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Boston | Chicago | New York | Washington, D.C. Conflict-Sensitive Teacher Education: Viewing EDC’s Experience with the South Sudan Teacher Education Project Through a Conflict-Sensitive Lens

I. Introduction Using the USAID-funded South Sudan Teacher Education Project (SSTEP) that began in 2011 as a case study, this paper examines the emerging guidance regarding the conflict-sensitive design, implementation, and financing of teacher education policy and programming. In particular, we refer to the guidance and conceptual frameworks provided by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) in its INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education, published in 2013. This paper is intended primarily for policymakers, practitioners, program designers, and researchers working to improve education in fragile and conflict-affected environments. By reviewing recommended conflict- sensitive strategies within the context of a teacher education project that is operating within a “conflict recovery” environment, we aim to answer four key questions:

§ How does SSTEP’s design affect the applicability of recommended conflict-sensitive teacher education strategies? § What roles do donor, implementing partner, and Ministry decisions play in facilitating or undermining the application of recommended conflict-sensitive teacher education strategies? § Are the recommended conflict-sensitive strategies realistic when applied to existing dynamics, and are they effective? § What have we learned and what do we recommend to improve the likelihood that conflict- sensitive teacher education strategies can be successfully applied in future programming?

In the following sections we provide a brief overview of education in South Sudan, describe the SSTEP, introduce the concept of conflict-sensitive education (CSE), present INEE’s recommended strategies for conflict-sensitive teacher education (“CSE guidance”), and view SSTEP through the conflict-sensitive lens embedded within these strategies. For each chosen CSE teacher education standard, we present an observation, discussion, lessons learned, and recommendations, both for the conflict-sensitive design of teacher education programs in general and for fine-tuning INEE’s CSE guidance in particular. It should be noted that the SSTEP was awarded before the publication of the INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education. The overlay of the CSE guidance onto SSTEP is therefore retroactive.

1 II. Background Sudan’s recent history has been dominated by two civil wars, through which the southern part of Sudan sought independence from the northern part. The first war took place between 1955 and 1972, and the second between 1983 and 2005. The conflict was rooted both in an identity clash between the mostly Arabic-speaking and Muslim North and the mostly English-speaking and Christian sub-Saharan South, and in a struggle by the South to establish equal access to mineral resources, political influence, and government services. In January 2005, southern Sudan, represented by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with Sudan, which granted the South regional autonomy and guaranteed representation in a national power-sharing government. In January 2011, in a formal referendum on independence, 99 percent of southern Sudanese voted to split from Sudan. Since 2011, the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) has been recognized as an independent nation, although some contested border areas remain.

Since the signing of the CPA, RSS government institutions have continued to develop their human and administrative capacities. However, this brief period has been fraught with both internal conflicts and ongoing disputes with Sudan over border areas, oil, and citizenship issues. In 2011, oil disputes with Sudan led the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GOSS) to shut down its oil wells, which provided around 98 percent of its revenues. This resulted in drastic austerity measures as the GOSS cash flow was severely constrained, with very limited funding provided for social services, including education. It took more than a year for oil revenues to get back on track; even then, most oil revenues were diverted to security. Oil disputes between Sudan and South Sudan are ongoing and threaten political and economic stability.1

Challenges again erupted in December 2013, when a “clash of political egos” between the GOSS President Salva Kiir, who belongs to the Dinka ethnic group, and his vice president, Riek Machar, who belongs to the Nuer group, sparked an ethnic conflict that resulted in the deaths of many thousands. The hostilities between the Dinka and the Nuer (which also involve other smaller tribes) are based on long-standing grievances and cultural divides, including ethnic violence during the civil wars. What seems to have begun as a political confrontation between Kiir and Machar quickly deteriorated into an ethnic conflict that reflects the deep divides within South Sudanese society.

South Sudan is still very much a conflict-affected nation. Ongoing conflict—whether with the North or among the South Sudanese themselves—represents a formidable obstacle to the development of critical governance, economic, and social institutions and infrastructure. For the foreseeable future, South Sudan remains among the least-developed nations in the world, with an average per capita income, as of 2009, of $484, and with an estimated 14 of every 100 children dying before their fifth birthday, most of them from preventable diseases. Seventy-three percent of South Sudan’s population is illiterate.2

A. Education Status

As the world’s newest country, and as a nation plagued by persistent violent conflict, South Sudan faces significant education challenges. Currently some 73 percent of adults are unable to read and write, and

1 Source: Department for International Development (DfID), 2012. 2 Source: World Bank (2012); DfID (2012).

2 90 percent of primary school students drop out before completing grade 6.3 Sixty-four percent of primary school-age children are out of school, with over-age children making up 85 percent of all primary school enrollees. In 2011 the net primary school enrollment rate was 44 percent.4

There is wide regional disparity in education enrollment and attainment across South Sudan’s 10 states, with the probability of attaining grade 8 completion ranging from 25–43 percent in the highest- achieving states (Western and Central Equatoria, and Upper Nile) to 11–20 percent in the lowest- achieving states (Lakes, Jongeli, Warrap, and Eastern Equatoria). Educational outcomes are lowest for girls and for rural and the poorest children; not surprisingly, areas with historically less-developed education systems continue to report the lowest access, quality, and attainment.5

These statistics belie the fact that South Sudan’s Ministry of Education, with support from the international education community, has worked hard for more than a decade to improve education. The Ministry has made slow but steady gains in education policy, systems, and capacity development at the central and state levels. In addition, access to education has steadily increased. By 2010, primary school enrollments had risen to 1.6 million—up from .7 million in 2005 when the CPA was signed—with approximately 3,400 primary schools and 196 secondary schools in operation in 2012.

Table 1: Basic Education Indicators, South Sudan, 2011

Gross primary school enrollment rate 69% (boys 81.4%, girls 54.5%)

Net primary school enrollment rate 44% (boys 50.8%, girls 37.1%)

Gender parity index (primary school) 0.59

Gross pre-primary school enrollment rate 6% (boys 5.5%, girls 5.7%)

Net pre-primary school enrollment rate 2% (boys 2.3%, girls 2.3%)

Primary school completion rate (average) 10% (boys 13.7%, girls 6.2%)

Children ages 6–11 out of school 1,022,100 (64% of primary school age population)

Source: Government of South Sudan, Ministry of Education, Education Management Information System (EMIS), 2011 (n.d.); The Republic of Southern Sudan: The Sudan Household Health Survey 2010 (2011).

3 Source: UNICEF South Sudan, Basic Education and Gender Equality (n.d.) [Website]. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/southsudan/education_Education_issue.html 4 Source: World Bank (2012). 5 Ibid.

3 Table 2: Average Growth in Student Enrollments, by Level, 2000–2009 Average Annual Enrollment Growth (%) Level 2000 2005 2009 2000–05 2005–09 2000–09 Primary Education 331,000 669,000 1,380,580 15 20 17 Secondary Education 7,740 17,465 44,027 18 26 21 Higher Education 15,102 23,968 7 (2002) (2002–09) Vocational Training 724 2,760 16 Source: World Bank (2012).

Yet, improved access to education has raised and highlighted more complex challenges related to school quality and to teaching skills in particular. Such challenges include an extreme teacher shortage, difficult teaching and learning conditions, and low education and skill levels of the teachers themselves. The pupil-to-teacher ratio is less than ideal; in 2011, while 1.6 million children had enrolled in school, only 17,000 teachers were on the government payroll, resulting in a teacher-pupil ratio of roughly 80:1. Luckily, an additional estimated 10,000 “volunteer teachers” lowered the ratio to 50:1.

Typically, volunteer teachers are community members who have completed a basic level of schooling but have not had access to any teacher training. They may receive some form of compensation from local government authorities or the communities themselves, but they are not government employees. Their volunteer status raises a number of questions, such as:

§ How were the volunteers selected, by whom, and using what criteria? § What training did volunteers receive? § Has the government provided any support to these teachers?’

Conservative estimates predict that approximately 1.8 million children, at a gross enrollment rate of 70 percent, will be enrolled in primary school by 2015. At a 50:1 teacher-pupil ratio, this enrollment would require 35,000 teachers.6 Where will these additional teachers come from, and when, where, and how will they be trained—let alone paid?

An additional complicating factor is the low level of educational attainment for teachers, particularly those in primary schools. According to a 2012 World Bank Report, 46 percent of teachers had only a primary school education, while 45 percent had secondary education. The large majority of the volunteer teachers have completed no more than eight years of primary school. Further, only 40 percent of teachers possessed any sort of professional training.7 Given the poor quality of schools, many primary school teachers are thus unlikely themselves to fully understand the content, let alone the pedagogy, of the curriculum.

