NAVY NEWS WEEK 36-1

2 September 2018

US Navy Revives 2nd Fleet to Counter Russia in North Atlantic The U.S. Navy Friday formally re-established its 2nd Fleet, intensifying its focus on the North Atlantic Ocean where the Russian military is operating at a pace not seen since the end of the Cold War. The change is mostly organizational. It revives an admiral-level command dedicated to overseeing American warships as they deploy between the U.S. East Coast and the Barents Sea, off the coasts of Norway and Russia. The revived fleet also reflects a broader change in U.S. military strategy. The nation’s primary concern is shifting from terrorism in the Middle East to America’s growing competition with Russia and China. “We’re not looking for a fight,” Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson said aboard the USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier in Norfolk, Virginia. “But the best way to avoid a fight is develop the most powerful and deadly and competitive Navy possible,” he said. Richardson added that if called upon, the Norfolk-based 2nd Fleet “will conduct decisive combat operations to defeat any enemy.” Both China and Russia are building larger navies as they try to expand their global influence. And Russia in particular has been increasing its submarine patrols, among other military activities. In 2017, Russian Adm. Vladimir Korolyov said his nation’s submarine crews had spent more than 3,000 days on patrol in the last year, matching the Soviet-era operational tempo. It’s unclear how many days Russian subs had been on patrol in previous years “It’s an excellent level,” he said in remarks carried by state RIA Novosti news agency. Concerns about information warfare have also emerged among U.S. lawmakers and American allies as Russian ships linger near undersea communications cables. Encounters between Russian and NATO warplanes have also become increasingly frequent.In January, Britain’s Royal Air scrambled two fighter jets to intercept Russian strategic bombers near U.K. airspace. 2nd Fleet is back The original 2nd Fleet was created in 1950 as a response to the growing threat of the Soviet Union. It played an integral role in events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It was eliminated and merged with Fleet Command in 2011 to save costs. Having a 2nd Fleet allows the U.S. to work more closely and effectively with its NATO allies, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Gary Roughead said in an interview. And they will be better prepared to respond to potential Russian aggression. Roughead said he fully expects the Russian military to increase its presence in the Atlantic in the coming years. One critical area will be the waters between the , Iceland and Greenland. “Clearly, the Russian fleet is not the size that the Soviet fleet used to be, and nor is our fleet,” Roughead said, a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and a former chief of naval operations. “But I think the reactivation is a very wise thing to do.” Source: VOAnews

A view of Cammell Laird shipyard as viewed from the Royal Iris Of The Mersey which undertook the annual cruise organised by Friends Of The Ferries - http://www.friendsoftheferries.org.uk with on the left Royal Fleet Auxiallry vessel Fort Victoria and on the right the research vessel Sir which is fitting out following her launch in June. Photo : Simon Smith ©

Goa Shipyard lays keel for 3rd vessel of new class OPVs The vessels are based on in-house design of GSL and will be sporting modern and technologically advanced machinery Keel of the third Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) of the new 5 CGOPVs project for the Indian Coast Guard was ceremoniously laid at Goa Shipyard Ltd recently. The project is a follow on of 06 CG OPV project completed in 2017. With focused efforts towards Make in India, the indigenous content has been increased from 60 per cent, for 06 CG OPV project, to 70 per cent for the ongoing 05 CG OPV project. The contract for 5 CGOPVs was signed by GSL with ministry of defence on Aug 26, 2016 and commencement of production of first vessel was formally started within three months with formal steel cutting on November 13, 2016. The vessels are scheduled to be delivered between January 2020 and June 2021. The vessels for the Coast Guard are based on in-house design of GSL and will be sporting most modern and technologically advanced machinery and computerised controls systems, making them the most advanced patrol vessels in service with the Indian Coast Guard on delivery. Source: .governancenow

SS Mendi: Theresa May to return WW1 shipwreck's bell to South Africa 27 August 2018

This bell from the SS Mendi which sank in the Channel in 1917 killing more than 600 South Africans

