ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 22, No. 4 (HU)

October 2019

Hungary external relations briefing: Turkey’s Security Zone in Northern Syria In the Light of Hungarian Interests Csaba Moldicz

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Turkey’s Security Zone in Northern Syria In the Light of Hungarian Interests

This external relations briefing focuses this time on how Turkey’s efforts to establish a permanent security zone in northern Syria is being interpreted in the Hungarian foreign policy and what reactions came from other European countries and the US. Turkey launched the so- called ‘Operation Peace Spring’ on October 9, 2019, just a few days after the US withdrew its troops from the region, that earlier supported Kurd-forces in its fighting against the Islamic State. Later on, Turkey and the US agreed upon a ceasefire for 120 hours, which gave Kurd- forces enough time to withdraw from the 18-miles (30 kilometers) buffer zone. Part of Turkey’s plan was to create a security zone where Syrian migrants could be reallocated from Turkey. The need for this move was explained by referring to significant costs and security problems. Meanwhile, Turkey and Russia agreed after lengthy talks in Sochi to jointly oversee the Kurdish pullback in an area of 10 km broad zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. While both the Russian and the US foreign policy makers claim a big victory in stabilizing the region, the European assessment of the situation is very different, at the same time not coherent. This briefing focuses on the Hungarian interpretation of the events in Syria and its broad policy implications.

1. The Hungarian reaction in a European context

As we pointed out in our earlier briefings, the adoption of the EU declaration regarding Turkey’s military action was not without discussion, and though Hungary agreed to support the document at the end, it has become clear that Hungary pursues a different policy in the region.

At this point we must be reminded that Turkey has often been assessed by Western European politicians and pundits as an “institutionalized autocracy” in best case, whereas the Hungarian Prime Minister has tried to strengthen ties with Turkey in recent years.1 It is very clear that Hungary assesses Turkey as a main player in securing the stability of the Central European region and reducing the migration pressure on Europe.

1 In October 2018, Turkey and Hungary agreed to double their bilateral trade volume and expand bilateral economic relations in other ways. Moreover, Hungary and Turkey aim to start a cooperation in the defense industry.

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Last week, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade pointed out in Baku, that it lies in the Hungarian interests that the migration problem will be solved in Syria, and not in Europe. The Minister referred to Hungarian interests several times in his talk too. He also made references to the Turkish argumentation underlining if Turkey cannot solve the problems of the Syrian migrants in Turkey this way, it will allow migrants into Europe. It should be pointed out that there are around 4 million Syrian migrants2 and the Turkish government spent circa 40 billion USD on refugees, while the EU spent just 3.3 billion.

The Hungarian Minister underlined, if the 4 million migrants will be allowed to travel to Europe, they must be stopped at the Hungarian borders and that is not in the Hungarian national interests. It was underscored by him that the Hungarian government does not regard the right to migration as a basic human right. In the Hungarian assessment, the problems leading to migration must be solved in the origin country of the migration, not in other countries. Solving the problems in the origin country is the only, long-lasting solution to the problem of migration.

In Baku, the Turkish President thanked for the Hungarian “support at international stage” in the question of whether Turkey’s action to establish the security zone in Syria was justified. It was pointed out in several media coverages of the military action and the European reaction that Hungary removed the teeth of the EU declaration, when there is no reference to Kurds in the declaration by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

At the same time, the military action sparked a fierce debate in the NATO too where Turkey is a member and has the second largest army. Despite the fact that some NATO members announced that they won’t sell weapons (Italy, France, Germany, the UK and Spain) to Turkey anymore, NATO's secretary-general said he acknowledges Turkey's legitimate security concerns, however he also urged Ankara to limit its military action in northeast Syria.

Obviously not only the Turkish military action provoked debate, but Hungary’s own way in foreign policy was met with incomprehension in the EU. The former foreign affairs of Greece, Nikos Kotzias put this way:

“The EU has been paralyzed by Hungary’s provocative veto. For two years and at eight meetings, I had tried to convince my colleagues in the EU Council of Foreign Ministers to

2 It must be pointed out, that there are different numbers regarding the Syrian migrants in Turkey. (3.6 and 2.5 millions are also mentioned.)

2 discuss the Kurdish issue and what the stance of a democratic EU should be. Now the EU is unprepared and without a strategic compass.”3

Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Asselborn used stronger words:

“it can’t be that a country like Hungary repeatedly blocks the EU on its own,” adding, that “if we cannot even come up with a statement together, we’re not even a dwarf in foreign affairs, we’re nonexistent.”4

The German politician from the CDU, Johann Wadephul went further and questioned Hungary’s place in the EU in an interview to the German broadcaster ZDF:

“We would like Hungary to make it clear which team the country plays in or it might be faced with leaving the one day”.

Though the MPs of the supported a document condemning Turkey’s military action in North-Syria yesterday, this support is of less relevance for two reasons: firstly the Fidesz MPs followed the fraction discipline when voting for the motion; secondly the European Parliament’s document, which proposes economic sanctions against Turkey, mainly in the agricultural trade and the suspension of the customs union, if formers steps would not change the course of Turkish polices is not binding for the Council.5 For the moment, it seems to be very unlikely that this proposal would be accepted by the Council.

2. The broader context of the Hungarian foreign policy actions

The remaining question is why the Hungarian foreign policy is willing to go against European partners in this – at least at the first glance – irrelevant issue. To understand this dilemma, we must refer to the basic principle of the Hungarian foreign policy, which represents Hungarian national interests and it doesn’t relay on the so-called value-based approach.

As we pointed out in our earlier briefings, Central European countries, especially Hungary, seem to focus much more on their core national interests than West European countries where even interest-based foreign policies’ moves are often explained in the terminology of the so-called Western values. In the Middle East, there are two countries so far

3 Sarantis Michalopoulos, 2019: The Brief, powered by the – A missing EU word, a lost EU state. EURACTIV. https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/the-brief-powered-by-the-martens-centre-a- missing-eu-word-a-lost-eu-state/ 4Ábrahám Vass, 2019: Hungary Reportedly Opposed EU Declaration on Turkey at First. Hungary Today, https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-opposed-eu-declaration-turkey-war-kurdish/ 5 The Council comprises of the heads and the prime ministers of the EU member states.

3 that could clearly benefit from this difference in foreign policies and capitalize on that: Turkey, and Israel.

However, it must be pointed out, that the dilemma of interest- versus value-based foreign policy is not new because the European political history can easily be described by the duality of these alternative approaches, this choice was added to the “menu of foreign policy approaches” after the Westphalian peace (1648). The basic idea is that permanent political stability can only be achieved in an international system where alliances are based on the core political and economic interests of the states, not different ideologies or faiths. The dilemma of choice became apparent after WWII, when the interest-based approach in the West was slowly replaced by a value-based framing underlining the significance of common Western values in foreign policy.

As a result of a long development, today, the EU institutions and their daily functioning are very much based on the idea of common values, specified in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty6. This approach was accepted until the ‘big-bang enlargement’ in 2004 when 8 Central European countries joined the EU whose historical experiences and nation state concepts fundamentally differ from the Western European ones. In this case, only Hungary rebelled against the common EU approach, referring to its core national interests, but obviously this is not the last case and not only Hungary will do it, when national interests dictate a different foreign policy approach.

6 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

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