6 From a PowerPoint presentation titled “South Sudan Teacher Supply and Demand Analysis 2011–2016,” presented by Charlie Goldsmith Associates, London, England, to DFID and MoGEI, 2007. For more information, visit http://www.charliegoldsmithassociates.co.uk/work-we-have-done. 7 Source: World Bank (2012), p. 119.

4 There are also questions regarding testing and certification systems, as there have been numerous cases of false certificates.

Finally, for teachers who live in the north of the country and have been schooled in Arabic under the influence of Khartoum (known locally as “Arabic pattern”), English literacy is a tremendous challenge.

In addition to insufficient numbers and untrained teachers, other challenges that contribute to difficult learning and teaching conditions include low capacity to manage and supervise teachers, low participation of PTAs and communities in school governance, inadequate teaching materials, and lack of basic school infrastructure. All of these are additionally strained in some states by a continuing influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), many with different educational backgrounds and learning needs, and by ongoing inter-ethnic tension that overflows into the classrooms. Such challenges were only heightened when, due to budget austerity measures imposed in 2012, the government ceased support for state-run teacher education colleges and made a significant overall reduction in education service delivery, including teacher payment. As a result, many teachers spent months without being paid, further exacerbating teacher attrition and the cycle of poor school quality and high drop-out rates.

B. Teacher Education

Until 2012, South Sudan’s draft National Teacher Education Strategy, first developed in 2006 and amended periodically, provided for both pre- and in-service training of teachers. The strategy stated that pre-service training should occur via a Teacher Training Institute (TTI) in each state and two County Education Centers (CECs) in each county, for a total of 10 TTIs and 158 CECs, with oversight provided by the National Ministry.8 The teacher certification framework called for a two-year pre-service training program via TTIs for candidates with a secondary degree, and a four-year residential training program via TTIs for those possessing Primary 8 through Secondary 3 completion. Active teachers were to participate in a four-year in-service training program via distance learning and face-to-face instruction at CECs. Certification for all teachers was to be granted by passing a common teacher exam, administered at the end of the training cycles.

Overall policies and standards for the teaching force were to be established by the Ministry of General Education and Instruction (MoGEI). While many policies and standards are still pending, those that have been improved were to be implemented by State Ministries of Education. Specifically, the States were expected to do the following:

§ Prepare budgets for teacher salaries and benefits, based on projected demand (enrollments, new schools, pupil-teacher ratios, qualifications structure) § Apply educational and teacher standards in the management of the teaching staff § Register, appoint, grade, post, supervise, support, and discipline teaching staff § Ensure that teachers are paid salaries and allowances on time and according to scale § Assess and promote staff based on in-service training, performance, and criteria specified by a teacher career ladder

8 Ibid.

5 § Monitor progress in meeting Education Sector objectives for teachers within their States9 However, these expectations were unrealistic given South Sudan’s poor existing training infrastructure, the low management capacity at the central and State levels, the lack of funding, and the dearth of existing or prospective teachers who met the desired minimum education requirements. Not unsurprisingly, neither the National Ministry nor the States were able to fulfill the expectations.

South Sudan’s General Education Bill, passed in 2012, represented an important advance toward updating the earlier strategy and in clarifying basic elements of the education system’s structure. However, the bill failed to address a number of critical areas of education policy, teacher education among them. Currently, there are no structured teacher education policies in place. Furthermore, while education policy is designed at the national level, the Ministry suffers from a dearth of qualified education experts; at the State level, there is limited implementation of the policies that do exist. Many states simply do not comply with national policy, with some states operating independently and in clear violation of approved policies.

C. Donor Support to Education

Donor support to education in South Sudan falls primarily into three categories: pooled funds that are contributed to by a variety of donors, multi-lateral assistance, and bilateral assistance. Among the bilateral donors, the United States and United Kingdom provide the largest support for education. Table 3 below summarizes some of the major education-focused donor initiatives in the past 10 years.

Table 3: Major Donor Initiatives Support Description POOLED FUNDS Multi-Donor The MDTF-SS was designed to build the capacity of state institutions while simultaneously delivering Trust Fund on urgent needs, rehabilitating core physical infrastructure, establishing essential public services, and Southern Sudan facilitating the transition from a subsistence-based economy to a development-oriented economy. In (MDTF-SS), education, the Rapid Impact Emergency Project provided learning materials, and the Education 2005–2013 Rehabilitation Project (ERP) supported the building of learning centers and training. Joint Donor These funds supported the Capacity Building Trust Fund and the Basic Services Fund, the latter of Team Pooled which funded NGOs to implement school construction and pre-service and in-service teacher Funds, 2005– training. Lead donors include the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and present Canada. Global The GPE provides support for the government’s Education Sector Plan (2012–2017), which focuses Partnership for on access, equity, quality, and efficiency and the implementation of the General Education Strategic Education (GPE) Plan. UNESCO and USAID coordinate the GPE with multi-donor support. Funding, 2012– present MULTI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE European Union In 2012, the Commission adopted a multi-annual programming document for the period 2011–2013 that allocates €30 million to education projects in South Sudan. UNICEF UNICEF is using three key strategic approaches to improve prevailing education conditions in South Sudan: (1) Education Sector Policy and Planning includes passing and implementing the Education

9 From an internal memo (2012), by EDC consultant Dr. Ash Hartwell.

6 Act, (2) Improved Quality of Education includes safe, effective, inclusive, gender-sensitive, and healthy learning spaces, and (3) Education for Children and Young People Out of School involves the provision of flexible learning opportunities and establishing links between formal and non-formal education systems. UNESCO In 2010, the MoGEI, in partnership with UNICEF South Sudan and the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, developed South Sudan’s first General Education Strategic Plan. Subsequently, UNESCO, with the Ministry of Education in South Sudan, launched the 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring Report in Juba. This policy paper outlined educational challenges and opportunities in South Sudan, and called for a concerted international aid effort. World Bank In 2012, the World Bank disbursed $25.5 million U.S. to the ERP in South Sudan. The South Sudan Development Plan included expanded access to general education as a core target under the Social and Human Development Pillar. In FY13, the World Bank undertook pilot programs related to basic and practical skills development. The Bank-administered Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program targeted rural and urban livelihood options for ex-combatants, including basic numeracy and skills development.

BILATERAL ASSISTANCE United Major programs, in addition to UKAID’s contribution to the MDTF-SS, include the initiation of the basic Kingdom services fund (described above), to which it was the largest and lead donor. Current major education Agency for projects include the South Sudan Education Programme, Textbooks for South Sudan, and the Girls’ International Education in South Sudan Programme. Development (UKAID, formerly DfID)

United States Established in 2001, the Sudan Basic Education Program (SBEP) contributed to USAID’s overall Agency for strategic goal of enhancing southern Sudan’s environment for conflict reduction by increasing International equitable access to quality education. The follow-on USAID Sudan Technical Assistance Project (STAP) Development focused on building central and State Ministry capacity in the areas of education management and (USAID) program implementation, with a particular focus on building systems to support the continuing expansion and improvement of education in southern Sudan. The Southern Sudan Interactive Radio Instruction project was initially funded in 2004, and provided learning opportunities for children, adults, and teachers in South Sudan. Gender Equity through Education (GEE) (2007–2011) disbursed stipends to more than 5,300 female learners over age 5, half of whom are to have graduated from a GEE-supported secondary school or TTI since 2008.

D. The South Sudan Teacher Education Project

The SSTEP grew directly out of work done previously through the USAID SBEP and STAP projects, as well as the MDTF-SS, BSF, and ERP. In 2011, USAID awarded EDC $30 million over a three-year period to implement the SSTEP. The idea was that SSTEP would pick up where the other projects had left off in terms of teacher training, particularly with the MDTF-SS and BSF teachers. The objectives of this initiative were to work closely with the National Ministry and 10 State Ministries of Education, and through TTIs and CECs, to (1) improve policy frameworks and management systems to professionalize teaching and to ensure effectiveness and quality in the delivery of education services, (2) improve teacher performance, and (3) increase access to curriculum-based teaching and learning materials.