A World War One relic linked to one of the worst maritime disasters in English waters is to be given to South Africa by Theresa May. The SS Mendi sank off the in 1917 killing more than 600 South Africans en route to the Western Front to support British troops. The vessel was rammed by a British merchant ship in thick pre-dawn fog. The prime minister will hand it to President Cyril Ramaphosa in on Tuesday. The ship's bell was given to BBC reporter Steve Humphrey in 2017 in a plastic bag at , Dorset, after an anonymous phone call. A note in the bag read: "If I handed it in myself it might not go to the rightful place. "This needs to be sorted out before I pass away as it could get lost." The SS Mendi sank on 21 February 1917 when it was accidentally rammed in thick fog by the Royal Mail packet-boat SS Darro. A government inquiry said the Darro failed to lower lifeboats, leaving 646 men to drown. Most of the dead were members of the South African Native Labour Corps (SANLC), heading to to carry out manual labour on the Western Front.

More than 800 members of the South African Native Labour Corps were on board the Mendi at the time of the disaster

The Darro's captain, who was blamed for the tragedy by the Board of Trade, was handed a one-year suspension of his master's certificate. The story became a symbol of racial injustice in South Africa, where successive white-led governments discouraged annual Mendi Day commemorations. In 1995, the Queen and Nelson Mandela unveiled a memorial to the Mendi victims in Soweto. It's thought the bell was taken from the shipwreck in the early 1980s. Until recently it had been on display at the Sea City Museum in . On Tuesday the bell will be presented to the President of South Africa at a ceremony in Cape Town. The Prime Minister's deputy official spokeswoman said: "This was the bell from the SS Mendi which sank in the Channel in 1917, killing more than 600 South Africans. "It's a really important relic for them and the kind of focal point of their First World War remembrance." Mrs May will also visit Nigeria and Kenya as part of her first trip to Africa since becoming prime minister. Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk

Defense Ministry approves ₹46,000 cr worth projects By Varsha Santosh August 26, 2018 Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) approved ₹46,000 cr for purchasing defense equipment and supplies. This included utility helicopters and anti-submarine capable multi-role helicopters, Short Range Missile and Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems. 2 types of Helicopters for Navy The DAC approved 111 utility helicopters and 24 anti-submarine capable multi-role helicopters (MRH) worth ₹21,000 cr. ‘The availability of MRH with the Navy would plug the existing capability gap,’ the defense ministry statement said. During anti-submarine warfare such choppers place their into deep waters and release torpedoes while searching for enemy submarines. Its sonar suite assists in navigation and provides situational awareness. This is the first project under the MoD’s Startegic Partnership (SP) where in indigenous manufacturers work in collaboration with foreign counterparts. ‘In an endeavor to convert policy into implementable directions and to kick-start the process, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) also approved platform-specific guidelines for procurement of naval utility helicopters,’ said a defense ministry release in July. ‘All procurement under the SP model would be executed by specially constituted empowered project committees to provide focused attention and ensure timely execution,’ the Ministry added. Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System About 150 155 mm Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems were designed and developed by DRDO for a cost of ₹3,364.78 cr. Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) will nominate production agencies to manufacture these guns. The Ministry says that this will be a major push for ‘Make in India’. Short Range Missile The DAC has cleared requests for 14 Vertically Launched Short Range Missile Systems, out of which 10 will be indigenously developed. Source: https://www.theindianwire.com 46 000 cr equals 460 billion rupees equals roughly $6.5 billion.

Navy Accepts Delivery of Freedom-Variant LCSs Sioux City, Wichita

First PLAN Type 055 'Nanchang' Started Sea Trials in China August 2018 Naval News Posted On Sunday, 26 August 2018 12:51 Based on ship spotters images from China, it appears that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN or Chinese Navy) first Type 055 Destroyer 'Nanchang' (南昌, with hull number 101), sailed out for its first sea trials on 24 August, 2018. The vessel (first of the Renhai-class cruiser, its NATO designation and classification) was built at Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Corporation (Jiangnan-Changxing) in Shanghai (a member of China State Shipbuilding Corporation CSSC).

