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3-1946 Handbook on USSR Military Forces, Chapter IV, Semi-Military Organizations. 15 March 1946 War Department (USA)

Robert L. Bolin , Depositor University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected]

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Technical Manual, TM 30-430 Handbook on USSR Military Forces Chapter IV, Semi-Military Organizations 15 March 1946

Robert L. Bolin, Depositor University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected]

Technical Manual, TM 30-430, Chapter IV, 15 March 1946

Handbook on USSR Military Forces Chapter IV, Semi-Military Organizations

War Department Washington, DC

Comments

The copy digitized was borrowed from the Marshall Center Research Library, APO, AE 09053-4502.

Abstract

TM 30-340, Handbook on USSR Military Forces, was “published in installments to expedite dissemination to the field.” TM 30-430, Chapter IV, 15 March 1946, “Semi-Military Organizations,” is a brief chapter describing militarized governmental organizations including security services, signal and transportation organizations, youth organizations, and partisans.

This manual is listed in WorldCat under Accession Number: OCLC: 19989681

A Note on Scholarly Usage

Since revised editions of Army manuals are customarily issued with the same manual number and title as the previous editions, the minimal scholarly citation must contain the date of issue. The minimum unambiguous citation for this chapter is TM 30-430, Chapter IV, 15 March 1946. 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430

CHAPTER IV

SEMI-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Page INTRODUCTION •...... •... IV-I Section IV. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT OF 1. General ...... IV-I TRANSPORTATION...... IV--8 2. Agencies Incorporated into Army and Navy. IV-I 1. General...... IV--8 3. Agencies Given Armed Force Status ...... IV-I 2. Coordination...... IV--8 4. Agencies Legally Militarized ...... IV-l 3. Movements...... IV--8 5. Partisans ...... IV-I 4. Responsibility...... IV--9 6. Effectiveness ...... IV-2 Section V. SEMI-MILITARY TRAINING OR- GANIZATIONS ..••...... •...... IV-9 Section I. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT OF 1. General...... IV -9 INTERNAL AFFAIRS ...... 2. Osoaviakhim and Komsomol...... IV--9 1. General ...... , ...... 3. Vsevobuch ...... IV-IO 2. Border and Security Troops ...... 3. Interior Troops ...... Section VI. PARTISANS ...... IV-IO 4. Signal Troops ...... 1. Development and Mission ...... IV-IO 5. Police Troops ...... 2. High Command and Coordination with Red 6. Fire Defense Troops ...... Army ...... IV-IO 3. Organization and Equipment ...... IV-12 4. Tactics ...... IV-12 Section II. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT OF STATE SECURITy ...... IV-7 List of Illustrations 1. General...... IV-7 Figure Page 2. Organization...... IV-7 1. Organization of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)...... IV-3 Section III. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT OF 2. Organization and deployment of a NKVD SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS ...... IV-7 border battalion...... IV-4 1. General...... IV-7 3. Structure and organization of , 2. Responsibility for Army Communications.. IV-7 Communist Party control of Partisans, and 3. Organization...... IV--8 lateral liaison with headquarters. IV-ll

IV-I 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430

CHAPTER IV

SEMI-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION counterespionage among the civil population and in the army and the navy. 1. GENERAL The Soviet government carefully controlled the One of the outstanding features of a totalitarian functions of the NKVD. The Army was made re­ state is the facility with which governmental agencies sponsible for its own internal security in 1943. can be applied to military effort. During World Secret domestic counterespionage and foreign espio· War II, all agencies of the U. S. S. R. and the Com· nage functions were given to the newly organized munist Party were devoted, in varying degree, to Peoples' Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). military purposes. The NKGB also was given the status of an armed The transition of agencies and individuals be­ force. tween civil and military positions within the has always been extremely fluid. A number 4. AGENCIES LEGALLY MILITARIZED of semiofficial bodies, commissariats, and main ad­ Because the operation of transportation and signal ministrations were, however, specifically brought communications systems had to be coordinated into the military structure during World War II. closely with the requirements of the Red Army and These organizations included those temporarily in­ Navy, the Soviet government legally militarized the corporated into the Red Army or Navy, those given Commissariats of Signal Communications, Trans­ the status of armed forces, those legally militarized, portation, Waterways, and the Maritime Fleet. Re­ and the Partisans. peated enemy attacks also necessitated their mili­ 2. AGENCIES INCORPORATED INTO ARMY AND tarization. Personnel in these organizations were NAVY subjected to martial authority and, in most instances, The most important agencies temporarily incorpo­ were given army or navy ranks. They wore special rated into the Red Army and Navy were the Main uniforms. Administrations of the Civil Air Fleet, the Hydro­ 5. PARTISANS Meteorological Service, and the Northern Sea Route. The organization of the movement in the In addition, the Main Administration for Universal areas of the U. S. S. R. occupied by the Germans Compulsory Military Training of the Citizens of the and in other countries overrun by German forces is U. S. S. R. (Vsevobuch) was organized in 1941 to the only exception to the rule that the Communist place the semiofficial and voluntary training activi­ Party does not maintain an armed force within the ties carried on by the national Organization for the Soviet state. Defense of the Soviet Union and Defense against Early in World War II, the Central ~ommittee of Air Raids and Chemical Attack (Osoaviakhim) un­ the Communist Party directly commanded and ad· der military control and on a compulsory basis. ministered all Partisan activities through the Com­ 3. AGENCIES GIVEN ARMED FORCE STATUS mander in Chief of the Partisans. Operational co­ Even before World War II, troops of the Peoples' ordination of Partisan activities was taken over by Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) had the the General Headquarters and by army group legal status of an armed force equivalent to the Red (front) headquarters in the field as the Red Army Army and Navy. Its authority was extensive. It assumed the offensive. Once an area was reoccu­ maintained border guards and strategic security pied, control over all Partisans was assumed by the forces, controlled all local police and fire depart­ Chief of Security Troops, who commanded all ments, conducted foreign espionage, and conducted NKVD forces within each army group zone.