7 EDC proposed to achieve the following results:10

§ Five policies (HR, affirmative action, accreditation, teacher certification, and Education Support Network [ESN]) and five standards (head teachers, TTI tutors, CEC tutors, inspectors, and supervisors) developed § A unified pre- and in-service curriculum § In-service tutor and student materials for five subjects § Pre-service tutor and student materials for five subjects § Resource Centers renovated or built at each of the 12–15 institutions in the ESN § 4,751 teachers on the pathway to certification § 115 TTI and CEC tutors trained and using the new unified curriculum § 5,300 head teachers, inspectors, and officials trained in the new curriculum and in other critical areas § 246,830 learning materials developed or acquired and distributed

USAID began designing the project years before the award was made to EDC, during a period of great optimism after the signing of the CPA. However, by the time the project began in October 2011, conditions in the education sector had changed significantly. Within months of inception, EDC staff began to identify program objectives and design elements that seemed unfeasible and began working with the Ministry and USAID to adjust the program’s focus and activities to achieve feasible objectives. Specifically, the conditions affecting implementation within SSTEP’s first year were as follows:

§ The absence of operational budgets for the Curriculum Development Center, the TTIs, and the CECs: Under the austerity measures resulting from oil disputes with North Sudan, the government was not able to provide adequate funding to any of the teacher preparation institutions with which SSTEP had planned to work as a counterpart.11 As a result, these institutions were almost entirely non-functional. There was only one functioning government TTI and a limited number of CECs operational during this time. In-service training through the Ministry training structures was therefore severely limited. § The lack of tutors for the in-service training model: With the closure of the TTIs and consequent lack of teacher trainers, SSTEP turned to government-paid tutors, linked to the CECs or the State Ministries, to deliver in-service training and support. Typically, State tutors were retired teachers linked to a CEC (if operational) and tasked with conducting training, coaching, mentoring, and supervision of teachers. Unfortunately, in many states the government tutors were unavailable, unqualified, or simply not working, as they were not being paid. With many CECs non-operational, the tutors were left unsupervised and without a clear set of roles and responsibilities. To address the dearth of tutors, SSTEP hired a modest number of trainers to staff its field offices, adding unforeseen costs to the project. With limited financial resources,

10 From the SSTEP Performance Monitoring Plan developed for USAID by EDC, 2011. More information is available at http://sstep.info/index.php/quality-assurance 11 While specific data are hard to obtain on actual budget figures, SSTEP estimates that only 30 percent of the Ministry budget was allocated in FY2012–2013. Roughly 10 percent of the overall FY2012–2013 austerity budget of 6.7 billion South Sudanese pounds (USD 1.3 billion) is allocated to education. Following this logic, an estimate of total funding for education in South Sudan for 2012–2013 is in the range of USD 40 million.

8 SSTEP was not in a position to hire the high numbers of trainers necessary to ensure quality in- service training delivery in each State. § High departure of teachers who had been trained through the MDTF-SS and BSF: Approximately 1,650 teachers were enrolled in the MDTF-SS, of whom SSTEP was able to locate and re-enroll approximately 900. The reasons for the high rate of dropout ranged from teachers finding other (paid) jobs, including jobs in the police force or the army, to loss of interest in the teaching profession, which was also related to delays in salary payments. As a result, to maintain its commitment to USAID to train large numbers of teachers, SSTEP had to work with the State Ministries to recruit more teachers. § Lack of established systems to regulate the teaching profession: While SSTEP was committed to improving policy frameworks and management systems to professionalize teaching, progress was slow due to delays in passing and then implementing the Education Bill in Parliament. Teacher professional development, including certification, remained a pending issue on the agenda. In particular, there was a lack of agreement within the Ministry regarding the minimum education level required to enter a TTI or CEC (or to attend in-service training). Some in the Ministry believed that teachers should have at minimum an eighth grade education, whereas others (along with SSTEP staff) believed that all interested candidates should be eligible for some teacher training program. This disagreement made it difficult for SSTEP to offer appropriate training to the broad range of teachers with varied education and skill levels. § Lack of curriculum counterpart expertise and workforce to complete and revise the previously developed teacher training curriculum: While SSTEP had anticipated leading a curriculum review process and supporting the development of materials, it was envisioned that the Ministry itself would conduct the mainstay of the work. Unfortunately, due to a variety of factors including budget, the Curriculum Development Center at Maridi was largely dysfunctional.

To respond to the above conditions and others, in December 2012 SSTEP submitted to USAID a change in approach that was outlined in the SSTEP “Master Plan,” which benefited from wide consultation with the Ministry and USAID. The main elements of the Master Plan that detailed the first major shift in approach were as follows:

§ Reduction in the number of teachers and increase in the number of tutors to be trained: Due to the lower-than-anticipated number of teachers re-enrolling in teacher training, coupled with the Ministry’s insufficient funds to maintain the minimum infrastructure for in-service training at the State level, the overall target for teachers undergoing training was reduced. Realizing that the emphasis would be on in-service training moving forward, and understanding both the critical role and low capacity of government tutors, tutor support and training was expanded to reach more tutors with a more in-depth training program. § Emphasis on early primary grade teachers and proposal of a Lower Primary Provisional Certificate: Given the high number of lower primary teachers with little to no training, SSTEP proposed to focus on a two-year in-service training model whereby teachers would receive a Lower Primary Provisional Certificate and have an additional five years to upgrade to a full primary teaching certificate. SSTEP, USAID, and some in the Ministry viewed this as a cost- effective and efficient way to upgrade the skills of thousands of teachers in a relatively short timeframe. The delivery model would continue, namely, (1) face-to-face training (three weeks and three times per year), (2) cluster meetings, and (3) community-based studies. Following this

9 pattern, teachers could obtain the Lower Primary Provisional Certificate in two years and the full certificate in four years. § Focus on reading: Recognizing the importance of literacy in South Sudan, and the lack of materials and methods to teach reading and writing, SSTEP proposed to integrate the teaching of reading and writing into the English syllabus of the unified teacher training curriculum, to design new literacy training materials, and to train a core group of tutors as trainers. This also was related to USAID’s guidance on emphasizing reading. § Expanded SSTEP offices based in States: Initially SSTEP staff worked from one office in Juba. In response to the challenges faced by the Ministry in terms of the number and qualifications of tutors, SSTEP expanded its field presence in order to provide more direct support to tutors and teachers alike. State Offices were eventually opened in each of the 10 States, with a total of five staff positions (three technical, two operational).

By December 2013, SSTEP had trained close to 3,000 teachers and tutors; however, none of these teachers had completed the full four-year in-service training program, and few were likely to complete it during the project’s life cycle. Furthermore, the in-service model agreed on by all stakeholders had proven difficult to implement, due to the widely dispersed geographic locations of the teachers, limited TTI and CEC capacity and resources, and challenges in identifying and training tutors. At the average annual rate of expenditure supporting the in-service model, SSTEP would have run out of funding without any certainty that enrolled teachers would be formally recognized (i.e., certified) by the GOSS.

SSTEP had all along been advocating for the Lower Primary Provisional Certificate, which would have enabled SSTEP trainees to take this exam during the life of the project. Notwithstanding significant efforts made by SSTEP, the Ministry had not made any progress on approving the Lower Primary Provisional Certificate, largely due to disagreements over whether there was much value in training teachers with less than secondary degrees. Given these changes and the arrival of new USAID staff in South Sudan, SSTEP embarked on a new round of modifications with USAID and the Ministry in December 2013. The major emphasis of this second shift in approach included the following changes:

§ Expansion of policy and teacher training curriculum development work: To lay the foundation for future teacher professional development, and given the challenges noted previously, it was agreed that SSTEP should focus its remaining resources on foundational elements of policy and curriculum development. § Suspension of in-service training activities at the State level (enrollment: 1,900 teachers): With more resources devoted to policy and curriculum, it was argued that continued training for a few thousand teachers would be a lower priority, particularly given the lack of clarity regarding whether these teachers would be formally recognized. § Accelerated implementation of a residential teacher training program, beginning with the one functional TTI: Recognizing the limitations of the in-service model in South Sudan, stakeholders agreed that residential training should be prioritized in order to continue training for teachers who were close to finishing the full teacher training curriculum. § Piloting of an alternative afternoon in-service model in one State: SSTEP agreed that it would be important to pilot a new service delivery model for in-service teachers whereby teachers were released early to attend afternoon training sessions. § Intensive support to key CEC and TTI tutors in all States: Recognizing the key role of tutors, SSTEP planned to build the capacity of tutors rather than deliver in-service training directly.

10

USAID, EDC, and the Minister of Education concurred with this approach, with the rationale that by making more strategic, foundational investments in policy and curriculum, the impact on South Sudan’s education system would be greater than if they continued to invest in a small percentage of the overall teachers requiring training (the 1,900 teachers enrolled at this point in time represented less than 10 percent of the teaching force). In sum, while aware of the frustrations of teachers who would not be able to complete their training, the stakeholders concurred that priority should be given to foundational work.12

III. Conflict-Sensitive Education

Education is not immune from conflict. Not only does conflict visibly impact the quality and delivery of education, education also directly and indirectly mitigates or exacerbates conflict. A growing body of evidence13 has led education policymakers and practitioners active in conflict-affected environments to re-examine education programming, planning, and financing using a conflict-sensitive lens.

