Conflict&Security

Airpower The Flip Side of COIN Daniel Baltrusaitis

Despite the success of the U.S. military in conventional Daniel Baltrusaitis is a U.S. Air Force colonel and warfare, recent experiences in Iraq and have illus- has held numerous com- trated the challenges of pursuing a counter-insurgent strategy mand and staff positions in the Air Force as a B-1B and against “asymmetric threats” such as improvised explosive U-2 pilot. He is currently a PhD candidate in inter- devices or suicide bombers. The “asymmetric” strategy often national relations in adopted by insurgents allows a relatively weak force to incapac- Georgetown Univeristy’s Departmeny of Govern- itate a stronger one by exploiting the stronger force’s vulnera- ment. bilities rather than meeting it head-on in conventional com- The views expressed in this arti- bat. Our current wars have focused national attention on the cle are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy ability of the Army and Marine Corps to cope with this “asym- or position of the United States Air Force, Department of metric” environment, yet the influence of airpower has been Defense, or the U.S. Govern- conspicuously missing from the debate. Even the core military ment. doctrine for counterinsurgency, or COIN, fails to acknowl- edge the benefits that airpower can play against these asymmet- ric threats. The Army and Marine Corps recently released Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5), an impres- sive and influential 282-page document that skillfully address- es many difficult COIN issues. This doctrine is viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq, and will likely become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine that will guide all the armed services.1 Regrettably, this impressive doc-

Summer/Fall 2008 [89] AIRPOWER ument fails to inform the COIN strate- that these airstrikes are attacking combat- gist, and policymakers, on the influence ants–while at the same time safeguard of highly integrated joint COIN strategy. civilians in that process–allows insurgents Rather, it treats the influence of airpow- to gain an advantage in the propaganda er as an adjunct capability confined to a war.3 Arkin exposes the central paradox short, five-page annex of “supplemental in the understanding of the use of air- information.” By failing to integrate the power; it is an essential COIN tool, but it full potential of today’s airpower capabil- is often unfairly accused of being a blunt, ities and by focusing almost exclusively on highly destructive, instrument that only the ground dimension, FM 3-24 undermines the COIN strategy. Civilian falls short of offering U.S. decisionmak- casualties from U.S. and NATO ers a pragmatic, joint solution for the airstrikes in Afghanistan were one of the challenge of COIN.2 The current doc- main storylines of last year, but these sto- trine fails to integrate all aspects of mili- ries of civilian casualties do not tell the tary power that may be implemented for whole story. The use of airpower in the most effective counterinsurgency cam- Afghanistan has been highly effective, paign. By failing to integrate airpower allowing a NATO presence across the (or seapower) into this cornerstone doc- breadth and depth of the country, deny- trine document, U.S. and coalition ing sanctuary to insurgents while ensur- forces risk planning operations in a dis- ing a sustained NATO offensive. jointed fashion where planners do not Arkin equates U.S. acceptance of col- understand the strengths and weaknesses lateral damage claims as equivalent to of service capabilities. This paper exam- answering the following question: “When ines the influence of airpower on COIN did you stop beating your wife?”4 He strategy and articulates the benefits of an argues that instead of accepting unsub- integrated joint COIN doctrine to combat stantiated collateral damage claims, senior effectively the insurgents in Iraq and leaders should highlight the fact that air- Afghanistan. power’s effectiveness is so frustrating to the enemy that the insurgent’s only Airpower Misunderstood. recourse is to portray it as particularly People, even military commanders and damaging to civilians. Arkin’s point is that political leaders, often misunderstand U.S. commanders do not have to hold the the influence of airpower in a military assumption that airpower is more damag- campaign because of the claims that it is ing than other elements of force and that an indiscriminate weapon that induces insurgent fighters still retain a responsi- unwarranted collateral damage, thereby bility when using civilians as shields. As damaging the campaign for hearts and part of a proper information strategy, this minds. William Arkin, who writes an point needs to be emphasized by U.S. online national security column for the commanders in the media. The attitude Washington Post, suggests that by accepting that airpower causes undue damage is unsubstantiated collateral damage claims, emphasized in FM 3-24 when it states, U.S. military leaders actually undermine “an air strike can cause collateral damage U.S. coalition strategy by leaving unclear that turns people against the host-nation the role of airstrikes against Taliban and (HN) government and provides insur- al-Qaeda insurgents. By not stressing gents with a major propaganda victory.”5