687638°-46 IV-I TM 30-430 15 Mar 46

Occasionally, Partisans in reoccupied areas were Most semi-military organizations resumed their organized into "destruction battalions" to assist in civilian roles with the termination of martial law in the mopping up of the remnants of German forces. . Signal communications and trans­ All Partisans, however, ultimately were disarmed portation no longer are militarized. Military train­ and screened by the NKVD. Some were drafted into ing, other than regular recruit training, now is vol­ field replacement units. Some were given respon· untary and semiofficial. sible local positions with the NKVD or civilian au­ The NKVD and NKGB, however, are of even thorities, and some were sent to the rear as unreliable greater importance than during World War II. elements. The secret agents of the Occupied Terri­ They are insuring the orderly demobilization of the tories Administration of the NKGB assisted the army, the effective integration of dischargees into NKVD screen Partisans. the civilian population, and the careful screening of the future peacetime army to guarantee its complete 6. EFFECTIVENESS political reliability. Semi-military organizations generally proved to be of marked usefulness in the Soviet war effort. Par­ Section I. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT tisans were of strategic importance in impeding Ger­ OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS man operations. The NKVD and NKGB consoli­ 1. GENERAL dated the rear area of the Red Army and protected The Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs the zone of the interior. A considerable number of {NKVD) is responsible for maintenance of the se­ German remnants and isolated dissident groups were curity of the Soviet Union. controlled so effectively that they never interfered It conducts frontier and coastal patrols, controls seriously with military operations. The signal com­ all local police and fire departments, maintains spe­ munications and transportation systems of the U. S. cial mobile forces for use against sabotage or insur­ S. R. were able to accomplish their missions success­ rection, and is in charge of all . fully despite a partial break-down in the winter and The local police functions involve the NKVD in spring of 1942 and despite serious shortages. the maintenance of internal passport control; birth In contrast, V sevobuch achieved only limited certificates, and other vital statistics. Its control results. The attempt to add training to the total over local fire departments gives it over-all control productive effort of Soviet civilians required an im­ of passive antiaircraft defense in time of war. Fi­ possibly great effort. Results were achieved only nally, the control of labor involves the Com­ for a few critical months and in a few special fields. missariat in extensive construction, mining, and One of the most significant aspects of the Soviet development projects. All roads and highways are employment of semi-military organizations was the responsibilities of the Commissariat. care exercised to insure effective coordination with The NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat the strictly military effort, to prevent the growth of and consequently has corresponding organizations a vast competing structure, and to avoid duplication in the republics. Not all of the main administra­ of effort. tions of the Commissariat, however, have counter­ The maintained control parts in the republics (fig. 1). over all semi-military agencies, although the General The Main Administration of Border Troops, for Headquarters directed NKVD, NKGB, and Partisan example, is organized directly into operations. Each organization was charged with Districts. Railroad troops and other interior troops strictly delimited functions. In several instances, remain mobile under central control. Although notably the NKVD, prewar functions were reduced. prisoners are controlled directly by the Main Admin­ Thus the NKVD lost its control over army intelli­ istration of Labor and Prisoner-of-W ar Camps, their gence, counterintelligence, and secret operations. productive efforts normally are directed by special It consequently was denied conditions favorable for trusts such as Dalstroi, a trust for the economic grandiose usurption of the military effort, such as development of the area in the Far East. was exercised by the SS in Germany. The volun­ Semi-military forces of the NKVD include Border te8r Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary role Troops, Interior Troops, Signal Troops, Police during World War II. It was supervised strictly by Troops (militia), and Fire Defense Troops. The the Communist Party so as to prevent its operation Commissariat's troops normally are selected from re­ as the nucleus of any dissident movement. liable Party members. Their great strength, at one

