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Author Index Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88037-4 - Advanced Data Structures Peter Brass Index More information Author Index This is a list of authors of papers cited in this book, together with their current affiliation, where I could find it. This shows the wide geographic distribution of the subject, as well as some centers. Serge Abiteboul: [Abiteboul et al. 2001] Amihood Amir: [Amir et al. 2000] Bar-Ilan INRIA Rocquencourt, France University, Israel Mohamed Ibrahim Abouelhoda: Arne Andersson: [Andersson 1989a, b, [Abouelhoda et al. 2004] University of Ulm, 1990, 1993, 1999; Andersson et al. 1990; Germany Andersson and Nilsson 1993, 1994, 1995] Wilhelm Ackermann: [Ackermann 1928] Uppsala University, Sweden (died 1962) Chuan-Heng Ang: [Ang and Tan 1995] Georgi˘ı M. Adel’son-Vel’ski˘ı: National University of Singapore, Singapore [Adel’son-Vel’ski˘ı and Landis 1962] Jun-Ichi Aoe: [Aoe et al. 1992; Morimoto Pankaj K. Agarwal: [Agarwal et al. 2002, et al. 1994] University of Tokushima, Japan 2005] Duke University, USA Alberto Apostolico: [Apostolico 1985; Alfred V. Aho: [Aho et al. 1974, 1976] Apostolico et al. 1994] Purdue University at Columbia University, USA West Lafayette, USA Miklos´ Ajtai: [Ajtai 1978] IBM Research Cecilia R. Aragon: [Seidel and Aragon Almaden, USA 1996] Lawrence Berkeley National Susanne Albers: [Albers and Karpinski Laboratory, USA 2002] University of Freiburg, Germany Bruce W. Arden: [Arden et al. 1961] Brian Allen: [Allen and Munro 1978] Lars Arge: [Arge and Vitter 2003; Procopiuc Jussara Almeida: [Fan et al. 2000] et al. 2003; Arge et al. 2004; Agarwal et al. University of Wisconsin at Madison, USA 2005] University of Aarhus, Denmark Noga Alon: [Alon et al. 1999] Tel Aviv Setsuo Arikawa: [Kasai et al. 2001] Kyushu University, Israel University, Japan Stephen Alstrup: [Alstrup et al. 1998, 1999, Hiroki Arimura: [Kasai et al. 2001] 2000, 2005; Alstrup and Holm 2000; Hokkaido University, Japan Alstrup and Thorup 2000; Alstrup and A. Arvind: [Arvind and Rangan 1999] Rauhe 2002] University of Copenhagen, Malcolm P. Atkinson: [Hunt et al. 2002] Denmark University of Edinburgh, Great Britain Helmut Alt: [Mehlhorn et al. 1988] Free Mike D. Atkinson: [Atkinson et al. 1986] University Berlin, Germany University of Otago, New Zealand Srinivas Aluru: [Ko and Aluru 2003, 2005] Mauricio Ayala-Rincon:´ [Ayala-Rincon´ Iowa State University, USA and Conejo 2003] University of Brasilia, Ole Amble: [Amble and Knuth 1974] Brasil 441 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88037-4 - Advanced Data Structures Peter Brass Index More information 442 Author Index Yossi Azar: [Azar et al. 1999] Tel Aviv Guy E. Blelloch: [Blelloch et al. 2003] University, Israel Carnegie Mellon University, USA Ghada Hany Badr: [Badr and Oommen, Norbert Blum: [Blum and Mehlhorn 1980; 2004] National Research Council, Canada Blum 1986] University of Bonn, Germany Jean-Loup Baer: [Baer 1975] University of Anselm Blumer: [Blumer et al. 1985] Tufts Washington, USA University, USA Ricardo A. Baeza-Yates: [Gonnet et al. Janet A. Blumer: [Blumer et al. 1985; 1992; Baeza-Yates and Soza-Pollman 1998] Blumer 1987] Yahoo Research, Barcelona, Spain, and Flavio Bonomi: [Bonomi et al. 2006] Cisco Yahoo Research Latin America, Santiago, Research Center, USA Chile Prosenjit Bose: [Bose et al. 2003] Carleton Amitabha Bagchi: [Bagchi et al. 