Responding to this growing awareness, in 2013 INEE, through collaborative efforts of its working groups in Minimum Standards and Education in Fragility, published a resource package for designing and implementing CSE. The INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education states, “Education policies and programs that only focus on technical solutions are not sufficient to address the challenges found in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. If attention to conflict is not integrated into education policy and programming, there is a risk that education investments will increase tensions. Education programs and policies in conflict-affected and fragile contexts should be ‘conflict sensitive,’ both minimizing negative impacts and maximizing positive impacts.”14

INEE describes CSE as being an iterative process through which education professionals strive to understand the context in which education takes place, analyze the two-way interaction between this context and education programs and policies (development, planning, and delivery), and act to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of education policies and programming on conflict, within an organization’s given priorities.15

To assist in this process, the INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education provides a series of strategies and reflection questions for CSE, organized according to the five education domains put forward in INEE’s core guidance document, Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery:16 (1) Foundational (community participation, coordination, analysis), (2) Access and Learning Environment, (3) Teaching and Learning, (4) Teachers and Other Education Personnel, and (5) Education Policy. Both the Minimum Standards, which further define the targets for South Sudan, and the INEE

12 Soon after reaching SSTEP’s newest agreement, South Sudan’s most recent round of inter-ethnic hostilities erupted. All international SSTEP staff were evacuated from South Sudan in December 2013, and in early February 2014, USAID initiated termination of the project. 13 See the INEE website (http://www.ineesite.org) for access to a range of studies. 14 Source: Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (2013), p. 7. 15 Ibid. 16 Source: INEE (2010).

11 Guidance Note address teacher education—the particular focus of this case study—under Domains 3, 4, and 5.

A summary of the relevant sections of both the INEE Guidance Note and the Minimum Standards is attached as Annex 1 to this paper. The most relevant areas are summarized in Table 4, with more detailed descriptions provided in Annex A.

Table 4: INEE Minimum Standards Most Relevant to SSTEP INEE Minimum Standard Summary Standard Domain Domain 3: Standard 2: Training, Teachers and other educational personnel receive periodic, Teaching and Professional relevant, and structured training according to needs and Learning Development and circumstances. Support Domain 4: Standard 1: A sufficient number of appropriately qualified teachers and other Teachers and Recruitment and education personnel are recruited through a participatory and Other Education Selection transparent process, based on selection criteria reflecting diversity Personnel and equity. Domain 4: Standard 2: Conditions Teachers and other education personnel have clearly defined Teachers and of Work conditions of work and are appropriately compensated. Other Education Personnel Domain 4: Standard 3: Support Support and supervision mechanisms for teachers and other Teachers and and Supervision education personnel function effectively. Other Education Personnel Domain 5: Standard 1: Law and Education authorities prioritize continuity and recovery of quality Education Policy Policy Formulation education, including free and inclusive access to schooling.

It is important to note that the INEE Guidance Note is “aspirational” by design. That is, both these standards and, to a more modest extent, the Minimum Standards put forward the ideal scenario toward which education partners would work, with the implicit understanding that these goals would not necessarily be attainable all at once and/or across all domains and standards, given the very challenging conflict-affected and fragile contexts where guidance would be applied. The standards are not accompanied by pathways or “steps” to attainment, thus making it difficult to monitor improvements and progress toward the long-term goals. This approach means that education partners will need to think carefully and collaboratively about which standards to prioritize and in what timeframe. Those domains that rely heavily or exclusively on host country government participation—such as Teacher Education—may prove especially difficult to attain, as SSTEP’s experience will demonstrate.

IV. Conflict-Sensitive Teacher Education and the SSTEP Experience

As noted above, South Sudan is a particularly challenging country. Not only is it recovering from decades of war (and seems to be sliding back into full crisis mode within a mere two years of independence), it is

12 also a new country that needs to implement laws and policies—in most cases creating them from scratch. This is a huge challenge—but it’s also an opportunity to learn from others and get the foundation right. In theory, the country should and could follow the standards set out in the INEE Guidance Note, but in practice this has been and will be difficult, given the extreme lack of capacity, technical expertise, human resources, and budget available to the Ministry of Education. After years of conflict, in which millions of South Sudanese have fled the country, the capacity of the Ministry is very low, and politics—greatly influenced by past and ongoing conflict dynamics—are often prioritized ahead of technical considerations.

A general comment on the application of the INEE Guidance Note for teacher education and support is that the large majority of recommendations are out of the hands of donors or implementers. Implementing the current CSE guidance for teacher education and support would require the full and active participation of a functional government structure (including the Ministry of Education, but also key government bodies). Successful implementation of this guidance would also require a government- wide commitment to prioritizing education. Unfortunately, in South Sudan, and likely other conflict- affected or post-conflict countries, the governance system simply does not provide the foundational requirements to implement the CSE guidance. These realities raise a number of questions for donors, implementing partners, and conflict-affected Ministries of Education that wish to adhere to the principles of CSE, for example:

§ What are acceptable timeframes within which to address the different CSE standards? § Given that not all standards can be addressed at once, how should priority sequencing be determined? § Given that governments face deep shortages of funds and capacity, what are acceptable, progressive milestones and benchmarks for developing conflict-sensitive teacher education and support that governments, donors, and implementing partners can use as guidance as they work toward the longer term and more ideal standards? How might government, donor, and implementing partner roles evolve as the teacher education and support system is progressively built? § In the case that the governance system is not able to collaborate in developing conflict-sensitive teacher education and support, what parts of the CSE guidance, if any, can still be applicable for non-governmental actors, and what sort of impact could they have?

The following sections provide more specific details on SSTEP’s experience of implementing the CSE teacher education and support guidance in South Sudan. Following this detailed review, we offer recommendations and lessons learned for how to make CSE guidance more operational, using the above questions as a guide.

Domain 3, Standard 2: Training, Professional Development, and Support

§ INEE Guidance Note: This standard is defined as “teachers and other education personnel receive periodic, relevant, and structured training according to needs and circumstances.”17 The training process is described as being inclusive and non-discriminatory, with special attention given to refugee teachers. Training should be provided by qualified trainers who are aware of

17 Source: INEE (2013), p. 11.

13 conflict dynamics. In terms of content, the emphasis of teacher training is meant to include human rights, responsible citizenship, reconciliation, conflict dynamics and transformation, identity issues, non-violent alternatives, and addressing historical memory. In regard to South Sudan, the Minimum Standards lay out specific goals for first and subsequent trainings on emergency issues and the need for subject-specialist trainers. § Observation 1: With limited teacher education capacity and resources, the Ministry prioritized a focus on core subjects over more conflict-sensitive ones, such as peace-building and human rights. § SSTEP Experience: As noted above, South Sudan has a severe teacher shortage and currently relies on a large percentage of volunteer and untrained teachers for whom the only training option is in-service. The window for substantive face-to-face in-service training is limited to 9–12 weeks per year. With limited physical infrastructure to house teachers, as well as transportation challenges, the cost of conducting face-to-face training is very high and is not sustainable by the government of South Sudan. Given these realities, the Ministry expected SSTEP to focus its teacher training resources on conveying basic curriculum content and pedagogy in the five core subject areas (English, math, social studies, science, and professional studies). Other elements of the curriculum, such as physical education, music, and art, were, in SSTEP’s experience, never covered in in-service teacher trainings. In an environment where neither core nor non-core curriculum topics were given adequate coverage, there was no discussion of adding “extra” topics, such as peace-building, education in crisis and emergency situations, or identity issues. Donors and implementing partners might argue that the knowledge of how to help manage crises and emergencies would be a priority for the teachers over the curricular content. However, this simply was not the priority of the fledgling government of South Sudan nor of SSTEP, whose mandate was to work with and through the Ministry and who struggled simply to ensure quality support for core subject training. § Observation 2: The MoGEI’s’s supply of teacher trainers (tutors) was inadequate in both number and quality to deliver training in core subjects and basic pedagogy, let alone conflict-sensitive approaches to education. § SSTEP Experience: With the closure of the TTIs and CECs, the limited teacher training that did take place was conducted by State Ministry tutors, who were more often than not retired government teachers. The role of the tutors was to support learning and the CECs and to direct teacher support and supervision. The number of tutors, as well as their suitability, knowledge, skills, and reliability, varied greatly from State to State. In many cases, the tutors were older teachers who could not easily get around in the difficult physical conditions of rural South Sudan, making monitoring and supervision of learning content very difficult. Furthermore, while many tutors might be listed on State rosters, these individuals were often not working and/or not being paid. And while SSTEP did provide significant training of tutors, the project had little influence over their deployment and was unable to monitor the quality of their training delivery. Within this context, it is difficult to imagine whether and with what degree of quality the critical and difficult topics of conflict dynamics and transformation, identity issues, and reconciliation would be delivered to teacher trainees. § SSTEP Lesson Learned: In South Sudan’s scarce human and financial resources environment there was extremely limited bandwidth for anything but the most basic and critical teacher education topics. Given the critical importance of conflict-sensitivity for teacher instruction in South Sudan, this topic should have been explicitly discussed, negotiated, and included as part of the “most basic/critical” elements of SSTEP’s curriculum design support to the MoGEI.