IV-2 .... , ~ -...OF INTERNAL '""""",,,IAT AFFAIRS I == - (NICVO) ~

SECURITY FORCES I ~ ,{ , I l I 1 I I

I IMAIN ADMINISTRATION M!,IN ADMINISTRATION MAIN AD~rISTRA TlON ADMINISTRATION"'" MAIN ADMINISTRATION MAIN ADMINISTRATION MAIN ADMINISTRATION MAIN ADMINISTRATION iMAIN ADMINISTRATION Of OF SECURITY TROOPS OF OF FIRE DEFENSE FOR OF Of ROADS AND IORDER TROOPS OF THE REAR AREA INTERIOR TROOPS SIGNAL TROOPS Of ,,?~:~~a~ORCE TROOPS ADMINISTRA TION NKVD SCHOOLS MOTOR TRANSPORT I I I I I I I I I I , I I NI

ADMINISTRATION Of ADMINISTRATION OF ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION POLICE FORCE fiRE DEFENSE FOR OF ROADS AND (Mllilla) TROOPS ADMINISTRA liON MOTOR TRANSPOR

I I I I I I NI

ADMINISTRATION OF ADMINISTRATION OF ADMINISTRATION I ADMINISTRATION POLICE FORCE FIRE DEFENSE FOR OF ROADS AND (Militia) TROOPS ADMINISTRATION I MOTOR TRANSPOR I I I I I I ,I . v I I NKVD I II (Obla.I) J : I I I I I I I I l I 1 1 I CAMPS CAMPS DIVISION OF DIVISION OF DIVISION FOR DIVISION OF POLICE FORCE .FIRE DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION J (Mllilla) TROOPS I Mof8:v:.ttfJoRl ~ -----_._- Figure 1. Organization of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). ~ :e TM 30-430 15 Mar 46 time well over half a million, attests to the impor­ to enter the zone, except at control points. Every tance of their activities during World War II. installation and road is guarded 24 hours a day. 2. BORDER AND SECURITY TROOPS No movement is permitted at night, except mounted The Border Troops of the NKVD are charged with or foot patrols accompanied by dogs. the supervision and security of the land and sea A Border Battalion's zone is approximately 60 frontier. They are organized into Border Districts miles wide, although it may be extended in areas of manned by Border Battalions (fig. 2), whose duties poor communications. Elements of the NKVD Air include border and coastal patrol, counterespionage Brigade assist Border Battalions in difficult terrain. and customs control. They do not garrison forti­ The Air Brigade is directly subordinate to the Peo­ fications. ples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. It includes a Border Battalions, averaging from 1,000 to 1,200 number of air regiments and independent squadrons. in strength, control the First, or Border, Zone of the During World War II, the organization of Border U. S. S. R. The First Zone extends approximately Troops in theaters of operations was modified. The 9 miles from the actual boundary. Only border Border Troops were redesignated as Security Troops troops and special construction units are permitted of the Rear Area of the Red Army. They were as-