PLAN's first Type 055 Destroyer 'Nanchang' (南昌, with hull number 101), sailed out for its first sea trials on 24 August, 2018

The Type 055 are the largest surface combatant currently being built in the world. The Type 055 Destroyer has a length of 180 meters, a beam of 20 meters and a draft of 6.6 meters for a full load displacement of 13,000t (compared to the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruiser and the Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer both at 9,800 tons or the Type 45 at about 8,500 tons). Their official PLAN designation is "10,000-ton class destroyer." while the US Department of Defense have been calling them "cruisers" since 2017. First ship of the class, 'Nanchang' was launched on June 28, 2017 at the Jiangnan Changxing Shipyard in Shanghai and the second one was launched in April this year at the same shipyard. Nanchang is expected to be transferred to the PLAN in 2019 provided builders and acceptance trials go smoothly. In total, eight Type 055 destroyers (including Nanchang) are currently under construction or fitting out in China. In addition to the Jiangnan-Changxing shipyard, construction is also being carried out in Dalian at the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company ( DSIC), which is part of another Chinese state shipbuilding corporation, China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). To date, another destroyer of this type has been completed in Shanghai (it was launched on April 28, 2018) and two more are being constructed at this shipyard. In Dalian, two Project 055 destroyers are at fitting out stage (both were launched simultaneously on July 3, 2018) and two more are under construction. Type 055 weapon systems The Type 055's weapons fit includes: The 130 mm H/PJ-38 main gun capable of firing several types of rounds including guided ones, the H/PJ-11 CIWS with a fire rate of 10,000 rd/min, the HQ-10 short-range missiles, decoy launchers and torpedoes. All other offensive and defensive missiles are found in the 112 silos of the universal VLS. These silos are distributed in two places - 64x forward and 48x aft, just in front of the ship's double hangar. They are of the same model as those used on Type 052D, compatible with both hot and cold launch thanks to the Concentric Canister Launcher (CCL) concept. Theoretically, all Chinese missiles which size does not exceed 9 meters in length and 0.85 meters in diameter can be launched from those VLS cells, provided that the combat system is compatible. To date, the Chinese navy plans to equip its first few Type 055 with HQ-9B anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 200 km, YJ-18A anti-ship missiles, a new type of medium range anti-aircraft missile and land attack cruise missiles based on the YJ-18 family, ie, practically the same as those already found on Type 052D destroyers. It is also likely that the new anti-submarine missile Yu-8A is among the ship's arsenal. U.S. Department of Defense Report In the recent U.S. DoD "Annual report to congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018", the Type 055 is mentioned with the following terms: China also launched its first RENHAI-class (Type 055) CG in 2017, with commissioning expected by 2019. At least three additional units of this class are currently under construction. The RENHAI CG is a 10,000-ton design that can carry an array of long-range ASCMs and long-range SAMs, and will likely be able to launch ASBMs and LACMs once these weapons are available. The RENHAI CG will be China’s premiere carrier escort for blue-water operations. It is not clear yet which type of "ASBM" (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile) is exactly mentioned here, as they would have to be small enough to fit in the VLS of the ship. Such an ASBM has yet to surface (at least in open sources). Source: https://www.navyrecognition.com

PHILIPPINE SEA (Aug. 26, 2018) The amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) and the amphibious dock landing ship USS Ashland (LSD 48), both a part of the Wasp Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), are underway alongside the Japan Maritime Self- Defense Force (JMSDF) amphibious transport dock ship JS Osumi (LST 4001) during a passing exercise (PASSEX) in the Philippine Sea, Aug. 26, 2018. PASSEX enabled the Wasp ARG and the JMSDF a chance to practice communications and maneuvering procedures. The Wasp ARG is currently operating in the region to enhance interoperability with partners and serve as a ready-response force for any type of contingency. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Taylor King/Released)