2002] University, Canada Indian Institute of Technology at Delhi, Panayiotis Bozanis: [Bozanis et al. 2003] India University of Thessaly, Greece Brenda S. Baker: [Baker 1993] Bell Labs, Peter Brass: [Brass 2007] City College New Murray Hill, USA York, USA Lech Banachowski: [Banachowski 1980] Gilles Brassard: [Brassard and Kannan, Polish-Japanese Institute of Information 1988] University of Montreal, Canada Technology, Warsaw, Poland Richard P. Brent: [Brent 1973] Australian Shivi Shekhar Bansil: [Bansil et al. 2003] National University, Australia Rudolf Bayer: [Bayer 1971, 1972a, b; Bayer Dany Breslauer: [Breslauer 1995] and McCreight 1972; Kempfe et al. 1987] Rene´ de la Briandais: [Briandais 1959] Technical University Munchen,¨ Germany Gerth Stølting Brodal: [Brodal 1995, Carter Bays: [Bays 1973a, b] University of 1996a, b, 1998; Brodal and Ga¸sieniec 1996; South Carolina, USA Brodal and Venkatesh 2000; Brodal et al. Norbert Beckmann: [Beckmann et al. 2002] University of Aarhus, Denmark 1990] Andrei Z. Broder: [Broder and Karlin 1990; R. Charles Bell: [Bell and Floyd 1983] Azar et al. 1999; Broder and Mitzenmacher Amir M. Ben-Amram: [Ben-Amram 1995; 2004; Fan et al. 2000] Yahoo, USA Alstrup et al. 1999] Academic College of Andrej Brodnik: [Brodnik and Munro 1999] Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Israel Technical University of Lulea,˚ Sweden Michael A. Bender: [Bender et al. 2002] HerveBr´ onnimann:¨ [Bronnimann¨ et al. State University of New York at Stony 2003] Brooklyn Polytechnic University, Brook, USA USA Michael Ben-Or: [Ben-Or 1983] Hebrew Mark Robbin Brown: [Brown 1978; Brown University of Jerusalem, Israel and Tarjan 1980] Samuel Watkins Bent: [Bent et al. 1985] Adam Louis Buchsbaum: [Buchsbaum et al. Jon Louis Bentley: [Bentley 1975, 1979, 1992, 1998; Buchsbaum and Tarjan 1995; 1990; Bentley and Friedman 1979; Bentley Bagchi et al. 2002] AT&T Labs–Research, and Maurer 1980; Bentley and Saxe 1980; USA Bentley and Sedgewick 1997] Bell Labs, Harry Buhrman: [Buhrman et al. 2000] USA University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands Petra Berenbrink: [Berenbrink et al. 2000] Jochen Burghardt: [Burghardt 2001] Simon Fraser University, Canada Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Mark de Berg: [Ferragina et al. 1999; Architecture and Software Technology, Agarwal et al. 2002; Arge et al. 2004] Berlin, Germany University of Eindhoven, The Netherlands Walter A. Burkhard: [Burkhard 1975] Omer Berkman: [Berkman and Vishkin 1994] University of California at San Diego, USA James R. Bitner: [Bitner 1979] Stefan Burkhardt: [Burkhardt and Gabriele Blankenagel: [Blankenagel and Karkk¨ ainen¨ 2003; Karkk¨ ainen¨ et al. 2006] Guting¨ 1994] Google, Switzerland © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88037-4 - Advanced Data Structures Peter Brass Index More information Author Index 443 F. Warren Burton: [Burton et al. 1985, Douglas W. Clark: [Clark 1975] Princeton 1990] Simon Fraser University, Canada University, USA Helen Cameron: [Cameron and Wood 1992] Edmund G. Coffman Jr: [Coffman and Eve University of Manitoba, Canada 1970] Columbia University, USA Pei Cao: [Fan et al. 2000] Stanford University, Saar Cohen: [Cohen and Matias 2003] USA Alessia De Col: [Colussi and De Col 1996] Svante Carlsson: [Carlsson 1984, 1987, University of Padua, Italy 1988, 1991; Carlsson et al. 1988, 1989; Richard Cole: [Bender et al. 2002; Cole and Carlsson and Chen 1992] Lund