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While it is certainly true that air attacks damage; however, the manual ascribes can–and do–cause civilian casualties, FM the greatest risk to the wrong source. 3-24 overlooks the fact that other forms According to Dunlap, “if avoiding the of lethal force cause damage that is even most damaging kind of ‘collateral dam- more significant. In a study on the inva- age’ is as important as FM 3-24 claims, sion of Iraq, noted then reducing the size of and reliance on the ground that in most cases, “Aerial bombardment component is the way to do it, not by limiting air- resulted in minimal adverse effects to the power [emphasis in original].”7 civilian population.”6 In the same report, It is not surprising after reading FM the organization observed that Army uses 3-24 that ground commanders fail to of force caused significant civilian casual- appreciate airpower’s essential contribu- ties. This is not to suggest that the Army tions to the COIN effort. The lack of was negligent in its use of force, but sound operating concepts for integrating reflects the reality that close contact oper- airpower into COIN doctrine has con- ations are just as dangerous for the civil- crete consequences for the overall COIN ian population–and as damaging to the effort. One battalion commander hearts and mind campaign–as airstrikes. admitted that, in his first few months in By voicing concerns on the use of air- Iraq, he “rarely put air into my plan— this power, and not expressing the same con- was because we did not understand how it cerns for other elements of military fire- could assist us in a counter insurgency power, FM 3-24 inappropriately focuses fight.”8 RAND analyst Benjamin Lam- on weapon systems rather than effects. beth, in his analysis of the use of airpow- Major General Dunlap of the U.S. Air er in the initial Afghanistan effort, notes Force contends that the manual’s that the lack of understanding of airpow- reliance upon a “boots on the ground” er advantages is endemic in the Army. approach actually increases the risk of According to Lambeth, leading Central incurring the exact type of civilian casu- Command leaders were “insufficiently alties most likely to create the adverse appreciative” of what the Air Force could operational impact normally attributed do, leading to excessive collateral damage to airpower. The Haditha incident— constraints, unnecessary bombing, and

The Haditha incident——where numerous cilivians were wantonly killed by ground forces that had just come under insurgent attack—— highlights the risks when young soldiers are in close contact with a hostile population.

where numerous civilians were wantonly distorted targeting.9 Strategically, the killed by ground forces that had just misunderstanding of the use of air assets come under insurgent attack—highlights let fleeing targets escape while increasing the risks when young soldiers are in close the danger to coalition ground forces. contact with a hostile population. FM 3- Air operations supporting the near dis- 24 is rightly concerned about collateral astrous Operation Anaconda in