14 § Recommendations for CSE: ! In cases where donors and implementing partners are directly collaborating with the MoGEI to determine and deliver teacher training, identify and agree on a limited number of core conflict-sensitive messages and approaches to be emphasized in teacher training. Next, work with training designers and Master Trainers to build these into training protocols, materials, and evaluations, even if training is focused on pedagogy or subject matter (i.e., integrate CSE messages into these topics). ! In cases where donors and implementing partners are working independently of the MoGEI to determine and deliver teacher training (for example, in cases where there is no functioning MoGEI, or in refugee or IDP camps), identify core curricular knowledge that teachers and students must know in order to progress in formal education at each grade level, then deliver curricular content within a broader, conflict-sensitive training plan that is specifically built for delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. ! Provide all Master Trainers with solid training in CSE principles and teacher education approaches. ! Consider alternative delivery mechanisms for teacher to have access to conflict-sensitive topics. For example, South Sudan has received thousands of radios that could be used for easy delivery of sensitive topics.

Domain 4, Standard 1: Recruitment and Selection of Teachers

§ INEE Guidance Note: This standard is defined as “a sufficient number of appropriately qualified teachers and other education personnel are recruited through a participatory and transparent process, based on selection criteria reflecting diversity and equity.”18 The Guidance Note references job descriptions, selection guidelines, selection committees, HR and payroll systems, and deployment policies. The Minimum Standards emphasize a 50:1 learning ratio, define three tiers of teachers, advocate for highly qualified other education personnel, and stress the need for transparent and equitable recruitment balancing ethnicity, gender, and language, with an objective of 25 percent of the teaching staff being female. § Observation: Teacher recruitment and selection varied by state and locality, and the processes were not transparent to external observers. § SSTEP Experience: SSTEP’s experience in regard to the recruitment and selection of teachers is that policies and practices varied greatly from one area to another and that there was little to no transparency in the process. There was no unified teacher registry in South Sudan. Some teachers were on the government payroll and thus fulfilled certain conditions of educational attainment, but the large majority were so-called volunteer teachers, who may receive some compensation from the community and/or the local education authorities. How these volunteers were recruited, trained, supervised, supported, and monitored was both varied and difficult to ascertain. Further complicating the scenario was the widespread nepotism (often based along ethnic lines) and corruption within the system. Officials at both the National and State levels were often appointed based on their past affiliation with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army rather than on qualifications or skills. This attitude trickled down to the State and payam levels, with rewards of

18 Source: INEE (2013), p. 11.

15 salaried positions being provided to loyal activists. False transcripts and education certificates were not uncommon, so the true level of schooling and knowledge of potential teachers was hard to determine. This was further exacerbated in the North, where most teachers were trained in Arabic-pattern teaching and had low English skills, making teacher knowledge testing difficult. SSTEP’s trainee cohorts came from two sources. The initial cohort consisted of teachers who had previously been trained under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. SSTEP therefore had no say in teacher recruitment or selection for this group. When this first cohort proved insufficient and SSTEP shifted strategies to recruit new trainees, SSTEP shared its selection criteria with State Ministries, who handled the actual recruitment and selection—one of the biggest challenges that SSTEP faced. The majority of teachers presented to SSTEP for training did not meet SSTEP’s selection criteria. SSTEP was faced with either rejecting them or proceeding. SSTEP chose to train all teachers who presented for training, with the rationale that all teachers would benefit from training and that the time and funding lost to begin a new recruitment with no guarantee of a different result would not be well spent. The scenario was further complicated by the difficulty in administering entrance examinations to the training programs, which was both costly in terms of mobilizing the students and difficult in terms of the engagement of the State Ministries. For example, when SSTEP did try to administer entrance examinations, in one State all the teachers failed. Were SSTEP to refuse to train these teachers, it would imply eliminating a priority State from the program. After consulting with USAID, it was determined that the teachers should stay in the program. Furthermore, according to SSTEP staff, there is a culture of suspicion of exam-sitting throughout the country, meaning that many teachers might be “frightened away” purely because of the entrance examination. § SSTEP Lesson Learned: Unless government teacher recruitment and selection mechanisms include community and/or third-party observers, along with clear entrance examinations, CSE recruitment and selection standards will be difficult to enforce or monitor, and participant backgrounds will be difficult to verify. § Recommendations for CSE: ! Through a CSE assessment, determine key teacher characteristics to consider for ensuring equity and diversity for this context. Also gauge teacher demand and likely supply in relevant geographic areas and in each relevant characteristic. ! In cases where donors and implementing partners are directly collaborating to deliver teacher training: • Jointly agree on a minimum percentages of teachers to be recruited and selected in each context-relevant CSE category and geographic region (ethnicity, gender, education level, language ability, etc.). • If necessary, agree on an additional number of extra slots that can be filled by any candidates, as long as they meet basic eligibility criteria. • If possible, over-recruit and over-select in each relevant CSE category to allow for attrition and no-shows. • Administer entrance exams to ensure that teachers meet minimum standards. • Budget for and assign neutral selection monitors in each selection site who will work with the local selection team to ensure that criteria are adhered to and verifiable.

16 • Include appropriate incentives to reward adherence to selection criteria (for example, cohorts that meet selection criteria will receive extra teacher supplies).

Domain 4, Standard 2: Conditions of Work

§ INEE Guidance Note: This standard is defined as “teachers and other education personnel have clearly defined conditions of work and are appropriately compensated.”19 The Minimum Standards note the need for safe environment, office space, ongoing professional development, and compensation according to a standardized salary scale or agreed-on terms and conditions. § Observation: South Sudan lacked a comprehensive teacher professional development policy that would address the conditions of work, and therefore teacher work conditions varied widely across the country. § SSTEP Experience: SSTEP was designed to work through the existing Ministry teacher support system and to build it at the same time. In actuality, neither the rudiments of this system nor Ministry capacity or will were sufficient to build on, let alone work through. As a result, SSTEP, like the Ministry, had little to no influence on the working conditions of the teachers who were trained through the project; therefore, the degree to which these conditions were conflict- sensitive was highly variable and generally low. While SSTEP did actively engage the Ministry on issues of certification, differing opinions within the Ministry resulted in no action being taken. Like many institutions in South Sudan, the Ministry was plagued by conflict between leaders. In the case of SSTEP, the decisions made by the Technical Committee were often overturned by the Steering Committee, or vice versa. Given the difficulty of engaging directly with the Minister to make a final decision, much was left in limbo. SSTEP made tremendous efforts to build consensus among the various government stakeholders, but unfortunately a culture of conflict and obstinacy prevailed, exacerbated by a tendency to use threats of violence and by ethnic and regional divisions and disparities (for example, conflicts often arose when some officials switched to speaking in Arabic). With the Ministry unable to present a unified consensus, it was not even possible to begin discussions with the other government agencies involved. § SSTEP Lesson Learned: If donors and implementing partners are committed to working through government to improve teacher working conditions, then they are limited to goals and strategies that acknowledge and accommodate the pace and priorities of government. § Recommendation for CSE: In cases where donors and implementing partners are committed to work with government to improve teacher working conditions, they should build in leverage points and design contingencies to ensure that a small set of critical, conflict-sensitive conditions are met. Possible strategies in this regard include the following: ! Systems Development Level: List the various teacher working conditions to be addressed, and include such information as: • the existing baseline condition of each component and a description of the desired minimum CSE standard for it • the capacity development needs to reach the standard • the costs of getting to the standard • the political challenges to overcome • the time required

19 Source: INEE (2013), p. 11.

17 • the relative importance of this component within the larger teacher support system

Use this matrix to come to a consensus with the MoGEI on a short list of the most critical teacher work conditions to be addressed, then design an approach to do so. ! Implementation Level: • Identify the roles and responsibilities of the MoGEI and implementing partners for assuring that minimum conditions are established for all targeted teachers, the costs and timing needed, and the indicators that will be used to demonstrate they have been achieved. • Build in clear leverage strategies and contingencies linked to progress in establishing minimum standards. If progress isn’t made, activate leverage and contingency strategies. • Consider working with non-governmental partners engaged in teacher training to collectively advocate for Ministry adherence and support.

