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ISBN 91-975238-8-7
ii Table of contents
List of figures ...... v Acronyms ...... vi Acknowledgements ...... vii Abstract ...... viii 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Waves of destruction: 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ...... 1 1.2 The vulnerability of Khao Lak laid bare...... 3 1.3 Tourism: a vulnerable industry? ...... 9 1.4 Report structure...... 12 2. Conceptual Framework ...... 14 2.1 Introduction...... 14 2.2 Vulnerability: a product of the human-environment system ...... 14 2.3 A conceptual framework for the analysis of vulnerability within the coupled human- environment system...... 17 2.4 The dynamics of relational scale ...... 19 2.5 Place: the embodiment of images and perceptions...... 21 2.6 Conclusion ...... 23 3. Methodology...... 24 3.1 Introduction...... 24 3.2 Understanding vulnerability through case-study analysis ...... 24 3.3 Applying case-study methodologies to vulnerability analysis...... 25 3.3.1 The strength of qualitative methodologies ...... 25 3.3.2 Exploratory literature review and document analysis ...... 25 3.3.3 Open-ended interviews ...... 26 3.3.4 Data analysis...... 27 3.4 Conclusion ...... 27 4. Power structures shaping paradise: Thailand and Khao Lak deconstructed...... 29 4.1 Introduction...... 29 4.2 Thailand: the land of smiles...... 29 4.2.1 Thailand: A tourist’s wonderland...... 29 4.2.2 The scale of tourism activity and governance in Thailand ...... 30 4.3 Khao Lak: Paradise personified...... 34 4.3.1 The nature of tourism development in Khao Lak...... 34
iii 4.3.2 The creation and ‘placement’ of Khao Lak ...... 37 4.4 Conclusion ...... 39 5. Causal factors underlying the vulnerability of Khao Lak...... 40 5.1 Introduction...... 40 5.2 Exposure ...... 42 5.2.1 Natural terrain...... 42 5.2.2 Placement and type of development...... 43 5.3 Sensitivity ...... 44 5.3.1 Uneven access and entitlements to resources ...... 44 5.3.2 Weaknesses in governance structures and processes...... 46 5.3.3 Lack of disaster awareness and preparedness...... 47 5.4 Resilience...... 48 5.4.1 Strong national tourism planning policies ...... 49 5.4.2 Early warning system: a key component of tourism’s recovery plan...... 55 5.4.3 Strong local representation ...... 56 5.4.5 Natural resource management ...... 57 5.5 Conclusion ...... 58 6. Research significance and recommendations...... 59 References ...... 66 Appendix 1 ...... 73 Appendix 2 ...... 75
iv List of figures
Figure 1: Tsunami Wave Travel Time ...... 2 Figure 2: Tsunami Wave Heights...... 2 Figure 3: Location of Khao Lak in Thailand...... 4 Figure 4: Penetration of the 2004 Tsunami Waves along the shoreline of Khao Lak...... 5 Figure 5: Arial photo comparison of Laem Pakarang...... 6 Figure 6: A bustling tourism community ripped apart by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami...... 7 Figure 7: A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis ...... 18 Figure 8: Interactive components of vulnerability within a given place ...... 18 Figure 9: Scaled governance structures shaping tourism in Khao Lak ...... 31 Figure 10: Tourist map of Khao Lak showing type and location of tourism development……….36
Figure 11: Scaled causal factors contributing to Khao Lak’s vulnerability based on the vulnerability framework developed by Turner et al. (2003)...... 41 Figure 12: Andaman Recovery Plan zoning and building regulations...... 50
v Acronyms
AATO Association of Thai Tour Operators DASTA Designated Areas For Sustainable Tourism Administration DFID Department of International Development (UK) FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations GDP Gross Domestic Product IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ITB Internationale Tourismus-Börse Berlin IUCN World Conservation Union NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board Thailand NESDP National Economic and Social Development Plan Thailand NGO Non-Government Organisation PATA Pacific Asia Travel Association TAO Tambon Administration Organisation TAT Tourism Authority Thailand TDP Tourism Development Plan TEATA Thai Ecotourism and Adventure Travel Association THA Thai Hotel Association TTAA Thai Travel Agents Association TTC Thai Tourism Council TTS Thai Tourism Society UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program WTO World Tourism Organisation
vi Acknowledgements
This work was carried out by the author as part of her BSc thesis at Macquarie University, in Sydney. Warm acknowledgements are due to Dr. Kate Loyd who supervised the author and Dr. Frank Thomalla,SEI who advised in the project.
vii Abstract
The tourism community of Khao Lak, on the Thai Andaman Coast was devastated on 26 December 2004 by the largest tsunami in recorded history. Thousands of local residents and international tourists lost their lives. In response, the Thai Government introduced the Andaman Recovery Plan aimed at facilitating a rapid recovery of the tourism sector and building resilience against further shocks. However, almost a year after the disaster it is evident that many local people who depend on tourism for their livelihood find it difficult to survive as the community continues to struggle to recover its economic base, and powerful elites determine the (re-) distribution of resources and access to markets. It is argued that measures such as the Andaman Recovery Plan cannot be successful without taking into account the underlying socio-political and environmental factors that contribute to the construction of vulnerability. To address this gap, the research presented in this report is guided by three key objectives: 1) to identify the socio-political and environmental factors that contributed to the high vulnerability of Khao Lak to the tsunami, 2) to investigate how these factors are intrinsically linked, and 3) to deconstruct the power discourses that create and sustain these factors through existing socio-political processes and supporting structures operating across multiple scales of social organisation.
Whilst the vulnerability of tourism-dependent communities to sudden environmental or socio- economic shocks is acknowledged in the tourism literature, no attempt has been made thus far to explore in a rigorous and systematic way the complex causal factors and underlying power-laden processes that contribute to the construction of vulnerability. Building upon the emerging multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis and human geography, three complementary theoretical concepts, Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework, relational scale, and the geographical concept of place, are used in combination to create a new extended framework for vulnerability analysis, which is then applied to the assessment of the vulnerability of Khao Lak to the tsunami. This assessment identifies 12 inextricably linked environmental and socio-political factors that collectively contribute to the exposure, sensitivity and resilience of the community. A detailed examination of the structural processes that shape tourism development in Thailand and Khao Lak revealed that these factors are complex outcomes of both historically embedded and contemporary processes driven by social norms and the politicised agendas of the dominant elite operating through various scales of social organisation. Through the unique combination of vulnerability assessment tools with relational scale and place, this work has made several important empirical and conceptual contributions to the analysis of vulnerability in tourism communities.
viii 1. Introduction
1.1 Waves of destruction: 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
On the morning of Sunday, 26 December 2004, the subduction of the Indo-Australian tectonic plate beneath the overriding Burma plate resulted in a massive megathrust earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 (British Geological Survey, 2005). The epicentre of the Sumatra–Andaman Islands earthquake was located 255 kilometres south-south east from Banda Aceh in Northern Sumatra. The event that followed altered the lives of more than one million people across the world (Wikipedia, 2005). The vertical uplift of the seafloor by several metres along the 1200 kilometre long rupture displaced an estimated 30 km³ of water, triggering the most destructive tsunami in recorded history (British Geological Survey, 2005; U.S. Geological Survey, 2005). The local time was 7:58:53am.
The multiple tsunami waves that radiated outward from the rupture line devastated countless coastal communities living in nine countries bordering the Indian Ocean – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar (Burma), India, especially the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Somalia, and Tanzania – but the effects were felt as far away as South Africa. Many of the devastated areas were popular tourism destinations. A travel time map for the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami event, detailed in Figure 1 below, illustrates the direction of the tsunami wave fronts and the travel time of the surges, while Figure 2 details the maximum heights of the tsunami waves as they hit the coastlines of the affected countries. The rapid onset of the tsunami waves in some locations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Nicobar and Andaman Islands and Thailand meant that many of the victims were taken completely by surprise. For these communities, prior warnings generated from an Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System would have arrived too late (Dominey-Howes, 2005, pers. comm., 3 August). The rare sight of the receding sea induced a number of people to inspect the exposed seabed and collect stranded fish with fatal results (Block, 2004). Six months after the event, the estimated number of lives lost stood at 226 330 (CNN, 2005a; BBC News, 2005) but the final figure may never be known.
In addition to the large number of local lives lost, over 5,000 foreign tourists enjoying the peak holiday travel season were among the dead or missing. The tourists that perished in the tsunami event had travelled from Asia, the Middle East, North and South America, and Australia, with the majority coming from Europe (CNN, 2005b). The hardest hit European nations were Sweden and Germany which had approximately 15,000 and 4,500 nationals holidaying in the affected region respectively when the tsunami struck (Levett, 2004). Many of these were vacationing in a picturesque Thai destination known as Khao Lak, the focus of this study.
1
Figure 1: Tsunami Wave Travel Time
Figure 2: Tsunami Wave Heights. (Source: Spiegel Online, downloaded from http://www.spiegel.de/flash/content/0,5532,9709,00. html on 13 August 2005).
2 1.2 The vulnerability of Khao Lak laid bare
Khao Lak is located on the West Coast of Thailand in the southern province of Phang Nga, approximately 80 kilometres north of Thailand’s showpiece beach resort of Phuket (Figure 3). Unlike its popular neighbouring destination of Phuket, Khao Lak is less commercialised and has little to offer its guests in terms of shopping or night life. However, its lure lies in its resplendent natural surrounds making it a peaceful haven to escape to. Khao Lak is bordered by Khao Lak National Park to the east and uninterrupted yellow sand, gently swaying coconut trees and turquoise water to the west. The service community which has expanded with the popularity of the destination is directly dependent on the sustained arrival of tourists from primarily European destinations. Before tourism the area consisted of little more than sparsely populated villages that derived their livelihoods from rubber and fruit plantations and subsistence fishing. The guests who frequent Khao Lak come to relax on the beach, trek or mountain bike through the mountainous hinterland passing dozens of waterfalls along the way, and use Khao Lak as a base for the world renowned diving destination of the Similan Islands located 80 kilometres from the coast (Khao Lak Inside, 2004). The tourists vacationing in Khao Lak at the time of the tsunami were looking for a relaxing and rejuvenating experience (Respondent M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Respondent P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). Instead, they, together with the local community, were faced with death and destruction.
On 26 December 2004, the tsunami brought catastrophic damage to six provinces in Southern Thailand that run down the Andaman Coast: Ranong, Phuket, Krabi, Trang, Satun and the most damaged Phang Nga. Together they attract 9.3 million visitors annually (approximately 5 million are foreigners while 4.3 million are Thai) who bring some 100 billion Baht (ca. USD250 million) to the region (Bangkok Post, 29 December 2004). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that the disaster has resulted in the loss of 120,000 tourism-related jobs in Thailand (Young, 2005). Yet no tourist area was hit harder by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami than the tranquil shores of Khao Lak. The first of the tsunami waves hit the peaceful beach resort directly from the west at approximately 10.30 in the morning, the largest of which reached a height of 10.6 metres (Warunpitikul and Tangwisutijit, 2005). The force of the waves penetrated as far as two kilometres inland, (see Figure 4), causing significant coastal erosion and demolishing everything in its path. In the space of a few hours 5,295 of the 6,369 rooms available in Khao Lak were reduced to rubble culminating in THB20 Billion in damages (Katharangsiporn, 2005; TAT, 2005a). Most of these were fully booked for the Khao Lak tourism high season. The destruction left behind by the receding waves is illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. Receiving no warning, the
3 tourists and the industry staff working in the many resorts and bungalows that lined the foreshore had no chance to escape.
Figure 3: Location of Khao Lak in Thailand (Source: adapted from United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Cooperation, January 2004).
4 N
Penetration of the tsunami waves Erosion caused by the tsunami waves
Figure 4: Penetration of the 2004 Tsunami Waves along the shoreline of Khao Lak (Source: Faculty of Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, 2005).
5 3 January 2003 29 December 2004
Figure 5: Arial photo comparison of Laem Pakarang. Satellite images taken of Laem Pakarang before and after the tsunami. Located in northern Khao Lak, Laem Pakarang was a favourite resort area for hundreds of Swedish tourists that flocked to this area every year. It was also the worst hit area of Khao Lak, the waves reaching over 10 metres and extending 2 kilometres inland (Source: IKONOS Satellite, downloaded from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov on 10 October 2005).
6 Patrol Boat washed 1 km inland, Bang Niang Bang Niang Beach – the remnants of the La Village Flora Resort owned by one of the Thai Princesses
Beach front, Laem Pakarang Guest House, Laem Pakarang
The former Baan Khao Lak Resort, Nang Thong Beach
Figure 6: A bustling tourism community ripped apart by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Source: Emma Calgaro, 2005).
7 The cost of the tsunami in terms of human lives lost is insurmountable. The tsunami claimed the lives of 4,224 people in Phang Nga Province alone equating to nearly 80 percent of the total fatalities in Thailand (Warunpitikul and Tangwisutijit, 2005). Sources within the Thai tourism industry and the academic community state that the death toll could be up to three times higher than the publicised figures, attributing the discrepancy to the government’s attempt to minimise the negative image that the tsunami painted of Thailand’s tourism industry (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). The Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) estimates that one in three tourism industry employees lost their lives in Khao Lak (TAT, 2005a) while the confirmed death toll of foreigners staying in the area stands at 1,953 (Hart, 2005; TAT, 2005b).
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami not only claimed the lives of thousands of tourists and tourism industry workers but also left the livelihoods of the affected tourism-dependent communities such as Khao Lak in ruin. Thousands of Thais who lost family members, friends and homes have also lost their source of income; the tsunami washed away their businesses and work places leaving them with no job, no income, dwindling means of survival and few if any alternatives (Bangkok Post Editorial, 27 June 2005: 10). In reaction to the immediate needs of those communities affected, Thai government officials have introduced the Andaman Recovery Plan aimed primarily at the recovery of tourism activity, while non government organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions are focussing on building resilience and formulating mitigation strategies against future shocks (UNEP, 2005). However, recent multidisciplinary research on the causal structures of human vulnerability to risk (Clark et al., 2000; Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001; Turner et al., 2003; Pelling, 2003; Thomalla et al., 2005) concludes that future rebuilding efforts and long-term resilience plans aimed at ensuring future sustainable livelihood options cannot be operationalised successfully without understanding the underlying socio-political structures and environmental linkages that form the foundations of vulnerability. In recognition of this key conclusion it is argued that an understanding of the causal factors underlying Khao Lak’s vulnerability is imperative to the success of future resilience building strategies. Accordingly, this work focuses on answering one fundamental question: what socio-political and environmental conditions led to the vulnerability of the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak? By answering this question and identifying the causal factors and processes that contributed to Khao Lak’s vulnerability this research provides researchers, policy makers and planners with the knowledge needed to formulate robust resilience building strategies that address the underlying causes of vulnerability instead of the consequences alone. However, before identifying and discussing the components that contribute to Khao Lak’s vulnerability it is important to explore the inherent vulnerability of
8 the tourism industry. Therefore, the search for answers begins with an investigation into the factors that leave the tourism industry so vulnerable to external shocks.
1.3 Tourism: a vulnerable industry?
The enormity of the tsunami event and its simultaneous impact on so many tourism destinations located around the Indian Ocean left the international tourism industry reeling and has once again highlighted the vulnerability of tourism destinations to external shocks. This predicament is not new. The Asian tourism market, of which Thailand is a key component, presents a good example of the varied shocks that the industry has had to face in the space of just one decade. Continuous events such as the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises, followed by the September 11 attacks, the Bali Bombings of 2001 and 2005, the SARS and Bird Flu epidemics of 2003 and 2004 strongly demonstrate how sensitive localised tourism industries are to events they cannot control (Wall, 1998). The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is yet another devastating example.
Despite the plethora of evidence presented in the academic literature confirming the vulnerability of tourism activity to unforeseen shocks (Richter and Waugh, 1986; Cassedy, 1991; Drabek, 1994, 1995; Sönmez and Graefe, 1998; Sönmez et al., 1999; Mansfeld, 1999; Richter, 1999; Nankervis, 2000; Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner and Vikulov, 2001; Ritchie, 2004; Huan et al., 2004; Knox and Marston, 2004; Méheux and Parker, in press), this point is still challenged by some who contend that the size and reach of the ‘global’ industry attest to its resilience to external shocks (Gurtner, 2004). According to Richter and Waugh (1986), if there is strife or trouble in one area, tourists simply choose alternate destinations. This obvious but powerful observation identifies the most disempowering characteristic of tourism activity. While the option of diverting business to alternate destinations within the same country or to other safer regions of the world (Richter and Waugh, 1986) may be available to international tour operators with many destinations packages to offer and national governments interested in retaining projected levels of GDP, this is not a luxury that tourism-dependent communities can afford. They cannot easily transport their investment, be it large or small, which in turn leaves them vulnerable to exogenous factors - including political unrest, economic downturns, health epidemics, and changes in travel trends – that often lie outside their control. The tourism experience sold to the consumer is fundamentally place-based but the production of the product, encapsulated in a destination’s projected image, incorporates multitudes of businesses (transport, accommodation, guides, marketing and selling to name a few) working at multiple scales that often span the globe (Urry, 1990, 1995; Dredge and Jenkins, 2003). The widespread destruction of the numerous Indian Ocean resort destinations caused by the 2004 tsunami and the ensuing financial uncertainty that threatens their livelihoods stands as an irrefutable testament to the vulnerability of tourism destinations.
9
The tourism literature identifies four main factors that contribute to the vulnerability of tourism activity to external shocks: the perception of risk and unsafe conditions, a high dependency on tourism as a sole livelihood option, a heavy reliance on the marketing strategies and product preferences of large international tour operators, and high levels of seasonality. The immense impacts of disastrous events, political instability and disease outbreaks upon tourism flows is directly related to the actual or perceived risk of safety and security attributed to such events (Sönmez et al., 1999) irrespective of whether the threat emanates from the destination itself or another unrelated part of the world. People will not travel if they feel unsafe or associate negative images with a particular destination (Sönmez et al., 1999; Gurtner, 2004). This powerful perception of risk rocks the very foundations upon which the tourism product stands – image.
The tourism industry offers its clients a carefully constructed experience, embodying perceptions and images that reflect the needs and desires of its clients (Young, 1999). The fragility of a destination’s carefully constructed image that mirrors the needs of its chosen market (Young, 1999) leaves it extremely vulnerable to exogenous factors. Once the destination image is tarnished by negative perceptions, especially from disastrous events, it is difficult for that destination to regain its competitive edge in the highly competitive global tourism market (Knox and Marston, 2004). Sönmez et al. (1999) and Cassedy (1991) observe that the destruction of a destination’s image and reputation following a disastrous event is attributable to two events: the event itself and the ensuing negative publicity that continues in the wake of the disaster, often persisting until pre- disaster conditions resume. The consequences of disastrous events on tourist destinations are inescapable and are often profound (Sönmez et al., 1999:3). They include: short-term losses in investment confidence, declines in economic growth, and lower rates of job creation are common indicators of a destination in crisis (Gurtner, 2004). This working paper argues that Khao Lak’s vulnerability is inherently linked to both the fragility of its destination image and the control foreign interests have over the promotion of that image.
The detrimental effects of negative perceptions of tourism destinations are often further exacerbated by high levels of dependency on tourism as a livelihood source, a heavy reliance on foreign controlled marketing strategies and the seasonality of business, each of which are common characteristic of tourism activity in developing countries. Many of the tsunami affected countries such as Thailand, Sri Lanka, India’s Nicobar and Andaman Islands and the Maldives rely heavily on tourism as a source of income and financial exchange. These countries are not alone. The World Tourism Organisation along with NGOs such as Tourism Concern and the Netherlands Development Programme (SNV), promote tourism as having the ability to contribute towards
10 economic and social security through regional development, poverty alleviation and self governance (Ashley et al., 2000; WTO, 2005a). These claims have long been accepted by governmental bodies enticing many developing countries to embrace the tourism industry to such an extent that it has replaced more traditional industries as the main source of revenue (Richter, 1993; UNEP Stakeholder Forum, 2002). Many developing countries are often not in a position to hunt around for alternatives (Wilkinson, 1989) due to inadequate natural resources in a particular region or fragmented small economies. However, such a high dependence on one livelihood option, especially one as sensitive as tourism, contributes to the vulnerability of these reliant communities (Knox and Marston, 2004). Furthermore, the seasonality of tourism activity in many destinations means that a shock in mid-season can easily wipe out much needed business revenue required for the duration of a year. The negative ramifications of Khao Lak’s high dependency on seasonal tourism revenue in the wake of the tsunami event will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
While the identification of these five factors provides significant insight into the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community, what is missing in the literature is a systematic analysis of the place-specific environmental and socio-political causal factors that create and sustain vulnerability levels in tourism communities. This work addresses this knowledge gap by introducing a detailed place-based socio-political and biophysical assessment of vulnerability to the tourism literature. In doing so, this research adds significantly to the understanding of tourism’s inherent and place-based vulnerability to external shocks. As argued in Section 1.2, knowledge of the underlying socio-political causal factors is crucial for the successful implementation of future resilience building strategies. The urgency for such knowledge is heightened by the fact that more and more developing countries are promoting coastal tourism as a key part of their development strategy without ensuring that appropriate resilience strategies are incorporated into this planning.
