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Against Rigidity. an Investigation of the Semantics and Pragmatics Of Against Rigidity An investigation of the semantics and pragmatics of indexicality , by Mary Lou Grimberg Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of London 1996 Department of Phonetics and Linguistics University College London ProQuest Number: 10017222 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10017222 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Abstract Saul Kripke, for whom the paradigmatic de jure rigid designator is the proper name, suggests that the link between such a name and its designatum is first established at an 'initial baptism' and that the link thus established is maintained by means of a 'causal chain'. One of the most significant properties claimed for such a designator is that its propositional meaning is exhausted by its referent. A second claim is the more mysterious one concerning the transworld identity of objects designated in this way. David Kaplan prefers to use the expression 'directly referential' to describe the semantic function of such terms. For him the paradigmatic directly referential term of natural language is the pronoun used indexically. He claims that such terms are also de jure rigid designators which contribute objects, not descriptions, to propositions. These two theses are closely associated, and it is against them both that I wish to argue as they give rise to a range of problems. In chapter one, some of the traditional philosophical problems are introduced. It is also suggested that there are additional, linguistic, reasons for believing the theses of rigid designation and direct reference to be mistaken. In chapter two certain problems arising from the assumption that indexically occurring pro-terms are directly referential are investigated in greater detail. In chapter three an alternative analysis of indexical reference, developed from Geoffrey Nunberg's model of indexicality, is presented. In chapter four the distinction between indexicality and deixis is investigated, and in chapter five I argue that the analysis of indexical interpretation developed in the previous chapters may be extended to include anaphoric reference also, thus providing a unitary semantic model for all the functions of pro-terms. Finally, the viability of this model is tested with respect to well-known problem utterances. The results of these tests are encouraging. Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 8 Introduction. So. chapter one - Prologue on proper names 9 1. Introduction 9 2. The Millian perspective 9 3. The traditional problems 12 3.1 Frege's puzzle 12 3.2 Russell's puzzle 14 3.3 Kripke's puzzle 15 4. Kripke's'picture' 17 4.1 The causal chain 17 4.2 Possible worlds and rigidity 20 4.3 Individual identity 23 4.4 Descriptive names 29 4.4.1 Donnellan's objection 30 4.5 Further doubts concerning rigidity 32 5. Eponymy 32 5.1 Eponymie morphology 34 5.1.1 Semantic coherence 3 5 5.1.2 Morphological rules 36 6. Proper names, pronouns and indexicals 38 6.1 Lexicalisation 41 7. The meaning of proper names 43 8. Defining rigidity 47 8.1 Kripke's definition 47 8.2 Various views of rigidity 49 8.3 The problems 50 chapter two - A problem with stipulation 58 1. On stipulation 58 1.1 Non-overt stipulation 58 1.2 Modal stipulation 59 1.3 Lexical stipulation 59 2. Rigidity and direct reference 60 2.1 Defining rigidity without worlds 62 2.2 Defining direct reference 63 2.2.1 Recanati and Kaplan 63 2.3 Kripke and de jure rigidity 71 2.4 Kaplan and character 73 2.5 Summary 79 3. The ambiguity thesis 80 4. Challenging the ambiguity thesis 88 4.1 Distinguishing anaphora from deixis 88 4.2 Determining REF-values 91 4.2.1 Difficulties in determining REF-values 95 4.3 The agreement hierarchy 10 8 4.4 Summary 118 5. Testing the ambiguity thesis 119 chapter three - Deferred reference 124 1. Introduction 124 2. Meaning and indexicality 125 2.1 Indicative and descriptive meaning 126 2.2 Conditions of indexicality 128 2.3 Nunberg's challenge 129 3. An alternative model of indexical interpretation 130 3.1 Index 131 3.1.1 Kaplan and the logician’s account of an index 131 3.1.2 Indices and the contingent a priori 136 3.1.3 Nunberg and the Peircean index 137 3.1.4 Nunberg’s indexless indexicals 139 3.2 Deixis 140 3.2.1 Bühler’s approach 141 3.2.2 Nunberg’s approach 142 3.3 Deferred reference 143 3.3.1 Semantic types 144 3.3.1.1 Participant terms 144 3.3.1.2 Nonparticipant terms 145 3.3.2 The semantic complexity of indexical expressions 146 3.3.2.1 The deictic component 146 3.3.2.2 The classificatory component 146 3.3.2.3 Classificatory or deictic? 