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Afghanistan provide a telling example. south of Baghdad illustrate how small Seymour Hersh, in Chain of Command, concentrations of coalition forces could illustrates that Army leaders mistakenly interdict al-Qaeda forces.12 Air strikes thought that they could do the operation were used as a means to deliver precise on their own and took little considera- firepower, limiting the exposure of both tion of how airpower could provide assis- friendly troops and the local population. tance.10 As a result, the air component Airpower not only allows a smaller foot- was introduced to the planning process print in the host nation, but the range very late and was not permitted to con- and flexibility of air assets allow them to duct major preparatory strikes, nor was it support commanders in multiple the- afforded sufficient time to move air assets aters with the same assets, reducing the to support the large-scale operation. number of U.S. military required in the- Even though air assets can be moved ater. Aircrafts such as B-1s and U-2s sta- rapidly, the Air Force was not aware of tioned in the Persian Gulf region rou- the scope of the operation and therefore tinely support operations in both Iraq ran out of aircraft during the operation. and Afghanistan, providing commanders Integrated planning from the onset strike and reconnaissance capability with would have ensured that sufficient air fewer forces, while the Air Force resources were tasked and available to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) plat- support the operation. The consequence forms such as the Predator and the was an operation where key Taliban Reaper support the theater with the bulk escaped, and numerous ground forces of the manpower stateside. Air Force were killed or injured, due to lack of air UAV pilots, sensor operators, and intel- support. ligence “fly” their weapon system from Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada Airpower Advantages. The main desert using intercontinental data links. advantage of using airpower in a military Effective use of airpower assets permits a operation is that its speed and flexibility smaller footprint in the host nation while allows fewer troops to physically be on providing a large security capability. hostile ground, providing a smaller The second advantage of airpower in a intrusive footprint and allowing a larger COIN operation is that it gives the U.S. area to be controlled by a given ground strategic “staying power” by reducing the force. This aspect of airpower has two potential for U.S. military casualties, advantages for a COIN strategy. First, it which erodes support for the COIN minimizes the presence of foreign troops domestically. Rory Stewart, in a recent with the host nation population. Air- New York Times op-ed, argues bluntly that borne surveillance, combined with rapid the U.S. COIN strategy exceeds national strike capability, makes it difficult for will–“American and European voters will insurgent forces to move in large num- not send the hundreds of thousands of bers or to mass on a target without detec- troops the COIN textbooks recommend, tion. This allows friendly forces to patrol and have no wish to support decades of in small numbers or be stationed in iso- fighting.”13 The current national debate lated villages without risk of being over- reflects the public’s cost benefit analysis whelmed by a large insurgent force.11 The regarding the COIN in Iraq. The large recent strikes against al-Qaeda havens deployment of ground troops is limited

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by concerns for the health of the Army activity in that area. These missions are and the political consequences for a highly effective, and if planned in long-term deployment. Unlike a large advance, provide a preventive non-lethal deployment of ground forces, airpower deterrent capability.14 Air assets are also has considerable staying power because of used to provide infrastructure protec- With the current generation of targeting pods and small explosive munitions, aircraft can, and often do, target these insurgents in the act, protecting critical infrastructure.

its relatively low cost, its low visibility to tion. Rather than patrolling the skies in the public, and because it limits enemy benign orbits, waiting for a ground sup- opportunities to inflict U.S. casualties. port requests, fighter aircraft routinely The enforcement of the no-fly zones fly over critical infrastructure such as over Iraq illustrates the staying power of pipelines and power lines providing a airpower. U.S. and coalition airmen deterrent protection to infrastructure successfully enforced the UN-mandated that is critical to reconstruction. With no-fly zones over Iraq for more than 11 the current generation of targeting pods years without losing a single aircraft. This and small explosive munitions, aircraft is not to argue that airpower can “go it can, and often do, target these insurgents alone”–ground forces would still be an in the act, protecting critical infrastruc- essential element of any strategy–but ture. rather proffers a strategy whose costs are Air Force mobility capabilities also more in line with the sacrifice Americans give commanders an advantage over are willing to make. insurgents by moving necessary forces rapidly over great distances. Airlift pro- Airpower is More than Air- vides a significant advantage to COIN strikes. Although airpower often makes forces, enabling commanders to rapidly the headlines when it strikes insurgent deploy, reposition, sustain, and redeploy strongholds in Iraq or Afghanistan, it ground forces. While ground forces can routinely supports coalition ground execute these basic missions alone, airlift troops in nonlethal ways. Nonlethal bypasses weaknesses that insurgents have innovations–such as showing force, pro- traditionally exploited. For instance, viding airlift, facilitating medical evacua- responding to the threat of roadside tion, and providing surveillance capabil- bombings and ambushes of U.S. ground ities–often prove more useful and effec- convoys in Iraq, the Air Force, in tive than airstrikes, particularly in the November 2004, sharply expanded its context of a COIN operation. airlift of equipment and supplies to bases One nonlethal innovation is the inside Iraq in order to reduce the “show of force” in which strike aircraft fly amount of military cargo hauled over at a low altitude over potentially hostile land routes. This effort kept more than areas in order to discourage adversary 400 trucks and about 1,050 drivers with