China's Navy Is Studying the Battle of Guadalcanal. Here's Why It Matters. In lieu of real wartime experience, the PLAN is drawing from history. by Lyle J. Goldstein August 26, 2018

China's military has not had much combat experience in recent decades, and this is recognized among Chinese military leaders as a potentially serious problem. The reasons for this scarcity of battlefield know—how are obvious and might even be praise-worthy. It has been nearly four decades since Beijing undertook a significant military campaign, so how would its armed forces have attained this knowledge? As I have argued many times before in this forum, nearly four decades without resorting to a major use of force represents very impressive restraint for any great power. By contrast, the U.S. military has been at war almost continuously since 2001 and fought several smallish wars during the 1990s as well. But for all the innovations that these recent American wars have spawned (e.g., aerial drones, heavily-armored vehicles), it remains unclear that the lessons learned from small, counter-insurgency wars, such as Afghanistan , are actually applicable to high- intensity warfare of the type that might occur in a great power showdown. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has sought to remedy its lack of actual combat experience by the careful study of military history, including the bloody Pacific War as I have noted in other Dragon Eye columns. August is steamy in the South Pacific and so the Guadalcanal campaign that began in August 1942 was hell. It was through that campaign that the fate of the Pacific was decided. While the dazzling miracle of Midway gets infinitely more attention, the grinding attrition battle just a few months later of Guadalcanal, which could be termed the “Verdun” of the Pacific War, ultimately proved to be the turning point. Losing 38 ships and perhaps over 700 aircraft proved devastating for Japan, although these losses were quite similar to those suffered on the American side. The difference, of course, was that America could replace these losses quite easily. Late last year (Dec 2017), the Chinese Navy’s official magazine Navy Today [当代海军] carried a reasonably detailed analysis of the crucial Guadalcanal campaign. The article concludes that Japan’s “command decisions and weapons development errors greatly increased the losses [指挥决策和装备研发上的失误更是大大加速了失败],” together with fundamental problems in Japan’s strategic culture. The Chinese analysis of Japanese mistakes in the campaign is neatly divided between errors in strategic judgment, operational and tactical errors, as well as mistakes in developing appropriate weaponry. At the grand strategic level, this Chinese Navy analysis assesses that Japan’s mistakes in the Guadalcanal campaign were partly a failure to reckon with the true significance of the Midway battle a couple of months prior in June 1942. Tokyo seemingly maintained its offensive posture in the South Pacific without recognizing the fundamental fact of “the mobilization of America’s enormous industrial capacity [美国强大工业机器启动].” The analysis asserts that much of the Japanese military was not even informed of the truly devastating results (for Japan) of Midway and that Tokyo’s decision-making was plagued by an incessant and pervasive cult of the offensive. It is noted that the South Pacific could have been invaluable to Japan’s effort to sever U.S. supply lines, but that a critical shortage of airborne intelligence inhibited effective decision- making. The great importance of the U.S. capture of Henderson Field early in the Guadalcanal campaign is noted, and this Chinese analysis concluded, meant that the Japanese pilots flying from distant Rabaul could not offer effective support to Japanese ground troops on the contested island, while Japanese carriers “would not dare to overreach by approaching Guadalcanal” [未敢过分接近瓜岛]. Japanese strategic decisions are assessed to have been plagued by poor coordination between ground and naval forces in the completely “unclear situation [情况不明].” This analysis also points out many Japanese operational practices that contributed to Japan's defeat on Guadalcanal. First, it is noted that Japanese soldiers had previously taken pride in their prowess in night fighting and also close combat. Both elements were said to be hallmarks of Japan's "bushido spirit" [武士道精神] or warrior ethos. Yet fighting of this type (in and around islands) implied relying on small caliber fires (e.g., mortars) rather than naval gunnery or air support for ground assaults. This "limited fire preparation" [有限火力准备] proved ineffective. The Chinese analysis notes, moreover, that Japanese assaults on Guadalcanal achieved neither stealth nor surprise. Then, there was the failure to concentrate sufficient forces. Initial Japanese attacks were too small and, by the time significant Japanese troops arrived, American defenses had been strengthened. Another fundamental Japanese