To date, there are few tourism studies that identify the causal factors that underlie the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities. Nankervis (2000) has identified various factors that contribute to the vulnerability of the tourism industry through his presentation of an industry- specific vulnerability analysis framework. Frameworks such as this are important because they identify common causal factors that can be incorporated into tourism planning strategies to build industry resilience. While Nankervis (2000) has contributed significantly to an understanding of the multiple factors that heighten the vulnerability of the industry, he fails to address the place- specific socio-political and environmental factors and processes that leave tourism destination communities so vulnerable to external events. It is strongly argued that unless these factors and processes are identified and incorporated into tourism policy and planning strategies, resilience
11 building strategies such as Thailand’s Andaman Recovery Plan will prove ineffective and cause the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities to increase. Therefore, this research aims to widen the current scope of tourism vulnerability research by identifying the socio-political and environmental conditions that led to the vulnerability of the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. To achieve this work: a. identifies the socio-political and environmental factors that contributed to the vulnerability of the tourism-dependent community of Khao Lak to the tsunami event, b. investigates how these factors are intrinsically linked, and c. explores the political discourses that shape these causal factors and processes through multiple scales of social organisation.
1.4 Report structure
To identify the underlying causal factors that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak and uncover the socio-political processes that shape these factors, a strong conceptual framework is needed to set the boundaries for the study. To guide the search for appropriate theoretical constructs, vulnerability is defined from a multi-disciplinary perspective in Chapter 2 following an extensive review of the vulnerability literature. An analysis of the multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability assessment is offered followed by a summary of the various causal factors that contribute to the three dimensions of vulnerability, namely exposure, sensitivity, and resilience. In light of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability, Chapter 2 presents three complementary theories that are used throughout the research to deconstruct the social construction of vulnerability: Tuner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework; relational scale; and place. A product of the emerging interdisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis, Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework identifies and maps the multi-scalar causal factors and processes along with the social institutions that contribute to vulnerability levels within a given place. The geographical concepts of relational scale and place build upon Turner et al.’s (2003 vulnerability framework by deconstructing the scaled power dynamics that shape these multi- dimensional factors.
Informed by both the complexity of the social construction of vulnerability in a given place and the place-based nature of the study, case study methodologies were chosen as appropriate tools to fulfil the informational needs of the study. Chapter 3 details the types of methodologies used throughout the research process and briefly critiques their usefulness in assessing the vulnerability of the coastal tourism dependent community of Khao Lak. The findings of this research are presented in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 4 sets the socio-political context for the research by highlighting the significant role social processes and the structures through which they operate
12 play in shaping vulnerability. Using relational scale, the key social actors that shape tourism development in Khao Lak are identified within the wider socio-political structures that shape the nature of Thailand’s thriving tourism industry structures. Khao Lak as an international tourist destination is then defined and ‘situated’ through the theoretical lens of place. Framed within this context, Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework in conjunction with relational scale are employed in Chapter 5 to identify the causal factors that contribute to the exposure, sensitivity and resilience of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community and uncover the underlying socio- political processes and politicised agendas that shape and sustain these factors. The findings reveal that Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the tsunami event was the outcome of 12 interconnected key causal factors shaped by social norms, developmental processes and political processes that have evolved from the decisions of social actors operating at multiple scales of social organisation.
The final chapter of this report, Chapter 6, brings the argument full circle by revisiting the key aims and objectives and reviewing the significance of the main empirical findings. It argues that the identification of the factors and processes that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak provide researchers, policy makers and planners with the knowledge needed to formulate and successfully implement robust resilience building strategies that address the underlying causes of vulnerability. This is followed by a critique of the usefulness of the three theoretical constructs used to explore the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community that culminates in the identification of an expanded vulnerability framework. Informed by the key empirical and conceptual findings, this report concludes by identifying future research initiatives that further refine the expanded framework and aid the future development of resilience building strategies.
13 2. Conceptual Framework
2.1 Introduction
What socio-political and environmental conditions led to the vulnerability of the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak? To successfully answer this complex yet fundamental question, a strong conceptual framework is required. To aid the identification of an appropriate framework, the chapter begins with a brief exploration into the evolving concept of vulnerability, offering a definition of the term from a multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis and a summary of vulnerability causal factors identified in the vulnerability literature. This is followed by the presentation of three complementary theoretical constructs that are employed throughout the study to guide the analysis of the socio-political factors that contributed to the vulnerability of Khao Lak to environmental shocks such as the tsunami event and disclose the underlying power discourses that shape these factors: Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework, relational scale, and place. Tuner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework guides the structure of this work and is used to identify the multi-scalar causal factors along with the social institutions that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak. The two geographical concepts of relational scale and place add depth to this analysis by deconstructing the power discourses that underlie vulnerability to reveal how power-laden processes and supporting socio-political structures create and perpetuate vulnerability. A summary of each of the three chosen theoretical constructs is presented followed by an appraisal of their applicability in investigating the underlying causal factors and socio-political processes that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak.
2.2 Vulnerability: a product of the human-environment system
Evolving from sustained research undertaken largely by three academic communities – development and food security1, climate change2, and natural hazards3 – the emerging interdisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis recognises vulnerability as a three dimensional product of the coupled human-environment system. From this perspective, the vulnerability of a community or group is determined by its exposure, sensitivity, and resilience to stress (Clark et al., 1998; Turner et al., 2003) and is defined as:
1 The development and food security community’s concept of vulnerability focuses on present social, economic and political conditions that affect food-security and human welfare in the context of development. See Chambers, 1989; Watts and Bohle 1993; Bohle et al., 1994; Ellis, 2000; FAO, 2001; Dilley and Boudreau, 2001. 2 The climate change community sees vulnerability as a summary of the net impact of the biophysical processes related to climate change. See Burton, 1997; Handmer et al., 1999; Klein and Nicholls, 1999; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2002; IPCC, 2001; and Downing and Patwardhan, 2003. 3 The natural hazards perspective views vulnerability as an outcome of the internal health of the human system whereby the natural hazard or shock is an independent trigger event that challenges the strength of the human system. See Wisner, 1993; Hillhorst and Bankoff, 2003; Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004. 14 the degree to which an exposure unit [human groups, ecosystems and communities] is susceptible to harm due to exposure to a perturbation or stress, in conjunction with its ability (or lack there of to cope, recover, or fundamentally adapt (become a new system or become obsolete) (Kasperson et al. cited in Downing and Patwardhan, 2003: 78). What demarcates this approach from the three aforementioned conceptualisations is the acknowledgment that vulnerability is not just a product of the human system (as is the case in much of the food security and natural hazards approaches) or the biophysical system (the focus of climate change research). Instead, this powerful and holistic perspective views vulnerability as the outcome of constant interactions involving the human and environment system. It is for this reason that the emerging multidisciplinary perspective is employed to guide the analysis of the vulnerability of Khao Lak presented in this paper.
As a place-based property of the coupled human-environment system, vulnerability is neither simple nor linear (Nankervis, 2000; Turner et al., 2003). The vulnerability of an individual, group or community is determined by multi-faceted socio-political processes that operate through social institutions dispersed across multiple spatial scales of social organisation (local, regional, national, and global) (Clark et al., 2000; Kasperson et al., 2002; Brooks, 2003; Turner et al., 2003). At the centre of these simultaneous interactions is locality. Vulnerability, by its nature, is always ‘place specific’ and localised, involving constant interactions between multiple stakeholders (be they individuals, community groups or social organisations) with localised concerns and competing agendas (Adger and Kelly, 1999; Kasperson, 2001). The multi-disciplinary approach identifies three interconnected dimensions that collectively determine the vulnerability of a household or community, namely exposure, sensitivity, and resilience. These three dimensions of vulnerability are place-specific but are shaped by wider socio-political and environmental processes that simultaneously operate at multiple scales of social organisation. A closer examination of exposure, sensitivity and resilience identifies the causal factors and social processes that shape vulnerability: Exposure: Exposure is largely a product of physical location and the character of the surrounding built and natural environment (Pelling, 2003) and is defined by Clark et al., (2000) as the degree to which a human group or ecosystem comes into contact with particular stressors or shocks. Vulnerability can increase through either cumulative events or when multiple stresses weaken the ability of people to buffer themselves against future adverse events, often due to the reduction in coping resources and adaptive capacities (Clark et al., 2000). Factors that increase a household unit’s or community’s exposure to external shocks include: population density and growth leading to inappropriate planning and development in urbanised areas that disregard the type and suitability of the natural terrain, environmental mismanagement and loss of biodiversity often caused by over development in biophysically sensitive areas such as coastal zones, and the
15 persistent re-urbanisation and development of hazard sites that excludes mitigation strategies (ISDR, 2002; Pelling, 2003; Mitchell, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). Sensitivity: Sensitivity is defined as the degree to which an exposure unit is affected by exposure to any set of stresses (Clark et al., 2000). Sometimes referred to as resistance (Pelling, 2003), sensitivity reflects the economic, psychological and physical health of a system and represents the capacity of an individual or specific group to anticipate and withstand the impacts of a hazard or shock (Kasperson et al., 2005). Factors that influence the sensitivity of an individual or group to external shocks include: age, gender, health and disability, ethnicity, class or caste (which affects income sources, lifestyles and where people live), immigration status, family structures, religion and social networks, cultural norms, governance structures, and political ideologies (Clark et al., 1998; Adger, 1999; Adger and Kelly 1999; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Moser and Norton, 2001; IMM et al., 2003; Brooks, 2003; Turner et al., 2003). Resilience: Resilience is inversely related to vulnerability and is defined as the ability of a community or exposure unit to withstand or absorb recurrent external shocks and stresses without losing its fundamental structure and function (Adger et al., 2002; Adger et al., 2005). The concept of resilience is a direct expression of the strength of the coupled human-environment system reflecting its self-organisation, learning, and adaptation capabilities (Carpenter et al., 2001) and its promotion is an unequivocal goal of livelihood sustainability strategies (Adger, 2003). The diversification of livelihood activities is one key strategy that can help build resilience, reduce vulnerability to external shocks and achieve an adequate level of livelihood security (Turner et al., 2003; Niehof, 2004). Such strategies notwithstanding, much of a systems ability to absorb external shocks and recover rests with the robustness and effectiveness of governance systems and social networks (Hewitt, 1997; Adger, 2003; Adger et al., 2005) that have the capacity to facilitate (or constrain) an individual’s, group’s or community’s access to resources, a key point in understanding both vulnerability and resilience that demands further explanation.
A community’s vulnerability to external shocks is characteristically dynamic and is intrinsically linked to entitlements and access to economic, social and political capital (Liverman, 1994; Adger, 1999; Adger and Kelly, 1999; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Pelling, 2003; Turner et al., 2003; Wisner et al., 2004), which include financial credit and welfare, information and social networks (such as family structures, religious and friendship networks) (Thomalla et al., 2005), and politically motivated representative bodies (such as unions and business associations). Entitlements and access to social capital is determined not only by human agency – but also by wider historically embedded socio-political agendas and economic processes (Adger, 1996; Kelly and Adger, 2000; Cutter, 2001; Turner et al., 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). The power base of a given social system that drives the unequal distribution of power and resources among social
16 actors (Hilhorst and Bankoff, 2003) lies at the heart of vulnerability making it the core underlying factor in influencing vulnerability levels within a given place. Yet these politicised structures that underlie vulnerability are the most difficult to change.
Pelling (2003) and Adger (2003) assert that structural change is needed to redistribute decision- making powers among the various societal actors in order to bring about a reduction in vulnerability levels. However, considering the threat such an action would pose to dominant power elites, this is one characteristic of the coupled human-environment system that is very difficult to change. Elite groups at the local, regional and national levels are likely to resist changes that they cannot control (Pelling, 2003). This resistance to change has wider ramifications for vulnerability reduction: it greatly affects future livelihood options, the resilience of the social system, and the implementation of long-term mitigation and capacity building strategies.
Acknowledging the primary role power plays in determining vulnerability it is strongly argued that an awareness of governance structures that facilitate uneven societal power distribution along with the agendas of the dominant societal elite is crucial to the understanding of vulnerability creation in a given location. Put simply, if power is not accounted for in the analysis of vulnerability then the full extent of vulnerability cannot be understood. Accordingly, the identification of the power-laden socio-political forces that shape the causal factors features as one of the key aims of this work and is examined extensively in Chapter 4.
2.3 A conceptual framework for the analysis of vulnerability within the coupled human-environment system
To aid the analysis of vulnerability from the interdisciplinary perspective, Turner et al. (2003) have developed a vulnerability framework, illustrated in Figure 7, which comprehensively identifies and maps the various scaled components involved in the creation and perpetuation of vulnerability within the coupled human-environment system. Included in this scaled conceptualisation are the human and environmental influences operating outside the focal population and the perturbations or stressors that emerge from these conditions. Multiple interacting stressors that bear upon vulnerable regions and people often emanate from higher levels of scale as do societal forces that structure vulnerability (Kasperson, 2001). Yet at the heart of Turner et al.’s framework lies place, where vulnerability is created. In recognition of the importance of place in vulnerability analysis, Turner et al. (2003) offer a place-based breakdown of vulnerability production, featured in Figure 8, showing the linkages between exposure,
17
Figure 7: A Framework for Vulnerability Analysis (Source: Turner et al. (2003: 8076).
Figure 8: Interactive components of vulnerability within a given place (Source: Turner et al. (2003: 8077).
18 sensitivity and resilience and listing the factors that contribute to each of the three dimensions of vulnerability. The interconnected and scalar focus of Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework coupled with its placement of exposure, sensitivity and resilience at the core of the coupled human-environment system creates a powerful tool for conceptualising both the mechanics of the wider multi-scalar system and identifying the multitude of interlinked factors that contribute to vulnerability levels within a given place. For this reason, the framework was chosen to frame the analysis of the causal factors contributing to the vulnerability of the tourism- dependent community of Khao Lak. Due to the recent publication of this framework, few studies have applied and evaluated this emerging framework in the analysis of vulnerability. Therefore, the employment of Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework to analyse Khao Lak’s vulnerability provides an opportunity to critique its usefulness and contribution to the assessment of vulnerability.
While Turner et al.’s framework does feature the drivers and consequences of vulnerability in the event of a shock, what it does not offer (nor does it profess to) is an explanation as to: a. how various social actors create, manipulate and use scaled socio-political processes and structures to further their competing aspirations; and b. how these power struggles either facilitate or constrain the access social actors have to socio-political resources, which in turn, influences their vulnerability and resilience to external shocks. As discussed in the previous section, acknowledging the primary role power plays in determining vulnerability is crucial to understanding the underlying processes and structures that perpetuate vulnerability in a given location. Accordingly, this research expands upon Turner et al.’s vulnerability framework to include the geographical concept of relational scale in the conceptual framework. Recognising scale as an expression of power and social control, the relational approach to scale analysis creates a forum for exploring these very issues.
2.4 The dynamics of relational scale
Throughout the history of geographical thought, scale as one of the foundational elements of the discipline, has come to represent three ways of conceptualising spatial organisation: scale as size, level and relation (Howitt, 1998). Relational scale, the last interpretation of scale and the focus of this discussion, moves beyond the conceptualisations of scale as size4 and level5 to concentrate on
4 Size, as a tool for spatial measurement and representation allows us to describe and bound space in terms of geographical, cultural and political markers (Herod and Wright, 2002), the most common forms of this being evident in the demarcation of distance and political territories (state, province or nation) on a map. 5 Scale as level has two functions in geography: the positivist view correlates to size and is used to represent hierarchal, conventional categories of social organisation such as ‘local’, ‘regional’, ‘national’ or ‘global’ that 19 scale as a fluid and dynamic socio-political construct (Lefebvre cited in Marston, 2000) that reflects the subjectivity of historical and contemporary power processes. Relational scale does not devalue, deny or exclude ‘naturalised’ scales of social organisation such as ‘local’, ‘national’ or ‘global’. Rather, it engages in the way in which scale is defined and used to both manipulate power and facilitate social transformation (Herod and Wright, 2002; Howitt, 2003). Scale, like vulnerability, is a conditional product of the tensions that exist between structural forces and human agency (Marston, 2000). The structural components involved in scale creation and manipulation include social actors such as the state, non-state political actors such as political activists, industry stakeholders and community representatives; social structures including political institutions and social networks; and social processes such as the capitalist market (Marston, 2000).
Social actors simultaneously use multiple scaled social processes and supporting structures to either reinforce the uneven balance of power within a given society (Howitt, 1993, 2003) or reshape discourses that surround their struggles and create new landscapes of power, recognition and opportunity (Ellem 2002; Sadler and Fagan, 2004). The angle depends on the politicised agendas or positionality of the social actors involved. The works of Adams (1996), Agnew (1997), Leitner (1997) and Howitt (2003) reveal how important an explicit understanding of scale is for social actors engaging in power relations negotiations – knowing which political buttons to press and at what scale is crucial in bringing about a favourable outcome, be it to reinforce existing power structures or bring about social transformation. Social movements and associated political actors have multiple scales of opportunity for mobilisation (Miller cited in Marston, 2000). Governments, corporations, and NGOs, for example, simultaneously construct different identities at various scales using the same pool of resources and elements. Those actors that take advantage of the resources found at one scale in order to overcome resource and structural constraints encountered at another scale are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals (Marston, 2000). However, uneven access to resources, power, information and time will dramatically affect political outcomes.
Recognising scale as an expression of power and control over economic, social and political capital, relational scale theory provides three interrelated avenues through which to explore the subjective politicised discourses that underlie the vulnerability of the tourism-dependent community of Khao Lak:
derive meaning from the contextual existence of the others (Howitt, 1993); while structuralists within human geography have taken this analogy one step further to recognise scale as a depiction of nested power hierarchies of social domination (Jonas, 1994; Marston, 2000; Howitt, 2003). 20 a. The deconstruction of the various scales of power surrounding tourism development in Thailand will reveal the positionality of the various social actors involved in tourism activity in Khao Lak. Identifying the positioning of the actors in relation to each other begins to build a picture of the competing vested interests involved in tourism development and their capabilities of accessing resources in order to fulfil their agendas. b. The identification of the dominant elites and their agendas creates a forum for analysing the way in which those with power in Thailand continuously redefine and reinforce politicised processes and complementary structures to sustain their power base. This process simultaneously strengthens their own positions while marginalising others. c. This in turn illuminates the multi-scalar governance systems through which the various Khao Lak tourism stakeholders simultaneously work in order to push their own agendas. This dynamic process reveals the way in which actors position themselves in the politicised arena of social organisation in order to gain better access to socio-economic capital. As argued in Section 2.2, the more access a household unit or group has to socio- economic and political resources, the lower their vulnerability against external shocks.
The use of the vulnerability framework presented by Turner et al. (2003) coupled with the application of relational scale to deconstruct the underlying power dynamics that shape and perpetuate these causal factors provides a robust tool for analysing the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism dependant community. However, the framework is not complete without the geographical concept of place. Considering the important role place plays not only in the formulation of the tourist product but as the arena within which vulnerability is created and sustained, the following section introduces place as the last piece of the conceptual framework. An exploration of place and its social construction provides a means through which to define the object of the study - Khao Lak – and ‘situate’ it within the wider structures and processes that define it as an international tourist destination and influence its vulnerability.