NKVD BORDER NKGB DISTRICT ------BATTALION ADMINISTRA TION

1ST BORDER 20 BORDER 3D BORDER COMMAND COMMAND COMMAND

9 TO 12 MILES

3 TO 5 MILES

Figure 2. Organization and deplorment 0/ a NKVD border battalion. IV-4 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430 signed the mission of apprehension of enemy agents, Missions of the divisions and brigades of the parachute troops, and Red Army stragglers or de­ NKVD are different. The divisions provide a cen· serters. They also guarded rear area installations tralized mobile force for maintenance of state secu­ and maintained straggler lines. The Security Troops rity. During the World War II, they were com­ of the Rear Area of the Red Army were withdrawn mitted for operations, particularly anti-Partisan from the Main Administration of Border Troops and actions and mopping up of enemy remnants, in the placed under separate administrative control. rear of army groups under the army group Chief of The former Border Battalions were organized into Security Troops. The brigades, however, provide Security Regiments, subordinate to army groups internal security within the military districts. Both (fronts) and commanded by the Chief of the Secur­ conduct defensive operations against airborne ity Troops of the Rear Area. forces. Normally, one Security Regiment was assigned The Railway Troops are charged with the defense to the rear area of each army, and five to six regi­ of railroad lines. They employ armored trains and ments to the rear area of each army group. cooperate closely with Railroad Station Comman­ Each Security Regiment consisted of three rifle dants of the Red Army, who are charged with the de­ battalions, a machine gun company, a reconnais­ fense of terminals, stations, and depots. Railway sance company, a submachine gun company, a signal Troops are organized into divisions, brigades, regi­ communications company, an antitank company, an ments, and separate battalions. Divisions in active engineer platoon, and maintenance, chemical war­ operational zones have as many as 10 armored fare, and transport units. Artillery was attached as trains. required. The strength of each regiment was ap­ The Convoy Troops protect the movement of proximately 1,650 officers and enlisted men. troops, supplies, and prisoners on the roads, rail­ roads, and waterways. They also insure the unin­ 3. INTERIOR TROOPS terrupted movement of convoys. Although their The Interior Troops of the NKVD constitute mobile major functions apply to the zone of the interior, forces to insure the security of the state. They in­ their commitment extends to the rear areas of armies. clude Operational Troops, Railway Troops, Convoy Normally, they are concentrated in the zone of main Troops, and Factory Guards. effort. Convoy Troops are organized into divisions, Operational Troops are charged with destruction each containing up to five regiments. of enemy elements in the interior and in the rear of The Factory Guards provide local and interior the Red Army, suppression of insurrection, and pro­ protection for major industries. tection of key installations and individuals. They also guard railroads and prisoners when necessary. 4. SIGNAL TROOPS Their organization has been subject to several The Signal Troops of the NKVD were organized in changes. Before World War II, they were organ­ 1943 as a separate administration directly under the ized into corps, regiments, battalions, and compa­ Commissariat to improve the communications secu­ nies. The corps were reorganized into divisions of rity of the Red Army and of the Peoples' Commis­ approximately eight regiments each early in the war, sariat of Signal Communications. Their mission Approximately five of the regiments were similar to includes monitoring of both friendly and enemy NKVD Security Regiments, organized from Border broadcasts, and the establishment, operation, and Battalions, one to two were motorized, and one was a maintenance of signal communication systems for cavalry regiment. By 1944, the divisions were be­ staffs and units of the NKVD. ing motorized, cavalry largely had been grouped into One Signal Regiment is subordinate to the Chief separate divisions, and brigades of two to three of Security Troops of each army group. Each Sig­ regiments and two to three separate battalions were nal Regiment includes three operating battalions and being organized within each military district. two signal construction companies. Its strength is At present, the divisions are believed to be approximately 1,000 officers and enlisted men. equipped with tanks and to approach the Red Army mechanized corps in size-approximately 15,000 5. POLICE TROOPS officers and enlisted men-and in fire power. The The Police Troops (militia) of the NKVD are a brigades appear to be flexible semimobile organiza­ uniformed force to suppress crime and control tiolli! similar to the Security Regiments. traffic. They also playa major role in state security

IV-5 TM 30-430 15 Mar 46 through comprehensive control of passports and vi­ The operations of the Main Administration for tal statistics. Police representation on all draft Antiaircraft Defense were integrated closely with boards and in reception centers assures the political those of the Main Administration of Antiaircraft reliability of all inductees. All changes in resi· Defense Forces (GUPVO) of the Red Army, with dence, travel applications, births, and deaths must the Osoaviakhim, and with the Commissariats of be reported to the police, normally within 24 hours. Transportation and Signal Communications. Police control is especially stringent within the The Commander of the operational staff for Second and Third Border Zones. The Second Zone Passive Antiaircraft Defense in each political sub­ extends approximately 60 miles in depth from the division was in direct communication with the boundary. All inhabitants in it are examined care­ GUPVO Commander, who was responsible for the fully by the police to determine their political relia­ active fighter and antiaircraft defense of the area. bility. Unreliable elements are sent further into the The visual observation systems of Passive Antiair­ interior. Travel within the Second Zone is permit­ craft Defense were integrated fully with the observ­ ted only with special passes. ers and radar of the GUPVO. The Third, or Alertness, Zone extends still deeper. Regional staffs of the Passive Antiaircraft Defense The population in this Zone is supervised carefully Main Administration controlled the passive defense and is specially indoctrinated to cooperate with the of signal and railroad installations. Because such Police Troops and other agencies of the NKVD in installations were major targets, they were provided the apprehension of suspicious characters. Travel with direct communications to the air warning in the Third Zone is controlled. center. Special damage repair brigades were pro­ Police Troops are organized on a Union-Republi­ vided for them. can basis. Consequently, police headquarters are Local air-raid defenses were based upon thorough attached to all political subdivisions down to district preparation of shelters and full mobilization of the or Oblast level. Police troops are organized into population. All air-raid shelters had to be approved regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons. by the local antiaircraft defense staff, a ~edical Each unit is much larger than corresponding units inspector, and construction organizations. in the Red Army. A Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group was organ­ Service in the Police Troops was on a volunteer ized in residences or apartments for every 200 to basis prior to 1941. Periods of enlistment were 2 500 population. One Group was organized for every years. Men who had served in the Red Army con­ 100 to 300 population in factories and other installa­ stituted the majority of personnel. Volunteers tions. All.able-bodied men between 16 and 60 and could join at 18. They could remain in the all able-hodied women between 18 and 50 were sub· service and be exempt from military service if ject to compulsory service in the Fire Defense their performance was satisfactory. Women were forces. They served in both their place of residence recruited' extensively for Police Troops during and their place of work. The sole exceptions were World War II. persons on active duty with the Red Army or the 6. FIRE DEFENSE TROOPS NKVD. The Main Administration of Fire Defense of the Each Passive Antiaircraft Defense Group included NKVD, assisted by the Central Research Institute of a Commander, his deputy, and five detachments. Fire Defense, controls the Fire Defense Troops. In Strengths of the detachments were 'as follows: time of peace, they are charged with local fire pro­ Detachment Strength tection. Control and observation______6 During World War II, the organization was Fire defense______9 changed into the Main Administration for Passive Anti-chemicaL______5 Repair and damage controL ______,..____ 7 Antiaircraft Defense. The regional counterparts of ~edical______4 the Main Administration controlled Passive Antiair­ craft Defense G'roups conscripted from local popu· Each Group maintained a reserve of not less than lations. They were responsible for preparatory 25 percent of its strength. measures against air raids, air-raid warning systems, The Main Administration for Passive Antiaircraft camouflage, camouflage discipline, defense against Defense shareQ the responsibility for civilian :ldense chemical attack, damage control, and first aid. training with the Osoaviakhim, the nation-wide \"01-