error, according to this analysis, concerned logistics. Japanese forces were not only inadequately supplied, but also critically failed to target American rear supply depots [未攻击美方后勤补给物资 ]. Concerning weapons (and sensors), the PLA Navy analysis points out that the Japanese Navy put a premium on visual spotting, creating flying bridges on its battleships that were ever higher. This was occasionally effective but caused Japan to be lag behind in the vital trend of radar development, in which the Americans proved adept. The Chinese analysis also notes that the Americans skillfully employed a small number of tanks during the campaign, while the Japanese were completely unable to support their ground troops with armor. The tanks, according to this rendering, not only boosted the confidence of the American troops, but also played an important role in beating off Japanese attacks. A final point in the analysis is that the Japanese strategic culture of "the attack is first [进攻第一]" resulted in naval ship designs that had "weak air defense and anti-submarine capabilities [舰艇防空反潜能力弱]." The Japanese Navy's ineffective , for example, formed a significant limitation on its naval operations, according to this Chinese Navy rendering. The above points do not, of course, imply that the Chinese Navy understands the Guadalcanal Campaign better than the countries that actually fought the battle. Indeed, one can find some contradictions in the Chinese Navy analysis. Thus, it is not quite persuasive to criticize Japan for having an offensive, risk-acceptant doctrine, on the one hand, and then simultaneously suggest that they lacked the daring to commit additional carrier forces. Still, it is not outlandish to suggest the analysis might reflect curriculum development within Chinese military academies. One might deduce from the above rendering that emergent Chinese naval and amphibious doctrine could quite possibly strongly prioritize intelligence, sensor development, firepower and preparation, the interdiction of adversary logistics, amphibious tanks, as well as ship self-defense, including especially anti-submarine warfare. Readers may take some reassurance from the Chinese Navy analysis of the Guadalcanal campaign in that the PLA does not seem to be enthralled with the so-called " cult of the offensive ” that can commonly afflict military organizations. Lyle J. Goldstein is a research professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the United States Naval War College in Newport, RI. In addition to Chinese, he also speaks Russian and he is also an affiliate of the new Russia Maritime Studies Institute (RMSI) at Naval War College. You can reach him at [email protected]. The opinions in his columns are entirely his own and do not reflect the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government. Source: https://nationalinterest.org Mk-105 Mod 4 magnetic minesweeping system APRIL 2001 The MK-105 MOD 4 Magnetic Minesweeping System, hereafter referred to as the MK-105 MOD 4, is an upgrade of the MK- 105 MOD 2 Magnetic Minesweeping System that is currently used in the Fleet. The system is a remotely controlled, helicopter-towed platform used in Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM). It is designed to provide a reliable and safe method of detonating influence mines. MK-105 MOD 4 System operations can be conducted from aviation-type ships [Amphibious Assault Ship Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA), Amphibious Assault Ship Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), Mine Countermeasure Support (MCS), Landing Platform Dock (LPD), Amphibious Transport Dock Ship (LSD), and Aircraft Carrier (CV)], ramps, docks, piers, and prepared beaches. Functional Description. The MK-105 MOD 4 is an upgrade of the MK-105 MOD 2 Magnetic Minesweeping System. Figure I-1 depicts the MK-105 MOD 4 Seaborne Equipment Platform. The MK-105 MOD 4 functions are controlled from the helicopter. A Turbo Generator mounted on the Seaborne Platform provides the output power required for mission minesweeping. The turbo generator consists of a gas turbine engine, speed reduction gearbox, and Alternating Current (AC) generator. The AC Generator output is routed to an alternator rectifier subsystem. Electrical current from the alternator- rectifier subsystem flows through a sweep cable array that trails from the hydrofoil platform with seawater completing the electrical circuit. The electrical current produces a magnetic field in the water that detonates magnetic influence mines. To ensure maximum sweep effectiveness and flexibility, the system is designed to produce either a constant or a pulsed current output that is controlled by the Control Programmer located in the helicopter. When an Acoustic Minesweeping device (MK- 104) is attached to the magnetic sweep array, the resultant magnetic and acoustic influence field outputs will actuate magnetic and combination magnetic-acoustic influence mines.