2.5 Place: the embodiment of images and perceptions
Akin to scale, the concept of place is more than a physical location or politically demarcated space. Place embodies a socio-politically charged landscape infused with multiple layers of meaning, identities born out of scaled networks of social interactions, experiences and understandings developed over time and space (Agnew, 1997; Massey, 1993, 1994). Place is neither static nor one-dimensional: it is an ever-evolving multi-faceted creation of social processes and human agency. The uniqueness of place derives from a distinct blend of localised and wider social interactions operating outside a given place and a historical layering of events that are particular to an area (Massey, 1993). The feelings and opinions of those who interact with that
21 space within a given moment in time tie these processes and events together culminating in a ‘sense of place’ (Agnew, 1997) from which identity of place and its corresponding subjects are derived (Massey, 1994). However, such feelings and opinions that shape the identity of place are highly subjective: perceptions of place are filtered through a multitude of experiences, judgements, and identities shaped by social interactions that develop over a lifetime. These multiple experiences and perceptions form a multiplicity of place-identities held by different groups, all of which are concurrently associated with the same space. Therefore, place cannot be understood without connecting it to places beyond the geographical space in question, each of which is in a constant state of flux (Massey, cited in Staeheli, 2003). However, underlying the subjective construction of place is the power of definition (Cresswell, 1999). The creation of place and its definition projected to the outside world is framed by politicised ideologies that inscribe a particular idea of order on the lives of the people who inhabit (but do not build) that space (Duncan, cited in Cresswell, 1999).
Place as a socio-political product of multiple images, identities and wider social processes formed and redefined upon an individual’s interaction with a given landscape is perfectly demonstrated in the systematic creation of the tourism product. The tourism product encapsulated in the tourism destination is a blend of multilayered imaginations that are constructed and defined by tour operators and key destination stakeholders in accordance with the perceived expectations and desires of the travelling public (Young, 1999; Pritchard and Morgan, 2000). In the process, places are reinterpreted, re-imagined, designed, packaged, and marketed (Knox and Marston, 2004) to match preconceived articulations of well-being, relaxation, fun, culture or adventure. The final result is a manufactured and ‘placed’ image that is sold to the tourist (Nijman, 1999). The questions of who carries out the re-imaging and cultural packaging and on whose terms (Knox and Marston, 2004) highlight important power dynamics that operate at various scales of social organisation. This key assertion is reaffirmed by the tourism literature presented in Chapter 1. One of the key causal factors behind tourism’s inherent vulnerability is a heavy reliance on the marketing strategies and destination positioning undertaken and controlled by large international tour operators. In light of the important role dominant social actors’ play in the definition and marketing of tourism destinations, it is argued that an understanding of these power dynamics and identifying the agendas that determine the form tourism activity takes in each destination is crucial in the identification of causal factors that create and sustain vulnerability levels in tourism dependent communities.
22 2.6 Conclusion
Adopting a multi-disciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis, this chapter has defined vulnerability as a multi-dimensional place-based product of the coupled human-environment system that is created and sustained by existing power processes and structures operating through multiple scales of social organisation in a given time and space. To fully address the complex issues involved in vulnerability creation, this chapter has formulated a tight theoretical framework through which to analyse Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the tsunami event. Included in the framework are the three complementary theoretical constructs of Tuner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework, relational scale and place. Drawn from the emerging multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis, Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework comprehensively illustrates the multi-scaled factors involved in the perpetuation of vulnerability. Relational scale takes the scalar analysis presented in Turner et al.’s framework one step further by deconstructing the scalar discourses surrounding vulnerability to expose the underlying socio- political processes and corresponding structures that shape the causal factors and the politicised agendas that drive them. Lastly, place provides a theoretical lens through which to define Khao Lak as the object of the study and ‘situate’ it within the wider structures and processes that not only define it as an international tourist destination but also influence its vulnerability to external shocks. It is argued that the use of Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework in conjunction with relational scale and place in the conceptual framework creates a strong and unique theoretical basis for the analysis of the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities and introduces a distinctive human geographical approach to vulnerability assessment. The following chapter presents case-study analysis as a powerful tool through which to implement this place-orientated framework.
23 3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
Vulnerability and the tourism destination are both socially constructed and place-bound. Accordingly, the analysis of the power-laden systematic and complex socio-political construction of vulnerability in the tourism destination of Khao Lak calls for a rigorous place-based methodology. The methodological strategy chosen must facilitate the exploration of the inextricably linked causal factors of vulnerability that are generated by the agendas and actions of a large number of social actors operating within the confines of wider socio-political processes and supporting institutions. Case study methodologies are designed to do just that (Yin, 1994; Kyburz-Graber, 2004). This chapter begins with a brief outline of the strengths of using case study methodologies in the analysis of vulnerability. An explanation of the various methodologies chosen for the case study analysis is offered followed by a brief critique of their application and usefulness in the identification of the various factors that contribute to vulnerability and the socio- political structures that perpetuate vulnerability levels within the tourism-dependent community of Khao Lak.
3.2 Understanding vulnerability through case-study analysis
Guided by the place-specific and systemic nature of vulnerability outlined in Chapter 2, case study analysis has come to dominate vulnerability assessment. Turner et al. (2003) promote the use of place-based methodologies in determining the characteristics of vulnerability for two reasons: place-based analysis opens up greater opportunities for public involvement and collaborative assessment; while the localised results directly inform place-specific resilience building strategies, and in doing so, fulfils the main goal of vulnerability assessment. The strength of case-study analysis lies in its usefulness in analysing the multi-dimensional properties of a social phenomenon within its real-life setting in a given time and space (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). To do this, case-study research strategies draw upon both qualitative and quantitative methods to build multiple perspectives and obtain a holistic representation of the phenomenon being studied (Kyburz-Graber, 2004). The decision regarding which methods to include in the research strategy is informed by the type of question posed and logistical considerations (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; Murray and Overton, 2003) to which the discussion now turns.
24 3.3 Applying case-study methodologies to vulnerability analysis
3.3.1 The strength of qualitative methodologies
In view of the systemic and multi-dimensional nature of vulnerability creation coupled with the time and monetary constraints placed on the field work process and language barriers, qualitative methodologies were deemed most effective in exposing the underlying causal factors and processes that contribute to vulnerability. Winchester (2002) identifies two types of questions that qualitative research seeks to answer: the formulation, maintenance, and legitimation of social structures; and the individual’s experiences of social structures and place. Recognising vulnerability as a product of human agency and socio-political structures of power, the systems approach to analysing vulnerability within a given place incorporates both of these issues. The methods chosen to examine the social construction of vulnerability within the coupled human- environment system were: an exploratory literature review, document and archival analysis, and semi-structured interviews. Practical limitations such as time and monetary constraints along with language barriers excluded the possibility of undertaking quantitative surveys, for example, to ascertain the resources and livelihood options available to individual household units within the Khao Lak community. The applicability of each of the methods chosen and their usefulness in meeting the informational needs of the research are discussed below.
3.3.2 Exploratory literature review and document analysis
An exploratory literature review of peer-reviewed academic journals, books, and selected United Nations and World Tourism Organisation publications was undertaken in order to establish a conceptual framework through which to analyse the vulnerability of the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak to natural and human-induced hazards. Furthermore, the vulnerability literature helped to identify causal factors that heightened vulnerability within a given community. These factors were used as a starting point for this research into the vulnerability of Khao Lak and were instrumental in shaping the document analysis and interview questions. In light of the topical nature of the subject matter, document and archival analysis was chosen to create a place-specific context for the planned fieldwork that was subsequently undertaken in Bangkok and Khao Lak, Thailand. The sources used in the analysis included: reputable and highly circulated Thai print and internet media sources published in English such as the Bangkok Post and The Nation, NGO operational frameworks detailing tsunami recovery strategies, minutes of governmental task force meetings, and key published scientific reports.
The advantages of using document analysis in researching vulnerability in Khao Lak were two fold. First, the technique was largely carried out before entering the field with the information
25 gathered proving useful in obtaining interview leads and shaping interview questions. Second, the current nature of the sources provided constant updates on the unfolding problems the tourism dependent community were having in accessing socio-political and economic resources. The information collated from the secondary data was used in collaboration with the common causal factors identified in the literature review to create three skeletal causal factor maps categorised in terms of the three dimensions of vulnerability: exposure, sensitivity and resilience. These factor maps were used as tools to help shape the interview structure.
3.3.3 Open-ended interviews
The aim of interviews is not to be representative but to gain insight into the complexities of social phenomena through the subjective eyes of social actors that form part of the social tapestry. Open- ended or semi-structured interviews were chosen to verify and build upon the secondary data in order to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the interconnected nature of causal factors that creates vulnerability in Khao Lak. A total of 24 interviews were carried out in Bangkok and Khao Lak over a one month period. The information obtained throughout this period was supplemented by ongoing updates supplied by key stakeholders via email correspondence. Interview participants included: key central and local government representatives, NGO representatives, selected environmental action group members, research institute and media representatives, and numerous tourism industry representatives from small and medium businesses based in Khao Lak. Despite the small sample size, the participants involved in the research process represent the main stakeholders involved in shaping touristic activity in Thailand and Khao Lak and the tsunami recovery process resulting in a rich source of overlapping opinions and multi-dimensional perspectives required for vulnerability research. Using snowballing and opportunistic sampling techniques (Hay, 2002), the participants were selected based on their intimate knowledge of the tourism industry and structures of governance operating in Thailand and their involvement in the recovery planning and implementation process. Participants were identified from media reports and personal referrals and secured via email, fax and follow-up telephone conversations. These sampling methods suited the Khao Lak case study structure in two ways. First, personal referrals allowed me to quickly establish a rapport with possible participant candidates. Second, the opportunistic sampling allowed me to remain flexible in the ‘field’ and follow unexpected avenues of enquiry (Brockington and Sullivan, 2003).
Most of the interviews were carried out in English as many of the participants were in high level positions or tourism-related work where English is regularly used. This was especially the case in Bangkok. A local Thai interpreter was present for the duration of the Khao Lak fieldwork where English is spoken but not well enough to communicate complex issues. Each interview was
26 carried out in a location suggested by the interviewee, often in the interviewee’s office or business establishment, and lasted for approximately 1.5 hours. The familiarity of the interviewee’s surroundings not only added to their comfort levels but awarded them some control over the interview process. The presence of a local interpreter in Khao Lak also assisted to put the participants at ease with the participants often reconfirming information through the interpreter despite the interviews being conducted largely in English. The taping of the interviews facilitated a more natural flow to the conversation and captured detail and vocal tones that were used later to help gage their reactions regarding certain events and governance processes. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the disclosed information and requests from several participants, the identities of the participants were kept confidential using pseudonyms. A list of the participants featuring their positions and the pseudonyms employed throughout this paper (Resp. A, Resp. B etc.) is provided in Appendix 1.
3.3.4 Data analysis
The interviews were documented and written up under loosely-defined causal factor categories that were identified from the document analysis and exploratory literature review. Separate categories were established to collate the information gathered on the governance structures that influence access to socio-political and economic capital. The original headings used to categorise information were expanded and altered throughout the interview and paraphrasing process to better reflect the causal factors that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism community and the socio-political processes of governance that shaped these factors. The method of paraphrasing was used over complete transcriptions due to time constraints and informational needs. The headings used to categorise and order the qualitative data collected from the interviews were also used to code the data. The complete paraphrased interviews and the collated secondary data were analysed and coded using NVivo, a qualitative analysis software package (Richards and Richards, 1994; Van Hovan and Poelman, 2003). An example of one of the interviews paraphrased using these coded headings is offered in Appendix 2.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that case study methodologies are very appropriate for the analysis of vulnerability based on their capacity to deconstruct complex and place-based phenomena such as vulnerability within its real life context. The inclusion of three qualitative methods in the research strategy was successful in revealing the various elements that contribute to Khao Lak’s vulnerability along with the subjective positionality of the competing social actors and their power-laden agendas. An exploratory literature review coupled with the analysis of current documents identified numerous causal factors that heightened Khao Lak’s vulnerability and the
27 social processes that perpetuated this vulnerable state. The open-ended interviews with key stakeholders with vested interests in Khao Lak’s tourism industry verified and built upon the causal factors and social processes identified from the secondary data. The detailed information obtained through the interview process culminated in solid findings that created an in-depth understanding of the politicised processes that shape the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism community. The triangulation of these complementary qualitative methods, chosen for their analytical and logistical suitability, not only met the informational requirements of this work but ensured rigour and transparency throughout the research process.
28 4. Power structures shaping paradise: Thailand and Khao Lak deconstructed
4.1 Introduction
Power structures and the politicised agendas of dominant social actors that drive these multi- scaled structures play a key role in influencing vulnerability levels. As argued in Chapter 2, the uneven access and distribution of socio-political resources amongst community members and their ensuing vulnerability to shocks is largely determined by existing structures of governance and socio-economic processes. Recognising the importance of these structural processes in shaping the factors that contribute to vulnerability, this chapter employs relational scale in conjunction with the geographical concept of place to set the socio-political context for the investigation into Khao Lak’s vulnerability to external shocks. In this chapter the power dynamics that shape tourism development in Khao Lak are deconstructed using relational scale to reveal and identify the three core elements involved in the manipulation of power: social actors and their agendas, the scaled social structures and processes through which they operate. The chapter begins with an overview of Thailand’s tourism industry, and provides an analysis of the wider governance structures that influence tourism development in Thailand and how these structures impact upon Khao Lak’s touristic development. The chapter then narrows its focus by ‘placing’ Khao Lak as a tourism destination. The geographical concept of place is used to examine the role key stakeholders have played in Khao Lak’s development as an international tourist destination and to explore how the fragility of its well maintained image contributes to its inherent vulnerability to external shocks.
4.2 Thailand: the land of smiles
4.2.1 Thailand: A tourist’s wonderland
Affectionately known as ‘the land of smiles’ (Thai Culture – The Land of Smiles?, 2005; Thai Airways, 2005), the Kingdom of Thailand ruled by the revered King Rama IX welcomes more than 10 million visitors annually (Brickshawana, 2003; WTO, 2005b). Many of these choose to holiday in the luxurious resort towns that line the turquoise coastlines of Thailand’s Malay Peninsula, one of which is Khao Lak. International tourism growth rates in the Asian region have been among the fastest in the world for more than a decade, causing many governments to place an increased emphasis on tourism as a stimulant for development and a generator of foreign exchange (Wall, 1998). Successive Thai government administrations have espoused to this policy with much success (Wall, 1998). The current government administration, headed by the billionaire Prime Minister Thaskin Shinawatra, is no exception. Today, tourism is the leading
29 foreign exchange earner for Thailand, providing a vital source of economic development and employment generation for the country (Hall and Page, 2000; Brickshawana, 2003). In 2003, earnings from tourism activity accounted for 7.3 percent of Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (WTO, 2005b). However, this success has not come without considerable effort. The following section identifies the key governmental and tourism industry stakeholders and corresponding governance structures that have long shaped the development of Thailand’s thriving tourism industry.
4.2.2 The scale of tourism activity and governance in Thailand
The tourism industry is a large scale business of trade and services, involving many levels of governance and interaction, making it one of the most dynamic devices in Thailand’s economic development (Brickshawana, 2003). There are two main groups that control tourism development in Thailand: the national Thai government aided by subordinate levels of government and the private sector (Smith, 2000; Leksakundilok, 2004; Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June). The close interactions between these parties (Smith, 2000), dictated by access to finances and scaled forums of power, characterise the nature of tourism in Thailand. Figure 9 features the various governmental departments and private sector stakeholders that shape tourism development in the context of Khao Lak. The role each key stakeholder plays in shaping tourism development in Thailand and consequently Khao Lak and their corresponding agendas will now be explored.
4.2.2.1 The role of the Thai government in guiding tourism policy
The national government wields extensive power over the way in which tourism is promoted and developed through tourism policy formulation, planning regulations and marketing strategies (Parnwell, 1998; Hall, 2001). The Thai government’s central role in these three areas since 1960 has been instrumental in building a robust and sophisticated tourism industry (Teo and Chang, 1998). The reasons behind the central government’s ardent interest in tourism are three-fold: to attract foreign investment, maximise earnings and project a favourable national image (Brickshawana, 2003; Leksakundilok, 2004; Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. C, 2005, pers. comm., 30 June).
The management and governmental support of the ever-expanding tourism industry is undertaken by three interlinked governance structures. Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT): The main role of the TAT is to create and project a strong national and domestic tourism image, which is achieved through constant marketing activities (Higham, 2000; Phayakvichien, 2005; Tourism Authority Thailand, 2003b). The TAT competes
30
Tourism governance structures in Khao Lak
Governmental
Departments Private Sector
Ministry of Sport: Tourism Authority National industry International
31 Office of of Thailand representative resort chains &
Provincial government: Southern Office: Phang Nga Tourism Medium resorts Phang Nga Phuket Business Association & businesses
TAOs: Bang Muang, Khao Lak Group Small resorts Khuk Khak, of SME Resorts & businesses
Key: International National Regional Local
Figure 9: Scaled governance structures shaping tourism in Khao Lak aggressively for the international visitor market and is able to do so by receiving complete financial backing from the central government (Hall and Page, 2000). The increasing number of unforeseen changes in socio-economic conditions detailed in section 2.5.1 has stretched the TAT’s promotional role to routinely include image damage control strategies (TAT, 2003). The creation of the TAT’s web-based Crisis Communication Centre set up in response to the Bird Flu Epidemic (Thai Government Public Relations Department, 2004) is one medium they use to keep the travelling public well-informed about events that negatively impact upon tourism flows to Thailand. This site was used extensively following the tsunami to inform the public of the extent of the tsunami damage to tourism areas and provided emergency information for concerned parties. However, an examination of the TAT’s promotional activities and support following the tsunami disaster reveals that the tsunami affected areas of Thailand are not promoted and supported equally. The decisions regarding which destinations to support are loaded with political intent steered by agendas that benefit the dominant stakeholders. This politicised point becomes clear through the TAT’s disinterest in Khao Lak’s recovery, which is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.1.3. Ministry of Tourism and Sport: Formed in 2003, the Ministry oversees tourism policy formulation and planning through its Office of Tourism Development (Leksakundilok, 2004; Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June). Policy is guided by a series of five-year Tourism Development Plans (TDPs) that form an integral component of the corresponding National Economic and Social Development Plans (NESDP) that steer the medium and long term aims of national development (NESDB, 2004). The consistent inclusion of tourism in the NESDP since the 1970s reflects the importance of tourism to the national development strategy. Provincial and local governments6: Coinciding with the formation of the Ministry of Tourism and Sport, provincial governments were awarded more input and control over localised tourism policy strategies to ensure that provincial and local tourism development plans matched the resources and needs of the localised populations (Brickshawana, 2003; Phayakvichien, 2005; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July). Neither the Ministry of Tourism and Sport nor the supporting provincial offices have the authority to monitor, regulate or set standards for any segment of the tourist industry (Richter, 1989). The responsibility for implementing and managing tourism development within the guidelines stipulated by the provincial and central governments lies with the local Tambon Administration Organisations (TAO) (Leksakundilok, 2004).
6 The governmental administration of Thailand is divided into 76 provinces. Each province is further divided into districts (amphoe) that are then apportioned into sub-districts (kìng-amphoe), communes (tambon), villages (mùu-bâan), sanitation districts (sùkhăaphíbaan) and municipalities (thêtsàbaan) (Cummings et. al., 2003). 32 Despite the existence of these technically well crafted and clear governmental plans and structures, they are rarely operationalised (Resp. I, 2005, pers. comm., 7 July). A lack of coordination amongst the numerous levels of government coupled with wide-spread corruption and a deficiency in expertise and real power at the lower levels of government make enforcement very difficult (Elliot, 1997; Prayakvichien, 2005; Resp. I, 2005, pers. comm., 7 July). According to a TAT representative (2005, pers. comm., 7 July), Thailand is very good at designing tourism plans and policies but they are more theoretical ideas that impress on paper rather than operational strategies. These weaknesses in the existing governmental structures of governance leave the tourism industry as the main driving force behind tourism development in Thailand (Elliot, 1997). Consequently, the form development takes within a given destination is shaped by the business agendas of the main stakeholders operating in that destination.
4.2.2.2 The role of the private sector in shaping tourism development
The private tourism sector consists of two main groups of businesses that operate at the international, national, regional, and local level. The formal tourism sector, consisting of accommodation providers, inbound and outbound tour operators, local tour operators, travel agencies, and transport companies, specialise in selling core components of the tourism experience. Support businesses such as photo developing shops, souvenir and clothing shops, restaurants and bars, convenience stores, and in the case of Thailand health spas and massage parlours, cater for the tourist’s every day needs and desires. The products and services that these industry practitioners offer to the tourists are determined by the wants and needs of the client and as with any business, profit margins (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). It is the culmination of these factors along with the collective support and political influence of numerous tourism industry representative bodies that largely influence tourism development, not governmental policy and planning (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July).