University, Hariharan 2003, 2005; Cole and Lewenstein Sweden 2003] New York University, USA J. Lawrence Carter: [Carter et al. 1978; Livio Colussi: [Colussi and De Col 1996] Markowsky et al. 1978; Carter and Wegman University of Padua, Italy 1979] Douglas Comer: [Comer and Sethi 1977] Fred´ eric´ Cazals: [Bronnimann¨ et al. 2003] Purdue University at West Lafayette, USA INRIA Sophia-Antipolis, France Paulo D. Conejo: [Ayala-Rincon´ and Conejo Pedro Celis: [Celis et al. 1985] Microsoft, 2003] USA Gordon V. Cormack: [Cormack et al. 1985] D.J. Challab: [Challab, 1991] University of Waterloo, Canada Chin-Chen Chang: [Chang 1984; Chang Maxime Crochemore: [Holub and et al. 1986, 1991] Feng Chia University, Crochemore 2002; Crochemore and Rytter Taiwan, Republic of China 2003] University of Marne-la-Vallee,´ Hsi Chang: [Chang and Iyengar 1984] France S.C. Chang: [Chang and Du 1993] Karel Culik, II: [Culik et al. 1981; Culik and Philippe Chanzy: [Chanzy et al. 2001] Wood 1982] University of South Carolina, Bernard Chazelle: [Chazelle 1985, USA 1990a, b; Chazelle and Guibas 1986a, b; Walter Cunto: [Cunto et al. 1989] Chazelle et al. 2004] Princeton University, Zbigniew J. Czech: [Czech et al. 1992, 1997; USA Czech and Majewski 1993; Majewski et al. C.Y. Chen: [Chang et al. 1991] Feng Chia 1996; Czech 1998] Silesian Technical University, Taiwan, Republic of China University at Gliwice, Poland Jingsen Chen: [Carlsson et al. 1989; Carlsson Artur Czumaj: [Berenbrink et al. 2000] New and Chen 1992; Chen 1995] Technical Jersey Institute of Technology, USA University of Lulea,˚ Sweden Ole-Johan Dahl: [Jonassen and Dahl 1975] Lin Chen: [Chen 1986; Chen and Schott (died 2002) 1996] Roger B. Dannenberg: [Dannenberg 1990] M.T. Chen: [Blumer et al. 1985; Chen and Carnegie Mellon University, USA Seiferas 1985] Amjad M. Daoud: [Fox et al. 1992] Qi Fan Chen: [Fox et al. 1992] University of Petra, Jordan Siu-Wing Cheng: [Cheng and Janardan A. Colin Day: [Day 1976] 1991] Hong Kong University of Science and Erik D. Demaine: [Bender et al. 2002; Technology, China Demaine et al. 2004; Patrasˇ ¸cu and Demaine Seonghun Cho: [Cho and Sahni 1998, 1999, 2004] Massachusetts Institute of 2000] Technology, USA Ying Choi: [Choi and Lam 1997] Luc Devroye: [Devroye 1992; Chanzy et al. Kyun-Rak Chong: [Chong and Sahni 2000] 2001; Devroye and Morin 2003; Devroye Hong-Ik University, Korea et al. 2004] McGill University, Canada C.-K. Chu: [Shepherd et al. 1989] George Diehr: [Diehr and Faaland 1984] Jiang-Hsing Chu: [Chu and Knott 1994] California State University at San Marcos, Soon M. Chung: [Chung 1992] Wright State USA University, USA Paul F. Dietz: [Dietz 1982; Dietz and Sleator R.J. Cichelli: [Cichelli 1980] 1987; Dietz and Raman 1991] © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-88037-4 - Advanced Data Structures Peter Brass Index More information 444 Author Index Martin Dietzfelbinger: [Dietzfelbinger Bruce Faaland: [Diehr and Faaland 1984] and Meyer auf der Heide 1992; University of Washington, USA Dietzfelbinger et al. 1994; Alon et al. 1999; Rolf Fagerberg: [Fagerberg 1996a, b; Dietzfelbinger and Hagerup 2001] Larsen and Fagerberg 1996] University of Technical University Ilmenau, Germany Southern Denmark at Odense, Denmark Yuzheng Ding: [Ding and Weiss 1993, Ronald Fagin: [Fagin et al. 1979] IBM 1994] Almaden Research Center, USA Ajit A. Diwan: [Diwan et al. 1996] Indian Sean M.
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