Domain 4, Standard 3: Training, Professional Development, and Support

§ INEE Guidance Note: This standard is defined as “support and supervision mechanisms for teachers and other education personnel to function effectively.”20 The Minimum Standards address the need for mentoring, counseling, training, formative supervision, classroom observation, and continual learning, among others. § Observation: As noted, the infrastructure required for the effective support and supervision of teachers simply did not exist in many parts of South Sudan. In many States, tutors were poorly qualified or not incentivized (paid) to do their work. Security, transportation, and logistical challenges hampered attempts at regular school visits to provide support to teachers. Schools were often very far apart, making even a cluster approach very difficult to implement, given the distances involved and the lack of transportation. § SSTEP Experience: As described above, SSTEP was designed to build system capacity and rely on it for delivery of teacher support at the same time. Given the lack of infrastructure available at the decentralized levels to support teachers, and the need to hire staff to fill in the gaps that existed due to the lack of government structures, SSTEP could not use this system. While there were a handful of non-governmental teacher training institutions, the government was reluctant for SSTEP to provide support to non-governmental agencies. SSTEP was therefore limited to providing training to tutors who would conduct the face-to-face study and cluster meetings and monitor teacher assignments. As noted, the tutors were not SSTEP employees, nor did they have any reporting or other responsibilities vis-à-vis the project. In order to ensure both quality and delivery of in-service training and support for the number of teachers SSTEP was committed to train, a massive supervision network would have to be put in place, either parallel to the government’s own semi-functional tutor structure or built for the government, but the resources (both financial and human) to do so simply didn’t exist. § SSTEP Lesson Learned: In conflict-affected environments, it is risky to build government infrastructure and at the same time rely on it for delivery of critical inputs. It is also risky to commit to teacher training targets that ignore the lack of infrastructure and human and financial resources.

20 Source: INEE (2013), p. 11.

18 § Recommendation for CSE: ! If necessary, in conditions of acute need for teacher support services, separate the two systems (design deliverables and strategies on the one hand, and service delivery on the other), and plan to provide services through non-governmental organizations, while at the same time continuing to build government capacity. Define criteria for conditions that must be in place before service delivery can be merged back into the government system, and work with the MoGEI to develop approaches to make that transition. ! In cases where there is a dual objective to build systems and deliver teacher support services, design (and agree on with MoGEI) contingency mechanisms that allow delivery to occur independently through non-governmental organizations, should systems development timelines get delayed. ! Limit donor or implementing partner targets to what can be achieved under prevailing conditions.

Domain 5, Standard 1: Law and Policy Formulation

§ INEE Guidance Note: This standard is defined as “education authorities prioritize continuity and recovery of quality education, including free and inclusive access to schooling.”21 The Minimum Standards detail recommendations for a wide range of education sector actors and the importance of advocacy for policy reform, along with free and inclusive schooling. § Observation: During SSTEP’s implementation period, the GOSS was more focused on maintaining security than anything else. Funding for education virtually ground to a halt. § SSTEP Experience: In a context of political turmoil, citizen insecurity, and budget austerity, education authorities did try to maintain free access to schooling. However, their ability to advocate for the continuity and recovery of quality education was stymied by deeply divergent views within government regarding the core elements of quality education, not to mention a funds shortage so severe that teacher training colleges remained shuttered and many teachers were simply not paid. Furthermore, there was a dearth of qualified education officials at all levels who might know enough about quality education to effectively advocate for it; there were no teachers unions; and functional PTA and school management committees were few and far between. So, while external agents (donors, implementing partners, NGOs) were perhaps the loudest voice in advocating for quality education, there was a limited technical structure, or powerful domestic political base, that could push this agenda, given the existing security and budget distractions. In all fairness, SSTEP did manage to support development of several key policies and policy notes. However, even if the MoGEI had succeeded in producing more policies, it is unlikely, given the larger governmental crises at play during SSTEP’s period of implementation, that a MoGEI proposal requiring added funding would have been accepted by the other structures of government. § SSTEP Lesson Learned: Advocacy for and action on education policy reform is easily stymied by security considerations, budget austerity, MoGEI political infighting, and lack of education advocates at all levels. § Recommendation for CSE: In cases where donors and implementing partners are committed to work with government to develop education policies, consider the following:

21 Source: INEE (2013), p. 11.

19 ! In designing a project and in writing a proposal to implement that project, analyze in as much detail as possible the human, financial, and institutional resources available to reach anticipated project goals, and adjust project goals to be in line with the government resources available. ! Create a priority matrix like the one described under Domain 4, Standard 2, above, then work with the MoGEI to determine a realistic set of priority policies. ! In cases of acute service delivery needs in absence of finalized policies, negotiate with the government to allow non-governmental organizations to deliver services, based on minimum CSE criteria for quality education.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Viewing the SSTEP through the CSE guidance lens, three major conclusions emerge.

First, SSTEP’s initial design did not reflect or respond to the conflict dynamics. It misjudged the existing capacity and/or will within the MoGEI, as well as the GOSS as a whole. Its scope and many deliverables were not appropriate for South Sudan’s conflict context. Its inflexible design and inappropriate strategy made it impossible to meet key deliverables because it made the accomplishment of tutor and teacher training (a critical output) dependent on a delivery system that was largely non-functional.

Second, INEE’s CSE standards for teacher education and support would have been too general to have provided the detailed guidance that SSTEP needed to function well in South Sudan’s conflict-affected environment. The guidance wouldn’t have significantly helped to make SSTEP a more realistic or conflict-sensitive design—it was simply too broad and too aspirational to help SSTEP prioritize and negotiate with USAID and the MoGEI for an approach that was sensitive to real and ultimately destructive conflict dynamics. To be useful in the area of teacher education and support, the CSE guidance should have offered more specific pathways, timeframes, milestones, or steps for helping the MoGEI to develop a conflict-sensitive teacher education system. For example, guidelines could specifically recommend that a workshop be held with curriculum design teams to discuss the integration of conflict issues into curriculum development. The guidelines could also offer practical suggestions for Ministries or implementing partners to improve the conflict-sensitivity of teacher recruitment practices.

Third, the MoGEI and the GOSS itself had neither the capacity nor perhaps the will to adequately address CSE planning and implementation. Given South Sudan’s capacity challenges and recent history, it is not surprising that some within government either didn’t see, or didn’t want to act on, many conflict-related challenges to teacher education, particularly if articulating and/or addressing them would jeopardize their own self-interests, or upset the precarious ethnic and power setup that existed post-CPA. In this regard, the INEE CSE guidance for Domain 1, Conflict-Sensitive Analysis, Participation, and Coordination, could have helped USAID and the MoGEI to identify and then consider during SSTEP’s design (1) the ethnic tensions that existed from the school community to the national level and ultimately erupted into massive violent conflict, (2) the pre-occupation of the government with security, which jeopardized the likelihood of broad government commitment to and resources for education, and (3) the Ministry’s inability to provide the physical and human resources necessary to achieve SSTEP’s

20 initial objectives. Had such an assessment been completed before the initiation of SSTEP, it might have allowed for more frank and balanced dialogue between USAID and the MoGEI.

One of the most important lessons from the SSTEP case study is that SSTEP’s pre-existing project design made it difficult to adopt a number of important conflict-sensitive teacher education strategies retroactively. Using conflict-sensitive approaches from the beginning would have allowed designers to do the following:

§ Identify the tension between the teacher training and the systems development goals, and either choose one or the other or design a way to address both that took the conflict setting into account § Analyze closely the capacity of government to provide education services, and design a project that recognizes those assets and constraints § Clearly define the ethnic and/or other underlying conflicts that can lead to (or have already resulted in) violence, determine the relative priority or mix of conflict-related vs. academic content, and identify ways to redefine the purpose of schools in these contexts: namely, to help prevent, reduce, and mitigate violent conflict § Work with government to determine a small set of critical policy or systems design priorities related to teacher education and support

Even this guidance, however, would not have allowed planners to foresee all future challenges. For this reason, CSE guidance should also include more specific suggestions for a risk analysis and contingency planning, not only for the teacher education and support domain, but for all CSE domains.

