideologies make assertionsabout key contentious aspectsof the solidarity being urged. Since they challenge, advocate, or seek to come to termswith the impactof modernity,all nationalistideologies mustbe concernedwith the validityof the core values of the traditional culture.Revolutionary ideologies seek to getrid of traditionalvalues; syn- cretistideologies seek to amendor retainthem, differing on theextent of interculturalborrowing which ought to be fostered.Ideologies make asser- tionsabout the nation's claim to historicaluniqueness, to theterritory that thenation-state ought to occupy,and to thekinds of relationsthat should 728 InternationalOrganization prevailbetween one's nationand others.Nationalist ideologies also contain constitutionaland institutionalprograms on how the nationought to be governed.Finally, these ideologies advance ideas on thehistorical mission ofthe nation, ranging from quiet self-perfection to conquest or therestora- tionof somegolden age. Continuingstrife among rival ideologies claiming different missions and differentinstitutions for their nation is proofof unsuccessful rationalization. Such strifeprovides evidence that the socially mobilized are split,that they cannotagree on the characteristicsthat make themdifferent from other nations.They cannot reach agreement on theunique institutions that ought to governtheir state. The societydoes notseem able to cometo termswith the strainsof modernization.A certainideology may succeed in capturing the statefor a limitedperiod and thenenact its program.But if a rival ideologytakes over soon thereafterand scrapsthe policies of itspredeces- sors,we are entitledto wonderwhether a morepervasive nationalism ever reallycharacterized the entire population, whether an acceptedcore body of valuesever existed. I reservethe termnational myth for the situationin whichthe clamor amongideologies has beentranscended to theextent of resulting in a coreof ideas and claims about selfhoodcommonly accepted by all the socially mobilized.Put differently,the nationalmyth represents those ideas, val- ues, and symbolsthat most citizens accept despite their being divided into competingideological groups. The mythrepresents the overlapamong ideologies.It is possible,of course,that the bearers of a specificideology capturethe state and eventuallysucceed in imposingtheir beliefs on everybody.Their ideology then becomes the myth. Something like this hap- penedin France after 1870, in Russia after 1917, in Japan after 1945. It is also possiblethat no singleideology ever wins finally and thatthe myth is made up of itemson whichrival ideologies have compromised,as in theUnited Statesafter 1865 or in Belgiumsince 1970.In eitherevent, evidence that a nationalmyth prevails is also evidenceof successfulrationalization. My definitionsseek to sidestepthe conceptualand historicaldichoto- miesthat plague the study of nationalism. Armed with these terms we do not have to worryabout the objectiveas opposed to the subjectivebasis of nationhood,authentic as opposed to illegitimatenationalisms, the virtues of the older typesand the vices of the latecomers.The termsought to coverevery situation and providea value-neutralway of comparingthem. Whetherwe approve or disapproveof the historicalresults is reallya questionof whetherwe are in agreementwith the particular form of ration- alizationthat came about; it need not be a judgmenton nationalismas a describablephenomenon. Finally,my definitions are capable of beingoperationalized through sys- tematicobservation. Paul Valerymay have been quiteright when he wrote that Whatis nationalism?729

Historyis themost dangerous product evolved from the chemistry of theintellect. Its propertiesare well known.It causes dreams,it intoxi- cates wholepeoples, gives them false memories, quickens their reflexes,keeps their old woundsopen, torments them in theirrepose, leads theminto delusions either of grandeur or persecution,and makes nationsbitter, arrogant, insufferable and vain.'3 However,we need not stop withhis observation.We can determinejust howarrogant and howvain a givennation may be, comparedwith itself and withothers at variouspoints in theirhistories. Moreover, we can determine whythe arrogance prevails by comparingthe competing ideologies and by discoveringwhich beliefs emerged as thenation's myth. Not evennational- ists act on the basis of pure will or intuitiveromantic insight. They are constrained,like everyactor in a collectivesetting, by the rulesof sat- isficing,by the need to calculatethe opportunity costs of making alliances or stressingthis or thattheme, by theimperative of recognizingrelations of strategicinterdependence with other actors. Even the formulationof a nationalistideology involves rational choice.

Nationalist ideologies compared: a typology An incompletereading of modern history suggests the existence of seven manifestationsof nationalistideologies, four revolutionary and threesyn- cretistin emphasis.Despite their differences, all sevenhave certain charac- teristicsin common that distinguish them from premodern ideologies. All are populistic;they all derivetheir appeal from the claim that "the people" ofa certainterritory (not a class, or statusgroup) have an innateright to self- determination.All are progressivebecause theyreject all or some of the historicalpast; they believe in theefficacy of human intervention tochange historyfor the better. And all are rationalbecause they diagnose a challenge andprescribe a response;they embody distinct notions of cause and effect, endsand means;matching means to endsis notusually random, emotional, passionate,willful, or romantic. But the differencesbetween the two maintypes also mustbe stressed. Revolutionaryideologies insist on drasticinstitutional change. Certain types of social groupsare to be removed.Relations among remaining and new groupsmust become totally different. The old elitemust go anda newelite, compatiblewith populism and progress,must take its place. Syncretist ideologiesare unwillingto be thisdrastic. They do notrepresent a sharp breakwith the past, onlysome compromisewith it. Theyoften reject the values of modernity,though they seek the incorporationof its techniques and someof its institutions.