TABLE I-1: MK-105 MOD 4 CHARACTERISTICS

DESCRIPTION CHARACTERISTICS

Foilborne Length 26' 10-5/8"

Ground Configuration Length 28' 9-1/4"

Foilborne Width 21' 1-1/4"

Ground Configuration Width 16' 10"

Foilborne Height (less Retrieval Rig) 15' 2-1/8"

Ground Configuration Height (less Retrieval Rig) 12' 1-1/2"

Net 8360 pounds Fuel Capacity 1292 pounds (190 gallons)

Usable Fuel 1115 pounds (164 gallons)

Gross Weight 9750 pounds

Maximum Operational Speed 25 knots

Maximum Operational Sea State 4

Maximum Power 350 kilowatts

Maximum Current 3500 amps Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org CH-53K: The U.S. Marines’ HLR Helicopter Program Aug 27, 2018 04:54 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff August 27/18: Keep’em sweeping The Navy is contracting Technical Systems Integration for the provision of necessary overhaul and modification work on the USMC’s Mk-105 minesweeping system. The firm-fixed-price, indefinite- delivery/indefinite-quantity contract has a value of $10.5 million, but also includes options, which if exercises, would bring the face value to roughly $54 million. The Mk-105 Magnetic Influence Minesweeping System is a catamaran hydrofoil which is towed behind the MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter. It is used to detect mines that use magnetic sensors to target the metallic hulls of ships before detonating. The twin magnetic tails, consisting of open-electrode magnetic sweeps, are towed behind the sled, detonating mines to clear the water for safe shipping. Work will be performed in Panama City, Florida, and is expected to be completed by August 2019. The U.S. Marines have a problem. They rely on their CH-53E Super Stallion medium-heavy lift helicopters to move troops, vehicles, and supplies off of their ships. But the helicopters are wearing out. Fast. The pace demanded by the Global War on Terror is relentless, and usage rates are 3 times normal. Attrition is taking its toll. Over the past few years, CH-53s have been recalled from “boneyard” storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in Tucson, AZ, in order to maintain fleet numbers in the face of recent losses and forced retirements. Now, there are no flyable spares left. Enter the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) program, now known as the CH-53K. It aims to offer notable performance improvements over the CH-53E, in a similar airframe. The question is whether its service entry delay to 2018-2019 will come too late to offset a serious decline in Marine aviation. The HLR Program Lifts Off