SSTEP is in the process of winding up its activities; however, there will certainly be future U.S. government and other donor programs that focus on teacher training (or other components of the CSE guidance not referenced in this paper). Specific recommendations moving forward include the following:

§ The CSE guidance should be better understood and adopted by all development partners, specifically by Ministries of Education themselves. In fact, the current INEE CSE Information Pack is probably best used as an introductory or foundational information set, to build awareness and promote broad acceptance throughout the education sector. Used in this way, the pack’s generally broad-stroke and aspirational guidance can provide a model for what CSE can and should be. Future iterations of the guidance should also include orientation on how the issues around conflict and education can be better promoted, prioritized, and understood by government and non-governmental counterparts in developing countries. § Current CSE guidance (as well as country-level adaptations of the Minimum Standards) should be complemented by future materials that specifically target designers, planners, and implementers and that provide more detailed and specific recommendations, interim milestones adapted to country situations, and more specific risk analysis and contingency planning guidance. § Development partners (donors, implementing partners, governments, NGOs, etc.) in highly conflict-affected areas should build a maximum degree of flexibility into programs, and develop backup plans when conditions change (as they most certainly will) over the life of the programs. § In a transition from humanitarian to development support, development partners and host- country governments must find the right balance between foundational development (in the

21 case of SSTEP, policies and curricula) and immediate needs (in the case of SSTEP, training thousands of teachers). Without ensuring the timing and phasing of support, outcomes can be risky.

The current conflict in South Sudan is evidence of fundamental and historical tensions that if not addressed adequately will continue to emerge in the future. Understanding the roots and manifestations of the conflict, and addressing historical grievances, will be key to the future development of South Sudan. While these dynamics (and their redress) extend more deeply and broadly than the education sector, teachers, as a primary influence on young people outside of the home, must better understand how to address them in their classrooms and communities. For this to happen, South Sudan’s fragile education system, and in particular its support for teachers, must continue to develop— with conflict prevention and mitigation being among the sector’s core mandates. While active crisis makes on-the-ground systems development work challenging, progress can always be made—and one important step is continued and growing dialogue on and awareness of the role, elements, and importance of CSE.

22 References

Charlie Goldsmith Associates. (2007). South Sudan Teacher Supply and Demand Analysis 2011–2016 [PowerPoint presentation for DFID and MoGE]. London, England: Author. Conflict Sensitive Education. (n.d.). Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) [Website]. Retrieved from http://www.ineesite.org/en/education-fragility/conflict-sensitive-education Department for International Development (DfID). (2012, December). Business Case for the Girls Education South Sudan (GESS) Programme. Thom Ping, Juba, South Sudan: DfID South Sudan. Retrieved from iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3785384.docx Government of South Sudan, Ministry of Education, Education Management Information System (EMIS). (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.fhi360.org/projects/education-management-information-system- emis-support-ministry-general-education-and Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). (2013). INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education. New York, NY: Author. Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). (2010). Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery. New York, NY: Author. The Republic of South Sudan: The Sudan Household Health Survey 2010. (2011). Juba, South Sudan: Ministry of Health and National Bureau of Statistics. UNICEF. (n.d.) UNICEF South Sudan Basic Education and Gender Equality [Website]. Retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/southsudan/education_Education_issue.html World Bank. (2012, January 1). Education in the Republic of South Sudan: Status and challenges for a new system. Africa human development series; Africa education country status report. Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16439140/education-republic-south-sudan-

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24

Annex A: Summary of Teacher Education and Support Guidance, excerpted from INEE Guidance Note on Conflict Sensitive Education (2013) and the INEE South Sudan Minimum Standards, 4th Copy (2012)

INEE Minimum Standards Domain 3: Teaching and Learning Standard 2: Training, Professional Development and Support – Teachers and other education personnel receive periodic, relevant and structured training according to needs and circumstances. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan Training Process In South Sudan, periodic and structured training means that • Training opportunities are available to male and female teachers and other educational personnel, according to needs, without discrimination against • Pre-service, in-service and distance teacher training in South Sudan includes any group. emergency content. • Attention is given to the special needs of refugee teachers, including recognition • Training must be organized and conducted based on identified training needs of their teaching qualifications, ensuring their right to employment, and meeting of the teachers. their professional development needs. • The first training of teachers for temporary learning spaces or emergency- • Qualified trainers, who are aware of conflict dynamics and their own biases, affected schools should be undertaken before an emergency occurs, or one conduct training courses that are accessible to all teachers, reinforce themes week after recruitment, and should include orientation on prioritized life-saving of conflict transformation, non-violence, participation, and provide ongoing messages, child protection and psychosocial support. support during the changing conflict dynamics. • Following the first training, training on additional prioritized topics should be • Through training and ongoing support, teachers are able to model conflict provided as needed and relevant. sensitive methods, e.g. using participatory and inclusive instruction, and non- • Timing of the training should take into consideration breaks in the school discriminatory, non-violent behavior and acceptance of diversity. calendar such as holidays and agricultural seasons. • Training is recognized and approved by relevant education authorities • Training on topics specific to the emergency context should be done through without discrimination. specific workshops and cascade approaches. • Follow-up monitoring and support is necessary to ensure teachers are putting Training Content emergency and protection principles and skills into practice. • Training content includes competencies on human rights, responsible citizenship, reconciliation, conflict dynamics and transformation, identity Training relevant to needs and circumstances means that issues, non-violent alternatives, addressing historical memory so that teachers can lead discussions and activities on these topics. • Instruction or teacher training is based on the assessment of the learning needs of teachers and learners. Support • Needs should be prioritized and subject specialist trainers should be hired to • Training programs promote professional peer support structures amongst develop and deliver training materials that are relevant to the teachers and teachers to increase coping skills, share good practices, and reduce their context. psychosocial stress.

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INEE Minimum Standards Domain 4: Teachers and Other Education Personnel Standard 1: Recruitment and Selection - A sufficient number of appropriately qualified teachers and other education personnel are recruited through a participatory and transparent process, based on selection criteria reflecting diversity and equity. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan • Clear, appropriate, non-discriminatory job descriptions and A sufficient number of teachers in emergency situations means one teacher to 50 selection guidelines are developed before the recruitment learners…In the likely case that there are more learners and a limited number of process. learning spaces and volunteer teachers, the community and the education personnel • A representative selection committee selects teachers and should think of creative ways to work toward this standard, eg, having both morning other education personnel based on transparent criteria and and afternoon shifts, dividing the tent/shelter into two or more classrooms, an assessment of competencies, taking into account conducting teaching/learning under trees during the dry seasons, using community acceptance, gender and diversity. methodologies appropriate for large class sizes, such as working groups, and learning • Future teacher deployments avoid bias towards one group corners. (ethnic, caste, class, language or gender) through activities such as in-service training, local hiring and certification A sufficient number of other education personnel in emergency situations means recognition for returnees, or teacher mentor programs. there is a head teacher and a deputy head teacher for each temporary learning • Education actors support the Ministry of Education to develop space. long term, equitable, human resource and payroll systems. Appropriately qualified teachers has 3 categories: • Teachers unions and professional associations of diverse groups are included in developing recruitment and selection Category 1 includes successful secondary education graduates/leavers who have processes. undergone continuous professional development in the five core areas of lesson Teacher deployment policies are fair and transparent, respect • preparation: 1) schemes of work and lesson plans, 2) application of learner-centered teachers’ needs and preferences, and are based on positive methods of teaching, 3) preparation and use of teaching/learning aids, 4) incentives rather than negative sanctions; e.g. married assessment of learners, and 5) classroom management. teachers are not sent to different sites; teachers are incentivized to relocate voluntarily to areas of need, rather • Category 2 is for successful secondary education graduates/leavers with some than sent as a punishment. professional qualification in teaching such as a Grade III teacher, diploma or a Bachelor’s degree. • Category 3 is made up of volunteer teachers selected from those applicants who can read and comprehend a text in the language commonly used by the displaced/affected population. These teachers are appropriate in emergency situations when Category 1 or 2 teachers are not available.

26

Appropriately qualified other education personnel refers to a head teacher and a deputy head teacher with a Grade III teaching certificate. At Payam and County level, appropriately qualified personnel should be either: secondary education graduates with a Grade III teaching certificate, diploma or degree in education; or, secondary education certificate graduates who have received continuous professional development in the five core areas (as detailed above) and formative supervision training to enable them to conduct ‘before the supervision’ dialogue, classroom observation and ‘after the supervision’ dialogue and mentoring.

Participatory and transparent recruitment process means that in the case of displacement where children have moved to functioning schools, the recruitment process should involve the head teacher, deputy, PTA chairperson and a representative from the Payam education office. In the case of displacement where there are no functioning schools, the recruitment committee should consist of the displaced community representatives, camp leaders, responding agency and the Payam education officials. The committee should agree on the selection criteria, and share with the community the selection criteria and the number of teachers that need to be recruited. A public invitation should be issued for interested persons to write application letters to the selection committee. The selection committee screens the applicants and appoints the most suitable ones as teachers.