13. CollectedWorks of Paul Valery,ed. JacksonMathews, vol. 10 (New York: Bollingen Foundation,1962), p. 14. 730 InternationalOrganization

Revolutionaryideologies therefore tend to be moreinternally coherent thansyncretist ones. Theyembody a sharpersense of technical rationality. Theyare willingto tradeoff values quite ruthlessly, whereas their syncretist rivalsare oftenhesitant and inconsistentin theirchoices. All nationalist ideologiesstress the shortrun over the longterm. None appreciatesthat overthe long haul any set of major institutional changes triggers unforeseen and possiblyunwanted consequences, inconsistent with the values being urged.But syncretistideologies are muchmore likely to sufferfrom the uncertaintiesof the long run. Revolutionaryideologies are consistentin urginginclusive popular participation, whether voluntaristic or manipulated. Syncretiststend to fudgethe issue of participation,alternating between voluntarymodes and manipulation,between elections and repression,be- tween individualrights and the obligationto submergeoneself in the nationaliststruggle. FollowingCarlton Hayes and Hans Kohn, I dividethe revolutionary ideologiesof nationalisminto "liberal" and "integral"variants. Each, in turn,must be subdivided.Liberals break down into "Jacobins" and "Whigs,"integralists into "Marxists" and "fascists." Jacobinliberals reject traditional values and institutionscompletely and wishto replacethem; Whigs also rejectthem but look for replacements more cautiously.Both believe that liberal societieshave many international affinitiesand ought to borrowfrom one another.Jacobins derive the nation's claimto historicaldistinctiveness from alleged ethnic and linguistichomo- geneity;thus they profit from whatever processes of homogenizationand centralizationmay have been triggeredby earlierregimes, as did Robes- pierre,Danton, Cavour, and the 1848Frankfurt Parliament. Whigs prefer the legitimacyof historicalcontinuity to ethnichomogeneity, as did J. S. Milland Nehru.Both types agree that the area occupiedby whatevergroup is definedas "the nation"is theproper territory of its state. Both also agree thatrelations among liberal nations ought to be peaceful.Toward nonliberal politicalentities, however, Jacobins and Whigsare willingto use forceto make othersprogress toward liberalism, to aid in theirliberation, and to colonizethem for their own good. Jacobins are somewhatmore aggressive in theirproselytizing zeal, as shownby WoodrowWilson and ThomasJeffer- son. All liberalnationalists advocate representativedemocracy, natural rights,and the freeparticipation of all citizensin government.Jacobins believethat the historical mission of the nation is notmerely continuous self- perfectionbut also theglobal diffusion of the creed. Whigs prefer to confine mattersto continuousself-perfection. There has been an electiveaffinity, to say the least, betweenliberal nationalismand late 19th-centuryimperialism, with American intervention in Mexicoand theCaribbean, and withAllied meddling in theRussian civil war after1917. The powerof thecreed was obviousin the occupationof Germanyand Japan after 1945, as wellas in theconstruction and conduct of Whatis nationalism?731

NATO. It is farfrom obvious that liberal nationalism also has an elective affinityfor a peacefulworld order, despite the presence of some themes that mightlead one to suspectit. Whenwe examinethe integralistfamily of ideologies,such suspicions vanishfast. Fascists and Marxistsalso rejectthe old orderand its values, thoughfascists sometimes pretend to retainsome of its symbols,as in Hit- ler'splaying with pre-Christian themes, Mussolini's appeals to Romangran- deur, and Kita Ikki's to Shintoideas. Borrowingfrom other integralist societiesis praiseworthy.What group of people is to be selectedas "the nation"?Marxists opt forthe particular class, or coalitionof classes, that resistsimperialism in a specifiedterritory. Fascists use a racialcriterion or argumentsabout historicalcontinuity or both.Both ideologies advocate a totalitarianmode of government by a vanguardof the elect which incarnates thenation as a collectivity.Both assume that the nation must struggle for survivalbecause it is constantlythreatened by attackfrom hostile external forces.Fascists glorify war and self-assertionas part of the nation's mission. Marxistsaccept war as inevitableas longas imperialismcontinues to live, butthey glorify only wars of national liberation. For thefascist, the mission ofthe nation is to assureits own survival; for the Marxist it is theushering in ofa classlesssociety. The idea ofa harmoniousinternational order is aliento fascistsand Marxists, except on minorissues in the short run. As longas the contrastbetween liberal and integralnationalism remains as starkas the historicideologies suggest, the idea of a rationalizedworld seems far- fetched.But then, the successors of Stalin, Mao, Hitler,and PrinceKonoye seemto have sensedthat ideological purity is notalways rational. The threekinds of syncretistsdisagree on howmuch of the revolutionary ideologiesought to be acceptedin their countries. "Synthetic syncretists"- MohandasGandhi, Leopold Senghor,K'ang Yu-wei,Mazzini, the German romantics-considermany modern values as desirable,provided they can be mixedappropriately with traditional values to be retained.However, such ideologiesfeel that not all traditionalvalues are worthyof retention, particularlythose closely associated with a diffuseagrarian order. Synthet- ics wantto borrowvalues, along with institutions and techniques,from the earlymodernizers. Their claim to nationhoodfor their own countriesrests on historicallongevity. They demand only the existing state for the nation's home.They seek peacefuland cooperativerelations with others, after the survivalof theirnation seems assured. Democracy may or maynot be the featuredform of government;various formsof authoritarianrule by the elitethat understands the propermixture of values is morecommon. The historicalmission of the nationis to bringabout its own survivaland protection,which implies heavy borrowingfrom nonindigenous cultural sourcesin orderto succeed.Among the successful synthetic syncretists we could list some of theMeiji reformers,modern South Korea, and perhaps thepostindependence regimes in IvoryCoast and Senegal. 732 InternationalOrganization