Sikorksy on HLR, 2011

The $25.5 billion, 200-helicopter CH-53K program will define the long-term future of the US Marine Corps’ medium-heavy lift capabilities – and may be needed to save Marine aviation in the medium term. On average, existing CH-53E aircraft are more than 15 years old, have over 3,000 flight hours under tough conditions, and are becoming more and more of a maintenance challenge with a 44:1 maintenance man-hours:flight hours ratio. Not to mention the resulting $20,000 per flight-hour cost ratio. According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, a 1999 analysis showed that the existing fleet has a service life of 6,120 flight hours, based on fatigue at the weakest point where the tail folds. The USMC expected that the existing fleet would start to reach this point in 2011, at a rate of 15 aircraft per year. The Marine Corps itself is the source of the disconnect. The HLR program initially called for 156 new-build helicopters derived from the CH-53E Super Stallion design, with initial flight tests in 2010-2011, and initial operating capability (IOC) in 2014-2015. IOC was defined as a detachment of 4 aircraft, with combat ready crews, and prepared to deploy with all required equipment and spares. In 2010, however, the Marines grew the program plan to 200 helicopters, even as they pushed its initial flight back to FY 2013, and IOC back to FY 2018. The program wasn’t experiencing problems, and no reasons were given, beyond statements concerning the program’s aggressive schedule. Further slippage has occurred since. Here’s the full timeline: The current schedule creates a number of risks for the Marine Corps. There’s no question that pushing the CH-53K program back will leave the Marines with a dwindling heavy-lift helicopter fleet, whose size, capability, and safety are governed by mechanical realities rather than political diktat. In April 2010, the US military ran out of stored CH-53D/E airframes to refurbish and return to the front lines. In February 2011, the USMC retired its CH-53D fleet altogether. The other risk is political. On the one hand, the CH-53K is a large program, and the farther the Marines push it away, the easier it is to cut amidst budget crises. With its heavy-lift fleet dwindling, that could be disastrous for the force. On the other hand, budgetary crises also look for programs that are late or experiencing problems, and the CH-53K is big enough to earn a lot of attention if it’s seen as screwing up. That fact that the original schedule was overly aggressive wouldn’t be remembered. Was the move to push the CH-53K back an act of political negligence, to protect less critical programs like the V-22? Or was it an act of supreme prudence, which will lead to a strong program that survives precisely because it goes out and meets its targets? Opinions vary. Time will tell. The CH-53X / CH-53K The CH-53K’s maximum gross weight (MGW) will increase to 88,000 pounds with external loads, versus 73,500 pounds for the CH-53E. MGW with internal loads will be 74,000 pounds, compared to 69,750 pounds for the CH-53E. It’s being designed to carry a cargo load of 27,000 pounds (13.5 tons) 110 nautical miles, operating at an altitude of 3,000 feet and an ambient of 91.5 degrees Fahrenheit. This is nearly double the capacity of the current CH-53E Super Stallions, all in a helicopter that’s roughly the same size. Those altitude and temperature qualifications matter, too, because “hot and high” conditions lower aircraft load carrying capabilities and combat radius – especially for helicopters. This reduced performance has recently been a factor during operations in Afghanistan and relief efforts in Pakistan, for instance, and has been a factor with earlier models of the C-130 Hercules as well . Figures for the CH-53K operating entirely around sea level and in cooler would be higher, but would not be double that of existing CH-53Es. As an example of these variables at work, Sikorsky’s CH-53K brochure states that the improved CH-53K will have a maximum external load of 16.3t/ 36,000 lbs. On the other hand, an operation that carries an externally-slung load from sea level to a point 3,000 feet above sea level, with a total range there and back of 220 nautical miles/ 407 km, and 30 minute loiter at the landing zone, would have a maximum mission load of only 12.25t/ 27,000 lbs. Even at sea level, however, increased lift capacity will be important. As the Hummer’s fundamental lack of survivability began to marginalize it on the battlefield, the Marines led the charge to field “MRAP” blast-resistant vehicle designs instead. While an up-armored HMMWV weighs about 9,100 pounds empty, the lightest Category 1 MRAP patrol vehicles check in at ranging from 16,000 – 31,000 pounds, and even the “light” JLTVs that will replace a large segment of the HMMWV fleet are expected to weigh 14,000 – 20,000 pounds. Those weights mean that tactical operations to airlift mobile forces ashore beyond the beach, or within the zone of operations, will have only one helicopter available that can get the job done: the CH-53. If the Marines think their CH-53 fleet is seeing heavy use now, just wait. New Technologies In order to meet those requirements, the CH-53K will be depending on a number of new technologies. No one technology constitutes a big stretch, which is good news for the program. Instead, a host of technologies that have been developed since the CH-53E program will be refined, and used in inter-related areas. For the basic outlines of many low-risk CH- 53X/CH-53K improvements, read “An Affordable To Heavy Lift ” [PDF] by Lt. Col. James C. Garman, an H-53 family pilot and Senior Preliminary Design Engineer in Sikorsky’s New Product Definition Group. See also this interview with former HLR program manager Col. Paul Croisetiere. The most important new addition to the CH-53K will be its 7,500shp class GE38 / T408 engines, which have already hit 8,300 shp in ground tests. The military is hoping for 18% better specific fuel consumption than the similarly sized T64 engine, even though the engine would produce 57% more power. To improve maintenance and reliability, the GE38 is also expected to have 63% fewer parts. Other technologies slated for the CH-53K include a “glass” [digital] cockpit that has high commonality and interoperability with existing Army and Navy helicopters, high-efficiency rotor blades with anhedral tips that have 12% (main) and 15% (tail) more surface area, plus different construction to handle higher loads; a composite cuff attachment that attaches the main blades directly to an elastomerically-articulated titanium rotor head, without the need for specialized tools or multiple redundant fasteners; a cargo rail locking system; external cargo improvements, survivability enhancements, and enhancements designed to extend service life. Changes will be made as the program progresses, and engineers get a better sense of which technologies are ready, and which would create risks to the program. For example, the CH-53K was going to use a “viscoelastic lag damper” for the rotors, in order to minimize vibration and stress. It was removed in order to speed up deployment, and a modified version of standard linear hydraulic dampers will be used instead. The Navy hopes to achieve 2x reliability compared to the existing CH-53Es, but gave up the potential for 4x reliability, in exchange for less development risk.