1V-6 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430 untary defense association of the U. S. S. R. Joint tage. It is charged with security control over indus­ training regulations and a special 40-hour training trial installations and output and over the fiscal program were prepared. position of the U. S. S. R. Fire Defense Troops were trained to form the. The Counterintelligence Administration is con­ nucleus of Partisan bands should theil," area be over· cerned principally with control of the activities of run by the enemy. foreigners in the U. S. S. R. It also watches Soviet citizens of foreign birth or suspected of foreign Section II. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT affiliations. OF STATE SECURITY Other administrations and divisions of the Peo­ ples' Commissariat of State Security are charged 1. GENERAL with mail censorship, telephone and telegraph com­ The Peoples' Commissariat of State Security munications, secret surveillance within prisons, etc. (NKGB) was organized in 1943 to assume the func­ The Commissariat of State Security, unlike the tions of counterespionage and strategic foreign Commissariat of Internal Affairs, maintains no espionage which had been handled by a special divi­ troops or armed forces of its own. It operates sion of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. through small groups or individuals, largely under Reconnaissance, tactical espionage, and counter­ cover. It has, however, official militarized status. intelligence operations within the Red Army, how­ Its personnel are given military rank and the privi­ ever, were conducted by the Red Army itself. Overt leges of general officers. surveillance of the civilian population and signal security remained functions of the NKVD. Section III. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT The NKGB is a Union-Republican Commissariat, OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS but counterparts of the national organization have been established in few of the republics and political 1. GENERAL subdivisions of the U. S. S. R. The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica­ 2. ORGANIZATION tions (NKS) , a Union-Republican Commissariat, is Functions of the Commissariat of State Security are responsible for the majority of Soviet signal com­ performed by a number of administrations and munications systems. However, it is not responsi­ divisions. ble for combat zone communications, the internal The Foreign Countries Administration organizes communications of the Peoples' Commissariat of and conducts espionage outside of the U. S. S. R. Internal Affairs, the railroad signal system, or the It is believed to be composed of regional divisions. internal communications systems of the navy. It The Administration also is concerned with Soviet does include the postal, telephone, and telegraph propaganda abroad. services. The Occupied Territories Administration super­ The Commissariat cooperates closely·with both the vised and controlled Soviet nationals in enemy-occu­ Peoples' Commissariat of National Defense and the pied territory during W orld War II. It is not Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Its per­ known whether this administration still exists. It sonnel were placed under full military discipline may continue to conduct surveillance of Soviet na­ during World War II. tionals in areas outside direct Red Army control. It The close relations between the Commissariats of is believed that this administration was concerned Signal Communications and Defense during most of primarily with political reliability and that it took World War II were reinforced by the appointment of little or no part in the conduct of Partisan opera­ the of Signal Communications, Ivan T. tions. Peresypkin, as Chief Marshal of Signal Troops and The Secret Political Administration investigates Chief of the Signal Division of the Red Army Gen­ anti-Soviet activities and organizations within the eral Staff. U. S. S. R. It maintains secret surveillance of the 2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMY COMMUNICA~ loyalty of Communist Party members. TIONS The Administration for Counterespionage in the The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica­ Soviet Economy is charged with the responsibility of tions maintains and operates all communications in preventing foreign economic espionage and sabo- the area of army group (front) headquarters, except JV-7 TM 30-430 15 Mar 46 those direct to the GHQ. The Commissariat is reo Central Sections: sponsible for the development, production, and ini· Supply. tial supply of Red Army signal equipment, powerful Economic Planning. radio stations, charging equipment, and other oper­ Finance. ations beyond- the capabilities of Red Army signal Mobilization. troops. Lumber. ElecU:ification. 3. ORGANIZATION Personnel Training. The Peoples' Commissariat of Signal Communica­ Sanitary. tions is known to include Main Administrations for Accounting. the Postal Service, Signal Operations, and Signal Administration. Construction. It also includes a number of research Central Bureau for Foreign Relations. and training institutes. Coordination with the armed forces is the respon­ 2. COORDINATION sibility of the Central Military Administration of Coordination is effected between the Commissariat the Commissariat. of Transportation and the Chief of the Rear Services of the Red Army, between the Chiefs of Railroad Divisions and the Chiefs of Transportation of the Section IV. PEOPLES' COMMISSARIAT Rear Services of army groups (front), between the OF TRANSPORTATION Chiefs of Railroad Divisions and the Chiefs of Transportation of military districts, and between 1. GENERAL the Transportation Commissariat Station Masters The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation and the Railroad Station or Railhead Commandants. (NKPS) is an All-Union Commissariat charged 3. MOVEMENTS with the maintenance and operation of all railroads, including the subway. The planning and execution of major troop, supply, Prior to 1931 the Commissariat controlled all or evacuation movements by rail is the joint respon­ types of transportation. During 1931, however, re­ sibility of the Peoples' Commissariat of Transporta­ sponsibility for all transportation other than rail was tion and the Chief of Transportation of the Rear transferred to other commissariats. The Commis­ Services of the Red Army. sariat of Transportation was militarized in April Major military movements normally must be 1943. Employees were compelled to remain on their planned 30 days in advance because of the demands jobs for the duration of the war. They were placed made on the limited Soviet rail systems. The under the Red Army disciplinary code and were Transportation Commissariat must be prepared to made subject to military tribunals. Special uni­ inform the Red Army of its rolling stock and trans­ forms and military ranks were introduced in Sep­ port capabilities 25 days before the movement. tember 1943. Twenty-three days before the movement, the Chiefs Thirty-nine railroad divisions have been identi­ of Transportation of the army groups and military fied. Generally, they correspond to the military districts involved must forward their estimated re­ districts. quirementsfor the movement to the Chief of Trans­ Activities of the Peoples' Commissariat of Trans­ portation of the Rear Services of the Red Army, portation are conducted through the following who must submit his consolidated request to the agencies: Commissariat of Transportation. Should the request exceed the estimated capabili­ Departments : ties submitted by the Commissariat, the problem is Political. referred to the Supreme Economic Council or to the Central Operating. State Defense Committee for adjudication. Adjudi­ Central Locomotive. cation must be completed and a joint Commissariat­ Central Car. Red Army plan must be transmitted to the Chiefs of Car and Track Maintenance. Transportation of the army groups and military dis­ Signal Communications. tricts at least 13 days before the movement. The New Railroad Construction. Chiefs of Transportation and the Railroad Divisions