TABLE 1. Attributesof revolutionarynationalist ideologies

Ideology

Liberalism

Dimension Jacobin Whig Marxist Fascist

1. What should be reject reform reject reject sub- done about the core outright gradually outright stance but values of the tradi- retain symbols tional culture?

2. What ought to be borrowingis good; liberals ought borrow from borrow from borrowed fromother to borrow fromeach other other Marxists other Fascists cultures?

3. What is the ethnic and historical class defined as race or histori- nation's claim to linguistic continuity resistance to cal continuity historical homogeneity seen as ethnic imperialism distinctiveness? or linguistic withinspecific homogeneity territory

4. What territory whatever area is occupied by the whatever area is occupied by the is properlythe group defined in 3 group defined in 3 nation's?

5. How should the spread liber- make peaceful permanentstruggle, need forsur- nation relate to alism by ex- contributionto vival, endemic hostilitytoward other nations? ample and by war the expansion of others; if appropriate; liberalism;

foster peaceful relations among fightimperialism, glorifywar and all liberalnations; fightother but do not self-assertion nations or colonize them in order glorifywar to advance liberalismglobally

6. What is the proper representativedemocracy totalitarianrule via a vanguard institutionalstruc- natural rightsfor individual group incarnatingthe nation; ture forthe nation? citizen rightsinhere in nation, not in- dividual

7. What is the continuous continuous bringabout assure survival historicalmission self-perfection self-perfection classless of race of the nation? and the global but no explicit society diffusionof the mission other- creed wise

Examples FrenchRevolution, Mill, Nehru Stalin, Tito, Mussolini, Jefferson, Ho, Mao Hitler,Eastern Wilson, Cavour, Europe in the German liberals 1 930s, Kita lkki Whatis nationalism?733

TABLE 2. Attributesof syncretistnationalist ideologies

Ideology

Dimension Synthetic Traditional Restorative

1. What should be many modernvalues distrustmodern values; reject existingtra- done about the core are good and usable; very cautiously borrow ditionalvalues in favor values of the tra- mix with good tra- of restoringvalues of ditionalculture? ditionalvalues a past golden age 2. What ought to values as well as only techniques and only techniques, not be borrowedfrom techniques and institutionsneeded, institutionsor values other cultures? institutions not values

3. What is the historical culturalsuperiority religiousrevelation, nation's claim to longevity as evidenced by scripturalauthority historical historicallongevity; distinctiveness? race

4. What territory usually, but not area of existing area occupied by people is properlythe always, the existing state to whom the revelation nation's? state was made

5. How should the cooperativelyand peace- ambivalently,because of hostilelyand distrustfully; nation relate to fully,after survival is continu-iigfear for need forstruggle! other nations? assured survival vigilance

6. What is the variable various corporate de- theocracy properinstitutional vices to limitpopular structurefor the participationand nation? legitimateleadership of traditionalgroups 7. What is the assure its own survival assure its own sur- restore the golden age historicalmission and self-perfection vival of the nation?

Examples Gandhi, Senghor, Stein, Maurras, Meiji Tilak, Khomeini, K'ang, Yu-wei, Mazzini, reformers,many Con- Al-Banna, Slavophiles Afghani,Lutfi, German fucianists,Indian Romantics Muslim reformers

"Traditionalsyncretists" distrust nonindigenous values and have no in- tentionof introducingthem. They remain deeply attached to religioussys- tems thatpenetrate the local culture-Confucianism,Islam, Hinduism, Catholicism.However, such people are quite willingto take over nonin- digenoustechniques, such as technology,scientific education, literacy, and modemarmies. More important, they are willing to adaptindigenous institu- tionsto theextent necessary to incorporatethese techniques, for example, throughthe introduction of conscription, compulsory public education, and evenaspects of industrialism. Traditional syncretists persuade themselves- usuallymistakenly-that they can borrowtechniques and institutionswith- 734 InternationalOrganization out also acceptingthe values thatgo withthem. Their claim to national distinctivenessrests on an argumentfor historical cultural superiority over theirrivals which often takes a racialform, as in thework of Charles Maur- ras, some of thelate ChineseConfucianists, and of RabindranathTagore. Theyclaim as thenation's realm the territory of the existing state, but they are ambivalentabout the nation's relations with other countries because of theirstrong fear that they may not survive.Assuring that survival is the nation'smain mission,which implies an indigenouscultural renaissance alongwith the introductionof nonindigenousinstitutions and techniques. The modeof governance preferred by traditionalsyncretists is designedto containand channelpopular participation while legitimating the leadershipof traditionalgroups, as clearlyexpressed by one of theearliest "latecomers,"Prussia's Baron vom Stein. "Restorativesyncretists" reject foreignvalues and institutions;they merelywant the foreigner's techniques-his armies and factories.In fact, theytake the position that the values actually professed by theirown gov- ernmentare alreadydangerously corrupt and mustbe replacedby pure and authenticindigenous values. They are "restorers"because they wish to get ridof foreign moral and institutionalaccretions and bringback the purity of an earliergolden age. Theyrely on religiousrevelation and scriptural author- ity-the vedic textsfor Tilak, the Koran for Khomeiniand Hassan al- Banna, the ChristianBible forthe Slavophiles.Who is the nation?The peopleto whomthe revelation was made,irrespective of where they might live. How shouldthe nationbehave towardothers? It mustbe eternally vigilant,trust nobody, and be readyat all timesto defendits spiritualtrea- sure. Restorers,by virtueof theirstance, must expect war and violence. Theirchief mission is to restorethe lost golden age, which they attempt to do by institutinga theocratic dictatorship. They can no moreenvisage a har- moniousworld order than can theintegralists. The historyof mostnations is a storyof competitionamong these seven ideologies.Can theybe transcendedto giveus a consensualnational myth thatwould water down and sloughoff some of thecontrasting themes? Or, as in the case of some of the integralistand liberalexperiences, is the nationalmyth the same thing as a victoriousideology? In orderto investigate thesepossibilities, and theirimplications for a rationalizedworld order, I mustfirst show how to "measure"a nationalmyth.