Sikorsky on CH-53K

Given the CH-53E’s large maintenance ratio, reliability will matter. As former HLR program manager Col. Paul Croisetiere put it in a NAVAIR release : “Given the CH-53E’s operational costs and maintenance demands, heavy lift has built its reputation for excellence on the backs of our maintainers… We are going to take our maintainers somewhere they’ve rarely been before. Home for dinner.” Several decades of weapon program history suggest that the odds of meeting this goal are low. Instead, the trend is that these promises are made, but more advanced and complex weapons wind up having more points of failure, and require even more maintenance. If the CH-53K program can break that cycle, it would represent a landmark success in Pentagon weapons acquisition. Source: https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com Included because it is the helicopter used to tow the minesweeping sled.

BOSTON (Aug. 24, 2018) USS Constitution is tugged out to Fort Independence on Castle Island during "Old Ironsides" Chief Petty Officer Heritage Week underway. Chief Petty Officer Heritage Week is a week dedicated to mentoring the Navy's newest chiefs through naval history and heritage training aboard America's Ship of State, USS Constitution. (U.S. Navy photo by Seaman Donovan Keller/Released)

The drones that have become part of China’s military strategy PUBLISHED : Sunday, 26 August, 2018, 5:02am UPDATED : Sunday, 26 August, 2018, 5:01am China’s PLA, or People’s Liberation Army, is actively trying to make advances in military robotics and unmanned systems. It now has a range of unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, in use across its army, navy, air force and rocket force – the military’s strategic and tactical missiles unit. Here are some of them. NAVY BZK-005 or Changying

The navy generally uses smaller, tactical drones but it also has a limited number of sophisticated reconnaissance UAVs, notably this medium-altitude, long-endurance model. Roughly comparable to the US Global Hawk, it has a maximum range of 2,400km and a maximum endurance of 40 hours. It has been operating in the vicinity of the East China Sea since at least 2013 and there were also reports in 2016 that it had been deployed to Woody Island in the South China Sea – both disputed territories.

ASN-209 or Silver Eagle

This medium-altitude, medium-endurance drone has been in use by the navy since at least 2011 for long-distance communications support and electromagnetic confrontation. With a range of 200km and a maximum duration of 10 hours, it could be used to support satellite communications if they were knocked out by the enemy, or for guidance in targeting missiles during combat. Source: https://www.scmp.com

PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 24, 2018) Sailors wash down an F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 14 on the flight deck aboard the Nimitz- class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). John C. Stennis is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class William Rosencrans/Released) Ever thought that washing down an aircraft would be a sailor’s job?>

Workhorses of the sea

The Pacific Osprey Photo : Flying Focus Aerial Photography www.flyingfocus.nl ©