1V-8 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430 must have prepared their detailed joint plans and outside of the official organizations of the army must have transmitted them as warning orders to dates from 1912, when a national society was organ. military formations, railroad units, and industrial ized for semi-military training. Following the Revo­ enterprises concerned at least 10 days before the lution, many Soviet citizens and the Communist movement. Party realized the need for supplementing the limited 4. RESPONSIBILITY conscript training of the Red Army of the early The maintenance of epidemiological and epizootic twenties. Consequently, various societies were control on all railroads is a special responsibility of formed to accomplish this function. the Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation. The The societies were merged in 1926 into the Or­ Commissariat maintains medical and veterinary ganization for the Defense of the Soviet Union and inspectors on all trains and special infectious hos· Defense against Air Raids and Chemical Attack pitals at major stations and all railheads. The Main (Osoaviakhim,\ . The Komsomol (League of Com. Medical Administration and the Veterinary Admin· munist Youth) and its children's affiliates, the Pio· istration of the Red Army share in this responsi. neers and the Octobrists, formed the core of Osoa· bility. viakhim. Defense training outside of the army be­ The Peoples' Commissariat of Transportation is came virtually compulsory for Soviet youth. responsible for the operation of all railroads up to Although Osoaviakhim, and particularly its army railheads. It is responsible for all permanent Komsomol, achieved considerable success, the status and heavy construction, even in advance of army of universal military preparedness was not satisfac­ railheads. The Railroad Construction Battalions of tory at the beginning of the war with Germany. the Red Army are, however, responsible for initial Consequently, military control and compulsory par­ mine clearance. ticipation in prescribed training courses were insti­ Coordination between the Chiefs of Railroad Divi· tuted in 1941 with the organization of the Main sions and the Chiefs of Transportation of military Administration for Universal Compulsory Military districts is limited to planning, epidemiological and Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. (Vsevo­ epizootic control, and supervision of the Transporta' buch) of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense. tion Commissariat Station Masters and the Station Osoaviakhim was relegated to a secondary and Commandants. supplementary role for the duration of W orId War Station masters have sole authority over the oper­ II. The State Defense Committee required the or· ations of railroad lines, rolling stock repair, rail line ganization to turn its facilities over to the newly construction and repair, and railroad signal com­ formed Vsevobuch. Osoaviakhim conducted pas­ munications. sive antiaircraft and elementary aviation training, Station and railhead commandants of the Red conducted war-bond drives, and assisted in mine Army are responsible for the orderly loading and clearance and collection of enemy weapons and unloading of troops, equipment, and supplies, the equipment in recaptured areas. With the conclu­ successful operation and maintenance of Red Army sion of the war and the termination of Vsevobuch, dumps and depots, and the active defense of stations. Osoaviakhim once more is the primary auxiliary They exercise the disciplinary authority of garrison military training organization of the U. S. S. R. commanders over all troops and other personnel in 2. OSOAVIAKHIM AND KOMSOMOL transit or at stations. In defensive situations, it is Osoaviakhim is comprised of a pyramidal series of believed that they have tactical command over all local, oblast, and republican organizations. It is personnel in their sectors, including Transportation directed by the All-Union Presidium. Commissariat Troops, Railroad and Convoy Troops, The organization expanded rapidly following its and the local Passive Antiaircraft Defense Groups formation. Its membership totaled 2,950,000 in (in the zone of interior) . October 1927 and reached 13,000,000 in 1941. As early as 1929, there were 47,200 organized groups Section V. SEMI-MILITARY TRAINING for the study of military science. Osoaviakhim was ORGANIZATIONS actively engaged in aviation training. In 1931, it 1. GENERAL had 14 glider stations, 40 airfields, flying schools, Appreciation of the necessity for widespread interest model airplane shops, and centers for training avia­ and voluntary participation in military activities tion mechanics.