Selection criteria that reflect diversity and equity are based on an assessment of the ethnic, gender and language make-up of affected populations and the conflict dynamics. To support and move towards equity in teacher recruitment, at least 25% of teachers recruited for temporary learning spaces should be female; this percentage should be increased over time. Population information should be obtained not only from camp leaders, but also from other sources such as educational personnel and implementing agency staff.

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INEE Minimum Standards Domain 4: Teachers and Other Education Personnel STANDARD 2: CONDITIONS OF WORK - Teachers and other education personnel have clearly defined conditions of work and are appropriately compensated. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan Terms and conditions Clearly defined conditions of work mean an 8-hour work day in a safe environment with a clear and detailed job description and sufficient teaching and • Fair compensation and conditions of work are described in learning materials to fulfill the job. Office space and furniture should be provided contracts and provided consistently. as well as continuous professional development opportunities. • Non-national refugee teachers are given at least the same levels of job opportunity and protection, and terms and conditions, as Appropriately compensated means that – according to a standardized salary scale national teachers. or the agreed terms and conditions – staff receive timely compensation for their

• Teachers and other education personnel, regardless of group services. Compensation may be in two forms: 1) cash, or 2) in-kind incentives, characteristic, are allowed to organize to negotiate terms and such as housing and/or meals. The value of the compensation amount should be conditions. commensurate with staff qualifications and responsibilities, adjusted with • Compensation systems and conditions of work are coordinated hardship allowance for the particular type of emergency. across education actors to avoid intergroup grievances. Where possible, pay scale is on a par with salaries of workers in comparable sectors (for national population and internally displaced peoples). • Complementary incentive schemes are established (accommodation, bonus pay, term limits, quota systems) for hardship positions for teachers. Payment • Payment is equitable, sustainable, regular and not discriminatory between different regions or groups. Other • Prioritize early support to the government for the payment of teacher salaries, and take measures to transform community support to a state paid service.

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INEE Minimum Standards Domain 4: Teachers and Other Education Personnel STANDARD 3: SUPPORT AND SUPERVISION - Support and supervision mechanisms for teachers and other education personnel function effectively. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan Support In South Sudan, support mechanisms for teachers and other education personnel means the provision of mentoring support guidance and counseling, continuous professional • Teachers and other education personnel are involved in development, training (on psychosocial support and life-saving messages, administration professional development that contributes to their and management, teacher supervision, and provision of relevant teaching/learning motivation and builds their skills in conflict sensitive materials), access to adequate food, clean water and medical facilities, provision of classroom methodologies and practices. materials such as bicycles, paper, pens, ID cards and incentives when no salary is provided. • Appropriate, accessible and practical psychosocial support is available to students, teachers and other Supervision mechanisms for teachers cover formative supervision which includes: ‘before education personnel, in all regions and without supervision’ dialogue, classroom observation, ‘after supervision’ dialogue and informal discrimination. visits to the temporary learning space or emergency-affected school by a Payam

education official, Parent Teacher Association member or the head teacher. In contexts Supervision not easily or frequently accessed by education authorities (see definition in Education • A transparent, accountable and unbiased supervisory Policy, Standard 1: Law and Policy Formulation), a peer teacher support mechanism mechanism provides for regular assessment, monitoring should be established to share tools and skills. and support for all teachers and other education personnel regardless of region or group characteristic. Supervision mechanisms for other education personnel means involving education • Performance appraisals for teachers and other personnel in the development of the supervision tools, providing them with supervision education personnel are conducted, documented and tools, training them on practical supervision skills, and reviewing with them the discussed regularly, with transparent steps to avoid bias. supervision tools at least once every quarter. • School community members regularly have the opportunity to provide feedback on the performance of Support and supervision mechanisms that function effectively are usable, regularly teachers and other education personnel, specifically updated, cost effective, user friendly, locally available and allow for continuous learning their conflict sensitive practices in the classroom. and professional development. • Job descriptions and teacher codes of conduct are

agreed between teacher, employer and community and the education committee uses this framework to supervise teacher performance in an objective way.

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INEE Minimum Standards Domain 5: Education Policy

STANDARD 1: LAW AND POLICY FORMULATION - Education authorities prioritize continuity and recovery of quality education, including free and inclusive access to schooling. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan How Education Authorities include: • National education laws, regulations and policies uphold • Boma education officials the protected status under international humanitarian • Payam education officials and human rights law of education facilities, learners,

teachers and other education personnel. • County education officials State education officials • National education laws, regulations and policies • respect, protect and fulfill the right to education and • National education officials ensure continuity of safe, quality education for all • Representative of teachers’ unions groups without discrimination. • Representatives of education-implementing partners • Laws, regulations and policies are based on an analysis • Parent Teacher Associations and school management committees of the context and drivers of conflict and fragility, carried out through participatory and inclusive To prioritize means to include education in emergencies in humanitarian response, processes. education policies and education legalization. Additionally, prioritization can be done through dissemination of information on the relevant acts and policies through training, • National education policies are supported with action meetings and radio (FM and other national frequencies). Advocacy for education in plans, laws and budgets that allow a conflict sensitive emergencies should be undertaken in a coordinated manner to strengthen national laws education response to all groups without discrimination. and policies, including on issues such as protection of schools from occupation by armed • Laws, regulations and policies allow non-state actors, forces, inclusion for emergency provision of education in budgets and sector planning, such as NGOs and UN agencies, to establish education in mainstreaming of emergency response capacity and resources, and conflict mitigation and conflict-affected and fragile contexts. disaster risk reduction, into long-term development projects and plans. • National education sector policies and strategies ensure sector wide coordination (including with peace building Free schooling means no tuition fee, no uniform fee, no exams fee, no material cost, no actors) taking note of the needs of different regions and PTA fee, no registration fee nor any other fees associated with schooling. The right to population groups. school should not depend on access to school uniforms and shoes; this is especially true

• National policy makers and partners prioritize education for vulnerable children and youth in emergencies. strategies to reach underserved and underperforming areas. • National education policy is linked to broader national plans for social reconciliation/peace building. Education

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goals and targets are included in the broader development/peace building plans. What • Political will and capacity are mobilized to make education conflict sensitive and address conflict drivers, which have emerged through the conflict analysis. • Equitable access to all levels of education is promoted. • Curriculum, teaching and language are conflict-sensitive. • Conflict emergency preparedness including protecting education from attack is addressed. • Address other key issues identified in the national conflict analysis process. • National education sector policies ensure medium/long term strategies (to avoid grievances due to gaps in service), e.g. human resource, payroll, financial management and teacher supervision.

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INEE Minimum Standards Domain 5: Education Policy

STANDARD 2: PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION - Education activities take into account international and national educational policies, laws, standards and plans and the learning needs of affected populations. Conflict Sensitive Education Guidance INEE Minimum Standards for South Sudan Education activities include: formal (pre-primary, primary, secondary, tertiary), • Formal and non-formal education policy implementation reflects vocational/technical, non-formal education, informing policy and legislation, early childhood international and national legal frameworks and policies development, programmes for youth, and extracurricular activities such as sports and life skills. regarding education for all without discrimination. International educational policies, laws, standards include: • Analysis, planning and implementation of educational activities reflect the conflict analysis and are integrated with other plans, • INEE Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery e.g. peacebuilding and poverty reduction, to ensure better • Convention on the Rights of the Child coverage of neglected areas or groups. • Human rights treaties and conventions • National and local education plans respond to conflict dynamics • Refugee Convention and prepare for the short, medium and long-term. • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women • Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities • Financial, technical, material and human resources are sufficient • Universal Declaration of Human Rights for effective and transparent implementation of conflict sensitive • International Convention on Civil and Political Rights education programmes for all regardless of region or group • International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights characteristic. • Millennium Development Goals of 2015 international framework • Planning and implementation is informed by disaggregated data • Fast Track Initiative/Global Partnership for Education global platform • Education for All international movement on budget allocations, enrolments, and teacher deployments. • Go to School Initiative • Education sector’s ability to coordinate, regulate and monitor • Security Council Resolution 1998 against attacks on hospitals and schools, and previous non-governmental provision of is strengthened, to ensure related resolutions 1261, 1314, 1379, 1460, 1539, 1612, 1882 equitable coverage across regions. • Hyogo Framework for Action plan for disaster preparedness

• Supervision and enforcement mechanisms ensure that education • Education Act (forthcoming, Education Bill 2012 currently in draft) • Girl-Child Education Bill national laws, regulations and policies are implemented equitably • South Sudan Basic Standards for Schools (forthcoming, 2012) across regions. • South Sudan Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (2012) by-laws for girls’ education • The Child Act (2008) (a revised 2012 Act is currently in draft) • South Sudan Teachers’ Code of Conduct for Emergency Situations (2008) and South Sudan’s Teacher’s Code of Conduct (2012)