The profit driven agendas of the tourism industry are supported and strengthened by numerous private representative associations operating at the local, provincial and national level7 (Leksakundilok, 2004). However, the effectiveness of these associations in shaping the form tourism takes in a particular destination relies on the socio-political strength and resourcefulness of the members and their agendas. Khao Lak presents a good example of how effective well-
7 The most influential tourism representative bodies operating in Thailand at the national level include: the Thai Hotel Association (THA); the Thai Travel Agents Association (TTAA); the Thai Tourism Society (TTS); the Association of Thai Tour Operators (AATO); the Thai Tourism Council (TTC); and the Thai Ecotourism and Adventure Travel Association (TEATA) (Leksakundilok, 2004). 33 organised and locally grounded representative bodies can be in uniting the local tourism community members and pushing one collective agenda through various levels of social governance to benefit the majority. The Phang Nga Tourism Business Association and the recently formed Khao Lak Group of SME Resorts, featured in Figure 9, have been instrumental in strengthening Khao Lak’s tourism community and building resilience in the face of the tsunami event. The way in which they have achieved this is discussed further in Section 5.4.3.
The government strongly supports the industry driven developmental processes through the financial backing of tourism-related services such as infrastructure and promotional activity (Leksakundilok, 2004). The reasons for this close collaboration are two-fold. The government and the private sector are both interested in raising foreign exchange and in many instances the very people that are investing in tourism development in Thailand also belong to the political elite (Resp. C, 2005, pers. comm., 30 June; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; local tour guide, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). This overlap of interests is very much evident in Khao Lak. The luxurious La Flora Resort located on Bang Niang Beach in Khao Lak is owned by one of the royal princesses while the neighbouring Mukdara Resort is owned in part by the Thai Prime Minister. This close relationship between state and business concerns has enabled tourism in Thailand to become a significant economic force.
4.3 Khao Lak: Paradise personified
4.3.1 The nature of tourism development in Khao Lak
According to the members of the Khao Lak tourism community that were interviewed (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July), there are two defining features that differentiates their product from the famous neighbouring destination of Phuket. First, Khao Lak promotes itself as a peaceful haven for nature lovers who want to relax and rejuvenate. Second, Khao Lak businesses focus on building close relationships with their clients. For the business owners of Khao Lak there is no distinction between themselves and the clients: “The clients are more like family than guests. They are a part of our community” (Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). The bond between client and guest that forms an integral part of the Khao Lak experience serves the tourism business community in two ways. It not only creates a strong repeat client base (ranging from 20 percent for the many of the medium resorts to 80 percent for some of the smaller ones) but also stimulates more business with many of the repeat clients bringing friends (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm., 30 August). These distinguishing characteristics feature prominently in the brochures of some of
34 Europe’s largest tour operators - Thomas Cook, Fritidsresor, TUI, Apollo, LTU, and Kuoni - and are responsible for Khao Lak’s exponential growth from 100 rooms in 1996 to more than 6,000 by 25 December 2004. A map indicating the extent and type of touristic development found in Khao Lak prior to the tsunami event is presented in Figure 10.
The type of clients drawn to Khao Lak’s nature-focussed image are predominantly German and Swedish families and retirees that are looking to escape the European winter (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July). The strong market demand generated from Europe filled the resorts to full capacity for six months of the year (the high season running from October to March.) providing the community with enough earnings to sustain them through the low season. The low season generates very little business (approximately 30 percent) due to the Eurocentric client base (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; locally registered tour guide, 19 July). However, this high dependency on seasonal tourism earnings also leaves the community very vulnerable to external events that could threaten crucial peak season tourist flows. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is a devastating example of Khao Lak’s vulnerability to such events. The negative ramifications for this heavy seasonal reliance on tourism income are discussed in Chapter 5.
There are four types of business stakeholders in Khao Lak that benefited greatly from Khao Lak’s tourism boom. Each group has its own character defined by its place in Khao Lak’s historical development process dictated largely by the scale and reach of their marketing strategies: Small bungalow and resort owners: Emulating the development patterns of most Thai tourism destinations, Khao Lak humbly began from small-scale spot development (Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. H, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July). The first 10 bungalows were constructed on Nang Thong Beach in 1988 by a German man called Gerd and his Thai wife Noi. These bungalows were promoted in the widely read German guidebook Stefan Lösser that caters for the backpacker and naturalist market interested in remote places to discover (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July). The success generated by the guidebook and word-of-mouth, inspired local rubber and fruit plantation owners, fishermen and visiting Germans to invest in small resorts and bungalows of their own (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). The guidebook, which remains a staple source for this type of market (representing half of the current market base), is now supported by two German web-sites that promote small and medium sized accommodation and tours for the naturalist market (Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm., 30 August).
35
Medium-sized resort owners: Medium resorts along with small resorts form the backbone of the Khao Lak tourism industry, together accounting for more than 70 percent of Khao Lak’s total room capacity (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). Most of these businesses are owned by locals from the surrounding area (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). However, the client base for the medium resort market is very different from their smaller counterparts. The market base for the medium resorts is predominantly mass market tourists sourced through European tour operator brochures. Medium resorts began to appear in Khao Lak from 1996 onwards, their growth patterns being determined by Khao Lak’s brochure exposure (Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July). Large resort owners and international chains: The large 4 and 5 star luxury resorts are recent additions to Khao Lak’s tourism industry, most of which were built after 2000. They are still very much in the minority but access their markets through the European tour operators and their group international marketing strategies. The La Flora Resort owned by the Thai princess and the neighbouring Mukdara Beach Resort part owned by the Prime Minister (see Section 4.2.2.2) are two examples of the new wave of luxury properties that line the Khao Lak beachfront. Supporting businesses: Benefiting directly from Khao Lak’s mass market tourism boom, a multitude of businesses developed to support the needs of the tourist. The types of supporting businesses found in Khao Lak include restaurants, souvenir shops, tailor and health spa facilities, taxi services, local tour guiding businesses and scuba diving companies (refer to Figure 10).
Khao Lak’s positioning in the international market and the resultant tourism boom did not happen by chance. The following section examines the social construction of Khao Lak as a tourist destination through the theoretical lens of place and explores how the fragility of its well maintained image contributes to its inherent vulnerability to external shocks.
4.3.2 The creation and ‘placement’ of Khao Lak
Drawing upon the concept of place presented in Section 2.5, it is argued that tourism destinations are not defined in terms of political boundaries but by carefully constructed images. These images are created and maintained by key destination stakeholders and large foreign tour operators in accordance with the perceived desires of the particular tourist market the destination wishes to attract. An exploration of the development of Khao Lak supports this assertion. Khao Lak and its corresponding nature-focussed image were born out of the marketing strategy of the pioneers of Khao Lak, Gerd and Noi, who successfully promoted their bungalows through the Stefan Lösser guidebook to the naturalist tourist market. However, at this time ‘Khao Lak’ as a place did not exist. The beach area took the name of the local village, Nang Thong. It was not until the successful marketing launch of Khao Lak Laguna Resort in 1996 that transformed Khao Lak from
37 an undiscovered “sleeping” tourism community (Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July) to an internationally renowned tourism destination.
Khao Lak Laguna Resort was the first to secure and feature in the brochures of two prominent foreign tour operators: Neckermann Reisen based in Germany and Star Tours of Sweden (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). The inclusion of Khao Lak in the brochures of these large tour operators placed and defined Khao Lak as an international destination, building upon the original undiscovered image of Khao Lak projected by Gerd and Noi eight years earlier. The name ‘Khao Lak’ was taken from the mountain that overlooks the valley and used by the tour operators to demarcate the tourist product that featured in their brochures. The image epitomised in the brochures is transferred into an experience through the subjective interactions between the tourism community of Khao Lak and their guests. Today, the original names of the villages have been transposed by the identity of ‘Khao Lak’, a name that embodies the tourism product found in this particular area of Phang Nga Province. The importance of this niche positioning in Thailand’s competitive tourism market is well recognised by the Khao Lak tourism businesses that work hard to maintain this distinction. However, the very fragile and fickle nature of Khao Lak’s constructed image that encapsulates the essence of its product and its high dependency on market exposure generated through foreign tour operator brochures leaves it inherently vulnerable to external shocks such as the tsunami event.
The possibilities available to this booming yet close-knit tourism community seemed endless and development could not keep up with demand. But the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, ripped the community apart leaving families and livelihoods in tatters. The idyllic image of paradise, so carefully maintained by the community in conjunction with foreign tour operators who created ‘Khao Lak’, was destroyed by the tsunami waves. An examination of the social construction of Khao Lak using the theoretical construct of place not only identifies Khao Lak as a product of fluid social processes that operate through the local and international scale but also highlights its vulnerability. As argued in Chapter 1 and 2, a high dependency on a favourable image that is largely determined by foreign tour operators coupled with a heavy reliance on their subsequent marketing strategies and product preferences leaves Khao Lak very vulnerable to external events that lie outside the control of the place-based community. Supporting the contentions made by Cresswell (1999) and Knox and Marston (2004) in Chapter 2, these findings clearly show that power lies in the definition of place. Now the community of Khao Lak face an uphill battle; to survive they must once again build the image of paradise and persuade the large tour operators to feature their destination again in their brochures. The tourism numbers for the 2005/2006 high season beginning in October will be an indication of their promotional success. The causal factors
38 and processes that contributed to the tragic downfall of this seemingly robust and booming community are the focus of the next chapter.
4.4 Conclusion
Using the complimentary theoretical tools of relational scale and place, this chapter has established the socio-political context within which to examine Khao Lak’s vulnerability. This was achieved by investigating the wider socio-political governance structures and historical processes that have shaped tourism development in Khao Lak and identifying the main stakeholders involved. The social actors that control tourism development in Thailand and subsequently Khao Lak fall loosely into two categories - the government and the tourism industry. But the distinction between the two is sometimes blurred with members of the governing elite often having vested financial interests in tourism development. It is argued that this dual role of regulator and investor has contributed to weaknesses in the governance structures. The role of the government and the industry in Khao Lak’s development and depth of their involvement is markedly different. The main function of the government is to formulate tourism policy and planning strategies at the central and provincial levels and implement these through the local TAOs. However, due to governance weaknesses at the lower governmental levels that facilitate inefficiency and corruption, the plans are rarely operationalised. This consequently leaves the tourism industry as the main driving force behind tourism development in Thailand and the architect of the form it takes.
A closer examination of Khao Lak’s evolution as an international tourism destination through the theoretical lens of place demonstrates how localised industry stakeholders have moulded and shaped the product of Khao Lak in collaboration with foreign interests. However, it is argued that the very fickle nature of this tourism product and its foreign market ‘placement’ leaves Khao Lak’s tourism community inherently vulnerable to external shocks. Highly dependent on the promotional activities of foreign tour operators, many of Khao Lak’s tourism businesses are rendered powerless in determining their product’s ‘positioning’ and market success. The ramifications of these governance weaknesses and developmental processes for Khao Lak’s vulnerability to hazards and its capacity to adapt and recover following the 2004 tsunami event become very clear in the next chapter, which outlines the causal factors that underlie Khao Lak’s vulnerability.
39 5. Causal factors underlying the vulnerability of Khao Lak
5.1 Introduction
Disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami dramatically expose the strengths and weaknesses of the affected community’s social system and in doing so reveal its vulnerability to shocks (Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). Supported by the vulnerability literature presented in Sections 1.2 and 2.3, it is strongly argued that the success of future resilience building strategies rests upon a clear understanding of the socio-political causal factors that underlie these fallible attributes of the existing social system and its vulnerability. Accordingly, this chapter investigates the complex and proximate causal factors that contributed to the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism community to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami through the collective lens of Turner’s et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework and relational scale presented in Chapter 2. Framed within the wider socio-political context outlined in the previous chapter, the causal factors contributing to Khao Lak’s vulnerability are systematically explored using the three interconnected and place- based dimensions of vulnerability – exposure, sensitivity and resilience – that lie at the heart of Turner et al.’s (2003) framework. The power dynamics that shape each of the identified causal factors are then deconstructed using relational scale to reveal the power-laden agendas and vested interests of the socio-political elite that perpetuate social inequality and consequently vulnerability.
Like the nature of vulnerability itself (Clark et al., 1998: Nankervis, 2000; Turner et al., 2003), the presentation of the causal factors is neither simple nor linear; the explanations of the causal factors feed into and off each other. Accordingly, this chapter uses diagrams and a clear conceptual structure based on Turner et al.’s (2003) framework to examine the causal factors that have contributed to the exposure, sensitivity and resilience of the Khao Lak community to the tsunami event. Woven throughout this three-dimensional examination of Khao Lak’s vulnerability are explanations into how historically embedded and contemporary processes and complementing structures investigated in Chapter 4 have shaped the causal factors. A summary of the three- dimensional factors that contribute to Khao Lak’s vulnerability and the scales at which they are constructed is presented in Figure 11.
40
Vulnerability of Khao Lak to the 2004 Tsunami
Exposure Sensitivity Resilience
Human Conditions Coping/ Impact/ Response Response Components Limited livelihood options
Strong local Government Natural terrain Access to economic capital and insurance represen- led financial tation assisstance
Development Pre-existing weaknesses of
type government structures and
processes
Adjustment &
41 Unpreparedness for natural adaptation/response hazards Early warning system
Environmental Conditions
Post-tsunami tourism strategy Loss of coastal ecosystems Natural resource management
Resilient market base
Robust marketing strategies
Key: International National Regional Local
Figure 10: Scaled causal factors contributing to Khao Lak’s vulnerability based on the vulnerability framework developed by Turner et al. (2003). 5.2 Exposure
As defined in Section 2.3.1, exposure - the first dimension of vulnerability - is largely a product of the physical location and character of the surrounding built and natural environment. An examination of the characteristics of Khao Lak’s natural and built environment revealed two interlinked causal factors, presented in Figure 11 that left the tourism dependant communities so exposed to the tsunami event: the flatness of the natural terrain compounded by the lack of natural and structural defence systems, and the inappropriate development for the terrain. The decision to develop tourism in Khao Lak, the structural form it took and the subsequent degradation of the natural defences were indirectly shaped by the perceived needs of Khao Lak’s targeted clientele.
5.2.1 Natural terrain
The flatness and low-lying nature of the topography upon which much of the tourism development is built is a key factor of the high exposure of Khao Lak’s tourism communities to coastal hazards. Khao Lak is built along a 25 kilometre strip of extremely flat land that extends up to two kilometres inland to the foot of a bordering escarpment (Respondent F, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July). Whilst this proximity to beautiful beaches makes it a desirable location for tourism development, it leaves the built environment extremely exposed to storm surges and tsunami waves (Respondent B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Respondent C, 2005, pers. comm., 30 June; Respondent H, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July; Respondent O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July). The natural exposure of the terrain was further exacerbated by the clearing of much of the original deep- rooted forest and grasslands along with the introduced rubber plantations for tourism development. This development-orientated decision not only left the natural terrain more susceptible to coastal erosion, one of the many by-products of the receding tsunami waves (demarcated in red in Figure 4 in Section 1.2), but left the built environment with no natural defence mechanisms to break the force of the waves (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June; Resp. E, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July). Uninhibited by the topography and minimal vegetation, the tsunami waves penetrated two kilometres inland before sweeping debris and people out to sea (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. H, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July; Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). The areas of Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang, located on the flattest terrain (see Figures 4 and 10) were subsequently the worst hit. The development built on higher ground and nestled in the hills, such as those resorts located around Khao Lak Beach, sustained little damage. Measures aimed at reversing the degradation of the natural terrain and building ecological resilience are discussed in Section 5.4.5.
42 5.2.2 Placement and type of development
Jeff McNeely, chief scientist of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) attributed the enormous loss of life from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami to the human intrusion on natural shorelines, typified by the inappropriate development that lines the coast along the Indian Ocean rim (Bangkok Post, 29 December 2004: 3). According to Wong (2000), inappropriate development in Southeast Asia is a direct outcome of a lack of understanding of coastal processes on the part of tourism developers, which in turn, facilitates vulnerability (Wilhite et al., 1987; Pelling, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). Evidence from Khao Lak supports these claims. Capitalising on the stunning shoreline views and flat terrain, a multitude of small, medium and eventually large resorts were constructed along the Khao Lak foreshore (refer to Figure 10 in Section 4.3.1). However, the proximity of the resorts to the exposed beach coupled with the types of structures built and the material used in the structures contributed greatly to the physical exposure of the tourism community.
Khao Lak tourism development built after 1999 was subject to the following building regulations. Development was required to be set back 30 metres from the vegetation line and be no higher than 12 metres within 100 meters of this line (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). What the regulations did not specify were structural building codes that took into account the risk of storm surges or tidal fluctuations associated with coastal development. The authorities considered such measures to be unnecessary based on the belief that the Thai coastline was safe from natural hazards such as storm surges and tsunamis (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. H, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July; Resp. J, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July; Resp. L, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July). Subsequently, development was built in such a way that did not take the risk of natural hazards into consideration as is the case all over Thailand (Resp. F, 2005, pers. comm., 4 July). The smaller structures were largely built out of wood while many of the larger ones were constructed out of concrete with nearly all facing the beach directly. The pattern of destruction caused by the tsunami waves indicates the unsuitability of the development types found in Khao Lak. The force of the tsunami waves completely destroyed the wooden structures (mainly bungalows and small accommodation complexes) and gutted the concrete structures, entering the buildings by the large windows facing the sea, leaving concrete shells. Concrete buildings that were built at a 90 degree angle to the beach front largely survived, the brunt of the wave being resisted by solid concrete walls with no openings (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July).
43 5.3 Sensitivity
Sensitivity – the second dimension of vulnerability - reflects the socio-economic health of the coupled system that determines its ability to cope with the impacts of a hazard or shock. Indicated in Section 2.3.2, the coping capacity of the system depends both on the access its members have to economic and sociol-political capital needed to sustain livelihood sources, and the effectiveness of the governance structures and processes that determine the distribution of these resources. The sensitivity of Khao Lak to unforeseen shocks was heightened by factors relating to the private sector’s access to limited resources, the aptitude of the existing governance structures and the agendas of the governmental officials that work through these structures (see Figure 11). The following sub-sections demonstrate how these factors are outcomes of the wider social system and corresponding socio-economic processes within which they are situated.
5.3.1 Uneven access and entitlements to resources
5.3.1.1 Limited livelihood options
Livelihood diversification is recognised as a key strategy in reducing vulnerability and building resilience against a wide range of shocks (Moser and Norton, 2001; Turner et al., 2003). In Khao Lak, however, land resources are scarce and livelihood options are limited. Before the arrival of tourism the area was characterised by small villages, rubber, fruit and coconut plantations and small scale fishing (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July, Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July). Tourism development created a multitude of new opportunities for locals to start their own businesses8 and provided surrounding communities with thousands of steady jobs (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. V, 19 July). However, the rapid replacement of traditional agricultural livelihoods with more lucrative tourism-related income sources has dramatically reduced the range of livelihood options available to people in Khao Lak. With the introduction of tourism development along the narrow flat strip of coastal land, there is little appropriate land left for plantations. Whilst some tourism business operators still have access to alternative livelihood sources, such as a shop in the neighbouring town of Takua Pa or own plantations in the surrounding area, these people are clearly in the minority (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July).
The vulnerability of Khao Lak based on its prevailing reliance on tourism earning is further exacerbated by the highly seasonal nature of the tourism business and its dependence on a pristine
8 Approximately 80 percent of Khao Lak tourism businesses are operated by locals from the district of Takua Pa where Khao Lak is located. 44 environmental image that has been shattered by the tsunami. As illustrated in Sections 1.2 and 4.3, the tsunami event occurred at the height of the high season simultaneously destroying the infrastructure and the community’s season earning potential. Therefore, this event not only disrupted Khao Lak’s tourism activities during the high season of 2004 but severely limited the seasonal earnings that the community survive on for the entire year (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 June). Even under the most optimistic scenarios, it was estimated that those working in the tourism industry would not start to earn disposable income until the beginning of the 2005/2006 peak season starting in October 2005 (Mydans, 2005). To survive, the 42 resorts that have rebuilt and reopened for the 2005/2006 season (which represent approximately 30 percent of Khao Lak’s pre-tsunami accommodation capacity) require a minimum of 20 percent capacity (Resp. N, 2005, pers comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July, Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm.., 14 December). It is very uncertain as to whether this target will be reached due to the damage to Khao Lak’s image as a tourism destination. Khao Lak’s image of a paradisic retreat has now been replaced by death, sorrow and desolation. The challenge of restoring this shattered image and convincing tourists that Khao Lak is once again safe exposes the core element that underlies Khao Lak’s vulnerability to external shocks. This dilemma is compounded by the fact that there are so many alternate destinations for the tourist to choose from (Richter and Waugh, 1986). The Thai government is capitalising on its wealth of tourism destinations and is diverting much needed tourism business to other areas of the country that were not affected. However, this strategy does not assist the Khao Lak community that has become dependent on tourism income for their livelihoods. Drawing upon the observations of Sönmez et al. (1999) and Gurtner (2004) presented in Section 1.3, Khao Lak is a destination in crisis. In the wake of the tsunami event, unemployment and debt levels are high, investment confidence is very low and subsequently economic growth is non-existent.