147 3.3.2.4 The relational component 150 3.4 The process of interpretation 153 3.4.1 The semantics of ’we' 158 3.4.2 The semantics of indexical self-reference 158 3.4.3 The relational component o f’we’ 162 3.4.4 The semantics of T 167 3.4.4.1 Who am I? 172 4. Objections and responses 176 4.1 Kaplan’s objection 177 4.1.1 Cross-sortal mismatches 179 4.2 Recanati’s objection 182 4.2.1 The semantics o f’tomorrow’ 182 4.2.2 The pragmatics o f’tomorrow’ 187 5. The status of GRC* 190 chapter four - Indexicality and deixis 192 1. Introduction 192 2. Contextual 192 2.1 Non-demonstrative'he' 193 2.1.1 Extended inferencing 204 2.2 Non-indicative terms 211 2.2.1 Indexicality and 'pure' deixis 216 2.2.2 Deixis 221 2.2.3 The truth-conditional involvement of the speaker 222 2.2.4 Deictic shift and deictic projection 235 2.3 Ago 237 3. The distinction between indexicality and deixis 240 4. Conclusion 244 chapter five - Anaphora 246 1. Extending Nunberg's model 246 1.1 Semantics or pragmatics 249 1.2 Indices and anaphora 252 2. Terminology in the extended model 258 3. Deixis and anaphora 266 3.1 Deixis in anaphora 266 3.2 The semantics of distality and proximality 271 3.3 Coincident and simultaneous functions 274 3.4 Anaphora or deixis? 277 3.5 Donkey anaphora and parametric variation 279 3.6 The anaphora-deixis continuum 280 4. Pragmatically controlled anaphora 281 4.1 Unheralded pronouns 285 5. Cornish's antecedent-trigger 286 6. Semantic solutions to syntactic problems 289 6.1 Paycheck sentences 290 6.2 Pronominal contradiction 292 6.3 Possessive quantifiers 294 7. Conclusion 296 Bibliography 299 Acknowledgements First of all, I must acknowledge my debt to my supervisor. Professor Neil Smith; he encouraged me to start, and with mulish obstinacy he insisted that I finish, and he bore the lengthening gap between these two poles with fortitude and good humour, although he did once remark that he thought I would complete my thesis in a geriatric ward. I think what worried him was the thought that he might be in a neighbouring ward, still waiting for chapter five. Well, it's complete now, and v^thout the benefit of Neil's extensive knowledge and wisdom I never would have made it. Above all, he made me laugh. Thanks Neil. I would also like to thank all the lecturers in the linguistics department, as each one has at some point been both supportive and encouraging. It really has been a privilege to be a part of this department. The philosophy department at UCL has also been helpful and welcoming. I am particularly indebted to Tim CraTLG and Michael Martin, both of whom gave their time generously to this wandering linguist, as did Gabriel Segal of the philosophy department at King's. I must also acknowledge my indebtedness to Saul Kripke, David Kaplan and François Recanati, whose writings inspired my research. My greatest debt in this respect, however, is to Geoffrey Nunberg, on whose theory of indexical reference my own thesis is based. At this point, I must add the usual disclaimer. None of the above-mentioned linguists or philosophers is to blame for any shortcomings in what follows. The mistakes are mine. Lastly, I must thank my family, some of whom have grown up while I have been working my passage to that geriatric ward. They have always encouraged me, and I'm grateful. Introduction As should be apparent from the title, the avowed aim of this thesis is to question the validity of the doctrine of rigid designation. The challenge, however, is of a limited nature. I do not question the claim that it is possible to construct formal languages with respect to which the free variables denote - as is required of rigid designators - the same entity across worlds or, as Kaplan might say, in all circumstances of evaluation. I do, however, question the ancillaiy claim that the free variables of logic may be analogised in the relevant respect to the pronouns, and other pro-terms, of natural language. Furthermore, although the problems which I associate with the thesis of rigid designation are introduced in the context of their relation to proper names, the subsequent argument is not pursued at this level.
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