IV-9 TM 30-430 15 Mar 46 Although Osoaviakhim was designed to provide Section VI. PARTISANS military and physical training for citizens of pre-con­ 1. DEVELOPMENT AND MISSION script age, it also included former members of the Partisan operations have always been an important Red Army who wished to study new technical de­ factor in wars fought on Soviet territory. The large, velopments in warfare. Its program, which cen­ inaccessible areas and the robustness of the Soviet tered about clubs and training centers, included population favor this type of operation. virtually all types of military training. The mission of Partisan warfare is to harass Markedly close relations are maintained between enemy forces, to cut their extended supply and com­ the state, the Communist Party, and Osoaviakhim, munication lines, to assist Red Army operations, and the armed forces. The Soviet government has to gather information about the enemy. supported the organization strongly. It has author­ The Soviet government and the Communist Party, ized the use of army reserve personnel, giving them with the Komsomol, made preparations before active pay duty. World War II for the foundation of a Partisan move­ The organization of Osoaviakhim has been ment. The Osoaviakhim and the Fire Defense changed for peacetime operations. The clubs have Troops assisted in this preparation, and later in the been replaced by military-type units, infantry or actual organization of Partisan bands. V sevobuch cavalry squads or platoons and detachments of spe­ also assisted in the formation of Partisan bands after cialists. The Communist Party supervises the selec­ 1941. tion of unit commanders, often reserve officers or During World War II, the development of Par­ noncommissioned officers on deferred status. tisan bands was greatly facilitated by the German The Komsomol of the Communist Party special­ Army's inability to mop up the large territories cap­ izes in tank, artillery, and marksmanship training. tured during its rapid advance. Special recruiting Red Army personnel on active duty often have served agencies of the Communist Party in the rear of the as its officers. enemy forces furnished the Partisans. with a steady 3. VSEVOBUCH flow of replacements. It is estimated that more The Main Administration for Universal Compulsory than 300,000 Partisans were operating behind Ger­ Military Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. man lines at the end of 1943. (Vsevobuch) , which existed between 1941 and 1945, The Soviet Partisan command also assisted Parti­ had the mission of providing a reserve for the Red san bands in other countries under German occupa­ Army and for Partisan operations. It conducted tion, such as , Slovakia, and . training for all male citizens between the ages of 2. HIGH COMMAND AND COORDINATION WITH 16 and 60. RED ARMY A special 110-hour training program was given The Communist Party supervised and controlled the trainees during their off-duty hours, without inter­ Partisans. The High Command of the Partisans ruption of production and without pay. Regulations was the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement, first provided that the program must be completed in not under Marshal of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and more than 5 months and that classes must meet at later under General· Leitenant Ponomarenko. The least twice a week. Instruction was presented by Staff is responsible directly to the Central Commit­ reserve officers and noncommissioned officers re­ tee of the Communist Party. cruited from wounded Red Army personnel. Train­ The Central Staff of the Partisan Movement was ing was specialized by arm. Insofar as was practi­ represented in the General Headquarters and coor­ cable, the training organizations corresponded to dinated with the Operations and Intelligence Divi­ units and elements of the Red Army, but had no sion of the Red Army to assure closest cooperation military status. with the Red Army. The program achieved only partial success due to When the Red Army went on the offensive, much the inadequate supply of instructors and equipment. closer coordination was required. Special Partisan Best results appear to have been achieved in the staffs were organized at army group (front) and initial training of specialists, such as signal men army levels to achieve this coordination (fig. 3). whose courses extended far beyond the initial 110 The Operations Staff of the Partisan Movement in hours. the Rear of the Enemy was organized in enemy-