Indicators and measurement The neglectof systematic indicators of national integration and disintegra- tionis one of the mainfailings of theworks reviewed. There seems to be littleexcuse forthis as faras thequantitative measurement of degreesand typesof social mobilizationare concerned.Concepts and dataare plentiful. The best studiesof nationbuilding, such as EugenWeber's Peasants into Whatis nationalism?735

Frenchmen,use themto greatadvantage and do nothesitate to mixthem withqualitative observations. Where systematicpublic opiniondata on popularexpectations of the nation-state exist, of course, the political conse- quences of social mobilizationcan be directlyassessed. Whenwe do not have suchdata we are forcedto use qualitativeobservations on a systematic comparativebasis. Whatkinds of questionscould we ask of a societyin orderto makea judgmentof its degreeof rationalization under the umbrella of a nationalist myth?We wantto knowwhether such beliefs,despite the prevalenceof divergentattitudes, are sufficientlyconsensual to enablethe state to function to everyone'sbasic satisfaction.Moreover, we wantto knowwhether this happystate of affairsobtains despite linguistic, ethnic, religious, class, and statuscleavages. The followingquestions are appropriateindicators: Is therea formulafor political succession that is regularlyobserved withoutengendering coups and civilwars? Are thecore values communicatedby thepublic media and theschool systemgenerally accepted? Is thereevidence of majormovements or eventschallenging these values? Is theeconomic policy pursued by thestate perceived as equitableirre- spectiveof regional,linguistic, ethnic, or religiouscleavages? Is thecultural (especially linguistic) policy pursued by thestate per- ceivedas equitable? Is therea foreign-policyconsensus despite the existence of competing partiesand changesof government?(N.B. This need notmean that pol- icy remainsunchanged; it meansthat changes in policydo notengender strifethat covaries with other social cleavages.) Two key indicatorsare impliedby thislist, one quantitative,the other qualitative.What is theincidence of civilstrife, since strikes, riots, coups, conspiracies,and full-scalecivil war are the mostvisible evidence of dis- satisfaction?Is thelanguage policy pursued by the state a sourceof satisfac- tionor dissatisfaction? Civilstrife is a verytricky indicator because we cannotassume that every strike,every riot, every assassination of a politicalfigure provides evidence of deep-seatedand widespreaddissatisfaction. These eventshave varying diagnosticsignificance, depending on theextent of social mobilization,the degreeto whichthe statepenetrates the society,the natureof the urban- rural,high culture-lowculture split. FollowingTed Gurr and Muriel McClelland,we mustdistinguish between "turmoil," "conspiracies," and "internalwar" as providinga scale ofviolent events.14 Turmoil, in general,