5.3.1.2 Access to economic capital and insurance
In support of the vulnerability literature presented in Section 2.2.2, the findings of the research clearly show that the social processes that guide business financing and development in Thailand have significantly contributed to the sensitivity of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community. As outlined in Sections 4.3.1 and 5.3.1.1, Khao Lak’s tourism boom persuaded many people living in the greater Takua Pa District to invest all their accessible financial capital into lucrative tourism ventures. Like most business development in Thailand, tourism investors in Khao Lak started with small ventures sourcing capital from savings, land sales and profits from previous business ventures, and used all their profits to expand their businesses over time (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13
45 July). Financial institutions started to offer substantial loans to business applicants only as recently as 2004 in response to a perceived infallibility of Khao Lak’s tourism boom (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). Hence, the majority of small to medium business owners that reinvested all their profits in the expansion of their businesses were left with little means for recovery. Those investors that were successful in securing bank loans for their businesses prior to the tsunami event are now left with high repayment commitments but have no means to repay them (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. S, 2002, pers. comm., 13 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July).
This situation was compounded by the fact that most small to medium business operators had no insurance. Many Khao Lak business owners saw insurance as an unnecessary cost. They did not perceive any risks to the tourism boom and therefore reinvested all their profits into their expanding businesses (Resp. A, 2005, pers. comm., 29 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). According to the local business owners interviewed, this is a cultural norm in Thailand. Only the larger resort chains had access to substantial outside financial backing and insurance policies (Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). However, even those with insurance face economic shortfalls. One local resort owner confirmed that the insurance payouts were not high enough to cover the rebuilding costs (Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). But the most sensitive to financial risk are the tourism industry employees. They have no jobs, no land to sell or rebuild on and few other livelihood options to choose from (Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). Despite the existence of Social Security compensation entitlements, they are only available to officially registered staff. Many tourism workers, including the many illegal Burmese that work in construction and in the lowest paying tourism jobs are not legally recognised and therefore have no rights to financial entitlements (Ekachai, 2005a; Ekachai, 2005b; Matthews, 2005; Resp. G, 2005, pers. comm., 5 July).
5.3.2 Weaknesses in governance structures and processes
As identified in Section 2.2, the effectiveness of institutions and wider governance structures in controlling resources and regulating access to resources is an important contributing factor of sensitivity. In Khao Lak, considerable weaknesses exist in the governmental structures that guide tourism policy and implementation. As argued in Chapter 4, there is a clear lack of co-ordination between the different levels of government and a lack of capacity and power at the lower levels of government (Prayakvichien, 2005; TAT representative, 2005, pers. comm., 7 July). The decentralisation of tourism planning strategies in 2003 that awarded provincial and local governments more autonomy over their localised resources is good in principle but lacks logistical support. Phang Nga provincial officials have no capacity to oversee the local implementation of
46 tourism planning strategies and local authorities lack the expertise and political power to implement and enforce the plans (Resp. B, 2005, pers. comm., 29 July; Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July).
In agreement with statements made in Section 4.2.2.1, the findings prove that widespread corruption at the local level of government has further undermined the implementation of well- intended national planning regulations in Khao Lak. Those with money and political connections have the means to ‘persuade’ local government officials to grant ‘exceptions’ with regard to developmental approvals and building standards (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). Examples of such exceptions are evident in numerous places in Khao Lak. Developments such as the La Flora Resort (owned by one of the Thai princesses) and the neighbouring Mukdara Resort (owned in part by the Thai Prime Minister) are in clear violation of the 30 metre set-back line. Corruption - an informal system of governance – not only serves politically connected and wealthy stakeholders, but frequently includes government officials who belong to the local elite. These local government officials benefit financially from unofficial ‘additional’ payments and are in positions to partake in illegal development practices directly (Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). These benefits along with the fear of negative political consequences for challenging well connected stakeholders collectively strengthen this system of governance. In support of the vulnerability literature presented in Section 2.2, this finding demonstrates how the agendas of the dominant elite influence the uneven distribution of resources and in doing so heightens vulnerability. Moreover, corruption and the mismanagement of local resources within the local levels of government have resulted in a socio-political governance system that is insular and non-transparent. Accordingly, local community members are left with no clear platform from which to voice their concerns regarding the community’s development. The combined negative effects of these pre-existing governance deficiencies upon the recovery effort and the implementation of resilience building strategies in Khao Lak become strikingly clear in Section 5.4.
5.3.3 Lack of disaster awareness and preparedness
Sensitivity is determined not only by a group’s access to economic and political resources but also by access to social resources such as inaccurate information regarding the potential risks of living and working in highly exposed coastal areas. Cassedy (1991) and Drabeck (1992, 1995) concur that tourism businesses and industry organisations are often ill-prepared for disaster situations even in high risk areas where the potential impacts of disasters are regularly played down for marketing purposes (Murphy and Bayley, 1989). In Khao Lak, there was a clear lack of
47 information regarding the potential risk of natural hazards to the Andaman Coast before the tsunami. As argued in Section 5.2.2, the Khao Lak community along with others dotted along the Andaman coastline did not perceive the Andaman coastal zone to be unsafe or at risk to natural hazardous events. However, whilst this tsunami was the most destructive in living memory, it was not unforeseen that an event of this magnitude could occur.
In 1998, Smith Dharmasaroj, former director general of the Meteorological Department issued a warning to the government pertaining to the likely threat tsunamis posed to Thailand’s Andaman Coast (The Nation, 26 July 2005:2), which subsequently featured in media reports broadcast in Phuket at the time (Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). However, his claims were publicly refuted as the negative ramifications of the perceived risk upon tourism flows to Phuket and the surrounding area were considered too costly (Resp. C, 2005, pers. comm., 30 July; The Nation, 26 July: 2). The same reason was cited for the failure of the Meteorological Department to issue a warning immediately on hearing of the tsunami threat early on the morning of 26 December 2004 (Symonds, 2005). It could be argued that such politically and economically driven decisions to withhold critical information about potential risks to coastal communities and foreign tourists taken at the national level of government contributed greatly to the large number of lives lost. With hindsight, the socio-economic ramifications of not issuing a warning were far greater than those of a false warning. The ramifications of these politically loaded decisions strongly demonstrate how the agendas of the ruling national elite directly influenced vulnerability at the local scale.
5.4 Resilience
Resilience - the third dimension of vulnerability - is a direct indication of the capacity of the coupled human-environment system to withstand or absorb external shocks, such as natural disasters, without losing its fundamental function. As shown in Section 2.3.2, this capacity is largely determined by the ability of existing social networks and governance structures to facilitate access to resources that are needed to cope with and recover from a disaster. As Khao Lak continues to recover from the impacts of the tsunami the importance of strong governance becomes clear. Six of the seven resilience building factors listed in Figure 11 are products of wider multi-scalar governance structures and processes. The central government have played a crucial role in the distribution of much needed financial capital to aid the recovery effort, formulating tourism planning strategies aimed at building resilience for the future and are campaigning hard to win back tourist confidence. However, these mitigation strategies are being hampered by pre-existing deficiencies in the Thai governance structures and processes (see Sections 4.2.2.1 and 5.3.2) and governmental preferences that are perpetuating unequal resource
48 distribution. Instead of building resilience, these socio-political factors are heightening Khao Lak’s vulnerability to future shocks. Existing governance deficiencies include the absence of defined bureaucratic structures to facilitate transparent and fast aid distribution and a lack of expertise and political will at lower levels of government to facilitate the efficient implementation of tourism policy and strategies. These deficiencies are further exacerbated by corrupt practices supported largely by local elites. The following sub-sections focus on the success of the government-led resilience building strategies, the challenges such strategies pose for the various stakeholders involved in Khao Lak’s recovery and their subsequent reactions to these problems.
5.4.1 Strong national tourism planning policies
Sönmez et al. (1999) assert that partnerships between businesses, humanitarian organisations, all levels of government and the local communities affected by hazards can build socio-economic resilience in tourism destinations through the development of comprehensive crisis management plans and associated recovery marketing strategies. The Thai government’s Andaman Recovery Plan meets these criteria. A product of multiple stakeholder input (involving various academic institutes including Chulalongkorn University, specialised government departments such as the Designated Areas Sustainable Tourism Administration (DASTA) and local governments and communities), the Plan aims at stimulating a rapid and sustainable tourism recovery in the 10 tsunami-affected Andaman Coast sub-districts through three key strategies (TAT, 2005a): a. the formulation and implementation of an integrated tourism planning and development strategy, b. the facilitation of a strong private sector recovery by offering initial emergency payments, low interest loans, and tax relief measures, and c. the launch of multiple marketing drives to update the travelling public on the tourism facilities available and stimulate tourism flows to the restored areas. While the Plan offers strong guidelines for the affected communities, their successful implementation is proving difficult to achieve due to deficiencies in governance structures and conflicting interests operating at various scales of social organisation outlined below.
5.4.1.1 Post-tsunami tourism planning strategy
According to local governmental officials interviewed, the Plan aims to build resilience in tourism dependent communities against future natural hazards through the introduction of two complementary strategies: tourism development zoning regulations and, an integrated evacuation roads system that facilitates a quick escape in the event of another tsunami. Coming into effect on 1 May 2005, the new zoning laws and building codes featured in Figure 12 aim to lessen the exposure of the physical infrastructure outlined in Section 5.2.2 and are well regarded by the local
49
Built structures limited Built structures Built structures limited to to 25% of total area limited to 40% of total 60% of total area area
Restaurant and entertainment areas not to exceed 150 m 2
Living space not 2 No to exceed 90 m
develop-
ment
seaward
of 30 m
set-back
line
Maximum Maximum Maximum height 7 m height 12 m height 23 m
30 metres 45 metres
Beach Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3
75 metres 150 metres 300 metres
Figure 12: Andaman Recovery Plan zoning and building regulations (Source: Phuket Province Public Works and Town and Country Planning Department, 2005).
50 community. However, there remain logistical problems with the implementation of these plans leaving the effectiveness of the plans in doubt.
First, these new codes only apply to structures built or rebuilt after 1 May, meaning that those structures that were in violation of the original 30-metre set-back line and have rebuilt before this date are exempt. The government does not have the political desire or effective power to challenge the violating resorts that are in some cases part-owned by very influential elites such as the royal princess and the prime minister as discussed in Section 4.2.2.2 (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July; Resp. O, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. R, pers. comm., 12 July). The ramifications for this practical ‘oversight’ are four-fold. First, it gives those that are in violation of the set-back and minimising building regulations a sales edge as their structures are closer to the beach. Second, it creates further animosity and resignation with regard to the non-transparent and biased governance system among the complying businesses. Third, it leaves the offending businesses very exposed to future coastal hazards. Lastly, corruption and mismanagement of resources limits the existing sub-districts’ enforcement capabilities. No obvious moves have been made to address this governance shortfall revealed in Section 5.3.2 despite a renewed focus on sustainability (Resp. F, 2005, pers. comm., 4 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July). Hence, weaknesses in governance structures continue to hinder the implementation of resilience building strategies.
The second element of the new planning strategy, the evacuation roads system, remains unfinished for three reasons: bureaucratic complications, a lack of funds, and conflicting agendas. The large number of government departments9 with overlapping jurisdictions involved in the planning of the emergency roads system has slowed the formulation of this policy (Resp. L, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July). These bureaucratic complications are further exacerbated by the central government’s delay in finalising compensation amounts for the repossession of private land needed for the road expansions. The government does not have enough money to pay for the prime development land (Resp. R, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July). However, these complications are overshadowed by the strong local opposition to the introduction of such plans. Influential members of the local tourism community strongly oppose the introduction of the evacuation roads system for two reasons (Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. R, 2005, pers. comm., 12
9 In Thailand there are many government departments involved in the administration of the coastal zone areas: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; Department of Marine and Coastal Resources; Royal Forestry Department; Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning; Department of Roads; Department of Electricity; and provincial governments supported by district and sub-district administrations. The involvement of so many layers of government results in delays in policy formulation and at times causes conflict between departments. It is sometimes unclear as to who is responsible for what resulting in inter-department conflicts and power struggles (Leksakundilok, 2003; Resp. J, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July; Resp. L, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July; Resp. X, 2005, pers. comm., 16 July). 51 July). First, there are fears that the introduction of beachfront evacuation roads will alter the character of Khao Lak and result in a drop in market share. Second, the proposed widths of the roads (between six to twelve metres) are thought to be unnecessarily wide for their purpose. Without local consent, the government has no legal right to enforce the plans. This current stalemate between the government and local land owners is not only thwarting the resilience building strategies and prolonging Khao Lak’s recovery, it is also heightening the community’s sensitivity to future shocks.
5.4.1.2 Government-led financial assistance to promote a strong recovery
To support the infrastructural recovery of the private sector, the Thai Government endorsed three financial assistance measures aimed at the differing needs of the private sector stakeholders: initial emergency payments, the Tsunami Recovery Fund, and the Tsunami SME Fund. While these measures have assisted some businesses, application delays and bureaucratic obstacles coupled with corrupt practices have hindered the effectiveness of these plans. Initial emergency payments: In the absence of personal savings, the government offered one time payments between THB10,000 and THB66,000 (ca. USD250-1,600) to individual households directly following the disaster. To get access to these funds the village leaders were required to verify how much individual households had lost. Corruption at the local levels of governance has resulted in the uneven distribution of aid (Resp. D, 2005, pers. comm., 1 July). Participants based in Khao Lak were aware of numerous examples of fraudulent claims that largely benefited friends and relatives of prominent village elites instead of the wider community (Resp. K, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). The uneven distribution of financial capital has once again strengthened the financial position of the ruling elite while marginalising others in the process. Tsunami Recovery Fund: The Tsunami Recovery Fund was set up to financially assist medium and large businesses to rebuild. To apply for a loan under this scheme, businesses are required only to present a business plan. If granted a loan from this fund, businesses are required to pay 1 percent interest for the first seven years and then the rate changes in line with the national MLR rate (Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). This plan was very popular but was stalled temporarily by a lack of funds, a problem that central government has now rectified. Tsunami SME Fund: The Tsunami Small and Medium Enterprise Fund is aimed at assisting smaller businesses that have claims amounting to a maximum of THB300,000 (ca. USD7,500). The effectiveness of this scheme in assisting recovery is lessened by two factors. First, the application process is very slow causing delays in recovery time. Second, the failure to produce legal land deeds, proof of business registration, proof of former assets along with the inability to pay for new architectural plans are preventing the majority of small businesses from accessing
52 these funds leaving many small businesses in a very vulnerable position (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July, Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm.., 14 December). Moreover, the limit on funds is too low to make a real difference to the recovery of small businesses (Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July).
The only other financial option available to tourism businesses wanting to rebuild are commercial bank loans. However, bad credit coupled with doubts regarding Khao Lak’s future financial viability is limiting the success of many applications. Those with pre-tsunami loans have a much reduced chance of being granted a second loan to rebuild their businesses unless they have other businesses to use as collateral, while foreigners have no legal right to apply (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July, Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm.., 14 December). These obstacles are compounded by a reluctance from banks to lend money and reinvest in Khao Lak tourism business ventures due to the financial risk the area now poses (Sritama, 2005; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm.9 July). Banks along with some businesses are waiting to see what the 2005/2006 season brings in terms of business before making the decision to reinvest in tourism development in Khao Lak (Katharangsiporm, 2005; Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm. 13 July). This reluctance to reinvest and rebuild leaves the landscape looking incomplete and far from a tourist paradise, which in turn, hinders its capacity to recover. But the rebuilding of the tourism infrastructure is only one part of the tourism recovery equation. The biggest challenge is restoring consumer confidence and enticing tourists back. The strategies aimed at achieving this goal and the associated hurdles are the subject of the next section.
5.4.1.3 Robust marketing strategies and resilient markets
As argued in Sections 1.3 and 4.3, image and the marketing of that image are paramount to a tourism destination’s success. Consequently, Khao Lak’s future success hinges on the restoration of their image and their success in convincing the international tourist market that they are once again open for business. First impressions suggest that the TAT is working hard to restore consumer confidence on behalf of all the affected destinations. But the reality is somewhat different. To counteract the damaging effects of negative media reports and safety warnings issued by foreign advisory services and restore consumer confidence (Mydans, 2005; TAT, 2005f; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July), the TAT have spear-headed a comprehensive marketing campaign. As argued in the literature presented in Section 1.3, negative publicity is just as damaging to the affected destination’s marketability as the tsunami event itself (Hospitality Net, 2005). The marketing tools adopted by the TAT to achieve these aims include (TAT, 2005a):
53 a. the sponsoring of both international and domestic tour operator familiarisation trips to the affected areas, b. the reinforcement of Thailand’s strong tourism image through an aggressive promotional campaign aimed largely at the main source markets, supported by c. continuous informational updates regarding the carrying capacity of affected areas distributed through TAT offices located in the main source countries and via the TAT website, and d. the creation of discounted packages to the main southern tourist hubs such as Phuket.
Such strong strategies are proving to be effective for those tourism areas that feature in the promotions such as Phuket, Ko Phi Phi, and Krabi. Phuket, for example recorded a 16 percent increase in tourist arrivals for November 2005 compared to November 2004 (Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm.., 14 December). Unfortunately, Khao Lak is not one of them. A TAT representative confirmed that they do see Khao Lak recovering from the tsunami and therefore have not ear- marked it as a priority (2005, pers. comm., 7 July). The TAT’s decision to focus on Phuket and Krabi is somewhat understandable. Both destinations were only marginally destroyed and are major exchange earners for the country, while Ko Phi Phi’s touristic worth to the Thai government is assured by its role as a major marketing drawcard for its neighbour Phuket (Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm..,19 July). But such preferences based on economic and political reasonings have led to the uneven distribution of financial and political support among the affected communities. Consequently, these actions have simultaneously built resilience in some tourism communities such as Phuket and Ko Phi Phi, while heightening vulnerability levels in others, most notably Khao Lak.
Expecting no marketing assistance from the government (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm.., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July), the Khao Lak community members know that the recovery of Khao Lak lies with their ability to attract clients back. Key stakeholders such as the owner of the Khao Lak Laguna Resort and Richard Doring, resident German Travel Writer for the Stefan Lösser guidebook, are again using their marketing contacts employed to build Khao Lak as a tourist destination (as outlined in Section 4.3) to access Khao Lak’s core markets and rebuild consumer confidence. Indications from the large international tour operators such as Thomas Cook are positive. Although Thomas Cook has diverted much of the Khao Lak business for the coming 2005 season, they are already planning to fully feature Khao Lak again for the 2006 season. While many of the medium resorts have the means to wait until the 2006 season for a revival, the smaller support businesses that rely on the extensive brochure marketing for their client-base may not survive until then (Resp. O, 2005,
54 pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July; Resp. T, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). Small bungalow and resort owners are arguably in a stronger position from a marketing perspective as they continue to actively inform their clients about their recovery through the German internet sites that have grown to compliment the independent traveller business sourced through the Stefan Lösser guidebook. Their close control over these mediums award them more resilience than the larger resorts that rely heavily on brochure exposure for business (Resp. W, 2005, pers. comm., 30 August).
The resilience of the Khao Lak tourism community lies not only with the reach of its marketing strategies but upon the type of client it attracts. One source that both the small and medium resort owners are counting on to fill the much needed 20 percent business capacity for this coming season is repeat business. As shown in Section 4.3.1, repeat clients have brought stability and growth to Khao Lak throughout its touristic history and emails and letters received from guests strongly indicate that many will return for the coming 2005/2006 season (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm., 19 July). Some of the small and medium resorts are already fully booked for October 2005. Accordingly, it is argued that Khao Lak’s resilience to external shocks is greatly heightened by the resilience and loyalty of its repeat client- base. But this also shows how vulnerable they are through their dependency on foreign business. The faith of the Khao Lak community currently rests squarely in their hands.