Summer/Fall 2008 [93] AIRPOWER military escorts off the most dangerous spouse is “one of the biggest rounds we roads in Iraq. Innovations in airdrop can fire,” says Lt. Gen. Gary North, the technology allow airlifters to resupply top Air Force commander for the Middle ground units without putting the aircraft East and Southwest Asia. “That’s a story or ground units at risk. Ground units in they’ll tell forever.”15 remote areas of Afghanistan are being Finally, manned and unmanned sur- resupplied through Joint Precision Air veillance systems, such as the U-2, Preda- Drop System (JPADS) airdrop missions. tor, Global Hawk, and space assets, give JPADS combines a low-cost guided para- U.S. coalition counterinsurgent forces chute system with GPS integration, unprecedented capabilities in surveillance allowing very accurate high altitude air- and target acquisition. Overhead surveil- drops, keeping the aircraft out of harm’s lance fills critical gaps in knowledge, espe- way while accurately supplying isolated cially when the counterinsurgent force units. Resupplying troops by air in has not gained the acceptance and trust of remote locations takes vehicles off dan- the local population. Aerial surveillance gerous roads, thereby avoiding the threat platforms with long loiter times can place of accidents, improvised explosive an entire region under constant surveil- devices, and insurgent ambushes. lance visually and electronically. Air sur- A key element in ensuring that U.S. veillance has been particularly useful losses are minimized is the robust along isolated border areas where insur- aeromedical evacuation system. gents are tracked, and engaged with Aeromedical evacuation allows for the airstrikes, when entering Afghanistan. rapid transport of injured personnel and “We find and track the insurgents with civilians, not only shrinking the critical our intelligence, surveillance and recon- time between injury and focused medical naissance, and then target them with pre- care, but also reducing the footprint of cise effect,” according to Maj. Gen. medical facilities within the host nation. William L. Holland, U.S. Central Com- During the Vietnam War, the average mand Air Forces deputy commander.16 time for the injured to be transported Enhanced awareness from airborne sur- from the battlefield to the United States veillance of enemy operating areas, when was forty-five days. Today all services use combined with other sources of intelli- medevac helicopters to move injured gence, increases the number of opportu- patients to forward-based trauma cen- nities for COIN forces to take the initia- ters, while the Air Force typically moves tive. For instance, in Iraq, overhead plat- these patients from Iraq and Afghanistan forms are used to track insurgents planti- to major medical centers in Europe and ng IEDs back to their bomb-making net- the United States in three days or less. In work, allowing the whole network to be addition to the obvious benefits that dismantled.17 Just as in traditional war- medical evacuation provides to U.S. mil- fare, an integrated strategy affecting key itary personnel, it provides further nodes of the bomb-making network usu- advantages in a COIN operation. Med- ally reaps greater benefits than attacking ical evacuation of host nation military or the bomb-planters themselves. civilians can also build good will among the population and create a positive mes- Conclusion. The particular advantages sage. Saving the life of someone’s child or of airpower–its speed, range, persis-

[94] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs BALTRUSAITIS Conflict&Security tence, flexibility, and lethality–make it an pendent COIN doctrine. FM 3-24 is an integral element of modern COIN oper- outstanding work of scholarship and mil- ations. Unfortunately, FM 3-24, the itary theory, forming the bedrock of mil- current COIN doctrine, presents a itary strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. ground-focused perspective that limits The immediate concern, however, is strategic options compared to a truly joint whether the designation of FM 3-24 as strategy. The Air Force must take some of the “Book for Iraq” will cement FM 3-24 the blame for this lack of air strategy in as U.S. joint COIN doctrine. The airpow- the current document. Writing in 1998, er contributions reviewed here provide a one airpower scholar observed that, “to a short list of capabilities that should be large extent, the Air Force has ignored integrated into a comprehensive strategy insurgency as much as possible, prefer- for the counterinsurgencies rather than ring to think of it as little more than a ad hoc supplemental additions. The need small version of conventional war.”18 This for truly joint COIN doctrine is not about lack of interest was reflected in the slow whether airpower is acknowledged; introduction of COIN doctrine. The rather it is about bringing the best of the U.S. Air Force just recently released its whole armed forces–and the unique capa- primary doctrine document AFDD 2-3, bilities of all the services–to bear on our Irregular Warfare, incorporating airpower current armed conflicts. issues directly related to fighting a COIN. The Air Force needs to dedicate The author would like to thank Eliza- additional energy to showcasing its recent beth Grimm, Tricia Bacon-Gonzales, doctrinal developments in the Office of Sarah Cross, Hamutal Bernstein, John the Secretary of Defense and multi-ser- Sawyer, Colonel Keith Hrebenak, and an vice forums where irregular warfare and anonymous reviewer for their edits on COIN concepts are being debated in draft versions of this article. Additional- order to ensure that Air Force perspec- ly, he would also like to thank Major tives are voiced. General Charles Dunlap, USAF, whose This essay is not a call for an “air only” impassioned arguments for developing a strategy, but rather a call for the full “truly joint” attitude towards counterin- potential of airpower to be integrated surgency greatly influenced his thoughts into a more inclusive joint and interde- on the subject.