14. Ted RobertGurr and MurielMcClelland, Political Performance (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971). 736 InternationalOrganization is nota validindicator of dissatisfaction with the nation-state. It maysuggest alienationthat finds expression in rivalnationalist ideologies, but we cannot be surethat the demands put forward do notremain within the confines of a sharedmyth. We mustbe certainthat the riots and strikes are motivated by a setof symbols challenging the official ones before we can interpretthis form of civilstrife. Whatabout the incidenceof conspiracies(terrorism, mutinies, coups) directedagainst the government? These are notalways valid indicators of a desireto makeor unnmakea nation. I distinguishbetween conditions that obtainwhen a nationis yetto be builtand challengesto an existingnation- state,the condition of nationmaintenance. Let us assumea situationof incomplete social mobilization in a stateruled autocraticallyby a narrowlybased elite, though there is no doubtthat a state existsand is recognizedto exist.Conspiracies then constitute evidence of a desireto createa nation-stateifone segmentof the elite seems to imposeits visionof the nation on othersegments of the elite. Conspiracies also consti- tutesuch evidenceif the conspiring elite wishes to makea nationout of a targetpopulation distributed among several states. Conspiracies, however, are nota validindicator of such a desirewhen they merely serve as a method for displacingone set of caciques when another,as in most of Latin America's"national" period during the 19thcentury. For instance,the en- demicconspiracies of Santa Anna's are notevidence of nationalism, butthe conspiracies of thereformers of the 1850sprobably are. Now letus assumea situationin which social mobilization is faradvanced andan effectivestate exists as well,which, until the point at whicha marked increasein conspiraciesoccurs, had enjoyedlegitimate authority. The in- crease in conspiraciesis valid evidenceof a nationalistdesire to splitoff fromthat state or to takeit over,if the conspirators advance a nationalist ideologydifferent from the previously prevailing myth, as inthe case ofNazi Germanyor Lenin's Russia. An increasein conspiraciesis also a valid indicatorwhen the conspiratorsrepresent groups who feelleft out of the benefitsbestowed by the stateand its nationalmyth, usually because the conspiratorsare "different"for reasons of religion,ethnic, linguistic, or statuscharacteristics. Examples are Indiasince 1947, Northern Ireland, and Biafra. Internalwar, underconditions of completesocial mobilization,always proves the failureof a nationalmyth and the prevalenceof competing nationalistideologies. Under conditions of incompletesocial mobilization, however,this is notnecessarily the case. Internalwar here may just be the "normal"way of resolvinginterelite conflict for spoils and provenothing one way or theother about nationalism. Languagepolicy is a very sensitiveindicator of satisfactionwith the nation-state,provided we keep in mindtwo verydifferent situations, rec- ognizedmultilingual states (Switzerland, Belgium, India) that make no pre- Whatis nationalism?737 tenseabout having a singleofficial language used in all publicbusiness and imposedby thepublic school system, and statesin whichseveral languages are (or have been) used vernacularly,though a singleone is imposedas the officialmode of communication.In thefirst case, one wouldhave to know aboutthe extent of bilingualism among the elite and aboutpeople's willing- ness to functionin skilledprofessions in a languageother than their native one. Multilingualpolities are based on varioussubtle compromises; the willingnessto forgoa singleofficial language does not necessarilycome aboutwithout strife. The characterof these compromises provides the indi- catorsfor observing the fashioning of thenational myth. 15 The morecommon case involvesthe impositionof a singlelanguage to takethe place ofa numberof vernaculars that may or maynot belong to the same languagegroup as theofficial one. How can people be persuadedto abandontheir native vernaculars in favorof modernHebrew, Bahasa, and Swahili?What incentives are givento thosewho learnthe language? How are dissenterspunished? What makes the work of officiallanguage academiesauthoritative? As recentlyas 1863,one-third of Frenchelemen- taryschool children could not effectively communicate in standardFrench. We maywonder about the situation in the Soviet Union now. Yet thereis no evidenceof disaffectionfrom the nationalmyth. In short,the mannerin whicha singlelanguage is imposedon people providesclues about the thresholdbeyond which the imposition of a languageis perceivedas a viola- tionof nationalself-determination. It is a mistaketo thinkof anylanguage policysimply as impositionby the bruteforce of the centralizingstate. Speakersof minoritylanguages may have excellentreasons for complying withthe pressure merely to maximizetheir career opportunities; they may have equallyrational grounds for opposing the pressure.Everything de- pends on the policyand economiccontext in whichthe processoccurs. Rationalchoice criteria,not presumedattachment to primordialcultural values,explain outcomes.16 Definitionsand indicatorsare toolsto enableus to say somethingabout therelationship between nationalism and therationalization of societiesin the throesof modernization.They are also tools thatshould throw some

15. On Switzerlandsee Carol L. Schmid, Conflictand Consensus in Switzerland(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1981); this books contains ample quantitative evidence on lan- guageand nationalist symbols. On Belgiumsee ArendLijphart, ed., Conflictand Coexistence in Belgium(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1981). Kenneth Jowittshows how these variables manifest themselves in quitedifferent forms in "market"as opposedto "ordered"societies, in which interpersonal competition is legitimated interms of its contributionto the organicunity of the entiresociety (as in Leninistpolities). See his The LeninistResponse to National Dependency (Berkeley: Instituteof InternationalStudies, Uni- versityof Califomia,1978). 16. For a convincingdemonstration that game-theoretic formulations can illustratethe out- comesof encountersbetween language centralizers and speakersof minoritylanguages see David D. Laitin,"Political Linguistics and Cataloniaafter Franco" (Paper read at theannual meetingof the American Political Science Association, New Orleans,August 1985). 738 InternationalOrganization lighton theconditions under which the pattern breaks down, when rationali- zationat the level of the nation-stateseems no longerto work,and the searchfor alternative political constructs begins. Thistask has notyet been tackled. All I can do hereis to offera research agendaraisonne. Three questions arise: (1) Whatare the typical processes of rationalizationof an industrializingsociety, in termsof the growthof a nationalmyth? (2) Must successfuldomestic rationalization occur at the expenseof internationalharmony? (3) Underwhat conditions does thefail- ureof domestic rationalization lead to nonnationalformulas of governance?