5.4.2 Early warning system: a key component of tourism’s recovery plan
The Indian Ocean Early Warning System is heralded by both the government and tsunami- affected communities as a crucial tool for building resilience against future shocks. For the Khao Lak community, the system would not only safeguard them but would help to reassure tourists and therefore assist greatly in the area’s recovery as an international tourist destination (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. O, 2005, pers. comm., 10 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm.19 July). Yet despite the central role the early warning system plays in Thailand’s recovery and resilience building strategy, the installation of the warning towers was not completed until early December 2005. No explanation has been given to the community as to why the installation of the warning towers was delayed. The technology was available for installation in July, 2005. However, there is a general consensus among those interviewed that the reason behind this oversight is directly linked to the government’s preferences. Local community members believe this to be another example of the government’s focus on restoring tourist confidence in their southern and more lucrative
55 destination neighbours, Phuket, Phi Phi and Krabi, all of which have had functioning warning towers in place since July 2005 (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm. 13 July). Others attribute this ‘oversight’ to the ineffectiveness of Khao Lak’s local authorities in communicating the concerns of the community to the national level (Resp. V, 2005, pers. comm. 19 July). In spite of the reasoning behind the decision, the delayed introduction of the early warning towers left the community not only more vulnerable to future shocks but hindered their efforts in attracting tourism business back to Khao Lak.
5.4.3 Strong local representation
Much of Khao Lak’s resilience is founded upon the strength of the local representative groups headed by resourceful leaders. The Phang Nga Tourism Business Association and the Khao Lak Group of Small and Medium Enterprises have been instrumental in petitioning for more funding to hasten the rebuilding process, influencing development plans, and accessing core markets in efforts to help Khao Lak return to its former tourism glory. Supporting the contentions of Adams (1996), Agnew (1997), Leitner (1997) and Howitt (2003) outlined in Section 2.4, this strategic use of existing scaled structures and the creation of new forums of political activity clearly demonstrate the importance of understanding and utilising multiple scales of social organisation to bring about favourable outcomes. The multi-scalar avenues used by each group to support the local community in its recovery efforts and in building resilience are discussed below.
5.4.3.1 Phang Nga Tourism Business Association
The Phang Nga Tourism Business Association has maintained its role as a prominent and proactive force in shaping Khao Lak’s character throughout the developmental history of Khao Lak as a tourist destination and continues to use its access to financial and political resources in the wake of the tsunami to strengthen the community. Representing the concerns of the medium and larger resorts, the Association’s weekly meetings with the Phang Nga provincial governor have been used to air grievances over the delays in and uneven distribution of financial resources. Furthermore, the Association uses its close connections with their local parliamentary member, who previously held the position of president within the Association, to voice their opinions regarding the future planning strategy for Khao Lak at the national level (Resp. N, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. P, 2005, pers. comm., 11 July). The Association’s high level of political activity utilized simultaneously through multiple scales of social organisation continues to strengthen the local tourism community and build resilience against future shocks.
56 5.4.3.2 The Khao Lak Group of Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Resorts
Unlike its registered counterpart, the Khao Lak Group of SME Resorts was set up in direct reaction to the tsunami. The founder, Richard Doring, established this group to bring some stability, strength and hope to the small businesses that lost everything as a result of the tsunami (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July; Resp. Q, 2005, pers. comm., 12 July; Resp. S, 2005, pers. comm., 13 July). The Group has also successfully sourced additional funding from Germany through a Khao Lak accommodation website and distributes these funds equally among its members (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). The Group actively seek political forums from which to voice their concerns regarding the formulation of the new building regulations. In January, Richard Doring took the opportunity to present a Memorandum outlining the concerns the Group had regarding the rebuilding process directly to Prime Minister Thaskin (Resp. M, 2005, pers. comm., 9 July). While the Group’s interests do not conflict with those of the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association, each body operates independently. However, a common denominator found in both groups is strong and informed leadership that actively seek out ways to systematically operate at multiple levels of social organisation in order to build resilience within the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak.
5.4.5 Natural resource management
Building social resilience through the implementation of comprehensive planning and development strategies and the strengthening of localized governance structures is only addressing part of the equation. Adger et al. (2005) stress the need to complement such socio- political measures with strategies that enhance the capacity of ecosystems to regenerate and adapt to hazardous conditions particularly in sensitive coastal zones where 23 percent of the world’s population live. To counteract the physical exposure of the degraded and open terrain outlined in Section 5.2.1 and buffer the built environment against future wave surges, the Department of Marine and Coastal Resources are coordinating the replanting two types of native trees within the badly eroded 30 meter beachfront set-back zone (Resp. L, 2005, pers. comm., 8 July). Casuarina trees having deep root systems are being planted to stabilise the sandy soil and prevent further erosion while Pandanaceae trees that resemble mangroves are being reintroduced to the beachfront to both stabilise the earth and act as a natural barrier against future storm surges or tsunami threats. Native grasses are also being planted to secure the eroding sandy soil. Tourism as a major driver of change in coastal areas has the capacity to affect resilience in two ways: it can either build resilience through the provision of alternative livelihoods or decrease resilience through the destruction of the ecological resource base upon which it ironically relies for its success. The measures listed above do more than build biophysical resilience. Increasing the
57 biophysical resilience underpins the sustainability of tourism development and the livelihoods it supports.
5.5 Conclusion
Guided by the vulnerability framework presented by Turner et al. (2003), this chapter has identified twelve causal factors that contribute to the three dimensions of vulnerability: exposure, sensitivity and resilience. The identification and deconstruction of the power discourses that influence Khao Lak’s touristic development using Turner et al.’s (2003) framework in conjunction with relational scale has revealed how these factors are socially constructed and reinforced by both historically embedded and contemporary processes that are driven by social norms and the agendas of the dominant elite operating at various scales of social organisation. The exposure of Khao Lak to the tsunami was shown to be heightened by interconnected biophysical and socio-political processes operating at the local level, namely the natural terrain, the removal and degradation of natural defence mechanisms to facilitate touristic development, and the type of tourism development built. The findings of the research demonstrate that Khao Lak’s sensitivity to natural hazards is largely the product of four factors. First, limited livelihood options compounded by the domination of tourism development in the area have left most community members with no alternate income source to fall back on now that tourism flows have drastically declined. Second, social norms, which place little value on business insurance and limit the potential capital businesses could use to assist their recovery, contribute to economic vulnerability. Third, pre-existing weaknesses in governance structures and processes that consistently promote the uneven access and distribution of financial and socio-political capital has hindered the community’s capacity to withstand the tsunami’s unforeseen impacts. Lastly, a lack of disaster preparedness caused by national-level decisions has resulted in the devastation of the very industry that these decisions were designed to protect.
In support of the literature presented in Chapter 2, the identification of the resilience causal factors clearly demonstrates the importance of robust and effective governance systems and social networks in boosting a community’s resilience and aiding a strong recovery following a shock. To counteract the structural and biophysical exposure of Khao Lak and to facilitate a swift tourism recovery, the Thai central government has introduced a three-pronged strategy to strengthen both natural and structural defences against future shocks, to facilitate the recovery of tourism business through loans schemes, and spearheaded aggressive tourism promotion activities. However, as this chapter has argued these mitigation strategies are once again being undermined by pre- existing governance weaknesses and governmental preferences that are strengthening the recovery in some tourism areas while simultaneously marginalising efforts in Khao Lak.
58 6. Research significance and recommendations
In the wake of the disastrous 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that left the livelihoods of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community in tatters, the research presented in this report has answered one fundamental question: what socio-political and environmental conditions led to the vulnerability of the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak to the tsunami event? To fully address the multifaceted nature and complexity of this question, this research has fulfilled three main objectives outlined in Chapter 1. First, it has identified the socio-political and environmental factors that contributed to the vulnerability of Khao Lak to the tsunami event. Second, it has investigated how these factors are intrinsically linked. Third and most importantly, the research has deconstructed the power discourses that shape these causal factors to reveal how they are created and sustained through existing socio-political processes and supporting structures operating across multiple scales of social organisation.
Instrumental in fulfilling these aims was the identification and application of a strong conceptual framework to structure the complex analysis of the social construction of Khao Lak’s vulnerability. Drawing upon the emerging multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis and human geography, three complementary theoretical constructs were identified and included in the research framework: Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework, relational scale, and the geographical concept of place. By investigating the key research aim and objectives through the above-mentioned framework, the research presented here has made significant contributions both empirically and conceptually to the existing scientific knowledge regarding the social construction of vulnerability in tourism communities and its analysis. The first section of this concluding chapter reaffirms the main findings of this work and outlines their empirical significance in understanding tourism’s vulnerability to shocks. The second section critiques the usefulness of the three conceptual theories included in the framework and outlines their significance not only for the analysis of Khao Lak’s vulnerability but for the assessment of vulnerability in general. Lastly, this chapter makes recommendations for future research based on the findings presented here.
Initial investigations into the causal factors and socio-political processes that contributed to the vulnerability of Khao Lak began with an extensive review of the tourism literature detailed in Chapter 1. The tourism literature identified five key causal factors that contribute to the vulnerability of tourism activity to external shocks: a. the place-specific nature of tourism activity, b. the fragility of the destination image to negative consumer perceptions of risk and safety, c. the high dependency on tourism as the primary or only livelihood option,
59 d. a heavy reliance on the marketing strategies and product placement determined largely by international tour operators, and e. the seasonality of tourism flows. Evidence collected from a range of sources including primary data from fieldwork in Khao Lak supports these findings. The tsunami event destroyed Khao Lak’s highly marketable image as a peaceful haven for European travellers leaving in its wake visions of death and destruction. The once bustling seasonal resort town is now floundering, having no other livelihood source to support its tourism-dependent population. Heavily reliant on the promotional activities of large international tour operators and their European clientele, many businesses have no other option than to wait for the international operators to promote Khao Lak once again in their brochures. This high dependency on foreign-controlled market exposure and preferences leaves many of the Khao Lak tourism businesses with little control over their recovery. Some smaller resort and bungalow operators are more resilient than their larger counterparts because of their ability to access markets directly through websites and independent guide books. In spite of these challenges, most tourism businesses are trying to rebuild their livelihoods but subsequently do so under a cloud of uncertainty as there are no guarantees that the tourists will return to a place now synonymous with tragedy.
While the identification of these five factors is instrumental in understanding the vulnerability of Khao Lak’s tourism dependent community, the findings of this research categorically show that the causes underlying the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities are much more complex than the tourism literature acknowledges. Analysed largely from a risk management perspective, the tourism literature fails to acknowledge the complex environmental and socio- political context within which vulnerability is constructed and sustained. This work has addressed this knowledge gap by introducing the concept of vulnerability as a product of the human- environment system to the tourism literature. In doing so, this research has contributed significantly to the understanding of tourism’s inherent and place-based vulnerability to external shocks. Adopting the multidisciplinary approach to vulnerability analysis presented in Chapter 2 and applied to Khao Lak in Chapter 5, the findings show that Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was caused by 12 inextricably linked environmental and socio- political factors that collectively contribute to the exposure, sensitivity and resilience of the community (Figure 11, p. 41). The deconstruction of the power discourses that shape tourism development in Thailand and Khao Lak, identified in Chapter 4 and explored in Chapter 5, reveal that these factors are complex outcomes of both historically embedded and contemporary processes driven by social norms and the politicised agendas of the dominant elite operating through various scales of social organisation.
60 The evidence presented in vulnerability literature and the case study analysis of Khao Lak clearly demonstrates the central role power distribution plays in determining the uneven distribution of resources, which in turn heightens vulnerability. An example of how these scaled and stakeholder driven processes heighten vulnerability is apparent when examining the post-tsunami strategies. As argued in Chapter 5, the Thai Government has introduced the Andaman Recovery Plan to strengthen both natural and structural defences against future shocks, to facilitate the recovery of tourism business through loans schemes, and spearheaded aggressive tourism promotion activities. While the Plan is designed to benefit the 10 affected sub-districts equally, weaknesses in pre-existing governance structures and processes coupled with governmental preferences are hampering the success of these policies. For example, despite the introduction of new tourism development building codes and planning strategies, the local community doubts the capacity and political will of the local TAO authorities to implement and enforce these policies in the future. No measures have been undertaken to address the problems of corruption and a lack of governance transparency that have hindered strategies in the past. Access to financial aid was also hampered by a lack of transparent structures, especially at the local level where political preferences for family members and acquaintances outweighed need and eligibility. Finally, central government preferences for the swift recovery of the more established and lucrative tourism destinations such as Phuket, the Phi Phi islands and Krabi has resulted in the exclusion of Khao Lak from the TAT’s aggressive post-tsunami marketing strategy and delays in the installation of Khao Lak’s early warning system.
The government’s failure to acknowledge and address these governance weaknesses in their recovery and resilience plans is not only inhibiting the success of the Plan, this policy shortfall is also heightening the vulnerability of Khao Lak. As shown above, the consequences of this policy oversight are already apparent. This key finding reinforces the key premise that underlies this research. Future rebuilding efforts and long-term resilience plans aimed at ensuring future sustainable livelihood options cannot be operationalised successfully without understanding the underlying socio-political structures and environmental linkages that form the foundations of vulnerability (Clark et al., 2000; Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001; Turner et al., 2003; Pelling, 2003; Thomalla et al., 2005). Reaffirming the claims of Pelling (2003) and Adger (2003) presented in Chapter 2, structural change is needed to bring about vulnerability levels but this is very difficult to achieve due to the vested interests the ruling elite have in maintaining the existing power balance. Whilst such fundamental changes that challenge deeply rooted power structures are difficult to implement, it is strongly argued that an awareness of these issues and an understanding of the scale at which the supporting processes operate creates a forum for discussion and future action.
61 By expanding the analysis of the vulnerability of tourism communities beyond the five causal factors previously identified in the tourism literature to include the examination of the underlying socio-political and environmental factors that contribute to vulnerability, this work has contributed to the understanding of the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities to external shocks. This empirical contribution is important for two key reasons. First, an understanding of the causal factors and the underlying socio-political processes that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak is vital for its successful recovery in the short to medium term and for building resilience against future shocks in the long term. The empirical findings of this research clearly demonstrate that without knowing what the root causes of vulnerability are, resilience building strategies have little chance of long-term success. Therefore, it is argued that the identification of the factors and processes that contribute to the vulnerability of Khao Lak provide researchers, policy makers and planners with the knowledge needed to formulate and successfully implement robust resilience building strategies that address the underlying causes of vulnerability. Second, governments and various international development organisations continue to promote tourism as a poverty alleviation and development tool (Ashley et al., 2000; WTO, 2005a). This coupled with the high sensitivity of the coastal zones where much tourism development takes place increases the urgency to identify the causal factors that can lead to vulnerability. It is argued that an awareness of these factors not only aids the development of sustainable livelihood strategies in the tourism dependent community of Khao Lak but can also provide lessons for other tourism communities facing similar restricted livelihood options.
Fundamental to the deduction of these key empirical findings was the strong theoretical framework that was employed to structure the analysis of Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the tsunami event. By combining Turner et al.’s (2003) framework with the geographical concepts of relational scale and place, and applying it to the assessment of Khao Lak’s vulnerability, this work has created a new extended framework for vulnerability analysis. In doing so, this research has made important contributions to both vulnerability research by improving the existing vulnerability assessment tool, as well as to tourism research by applying this tool to this area of science for the first time. Each of the three theoretical constructs included in the conceptual framework played a significant role in the systematic assessment of Khao Lak’s vulnerability and together they provide a robust tool for analysing the vulnerability of tourism.
Turner et al.’s (2003) vulnerability framework, the first element included in the conceptual framework, proved instrumental in the identification of the various components involved in the creation and perpetuation of vulnerability in Khao Lak and the interlinkages that exist between the local, regional, national and global scales. Yet the application of Turner et al.’s (2003) framework
62 to the assessment of Khao Lak’s vulnerability highlighted several issues the framework does not capture well. First, whilst it was useful in conceptualising the complexity of the social construction of vulnerability within the coupled-human environment system, the nested scale used by Turner et al. (2003) does not fully represent the dynamic nature of vulnerability. Second, although the framework does acknowledge the multi-scalar human influences that shape vulnerability, it does not clearly show or explain how vulnerability is created and sustained across and through multiple scales of social organisation by the dominant elite. Considering the important role power processes play in shaping vulnerability, it is imperative that these factors and processes be better represented.
The introduction of the two geographical constructs of relational scale and place to the conceptual framework addressed these limitations. Relational scale proved very useful in the deconstruction of the situated power dynamics that perpetuate social inequality and heighten vulnerability in tourism dependent communities. Using relational scale, three interconnected human dimensions of vulnerability that influence the distribution of socio-political power in Khao Lak and regulate access and entitlements to resources were identified. These are the various international, national and local stakeholders and their vested interests in tourism activity in Khao Lak, along with the scaled socio-political processes and structures through which they operate. Identifying the various governmental and industry stakeholders and their competing vested interests over Khao Lak’s tourism development revealed how each stakeholder used and manipulated scaled processes in order to access socio-political and financial resources needed to fulfil their agendas, strengthen their power base and in doing so build their resilience. This was particularly evident when examining the way in which the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association and the Khao Lak Group of SME Resorts position their activities simultaneously at various scales to petition for additional financial resources and influence future development regulations. Supporting the assertions of Adams (1996), Agnew (1997), Leitner (1997) and Howitt (2003), the findings of this research demonstrate the importance of understanding and utilising multiple scales in reducing vulnerability levels. It is argued that the same principle will greatly assist in the formulation of robust and effective resilience building strategies. The identification of the social actors with vested interests in Khao Lak’s tourism industry and the multi-scaled structures they work through will assist policy makers, researchers, interested NGOs and governments in positioning their strategies at the most appropriate scales of social organisation.
Place, the last theoretical concept included in the conceptual framework, was crucial in defining Khao Lak as an international tourist destination and situating it within the wider socio-political context within which it was created. This was necessary for two reasons. First, defining Khao Lak
63 as a tourist destination set the boundaries for the place-based study. Second, the deconstruction of Khao Lak aided the identification of the various local and international stakeholders and developmental processes that contribute to the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities. Applying the concept of place to the analysis of Khao Lak’s vulnerability also highlighted the inherent vulnerability of the tourism product. The deconstruction of the multi-scaled processes involved in the social construction of Khao Lak as an international tourist destination revealed how little control the local community has over Khao Lak’s image-based positioning in the international tourist market and its promotion. The control over these processes that underlie Khao Lak’s success lies heavily with the numerous international tour operators listed in Chapter 4 who strategically define and position Khao Lak to meet the needs of their European clientele. Supporting the contentions made by Cresswell (1999) and Knox and Marston (2004) in Chapter 2, these findings clearly show that power lies in the definition of place. Reaffirming the arguments made in Chapter 1 and 2, a high dependency on a favourable image that is largely determined by foreign tour operators coupled with a heavy reliance on their subsequent marketing strategies and product preferences leaves Khao Lak very vulnerable to external events. The empirical findings deduced from the deconstruction of Khao Lak further support the causal factors identified in the tourism literature, bringing the analysis of Khao Lak’s vulnerability to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami full circle.
The findings of this research indicate that the use of relational scale and place in conjunction with Turner et al.’s (2003) framework has added considerable depth to the analysis of vulnerability. It is therefore argued that vulnerability assessments would benefit greatly from the inclusion of these geographical concepts. However, due to the exploratory nature of this research and the limited time frame within which it was conducted, additional work is required to further develop, apply, evaluate and refine the new and extended vulnerability framework. From an empirical perspective, this work has laid foundations upon which to base more in-depths analyses of the processes involved in the social construction of vulnerability in tourism dependent communities. While the empirical findings provide a good understanding of the causal factors and processes that contribute to the vulnerability of tourism dependent communities, more studies are required to add depth to these findings and identify consistent commonalities and place-specific differences. Therefore, it is recommended that a full scale analysis of the implementation of the Andaman Recovery Plan be undertaken. A full scalar assessment of the challenges faced by the main tourism communities located along Thailand’s Andaman Coast would not only build upon the causal factors identified in this report but would facilitate the identification of common structural and procedural challenges that are inhibiting the development and implementation of resilience- building measures within these communities. The identification of common challenges as well as
64 significant differences creates a solid grounding for the continuous development of robust resilience building strategies and more sustainable futures for tourism dependent communities with few other livelihood options.
