NO. 11 MARCH 2020 Introduction

Nile Conflict: Compensation Rather Than Mediation How Europeans Can Lead an Alternative Way Forward Tobias von Lossow, Luca Miehe and Stephan Roll

The conflict between and Ethiopia over the distribution and use of the has entered a new phase. Questions about how and over what period of time the reservoir of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will be filled are taking centre stage. Against this backdrop, the USA launched a new mediation attempt at the end of 2019. However, initial hopes of a swift agreement have not materialized. The longer substantial results are postponed, the more apparent it becomes that ex- ternal mediation alone will not suffice to resolve the dispute. In order to defuse the conflict, it might be necessary for Egypt to compensate Ethiopia for concessions on the GERD. Germany and its European partners should provide Egypt with financial support for creating a compensation mechanism. This would promote stability in Europe’s conflict-ridden neighbouring region, and reduce migration pressure. But Europeans should tie financial contributions to clear conditions vis-à-vis , aimed at improving water management and overall governance.

The negotiations on the Nile water conflict, activated, which stipulates that further mediated by the US administration, had to consultations should take place, that in- be adjourned once more at the end of Feb- ternational mediation should be jointly ruary. Egypt, Ethiopia and were initiated, or that negotiations should be again unable to agree on a joint and com- conducted at the level of heads of state or prehensive approach to the filling of the government. GERD reservoir. US Secretary of State Mike The lack of success of the Trump admin- Pompeo has indicated that it could be istration’s mediation efforts makes it clear months before an agreement is reached. once again that the conflict over the use of Since three rounds of negotiations in Nile water has reached a dead end. Whereas Washington have already failed to produce numerous negotiations in recent decades any tangible results, a complete failure have focused on the fundamental question of the US initiative cannot be ruled out. In of water use rights, Egypt and Ethiopia are this situation, Article 10 of the trilateral currently arguing above all about the time- Declaration of Principles of 2015 would be frame in which the GERD reservoir is ex-

pected to be filled from 2020 onwards. The tion against restrictions on its own water Egyptian government is insisting on a slow supply. Recurrent threats from Cairo to stop fill of 12 to 21 years in order to avoid major the dam project by military bottlenecks in the water supply. The Ethio- means if necessary are rather improbable, pian government, on the other hand, wants not least because of the distance between to fill within 6 years in order to be able to the two countries. To date, efforts to exert reach full capacity for its power generation pressure on Ethiopia via the mobilisation more quickly. Sudan is geographically of allied states have also been unsuccessful. located between the two parties and also in- The USA and the Europeans, but also the volved in the negotiations, but takes a large- Gulf States and the People’s of ly neutral position: together with Egypt, China, maintain good relations with both is benefiting from the existing countries; they are evidently unwilling to water distribution scheme and at the same take sides in the water conflict. time anticipates benefits from GERD. A fur- It is unlikely that the Ethiopian leader- ther loss of time will in any case weaken ship will compromise on its own initiative, the Egyptian negotiating position. given the national dimension of the project. At the end of 2019, about 70 percent of the construction work had been completed, Egypt under Pressure such that filling can begin in 2020 and full operation seems viable – depending on the Egypt relies almost entirely on the Nile for filling timeframe – in 2025. Currently, a its water needs, providing over 90 percent large section of the Ethiopian population of the nation’s water resources. Approxi- has no access to electricity. The construc- mately 86 percent of the Nile water that tion of the GERD is therefore of similar reaches the Aswan Dam originates in the importance to Ethiopia as the Aswan Dam . However, Ethiopia has was for Egypt: it is not just an infrastruc- so far been unable to take advantage of its ture project, but a project of the century, favourable geostrategic position as an up- which should pave the way for the moderni- stream riparian state. In the past, a lack of sation of the country. Further delays in its financial resources and an unstable politi- implementation, or a drastic reduction in cal situation prevented the expansion of the size of the project, can hardly be justi- the water infrastructure in Ethiopia. fied by the Ethiopian government to its own In light of this, successive governments population. Prime Minister ’s in Cairo have always insisted on the status visit to the GERD on 1 February 2020 was quo of water distribution. In doing so, they highly symbolic, just one day after another relied primarily on colonial : firstly, round of fruitless negotiations. an agreement of 1929 with the colonial Negotiations on the filling of the reser- power Great Britain, which granted Egypt voir are at an impasse – but with clear a veto right against water projects on the advantages for Ethiopia. In the event of upper reaches; and secondly, an agreement new delays, the government in with Sudan of 1959, which divided the Nile could initiate a rapid filling, which could water resources between the two countries, cause a dramatic water shortage in Egypt, and guaranteed Egypt 55.5 billion cubic and perhaps even impact on energy pro- metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion duction (see Map). In order to avert such a cubic metres. Cairo ignores the fact that scenario, the European states in particular these contracts were negotiated without could offer an alternative approach. After Ethiopia. all, Egypt’s security of supply and Ethiopia’s The construction of the GERD has fun- development are central to the stability of damentally changed the balance of power the entire region, home to over 250 million on the Nile. Adherence to the old water people. A lack of development opportuni- contracts no longer offers Egypt any protec- ties and water shortages could have serious