National mythsand successful rationalization I take rationalizationto be "successful"if a nationalmyth comes into existence,if conspiracies and internalwar do notchallenge that myth, if a consensuallanguage situation is legitimatedby the myth,and if the myth providesa coherentsecular alternative to earlierfragmented and incoherent patternsof beliefand conduct.The mythmust contain the nonreligious assertionsthat are designedto givecertainty and directionto thebeliever's mindand ofwhich Anderson and Gellnerwrite. It maycontain the patriotic appealsthat Seers considersvital for the implementation of self-reliant de- velopmentpolicies. Successful rationalization, to use Gellner'sformulation again,implies the substitution of a singlecommon high culture for the previ- ous flourishingof manyfragmented low culturesin thetarget population. Alternatively,the rational new culture is a unifiedamalgam of low- and high- culturethemes. How mightsuch a transformationbe explained? We mustgo back to the characteristicsof the people involvedin the modernizationprocess. The mobilized(elite and mass) maydiffer from one anotherin whetherthey are easilyassimilated into the highculture or whetherthey are differentiated fromit. On what basis can the mobilized-unassimilateddiffer from the mobilized-assimilated?What variables may appear to derailthe whole pro- cess? We mustconsider the timing of the eventsthat mobilize people and renderthem dissatisfied, the various dimensions of cleavage that may divide theassimilated from the unassimilated (such as race, socialstatus, religion, language,ethnicity), the spatial distribution of thetarget population, and the ideologiesthat motivate the actors.

Timing.Timing of stateintervention in theprocess of socialmobilization can makean enormousdifference in theoutcome. If social mobilizationis notyet far advanced and ifthe state has appreciablecontrol over the levers of symbolcreation and resourceextraction, then rationalization can be achievedby relaxing the criteria of access to high-cultureeducational facili- ties and statussymbols, thus admitting the unassimilated to nearequality. The elite,in effect, successfully co-opts the newly mobilized before they can formulatea counterideology. Whatis nationalism?739

Co-optationis mostreadily practiced when the state "builds" thenation, whenan effectivestate animated by an elitepossessed of a nationalistideol- ogyfollows the policies that result in thegradual incorporation of theun- mobilizedinto society. It is easierwhen the target population is notdivided byobvious cleavages, especially ethnic cleavages. And it is facilitatedby the use ofideologies that can act as dramaticmotivators. Co-optation is likelyto fail,however, when the targetpopulation is not homogeneous,when na- tionalsentiment precedes the existenceof a powerfulstate, when there is sharpcompetition among nationalist ideologies. Contrary to Anderson'sand Smith'sarguments, under the propertiming conditions, "official national- ism" can be a very effectiverationalizing agent. Its failurein Eastern Europe, Africa,and the Middle East is attributablenot to its "official" characterbut to the absence of the additionalfacilitating conditions. The failureof anyformula for rationalizing a society is almostguaranteed when socialmobilization is compressedinto a singlegeneration and when there is neithera strongstate nor a pervasivenationalist sentiment, as in mostof Africa.

Dimensionsof cleavage. It wouldbe lovelyif we coulddemonstrate that a uniquecombination of variablesdifferentiating themobilized-unassimilated fromeach otherand from the mobilized-assimilated could be associatedwith theemergence of a nationalmyth. We are unlikelyto findsuch a combina- tion,despite the continuing efforts of somestudents of nationalism to single outethnicity and languageas thatunique combination. No singledimension or combinationof dimensionsof differentiationcan be shownto be neces- sary,sufficient, or necessaryand sufficient,to explainthe formation of all nations.Dimensions of salience differ with the timing of the process of social mobilizationand withthe spatial distribution of thepopulations involved. In statesand societieswhose populationsdo not differmarkedly on ethnic grounds,the mobilized-unassimilated have to differfrom the assimilated on morethan one dimensionin orderto have the incentiveto formulatea nationalistideology. Simply speaking a differentlanguage or beingof a differentreligion from the assimilatedis not a strongenough incentive to demanda nationof one's own. However,in ethnicallyhomogeneous states and societies,the mobilized-unassimilated need to differonly on thedimen- sionof social statusto have an incentivefor demanding a nation-state.

Spatial distribution.The spatialdistribution of thepopulations involved interactswith the timingpattern. Rationalization is impededif ethnically diversepopulations live intermingled orin close proximityto each otherand ifthe processes of socialmobilization are suchthat the symbolic and extrac- tive resourcesof the stateare taxed beyondits capabilityto adapt. This happenswhen several mobilized/unassimilated ethnic groups make simul- taneousclaims for greater equality and participation.Their geographical situationmakes them compete against one anotherand against the dominant 740 InternationalOrganization groups.This was one factorimpeding the attempted rationalization of the Austro-Hungarianand Russianempires; it hindersrationalization in Africa now.