65 References
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66 Choike, (2004), Campaign: Global Response to the Southeast Asian Disaster, 30 December, viewed 25 March 2005,
67 Gurtner, Y. (2004), ‘After the Bali bombing – the long road to recovery’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 19 (4): 56-66. Hall, M. C. (2001), ‘Tourism and Political Relationships in Southeast Asia’, in P. Teo, T. C. Chang and K. C. Ho (eds.), Interconnected Worlds: Tourism and Southeast Asia, Oxford: Pergamon. Hall, M. C. and Page, S. (2000), ‘Introduction: tourism in South and Southeast Asia – region and context’, in M. C. Hall and S. Page (eds.), Tourism in South and Southeast Asia: Issues and Cases, Melbourne: Butterworth Heinemann. Handmer, J.W., Dovers, D. and Downing, T. E. (1999), ‘Social vulnerability to climate change and variability’, .Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 4: 267-281. Hart, A. (2005), ‘Tsunami Update: Thailand’, Lonely Planet, no date, viewed 18 May 2005,
68 Kasperson, R. E., Kasperson, J. X., and Dow, K. (2001), ‘Vulnerability, equity, and global environmental change’, in J. X. Kasperson and R. E. Kasperson (eds.), Global Environmental Risk, London: Earthscan. Katharangsiporn, K. (2005), ‘Fresh Start’, Bangkok Post, 27 June 2005, Business: B1. Kelly, P. M. and Adger, W. N. (2000), ‘Theory and Practice in Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change and Facilitating Adaptation’, Climatic Change, 47: 325-352. Khao Lak Inside, 2004, 2 (8), August – September. Kitchen, R. and Tate, N. J. (2000), Conducting Research into Human Geography, Harlow: Prentice Hall. Klein, R. J. T, and Nicholls, R. J. (1999), ‘Assessment of coastal vulnerability to climate change’, Ambio, 28: 182-187. Knox, P. L. and Marston, S. A. (2004), Places and Regions in Global Context: Human Geography, 3rd edition, New Jersey: Pearson Education. Kyburz-Graber, R. (2004), ‘Does case-study methodology lack rigour? The need for quality criteria for sound case-study research, as illustrated by a recent case in secondary and higher education’, Environmental Education Research, 10 (1): 53-65. Leichenko, R. and O ’Brien, K. (2002), ‘The dynamics of rural vulnerability to global change’, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 7 (1): 1-18. Leitner, H. (1997), ‘Reconfiguring the spatiality of power: the construction of a supranational migration framework for the European Union’, Political Geography, 16: 123-144. Leksakundilok, A. (2004), Community Participation in Ecotourism Management in Thailand, Ph.D. Thesis, School of Geosciences, Faculty of Science, Sydney: University of Sydney. Levett, C. (2004), ‘Swedish and German deaths soaring’, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December, viewed 15 August 2005,
69 National Economic and Social Development Board Thailand (NESDB) (2004), Government Policy: The 9th National Economic and Social Development Plan, National Economic and Social Development Board, viewed 12 June 2005,
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72 Appendix 1
LISTED DETAILS OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Date of interview Interview Participant Code Participant details† 29.06.05 Respondent A Thai Environment Activist TERRA Bangkok, Thailand. 29.06.05 Respondent B Senior Researcher Thailand Institute of Scientific & Technological Research (TISTR) Bangkok, Thailand 30.06.05 Respondent C Thai Academic Salaya, Thailand. 01.07.05 Respondent D Thai Academic Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand. 01.07.05 Respondent E Researcher SEI-Asia Bangkok, Thailand. 04.07.05 Respondent F Prof. Suraches Chetamas Khao Lak Tsunami Recovery Plan Project Manager Designated Areas for Sustainable Tourism Administration (DASTA) Bangkok, Thailand. 05.07.05 Respondent G UN Environmental Advisor UNEP Thailand Bangkok, Thailand. 05.07.05 Respondent H Journalist Bangkok, Thailand. 07.07.05 Respondent I TAT Representative TAT Southern Office – Region 4 Phuket, Thailand. 08.07.05 Respondent J Local Government Official Khuk Khak Sub-district Administrative Office Khuk Khak, Thailand. 08.07.05 Respondent K Khun Pikulsri Jeansukpraseat (Ooay) Manger of Tsunami Restaurant Bang Niang, Thailand. 08.07.05 Respondent L Government Official Department of Marine and Coastal Resources Takau Pa District Takua Pa, Thailand. 09.07.05 Respondent M Local Tourism Industry Representative The Khao Lak Group of SME Resorts Khao Lak, Thailand. 09.07.05 Respondent N Local Tourism Industry Representative Phang Nga Tourism Business Association
73 Khao Lak, Thailand. 10.07.05 Respondent O Local Tour Operator Khaolak-infonet.de 11.07.05 Respondent P Local Medium Resort Owner Khao Lak, Thailand. 12.07.05 Respondent Q Local Tour Operator Khao Lak Guide Co. Ltd. Khao Lak, Thailand. 12.07.05 Respondent R Khun Thawee Haomhuan Civil Engineer Phuket Province Public Works & Town & Country Planning Department Nang Thong Office Nang Thong, Thailand. 13.07.05 Respondent S Local Restaurant and Bungalow Owner Nang Thong Beach Nang Thong, Thailand. 13.07.05 Respondent T Local Registered Tour Guide Khao Lak, Thailand. 14.07.05 Respondent U International Volunteers Tsunami Volunteers Centre Khao Lak, Thailand. 19.07.05 Respondent V Registered Tour Guide Krabi Province, Thailand. 30.08.05 Respondent W Richard Doring Founder The Khao Lak Group of SME Resorts Khao Lak, Thailand. 16.07.05 Respondent X Khun Jakkris Sareemonchai Assistant Director of Similan National Park Thailand.
† Due to the sensitive nature of some of the material divulged throughout the interview process, the names of some of the participants have been suppressed. Where this is the case, their title or position is used instead for identification purposes.
74 Appendix 2
EXAMPLE OF PARAPHRASED INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT RESPONDENT P
Date: 11 July 2005 Place: Khao Lak
HISTORY OF TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN KHAO LAK: Before tourism came to Khao Lak there were very few people in this area. They had rubber tree plantations; they were fisherman and could buy locally produced food every day. The life was very simple and easy. Young people would leave the area to study in Bangkok and work in Phuket or Ko Samui. After the development of tourism in the Khao Lak area, people returned to the area. Before tourism there were few work opportunities in the area. In 1996, when the respondent interviewed for housekeepers he had 380 people apply.
Tourism has really benefited the area because it has provided locally-based jobs and new opportunities. Most of the locals did not have a salary before; they sat in empty shops. However, since tourism development in the area, they have a regular salary and earn commission. Their lifestyle and standard of living has risen constantly due to tourism. An indicator of this change in standard of living is indicated by the amount of motorcycles that were parked in the Khao Lak Laguna Resort staff car park: in 1996 there were two but at the time of the tsunami there were more than 100 motorcycles. There were also 3 or 4 cars that belonged to the staff. This indicates that the economy in the area is much stronger due to tourism.
Those locals that continue to catch fish and farm prawns can now sell their local produce at a good price to the hotels and resorts. Their lives are better quality now. The small businesses all the way up to the bigger businesses benefit from tourism.
In 1988 the tourism industry was well established in Phuket and Krabi. At this time two Germans by the names of Mr Hans and Mr Gerhard, came to Khao Lak with their Thai wives to rent land close to the existing Khao Lak Laguna and Khao Lak Resort. They rented three Rai of land and built 10 very small Bungalows complete with glass rooves. They charged THB50 per night and they had an adjoining coffee shop. Their clients were 100% German. They grew to 30 rooms by 1992. The Nang Thong bay resort was opened next. It was larger than the German establishment and charged THB200 per night. Up until 1995 the capacity of the two small resorts totalled 100 rooms.
The respondent started the Khao Lak Laguna Resort in 1996 with a 56 room hotel offering a swimming pool and breakfast. The cost was THB800 per room per night. Before this he had a pig farm then a prawn farm. The first year was not successful as he did not have access to a good market base. The resort was more expensive than the others two and backpackers can only afford to pay THB300 maximum. The respondent then teamed up with Neckermann Reisen from Germany and Star Tours in Sweden. Star Tours were late taken over by TUI and became
75 Fritidsresor. Once they had access to these larger markets, in 1998 they had a lot of success in these particular markets. They were fully booked for 5.5 months but did not yet have any clients in the low season.
With the success of the Khao Lak Laguna, the second generation of tourism companies came to develop in the same area surrounding the Laguna: Khao Lak Bay Front; Khao Lak Palm Beach; Khao Lak Sunset; and Khao Lak Paradise. This area in and around Khao Lak and Nang Thong Beaches developed into a village.
Bang Niang Beach started to develop in 2000 with the building of Chong Fa Beach. Development stretched all the way down the beach to Nang Thong Beach which also became a lot more densely populated. In 1996, Khao Lak had a room capacity of 100 rooms. In 2000, the capacity of the resorts and bungalows had grown to 2,500 rooms. In the last five years the capacity has doubled to reach 5,500 rooms for the greater area of Khao Lak.
Once the Laguna had success with Neckermann and Fritidsresor other tour operators featured Khao Lak such as Apollo, TUI, and LTU - three big European companies joined the market. Kuoni also came into the market.
Following the success of the Khao Lak tourism industry, the market in Phuket and Krabi went down as a good portion of their market moved to Khao Lak. The room rates in Khao Lak were not as high; the nature and environment was what the tourists coming from Scandinavia and Germany liked. Khao Lak offered a relaxed atmosphere and the resorts were right on the beachfront. Unlike Phuket, Khao Lak does not have a road along the beach. Most of the resorts have the bungalows on the beach. Khao Lak does not have the big building like Phuket and Krabi. That is why there are many repeaters. In the small resorts - Nang Thong Beach Resort, Garden Beach Resort - they do not charge more than THB1,000 per room per night. Fifty percent of the guests at these smaller resorts are repeaters. In the 3 and 4-star hotels about 20-30% are repeaters.
In the last five years they have had much success in the European market but in the low season occupancy is very low. The area has very few Japanese and Korean guests. In the last two years the Korean market has grown a little, more than the Japanese and Chinese markets making up only 1-2% of the market. The reason for this is that many of the hoteliers allocate most of their rooms to the European market. And this market is very strong with people coming every year. From 2001/2002, the clients in Germany who are looking for a long haul destination chose Khao Lak making Khao Lak the number 1 long haul destination in Germany, the second being Krabi. The agents have told the respondent that the clients will book Khao Lak first. When Khao Lak is fully booked they go to Krabi and Phuket. From 01 November to March Khao Lak is fully booked.
IMPACT ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS ON TOURISM IN KHAO LAK: The outside events and epidemics such as SARS, the Bali Bombing, 9/11, in 2000 Y2K, and recently the Bird Flu have not had a heavy affect on Khao Lak as they have in Phuket or Krabi. The reason for this is that the clients who come to Khao Lak know the situation and the surrounds
76 very well. More importantly, they know the people very well which gives them confidence in travelling to Khao Lak. The clients who come to Khao Lak do not just pay their money and come, they are like a family. They come and they know the staff at the front office, they know each other and they know the owners - they know the people personally.
NATURE OF TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN KHAO LAK: Most of the owners and staff are locals. They are not big people. The resorts in the area started small and grew bigger and bigger over time. That is why they know how to take care of their clients. The operators in the area try to charge reasonable prices. For the repeaters, normally the hoteliers will offer them special prices and deals. Normally the clients recommend the hotels to their friends and they themselves come back - the hotels get a lot of business through word-of- mouth. Its funny when the guests come as they organise to come to the Laguna for example at the same time as their friends and join together - 10 to 15 people - for dinner at one of the small restaurants and meet each other on the beach. If one of them has a birthday the guests will arrange dinner at a nice restaurant. The tourism market in Khao Lak is not like that found in Patong. Maybe in Krabi and Patong they have some business like this but here in Khao Lak this happens all the time - this is normal for the area. The clients are more like family than guests; they are part of the community.
The restaurant and shop owners and the small tour operators are mostly from the villages as well; they are very nice people. They do not charge too much and are not ‘professional business’ people. They are just interested in the money. The industry owners and workers are warm people and try to help their clients as much as possible. This is why the clients are so loyal and care about Khao Lak.
The Germans and Scandinavians do not come for a short time; they come for a period of 2 weeks up to 1 month. It is not worth it for them to come for a short time. They are attracted to Khao Lak because it is cheaper for them than Krabi or Phuket. For THB50 in Khao Lak you can get rice with something. In Phuket and Krabi the same food will cost you THB200 or THB100 respectively. Most businesses did not charge 5% for tax, 10% for surcharge. Businesses have now introduced these charges since the 5-star properties came to the area and started charging these extra amounts. But 4 to 5 years ago these extra charges were not passed on to the guest. Accordingly, the client also feels that it is better than Phuket. The village people may not know how to run a strong business or do not have the education but this is not a bad thing for the community as a whole. They still receive good benefits from tourism and their business. If they charged more then their restaurants would be empty for what gain!
SCALES OF POWER AND STRONG LOCAL REPRESENTATION: Six years ago the respondent was the president of the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association and they could not compete with Phuket or other competing area: they have many shopping facilities and nightlife and things like that. From the beginning the tourism business owners wanted to develop a special market that was distinct from the competing areas of Phuket and Krabi. They knew from the beginning that they only had nature to offer the clients; they have sun and trekking walks but that is all.
77
This is what the respondent pushed very hard to introduce a law concerning the beach area that disallowed deck chairs, scooters, umbrella stands and other businesses on the beach. The respondent was successful with this plan and the local government introduced a law stating that they are not allowed to have discos or go-gos - they are not allowed to have these things in Khao Lak and on the beach.
Some do not follow the law and bring deck chairs to the beach. But there are very few and the clients do not like it. So every year the Tourism Business Association lobbies the local authorities to enforce this rule and not allow people to limit access to the beach. The respondent and the other members of the Association want to keep the beach open for public access so it is for everyone. If they allow this type of development, these people think only about the money and not the clients. Sometimes they disturb the clients and sometimes they have accidents. The hotelier and industry worker are very careful about keeping the clients happy.
This is not the same case in other parts of Thailand. If you see the beach in other parts, there are many people, many beaches full of umbrellas. The respondent and the wider community in Khao Lak do not want this!
Every Saturday the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association meets with their local parliamentary representative. Their parliamentary representative was also the former president of the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association taking over the position from the respondent. He also has a hotel in the Patong Islands as well. He knows a lot about the tourism business so it is good to have him in this role. He can talk to the Prime Minister and also the Governor on behalf of the tourism community of Khao Lak and has access to these influential on a weekly basis.
The local parliamentary representative helped the hoteliers out when they had a problem getting access to the tsunami Recovery Fund money. He contacted the right people in relation to this problem and organised for a meeting to take place in Khao Lak to sort this problem out and to find out why the money was taking so long. He is a very good man because he works for the people and not for himself - he cares about the community. The community need more people like this in Phang Nga! Normally the local government officials are only interested in making money for themselves. It is not good for Thai villagers to be at the head of the local authorities - it is not good for business and development.
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION: A lot of the beaches in Phuket were much polluted but now after the tsunami they are trying to keep it clean again. They have the chance but the respondent believes that they will not take it! Once they lose this chance then they cannot get it back.
Due to the type of market that they have developed in Khao Lak, the hotelier and tourism business owners have been very careful in how they use the environment and very active in trying to promote sustainable practices. Most of the hotels in the area are nice guys. Most of them are villagers or foreigners that consider Khao Lak their home. The clients also teach the locals about
78 the importance of the environment. And for the locals, they love to make them happy and therefore try to keep the environment nice for the guests and themselves.
The investors that you find in Phuket or Krabi are different types of people than can be found in Khao Lak. The investors from Phuket did not come to Khao Lak. They thought there was nothing to do here; nothing to offer the tourism market. For Khao Lak, the most important selling point is peace and quite and the natural environment. The hoteliers and industry representatives use these words all the time when speaking to newspapers and promoting the area; they try to inform the public about what they have and do not want to give the impression that they have similar opportunities for guests to that of Phuket for example. Guests that come to Khao Lak can relax here in peace and quiet and the community will welcome them with open arms.
The environment was changed a little by tourism development but not so much by the resorts. The resorts like the 4-star resorts understood the value in keeping the trees. The area here in Khao Lak is so expensive! If the resorts did not have the trees surrounding their development and destroyed the surrounding environment, they would not have a successful business. But the shops near the road have chopped down trees to make way for their businesses and did not plant them again which is wrong.
The coconut trees helped to protect the landscape when the tsunami came.
The respondent’s land did not have many trees on it before because it was a tin mining area before. He spent a lot of money on bringing in mature trees from Bangkok and other parts of Thailand to plant on his property. One of the trees cost him THB150,000 - that is quite a lot for a big tree.
RESILIENCE OF THE INDUSTRY AND THE KHAO LAK MARKET: Due to the type of clients and development that they have in Khao Lak the respondent is confident that tourism will recover in the area once the damaged buildings and surrounding area are repaired and the environment regenerated. He is quite sure. In Khao Lak they have many properties on the beach whereas in Phuket and Krabi there are very few and those are very expensive. The respondent has spoken to various tour operators and travel agents including Thomas Cook [who took over Neckermann] who have advised him that once Khao Lak is rebuilt and ready to welcome clients again then the tourist will come back. At the moment Thomas Cook only features two hotels in Khao Lak since the tsunami, the Khao Lak Merlin Beach is one of these. But they are already planning to feature Khao Lak completely gain, like before, for the high season starting next year [2006] - two years after the tsunami. The tour operators have reviewed the charter flights for the coming high season. Phuket thinks that they will benefit from the extra business but this is not true; the charter flights have cut the number of flights down already.
Now the agents are trying to move their clients to Ko Chang, Krabi and Phuket at the moment due to the damage sustained in Khao Lak. But most of the travel agents get the same response for their clients: it is not the same and does not feel right for the guests. The clients that come to Khao Lak do not like the big towns and crowds.
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The decision to move clients to other areas and to cut the number of charter flights and advertising for Khao Lak is just related to the capacity of the hotels. The agents know already which products can sell in their market. The agents cannot sell Phuket to the clients of Khao Lak because the type of product is so different. Some of the clients may stay 50% of the time in Phuket and the remaining 50% in Khao Lak but more often than not the clients of Khao Lak only want to stay in Khao Lak. The clients may go to Phuket to shop but that is all.
The reason why the clients like Khao Lak is because many of them are retired or come as a family, many of whom are professionals with office jobs. They come only to relax. In Khao Lak there is no nightlife or no drugs, no sex tourism. Khao Lak is a limited product.
Khao Lak will not return to normal operations for this season. Those that do return this year will be special clients that love Khao Lak. They will come to support the industry but they will not stay for two weeks; they just want come to see it. Maybe they will only stay two or three night and then move on to other holiday destinations such as Hua Hin. But he is positive that many loyal clients will come to see Khao Lak this year. But the new customers will not come yet. They might stay in Phuket and then come one day to sight-see and see what happened here.
But the destination is not ready yet to welcome people back in large numbers!
It will be difficult for those that have limited access to funds to last them until next season comes [2006]. The respondent can only see them surviving if they move to another area until the tourism returns to Khao Lak. It will not be easy for them to survive as there are no other jobs in the area. And now it is very quiet, a bit like when the respondent opened up his resort in 1996. There have been many changes since the respondent opened his hotel up until the time of the tsunami. In the mornings the streets and Sois were full of people waiting for the hotel busses to come and pick them up for work. And the markets were full with both tourist and industry workers. And the streets were full with people having a good time. Last year the respondent’s income from tourism was THB9,000 million. In 2003, it was THB6,200 million - a big difference. In 1996 it was THB100 million. For the Similan Islands, the area earned THB300, 000 per year in the beginning. Before the tsunami they earned THB 10 million per year.
ACCESS TO LAND: Most of the locals did not sell their land.