IV-IO 15 Mar 46 TM 30-430

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ST A TE DEFENSE ------OF THE ALL·UNION COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ GHQ OF THE ------PARTISAN ~ ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND ~

>- ADMINISTRATION t-D:: FOR PARTISAN >!:~O SCHOOLS OD:: C/)D:: UJ PARTISAN STAFF t- ARMY GROUP (FRONT) ------AT ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS

PARTISAN ARMY OPERA TION S STAFF ·::-=--=-~=':"i AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS

COMBAT TROOPS

FRONT LINE

PARTISAN OPERA . .J TlONS STAFF IN .. ftI"'IQ.'tS _-- THE REAR OF AGENTS 3~-- THE ENEMY ...... ------

LEGEND ARMY CHANNELS

PARTISAN CHANNELS

PARTY CHANNELS

LIAISON

______AGENT REPORT CHANNEL BLOCK ~ ~ :Occasionally a company unit is found between battalion and platoon.

Figure 3. Structure and organization 0/ Soviet Partisans, Communist Party control 0/ Partisans, and lateral liaison with Red Army headquarters.

IV-II TM 30-430 15 Mar 46 occupied territory to receive orders from the Parti­ had sufficient supplies of weapons. Limited trans­ san High Command and to assure the dissemination portation was available to Partisans. It normally of orders to individual Partisan bands. consisted of light horse-drawn carts. 3. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 4. TACTICS The organization, equipment, and strength of Par­ In general, the Partisans operated on orders from tisan bands varied greatly. They depended upon the Partisan High Command to carry out specific terrain conditions, density of the road net, and the operations. When the Red Army went on the offen­ strength of enemy forces. sive, Partisan units usually were confined to opera­ The most commonly found unit was the Partisan tions which gave direct assistance to the advance battalion (Otryad), with 200 to 400 officers and elements of Red Army assault forces. They also enlisted men. In favorable terrain, battalions were assisted the Red Army by gathering information often combined into brigades and, early in the war, about the enemy, often employing children, women, into regiments (Polk). In very few instances, Par­ and the aged for these missions. tisan divisions (Divisia) were organized. Surprise raids and ambushes were characteristic Partisan units were composed of personnel re­ Partisan operations. They usually operated at night, ceived from the Communist Party and semi-military often near woods and marshes. Partisan bands nor­ organizations, of isolated Red Army soldiers, and of mally avoided engagements with strong enemy escaped prisoners of war. forces. After a successful raid, they returned to The types and quantity of weapons, equipment, their bases by separate routes. They continually and supplies used by the Partisans, largely depended changed their positions, marching by night and hid­ upon the initiative of the units and the success of ing by day. Partisan raids on enemy supply depots and columns. When Partisan units were surrounded, they broke Battlefields also were a source of supply. up into small groups which attempted to pass Partisans normally did not receive supplies from through the enemy lines or hid in the surrounded the Red Army or the Soviet government, except for area. medical supplies usually delivered by air. When Partisan units employed a markedly effective Partisan units were in contact with Red Army units, security system of sentries, patrols, and advance however, they were able to obtain equipment. observation posts. Roads leading to their camps Most of the food for the Partisans was obtained normally were camouflaged and mined. Excellent from the local population and was supplemented by communications were maintained by the use of radio supplies seized from enemy dumps. They generally and messengers.

IV-I 2