Nationalist ideologies as motivators.It seems likelythat the contentof particularnationalist ideologies would make a differencewith respect to eventualrationalization. The difficultyis again the factor of time. For ten- or twenty-yearperiods, one mightsuppose, any of our seven ideologies would be effectivemotivators to adjustto a new kindof life.But what happens if the continuedprocess of social mobilization,when linked to the kindsof frustrationsassociated with ethnic or religiouscleavages or competitively locatedgroups of the aroused, undermines the logic of the erstwhile success- fulideology and givesrise to a newround of differentiation? We knowthat thishas happenedon manyoccasions-in Belgium,Japan, and Turkey,to namebut a few. I hypothesizethat in situationsof ethnicspatial dispersion, where the mobilizingelite inheritsa weak state,the onlyideology capable of truly motivatingpeople toward a newlife is integralism.The Marxistvariant has historicallyproved to be themore effective one. We cannottest the halflife offascism since no fascistregime has survivedlong enough to completethe processof rationalization, though Franco's Spain may, inadvertently, come close. If, underthe circumstancesstipulated, rationalization is attempted throughreliance on a liberalor a syncretist-syntheticideology, the chances are thatthe newlymobilized but stillunassimilated groups will seek their salvationin secession,not in loyaltyto thenew dispensation. I hypothesizefurther that liberal ideologies can serve as effective rationalizingagents only in societiespossessing a strongstate prior to the onsetof massivesocial mobilization,endowed with a populationthat has becomelargely monolingual by the timeof fullindustrialization, and pos- sessingthe resources for satisfying mass demands. Whatabout syncretist ideologies? The compromisesbetween secular and sacredvalues which they all attemptsaps theirpower to rationalize.They tendto founder because they do notknow how to distinguishthe public from theprivate in religion.Secular nationalist ideologies make this distinction successfully:religion may flourishas an organizedpursuit without being conjoinedwith the publicrealm, though it may also go intodecline. The syncretistformulas are unwillingto makethis distinction, insisting that reli- gious values and institutionsretain public relevance. At the same time, however,these formulas,by allowingthe introductionof some secular valuesand institutions,tend to underminethemselves and to set thescene forviolent social conflict.Restorative syncretism, by seekingto confinethe impactof the modernto technologyand the military,may be able to buy time.The efficacyof theformula, of course,depends fatally on thetiming factor.I hypothesizethat syncretist formulas may channel the process of Whatis nationalism?741 modernizationfor a while; but the forcesthey unleash will successfully challengethese ideologies and produce either a liberalor an integralnational myth.

Must successful rationalizationresult in internationalstrife? Suppose thesehypotheses were accurate.What do theypredict for the relationsamong successful nation-states? Ignoring structural constraints on foreign-policychoice, the implications of thehypotheses for the quality of internationalpolitics are notpleasant. Nationalist myths contain claims on othernations, even afternational self-determination is achieved. The inte- gralistmyths suggest strife, insecurity, constant struggle. The Jacobinvari- antof the liberal myth legitimates the imperialism of the virtuous, even if it stops shortof acceptingthe inevitabilityof internationalstrife. Synthetic syncretismis peaceful,but the other two varieties of syncretismare at least ambivalentwith respect to relationswith other nations. Seers remindsus thateven in the area of internationaleconomic relations, all the typesof nationalismcontain the seed forpeaceful as well as bellicoseinternational contact. The conventionalwisdom has it thatRousseau was right:domestic hap- pinesscan be boughtonly at theprice of international unhappiness. Matters are evenworse if we considerthat unsuccessful domestic rationalization, as inthe later years of the Habsburg, Ch'ing, Romanov, and Ottoman empires, also engendersinternational disharmony. The argumentshould not be over- stated.True, the post-Enlightenment period has beenone ofactive interna- tional discord. At the same time, that period has also been one of unprecedentedincreases in economicand social welfarein theface of the steepestpopulation increases in thehistory of homo sapiens. Nor can it be convincinglyargued that the prosperity of the richest has beenbought at the priceof the impoverishment ofthe poorest. In short,the possibility of dem- onstratinga link between types of nationalism,patterns of domestic rationalization,and the incidence of international strife should not be seenas theequivalent of a doomsdayforecast. Even ifit weretrue that the higher standardsof welfareof the post-Enlightenmentworld are a resultof the competitiveprowess of the successfulnation-states-thus implying the prevalenceof a basicallywarlike world order anchored in mutuallyantago- nisticmercantilisms-the international anarchy was notentirely nefarious. Rousseau was not wrong,but he overstatedhis case by exaggeratingthe extentof internationalunhappiness. Nevertheless,the hypothesissuggested by thisline of inquiryis not a cheerfulone. It presagesthe continuationof conflict-proneinternational relationsas longas thenational myths now extantor beingborn reflect the seven ideologies.Whether as successes or failuresas rationalizers,the sevenideologies spell a troubledworld order even if Seers's predilectionfor sturdyregion-states were to becomereal. 742 InternationalOrganization

Can failed domestic rationalizationlead to internationalrationalization? I now standRousseau on his head: can we imaginethat domestic unhap- pinesswill lead to internationalhappiness? Since this has nothappened yet, we are engagedin a gedankenexperiment.17 Suppose thathitherto successfully rationalized nation-states encounter difficultiesrelated to technology,welfare commitments, and international economicinterdependence. Suppose furtherthat the same difficultiesbe- devilefforts of stateswho have notyet fashioned successful nations. Print capitalismmay have fosterednational integration. But managedcapitalism and statesocialism may not succeedin maintainingthe integration ifall of thefollowing conundra must be faced:excess industrialcapacity, uncertain- ties about investmentin high-technologyindustries, how to splitup the resourcesof the sea, deal withinternational debt, and protectthe biosphere frompollution, while also remainingcommitted to higherstandards of per- sonalwelfare for their citizens. Can thesimultaneous pressure of domestic turmoiland internationalinterdependence lead to politicalconstructs that are quitedifferent from what we knowand thattherefore imply a different kindof worldorder? I hypothesizethat because of these pressurespreviously accepted na- tionalmyths deteriorate. Previously mobilized people are no longersuccess- fullyassimilated or co-opted.Just as in a previousage theysought a new identityin nationalismonce theold identitiesceased beinguseful rationaliz- ers,the newly disoriented must search for an alternativeto nationalism.Just as theirpredecessors could select itemsfrom the menu of nationalist ideologies,the newly disoriented have choices:autarky, , inter- nationalregimes, mininationalism via secession,or a new globalidentity based on class or religion.