STRONG LOCAL REPRESENTATION: PHANG NGA TOURISM BUSINESS ASSOCIATION: In Phang Nga they have the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association that represents all the tourism-related businesses such as the hotels, restaurants and shops. This organisation works very closely with the provincial government regarding the planning of tourism in the area. When the government has an idea, they will ask the association first. The association then advises the governor what they think is good and not so good. If the Governor accepts these suggestions then the partnerships works very well. The Association also works with the sub-district government,
80 the ‘Oboto’ and the district government , the Tambon. But the local authorities do not understand how to keep tourism sustainable. They do not have the expertise or the knowledge. They are more interested in how to keep people in work and how to earn money for their area and how to benefit their pockets. Often the Tourism Business Association fights with the ‘Oboto’ because they do not understand the value of sustainable development. Examples of the conflicts include: the local authorities want to make a road along the beach but the Association does not like this; also the local authorities want to allow umbrellas on the beach and the Association doesn’t like or accept that either.
These objections are not so much for the industry business owners, the Association fights them in order to keep the nature of the Khao Lak area the same as this is what the clients like. When most people talk about tourism in Thailand, they focus on the industry business owners. But the respondent thinks that the focus should be the tourist and what their needs are. If the industry offers the clients what they are looking for then everyone benefits including the small village business owners. Many Thai industry people think about their pockets first. This is not the right way. So the Tourism Business Association tries to fight for the right way to conduct tourism in the area.
Every month the Association meets with the Provincial Government along with representatives from other industries such as agriculture or fishing. The business and the government communities come together to discuss and report on what is happing in their industries and discuss problems and concerns.
Before the tsunami there was only one representative body. But now after the tsunami there are groups in Khao Lak that have set up another one. But this new one is not registered. The second one is more for people to get together and talk together about their concerns - coming from the heart. But the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association is the main representative body and represents the needs and concerns of all the tourism-related businesses in Khao Lak. Every person in the tourism community in Khao Lak has the right to have their say if they choose to.
The respondent set the organisation up to improve tourism strategies in the area and to help steer tourism development in the same direction. This makes the industry stronger in the area and helps to keep development sustainable. This is very important. If you bring the wrong types of market and clients to the hotels then the brand or product image changes which then affects the business you already have - they will not come back any more.
But the process takes time to let everybody know what the Association is up to. The first time the respondent tried to introduce the ideas on no umbrellas or development on the beach, the rest of the community said no. The other hotel and restaurant owners thought that they should be able to use it and do this. But the respondent disagreed with them arguing that the clients should be able to freely walk along the beach and enjoy it because it is public land. If you have a road and then only allow your car to be parked there, it is not fair to the other people! Many of the hotel owners come from the village and sometimes they are not educated.
81 But it is not only the villagers that do not understand tourism. The respondent was surprised when the big businesses came to the area. They also did not understand or appreciate the special market that Khao Lak has. They want to operate their new businesses in Khao Lak like they do in other parts of Thailand, like Pattaya or Chaing Mai. Sometimes they want to organise ‘full moon’ parties or something like that. The Association has fought with them in the past because they do not understand the type of market that Khao Lak has. Sometimes the Association wins and other times they lose - no problem! They know that they cannot win all the time.
When the respondent was at University he was always active in organising people. At that time he learn about pig and prawn faming and how to manage these businesses in a way that brought success. The way you take care of a pig or a prawn is the same way you take care of people. The people are only different because they eat more than the pig and the prawn and they use all their senses i.e. their sight and smell. Tourism is an experience. But the philosophy is the same. The type of tourist is very important like the breed of the pig to the pig farmer. If you have a very good stock them you have good offspring. Tourism is the same. If you have good clients that enjoy the area, do not pay too much and do not destroy the area then you have a successful business - they will come back every year. It is true that Khao Lak does not have a market for the low season and the locals lose money that way. But if you change the market then this will affect your current high season market which will be worse for the future. Therefore you should only chose one way and not two ways. If you chose two ways, in the future Khao Lak will be like Phuket.
Since the tsunami, the Association has been invited to speak with key members in the central government about the new plans for the area. “Maybe this is because we talk a lot and complain a lot!” It is more effective to talk to the head office in Bangkok. Sometimes when you speak to different levels of government the meaning of your message will change by the time it gets to the right people. Because the members of the Association have worked in tourism for many years in the area, they know their guests and what the problems are. Big businesses in the past have done wrong things [regarding development] and the Association wants to prevent this happing in Khao Lak. Again this is not for the benefit for the members but more for their guests.
Good business practices are also beneficial for the Thai government too. Strong tourism in the future means that the government will benefit from taxes generated from this industry as well in the long term. Right now Thailand is losing a lot of money from tourism, more than what they have forecasted for. The government only forecasted loses for the first few months and it has been seven month already. This is a big problem. Phuket only have 10% occupancy right now.
KHAO LAK SMALL AND MEDUIM RESORTS: They came together to get help with funding supplied to them by German donors. They are not a formal association they have not been established long enough. The people being helped by the formation of this group are mainly village people that have never been to the bank. Khun Richard was very good at marketing the small businesses. Many small businesses in the Chong Fa area offer their rooms for sale on the website Khaolak.de. These small businesses need access to markets and the clients booking need to know that the money will be spent properly. This is Khun Richard’s market. The respondent thinks that Khun Doring set this up to show the government
82 that they wanted to keep their businesses following the tsunami. This is a good business for Khun Doring too who gets 15% commission for booking these rooms. Khun Doring’s Memorandum is not connected to the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association. But there is no competition between the two groups. They have the same interests. The respondent has talked to Khun Richard and known him for many years. He is a very good writer and has written very good promotional material about Khao Lak in the past. Khao Lak was known to backpackers because of him. Once the respondent was successful in the marketing of Khao Lak though the big European tour operators then Khao Lak grew very quickly. But Khun Richard was the first to really start the business here in Khao Lak.
Richard Doring is not a member of the Association yet. He does not have a resort and only rents out his private house to special guests. There are other resorts that are also not members of the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association. The respondent thinks the reason for this is based on the fact that many people in Phang are not used to or like to be involved with associations. It is up to the individua business owner but the respondent thinks this is a good way to come together for a common cause and makes the industry stronger. If you are not strong then you cannot control the way people act. Thailand is very weak with regards to strong local representation especially those in Phang Nga.
ACCESS TO FINANCING: People in area started with small money sourced from savings. The tourism business brings in a lot of money in the hight season. The small businesses used the profits to slowly grow and expand their businesses. In the first 10 years this is the way tourism development grew. They did not have access to other financing or loan money from the bank. It was difficult for people to borrow in the 1990’s due the recession and then finally the market crash and resulting Asian economic crisis. Interest rates were as high as 13.5%. When the respondent opened his resort, the interest rates were at 13.5%. Two years later the interest rates had climbed to 18%. Therefore, the local people with small businesses used their own money.
The Tsunami Recovery Fund is organised through the MFC companies. These companies work with the stock market. The government ordered the banks to put money into this fund. The first amount was THB1,400 million. This is all used up. The next lot of money is still coming. This project is good for big businesses. It is possible to get between THB10-500 million no problem! The Tsunami Recovery Fund is a loan program. For the Tsunami Recovery Fund the government only wants to see your business plan before they will consider your case. If they decide that your idea is a good business venture then they will loan you the money. The repayment condition for the Tsunami Recovery Fund is 10 years with an interest rate of 1% for five years and after this they charge a rate of MLR rate - this rate comes from five different banks. The low interest rate is very good for businesses and everyone is applying for this Fund and waiting for the new money to be allocated. This one is better.
The Small and Medium Enterprises Fund is good for small businesses. The maximum loan you can get from them is THB100 million. The SME Fund takes a share of the company as collateral in return for a loan. But the SME can own a maximum of 49% of a private business. The SME
83 Bank allocates a representative for each loan case but this representative does not have a say in the running of the business. They are a silent partner until the loan is repaid. The SME bank was set up specifically to assist tsunami affected businesses. The Minister of Finance, Khun Sumvit established the SME Bank with the support of the Prime Minister Khun Thaskin. The condition for repayment is seven years and they set an interest rate of 2% for the first three years.
If people do not have debt and have a good credit rating along with authentic deeds and registration papers for their land and business then it is not too difficult to get. As part of the application processes the applicants must document their plans, their expected costs and disclose what they owned before the tsunami. The SME Bank uses this information to calculate how much they will lend you. If small businesses do not have the correct paperwork then they apply to their regular banks. The government has placed pressure on the commercial banks to be lenient when allocating funds. If people talk a lot and loudly then they have a better chance of getting money.
The respondent thinks that the banks must have his picture cut out now and pasted on their walls as a warning to their staff! The news about the tsunami and the appeals for financial has helped the people a lot.
Some people had insurance but the payouts are not enough to cover the rebuilding costs. The respondent had full insurance cover but the insurance company only insures them for the amount that they spent eight years ago on the construction of the resort, not how much it is worth to rebuild today.
RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPORT PROBLEMS: Many of the hotels did not receive any assistance for the rebuilding of their hotel as the government says that they are rich people and do not need any help. The government has assisted with the supply of boats for the fishing community and agriculture but have not helped the tourism industry in Khao Lak to rebuild. Tourism is the main industry in Thailand but the government says that the hotels are rich enough to help themselves. This is not true in most cases. Nobody is considering the implications IF the tourists do not come back. Now many small businesses are begging for money. This has destroyed the community and is slowly destroying their lives! When somebody offers the businesses the money, they are very fast to use it and rebuild very quickly! The respondent does not understand this at all.
When the tourist come back this season they are going to see that the area is still under construction. But if they can see that the community has improved the beach and have replanted the grass and plants then they can see that the community is ready to welcome them back. This will be a key selling point for the future. If they see the rebuilding efforts this year then they will tell their friends and others at home that Khao Lak will be ready for people to return the following season. If they do not see any improvement then the opposite will happen and then the industry will not survive. This is basic thinking and only the respondent’s opinion but this may be a very big problem for Khao Lac’s recovery plan.
84 The respondent is frustrated because he thinks that the wrong people have the authority but do not know how to improve the situation. The government has not put the right people in the right job. And the Phang Nga Association does not have the power, they only have the ideas. As an industry they cannot do anything as they have not received any money from outside. The respondent has used his own money to clear his land in preparation for his rebuilding plans. They have not received any support despite the big Andaman Recovery Plans. If the government helped financially then the industry would feel supported and it would lift their spirits. One month after the tsunami the hoteliers were all very afraid for the future. The respondent tried hard to raise a feeling of hope to give them something to fight for again. It is not easy to bring the tourism community of Khao Lak back together psychologically.
But if they do not all develop all at the same time it will be impossible to revive the industry. If some people build and others do not then it will not look good. If everyone comes back together and plant the trees to make it look nice then the respondent thinks that tourism will come back very quickly.
In the last few years, the tourism business has fluctuated a lot due to Y2K, the Bali Bombings and so on. But the respondent is still confident that the industry can survive!
The TAT have not done much to support Khao Lak. Their main concern is for Phuket which is considered the heart of the Andaman Coast. When the respondent started his business in the area he tried to get the business from the Similan Islands from Phuket. Before Khao Lak existed as a destination, Phuket used Similan Islands to promote itself further saying that the islands were only 90 kilometres from Phuket. He used Similan as a marketing tool too saying that it was only 40 kilometres from Khao Lak in his media and brochure promotions. The divers used to use Phuket as their base for the Similan Islands, prior to the tsunami they used Khao Lak! Many of the diving shops moved from Phuket to Khao Lak. But it is difficult to talk about how to promote Khao Lak again in the future in two hours - there are many many stories.
For the marketing, the Khao Lak tourism industry never had much support from the TAT; they promoted themselves though linkages with the travel agents in Europe. The TAT do not bring the travel agents together and ask them what the travel agents need and what their clients want or are looking for. They do not work together. The TAT does not understand the market like the travel agents. The TAT are good at organising the big promotional parties but they do not use their budget wisely.
If Khao Lak wanted to come back for next season then TAT should be supporting the community to reach this goal. The hotels need to support the agents in informing them about the current situation. And the travel agents should be supporting their clients. This support network should be better and more effective than prior to the tsunami. They could do this by jointly supporting special offers for the clients such as stay one week but only pay for six nights to help the people in this area get their business back. It is very important to restore the brand image in order to get people back to Khao Lak. If they do this step by step the industry will die; if this takes too long the industry will die! The marketing should be a big boom!
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The respondent is not worried about the TAT or the agents diverting business right now because Khao Lak is not ready for business yet. But when they are, the TAT should give the community say THB20 million and then they can arrange the big promotional activities themselves! The respondent believes that they could do a much better job and promoting themselves than the TAT because they know the market and the needs of their clients. The local tourism community know how to get the clients to return faster! The community has promoted itself up until now and they know what sells! But the TAT do not use the money in this constructive way.
Thomas Cook has 8,000 agents working in Germany. When they see the area that they are promoting then they talk to their clients about it. The respondent has had much success with this strategy. The first education group that he can remember organising in 1996 has 15 rooms set aside for Thomas Cook. The young girls drank all his Mekong and empty his fridges. But they were happy and they enjoyed it! This group of girls sitting behind the travel agency counter will promote Khao Lak over other destinations!
The Andaman Recovery Plan has not helped Khao Lak. When the respondent started his resort, the people thought at he was crazy especially those who worked in the hotel industry. They did not see the possibility. He started the business by himself and now he knows what the client likes. It is very important to aim the right type of marketing at the right type of clients and then the guests will come back to Khao Lak.
The TAT has no faith that the tourists will return to Khao Lak. But the recovery for the next year is very important. This high season the community maybe only able to offer 1,000 rooms but for the next season they should be able to offer 4,000 rooms.
The anniversary event planned for Khao Lak by Thaskin will not help the community. If you do not improve the area then no party or big event is going to help. The TAT have tried to plan big events but it just wastes the money. These types of shows are planned more for show and to repair the image only.
The respondent thinks that the community should wait with the rebuilding effort. For this coming season 1,000 rooms is enough. The community should keep their money and boom for the coming year [2006]. The community and businesses should aim to make a big impression at next year’s ITB and make a road show in Frankfurt and in Stockholm and show a promotional film or something like that - show the public that Khao Lak is ready again. This marketing effort should all be done at the same time to make a big impression and show Khao Lak as a new and improved destination, not scattered over a few months here and there. This will make the market strong again and the money - THB 200 million - will be worth it. With these types of efforts, the tourists will see the reality of the situation and come back.
But this must wait until Khao Lak is ready - you cannot show the market some good things and when they get here the situation is totally different! This will have the opposite effect.
86 IMPACTS OF THE TSUNAMI ON TOURISM IN KHAO LAK: The respondent’s resorts, the Khao Lak Laguna Resort a Khao Lak Bhandari were both completely destroyed - 100%. The Laguna had 110 rooms and the Bhandari had 57 rooms. The Laguna received the reward from Thomas Cook for the best selling property in Thailand for the German market for the last 3 years in a row. The respondent gives 98% of their allocation to Thomas Cook and they sell all of it. The respondent want to come back for next season [2006] because right now he is waiting for the money.
The landscape has been altered by the tsunami especially in the areas of Chong Fa, Bang Niang and Laem Pakarang. Two to three kilometres of beach area was destroyed and eroded away. The respondent has land up near Khuk Khak beach - 30 metres was eroded away taking the trees and the land.
POST-TSUNAMI DEVELOPMENT PLANS: The new development plan is now finalised and has similar regulations to the old development building codes. The regulations stipulate that you cannot build within 30 metres of the beach. In the next zone between 30 and 75 metres from the beach you can only build to a maximum height of six metres. But the new regulations have changed and now you can build to seven metres high. In the next zone between 75 and 200 metres from the beach you can build to a maximum height of 12 metres which is the same as before.
The sub-district are trying to implement plans for new wide escape roads to be built leading away from the beach but this will not succeed. The people will not give the land to the government. The plan of the escape roads is not practical either. When people run away then the cars will still not be able to pass! He does not see the need for the big roads. The people can run five minutes and then be at the main road. Normally people run, they will not go to the car and try to drive away.
The plan came from the Public Works & Town and Country Planning Department. This is from the central government. Representatives from the central government are coming to Khao Lak to help the sub-district put the measures in place.
The respondent is very disappointed in the implementation process because they have the meetings all the time - they talk and talk and talk but they are not sitting down with the small groups and asking them what they think. They are just talking in bigger meetings. They are not talking to the various groups that will be affected by the plan. And these are village people who do not understand. The government says that they will lose their land and then says that this is good? And they have told the villagers how much they will be paid in compensation. If they do this then maybe the villagers will do it! The respondent thinks that the government will not offer the owners compensation because they do not have the money to do this! If they work with the money and they say OK we agree with the plan and will start next week then the people will believe them! But if they only have meetings here and then say before leaving for Bangkok that they will let the people know then ‘Bye-Bye’ to the plan.
87 From the perspective of the Phang Nga Tourism Business Association, the community needs to improve the area but not on a grand scale. They do not need a lot of money. They only need basic things that will improve the area in the long-term such as pedestrian walkways. That is enough! This will improve the area for the tourists. They do not need a lot of money to do this! They do not need much else! They do not want to use a lot of money because Thai people know that the Thai government is not rich like it was before. We want to keep only the basic things - no big roadway or something like that. They do not want to see big grey roads like in Patong!
The Association has been in talks with Khun Sumvit, a high official in Thaskin’s government, who has been send to Khao Lak to sort this problem out. There is only 3.5 months until the new season starts and nothing has happened yet: no new plants along the beach. The industry needs these things before the tourists will come back. Nobody can say where the money is coming from and who is responsible for it.
The central government has been continuously working on the plan but have not told people what they should do and how they can recover in the mean time. There have been no clear instructions up until now and so this has been that main problem holding the recovery process up! The first and main problem holding up redevelopment is the plan. The second it access to money. When they see the problem they should solve that but maybe the government needs more money to invest. The government may think Khao Lak needs THB500 million but the community needs only THB20 million to improve the area and get business coming back again!
MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION There were some people building illegally but not many. Sometimes the big hotels built illegally. If they do not disturb the local people then the government takes the money. The bigger businesses were guiltier of breaking the construction rules, for example, building higher than they should. The local businesses were more likely to build businesses on government land or too close to the beach.
The Phang Nga Tourism Business Association members did not engage in these practices and don’t like it when others break the rules. This makes it difficult for the Association to work with the Oboto because the Oboto does not like the way that the Association does things. The Association is trying to promote transparency and they are truthful in their practices. The Association does not want to work with the Oboto’s system which is to take money.
There have also been some problems with the correct allocation of tsunami relief money. Not sometimes, there have been many cases. People who never had boats before now have boats. The leaders favour family and friends. Sometimes people from outside the area are benefiting from the money allocated to the local people. There are many many cases. The people move from the temporary housing to the permanent housing and then the temporary house is already full of people again!
This is normal for developing countries. We accept it. The people and the dealings are not transparent. When the respondent was at university it used to anger him a lot. And now people are
88 trying to change the situation step by step to get a bit better all the time. You can see the evidence in Takua Pa; the head of the district government is not a good man! This lack of transparency is not good for the people. But he gets re-elected every year! But you cannot do anything. Maybe the problem is that people in the area are not educated enough or do not worry about the mistakes that are made at this level of government. When the government does something good for the people, the people cannot separate the two things. This is not good for the people.
The head of the local sub-district is not good at formulating plans and ideas. They might put in a water system but then not put in guttering and the road is washed away. When you compare this to the Head of Bang Muang he is very clever. He applied for the money from the higher levels of government and has improved his sub-district a lot. The tsunami has given the districts a chance to rebuild in a good way. The money for redevelopment is there but each sub-district has to apply for it and think about the beast way to use this money. If you do this correctly you can get access to whatever you want. But the local authority at Khuk Khak has not organised this for the locals. The head of Khuk Khak is not as clever and does not work as hard as the one in Bang Muang. They are not organised enough to have the details ready for the local plans. They are also not good at talking to the people about what they want and need and organising the necessary papers. They have not divided up the allocations in terms of housing or water etc. They can also hire someone to organise and manage the introduction of new services because the money is there right now. But they have not done this. If they had good management then all the money needed would come through Khuk Khak. They lack the ideas and expertise, they are very local people.
The tourism community and the local authorities work separately from each other. The tourism community does not want to be separate but the local authorities have made so many mistakes regarding tourism development in the area. If the tourism community want something done or have a problem they now go to the provincial government directly. For example, along the beach, the local authorities cut down the trees to sell them off for extra money that would go directly into their individual pockets. The respondent went to the Oboto to stop them. He could not. Then he went to the provincial governor. The Governor made one call directly to the head of the sub- district which stopped him cutting down more trees. He has had many personal experiences like this with the local authorities. The local authorities are willing to destroy the environment at the beach all for money. And also the money that is supposed to benefit the community does not get distributed by the government!
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