SWP Comment 11 March 2020

2 Map

consequences for Europe, including increas- tion and use remained unresolved despite ing migration pressure. If no agreement can the NBI. In the current stalemate, Euro- be reached, Germany and its European part- peans should present their own proposal ners should offer alternative solutions to that fundamentally recognises Ethiopia’s revitalise the negotiations. increased negotiating power. Unlike in the past, negotiations under European leader- ship should not concentrate on distribution A Compensation Mechanism quotas, but on how and in what form Egypt can alleviate the negative consequences for A renewed attempt to resolve the Nile water Ethiopia of the slow filling of the reservoir. conflict by external actors can no longer be One option would be to develop a com- limited to facilitating negotiations between pensation mechanism between the two the conflict parties. This approach has proven countries. It would need to stipulate that ineffective, not only because the Trump Egypt compensates Ethiopia for the eco- administration’s initiative has so far failed nomic disadvantages resulting from a to make a breakthrough. The slower filling process. The basis for calcu- Initiative (NBI), which was created in 1999 lating the opportunity costs that Ethiopia and is supported to a large extent by Euro- would incur could be twofold: the financial pean countries, has also not been particu- value of the electricity Ethiopia was not larly successful. Its objective was to bring able to generate and its corresponding eco- the Nile riparians around the negotiating nomic benefits. Since the data situation table and, in parallel, to promote is ambiguous, the determination of these cooperation on the use of resources. The opportunity costs could not be a purely political and legal issues of water distribu- technical process, but ultimately the result

SWP Comment 11 March 2020

3 of political negotiations, which could be Egypt (see Map). Even without filling the guided by Germany and its European part- GERD reservoir, the country will reach ners. Furthermore, the Gulf , the threshold of absolute in as the most important partners of the three 2025, according to (UN) Nile states affected, should be included in estimates. Considerable the negotiations. They would benefit from is contributing to this, as is mismanage- peaceful and sustainable conflict resolu- ment in the water sector and the misallo- tion, since they have invested heavily in the cation of public funds. Yet Egypt under Nile basin, especially in the agricultural President Sisi has become the ’s third sector. largest importer of weapons and is pushing © Stiftung Wissenschaft In view of possible climate variability, ahead with resource-intensive prestige proj- und Politik, 2020 such a mechanism would offer flexibility ects – such as a new capital in the desert All rights reserved in filling the reservoir. In rainy years, Ethio- (at least $45 billion) or the construction of pia could retain more water than initially a nuclear power plant (approx. $25 billion); This Comment reflects agreed, which would reduce compensation meanwhile government investment in water the authors’ views. payments. Conversely, the mechanism could management has been neglected. Major sea- The online version of be used to compensate the country in peri- water desalination projects, for example, this publication contains ods of drought if it passed on more water did not begin to take shape until 2017. functioning links to other to Egypt than originally agreed. If such a Thus Germany and its European part- SWP texts and other relevant compensation mechanism for the filling ners should tie their financial contributions sources. phase could be worked out, the rules and within the framework of the compensation SWP Comments are subject principles could also be used in the future solution to the following conditions. They to internal peer review, fact- to control the water volume at the dam. would have to demand a reorientation of checking and copy-editing. The financing of such a mechanism Egypt’s state spending policy, which should For further information on would have to be provided by Egypt. Al- no longer be oriented towards authoritarian our quality control pro- though under international law the country logic. To achieve such a reorientation, polit- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- is entitled to an equitable and fair share ical reforms towards better governance berlin.org/en/about-swp/ of the Nile , a quota system in accord- and accountability would be indispensable. quality-management-for- ance with Egypt’s position would be vir- Ethiopia would have to commit itself to re- swp-publications/ tually impossible to implement in law acting flexibly in the case of extreme and in practice. Due to the state’s drained droughts during the mutually agreed time- SWP finances, Cairo is hardly in a position to frame of filling the reservoir. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik finance such a mechanism on its own – German Institute for the Europeans would have to get involved. International and Security Affairs The Conditions for Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin European Engagement Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 The Europeans should, however, make www.swp-berlin.org their contributions to such a compensation [email protected] mechanism, and thus their support for

ISSN 1861-1761 Egypt, subject to conditions aimed at a com- doi: 10.18449/2020C11 prehensive solution to the water crisis. The conflict over the GERD and the use of the (English version of Nile waters is already taking place in the SWP-Aktuell 13/2020) context of an acute water emergency in

Tobias von Lossow is Research Fellow at Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Luca Miehe is Research Assistant at the and Division at SWP. Dr Stephan Roll is Head of the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 11 March 2020

4