Autarky.Not all countriessuffer equally from the cross-pressuresof postindustrialism.Some may have resourcessufficient to enablethem to meetthese challengeswith a minimumof domesticdisruption and little dependenceon othercountries, particularly if the volumeof welfarede- mandscan be reduced.The pressureswill undermine the national myth only to theextent that domestic remedies are unavailing.By no meansis every manifestationofinternational interdependence likely to subvertnationalism. Largecountries with integral myths are mostlikely to withstandthe search foralternative orders.

17. I havediscussed the argument that follows more fully in TheObsolescence of Regional Theory(Berkeley: Institute of InternationalStudies, University of California,1975); "Why Collaborate?"World Politics 32 (April1980); and "Words Can HurtYou: or,Who Said Whatto Whom about Regimes," InternationalOrganization 34 (Spring 1982). Whatis nationalism?743

Globalidentities. Candidates for this choice include a transnationalcom- mitmentto the creationof a global classless society(Marxism) and the acceptanceof a global religiouscreed stressingeither service to others (Christianity)or thetranscendence of politics (Hinduism, Buddhism). Smith is absolutelycorrect in showingthat each of thesecan be institutionally, normatively,and conceptuallyan alternativeto nationalism.However, in thepractice of modernpolitics, none of themhas in factbeen immuneto nationalism.The reconversionof believersinto the purerforms of these identitiesdemands not onlya rejectionof nationalmyths but a consistent rededicationto theoriginal cosmopolitan content of these creeds. Although the possibilitycannot be precluded,credibility remains low. The current prevalenceof traditional and restorative syncretisms works against this solu- tion.The innatesecularism of thefour revolutionary ideologies can hardly be said to favora turntoward transcendence or compassionateservice. The contentof Marxistintegralism, especially in itsantidependency guise, is no moreconsistent with such a choice.

Regionalism.The desirefor the regional integration ofpreviously success- fulnation-states, particularly in Europe,clearly owes somethingto thedete- riorationof earliernational myths. However, not even the most successful integrationschemes have yet resulted in a regionalidentity. Such an identity wouldnot constitute an abandonmentof nationalism but the substitution ofa largernation for several smaller ones. Alternatively,regional arrangements thatfunction effectively without leading to themerger of sovereigntiesare hardto distinguishfrom international regimes.

Mininationalisms.Contemporary effusions of longdormant ethnic iden- titiesin Western Europe do challengethe finality of the familiar nation-states and certainlyquestion the former myths. But I cannotconvince myself that theyconstitute solutions to thecross-pressures of postindustrialism. Auton- omousWales, Brittany,or Euskadiare no morelikely to deal successfully withthe turbulenceof the welfarestate than are the governmentsfrom whichthey wish to secede. Rationalchoice postulates(as well as recent events)convince me that we are dealingwith a temporaryphenomenon, not a seriousalternative to theexisting nation-states.

Internationalregimes. Such entitiesare alreadyquite familiar. Without concerningourselves now withtheir origins, I simplyhypothesize that the widespreaddemand for managed national economies sustaining high levels ofwelfare cannot be metin thecontext of sovereignnation-states. Meeting thedemands calls fornew regimes, and thereconstruction ofexisting ones, withthe consequences of furtherundermining the autonomy of thenation- stateas it seeksto cope withdomestic sources of eroding legitimacy. How- ever,countries animated by liberaland syntheticmyths are mostlikely to 744 InternationalOrganization feelthis pressure. Furthermore, widespread demands for managed national economiesstriving for rapid industrialization (implying some redistribution of wealthfrom North to South),also cannotbe metin the contextof the sovereignnation-state. Meeting these demands also callsfor the creation of variouskinds of international economic regimes. Integralist as wellas vari- ous syncretistmyths feel the logic of thispressure. Finally, everybody de- siresthe benefitsof technologicalinnovations. Conversely, the unwanted consequencesof such innovationscan be avoidedonly through acts of in- ternationalcollaboration and administration.Maximizing benefits while minimizingcosts calls forthe creation of nonnationalpractices and institu- tionsthat may tend to underminefurther the rationalization formula of the nation-state. Notethat the logic of these hypotheses does notpredict world government, or regionalintegration, or a strongerUnited Nations as thelikely outcome. Ifthe nation-state loses itsprominent position as thefont of effective social harmony,the alternative may be all or noneof thesepossibilities. Alterna- tiverationalization formulas may imply decentralization as wellas centrali- zation,or bothat once (thoughfor different demands and issues). All that can be affirmedwith confidence is thatnone of this is likelyto happenuntil the logic of the mobilization-assimilationbalance has runits course,until happinessrelying on thenation-state has everywherebeen tried, until social mobilizationis completein all countries.Whether we like nationalismor not,it seems to be a necessarystage through which political man has to pass. Even ifthere were no otherreasons for studying nationalism, that conclu- sionalone justifies the quest.