NOTES 1 Michael R. Gordon, Military Hones a New Strategy on blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2007/12/afg Insurgency (, 2006, Internet, http- hanistan_commander_bombs_li.html (date accessed: 1 ://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/washington/- February 2008). 05doctrine.html?pagewanted=print (date accessed: 2 4 William M. Arkin, In Afghanistan, It's About Air Power, February 2008). Too, Online, 2007, Internet, 2 FM 3-24’s preface does not describe it as doc- http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarn- trine aimed merely at ground operations but as doc- ing/2007/12/in_afghanistan_its_about_air_p.html trine for “military operations” in “counterinsurgency (date accessed: 1 February 2008). environments.” See United States. Dept. of the 5 United States. Dept. of the Army. and United Army. and United States. Marine Corps., The U.S. States. Marine Corps., The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Coun- Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army terinsurgency Field Manual: U.S. Army FM 3-24 : MCWP 3- FM 3-24 : MCWP 3-33.5, University of Chicago Press 33.5, E-1. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), vii. 6 "Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civil- 3 William M. Arkin, In Defense of Air Power (the ian Casualties in Iraq," (New York; London: Human Washington Post Online, 2007, Internet, http://- Rights Watch, 2003), 20.

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7 Charles J. Dunlap, Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An in All-Day Fight," the New York Times, 10 January 2007. Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing True “Show of force” missions comprise a large number of Joint Doctrine (Air University Press, 2008). the daily total of coercive missions flown, far outnum- 8 Howard D. Belote, "Counterinsurgency Air- bering bombing missions. See 21 January Airpower Sum- power: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War," mary: F-16s Provide Show of Force, 2008, Internet, Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 3 (2006): 56. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123083132 9 See especially Chapter 8, Lambeth outlines per- (date accessed: 1 February 2008); Airpower Summary for sistent problems integrating air operations into a 28 January 2008, Internet, http://www.centaf.af.mil/- coherent strategy. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power news/story.asp?id=123084058 (date accessed: 1 Feb- Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom ruary 2008). (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2005). 15 See Michael M. Phillips, "In Afghanistan, Mer- 10 Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road cy Missions Are a Part of War; Medevac Helicopters from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, 1st Harper Perennial ed. (New Offer Villagers Services Taliban And al Qaeda Can't York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 137. Match," the Wall Street Journal, 17 April 2007. 11 Alan Vick, Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: 16 Air Assets Support Afghanistan Strike, 2007, Internet, The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?sto- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006), 113. ryID=123037535 (date accessed: 4 February 2008) 12 Deborah Haynes, U.S. Airstrike Targets al-Qaeda 17 Marcus Weisgerber, Air Force ISR 'Backtracking' Helps Havens in Iraq, 2008, Internet, http://www.timeson- 'Round Up' IED Makers, 2006, Internet, http://integra- line.co.uk/tol/news/world/ iraq/article3166641.ece tor.hanscom.af.mil/2006/November/11302006/ (date accessed: 29 January 2008). 11302006-17.htm (date accessed: 31 January 2008). 13 Rory Stewart, "Where Less is More," the New 18 Dennis M. Drew, "U.S. Airpower Theory and York Times, 23 July 2007. the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confu- 14 Marc Santora, "U.S. and Iraqis Hit Insurgents sion," Journal of Military History October (1998): 809.

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