Nuclear Security in Pakistan

INSIDE Russia, U.S. Lag on Chemical Arms Deadline

Volume 39 Number 6 Arms Control JULY/AUGUST 2009 THE SOURCE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITYTODAY

NUCLEAR SECURITY IN PAKISTAN

Nuclear Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism Security By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen in Pakistan Separating Myth From Reality By Feroz Hassan Khan

Ending North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action By Hui Zhang

Looking Back: The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 By Greg Thielmann

IN THE NEWS Views From UN Tightens North Korea Sanctions Rolf Mowatt-Larssen GAO Finds Gap in U.S. Export Controls Feroz Hassan Khan U.S. Still Committed to Engaging Iran IAEA Finds Uranium at Second Syrian Site

U.S. $7.00 A Publication of the Arms Control Association Canada $8.00 www.armscontrol.org

Volume 39 • Number 6 July/August 2009 Arms Control THE SOURCE ON NONPROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY TODAY

Features Contents

21 Ending North Korea’s Nuclear Cover Stories Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action Nuclear Security in Pakistan China, North Korea’s most important ally and trading 6 Reducing the Risks partner, could serve its own of Nuclear Terrorism interests by pushing more By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen vigorously for Pyongyang’s denuclearization. 12 Separating Myth By Hui Zhang From Reality By Feroz Hassan Khan

News Looking Back: 45 28 The World The National • Russia, U.S. Lag on Chemical Arms Deadline Missile Defense • Accord on New Rules Eludes Nuclear Suppliers

Act of 1999 31 Asia and Australia By Greg Thielmann • UN Tightens North Korea Sanctions • S. Korean Pyroprocessing Awaits U.S. Decision

35 The United States and the Americas • GAO Finds Gap in U.S. Export Controls • MDA Tests Laser Amid Budget Cutbacks Departments ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 • Obama Arms Control Team Fills Out 2 Editor’s Note 39 The Middle East and Africa 3 Focus • IAEA Finds Uranium at Second Syrian Site Toward a Nuclear Freeze in South Asia • U.S. Still Committed to Engaging Iran

4 In Brief 43 Europe and the Former Soviet Union • Russia Vetoes UN Mission in Georgia

Cover photo: Pakistani soldiers guard nuclear-capable missiles displayed Nov. 27, 2008, at the International Defence Exhibition in Karachi. Rizwan Tabassum/AFP/Getty Images 1 Editor’sNOTE

he security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and infra- ing, but they respond to each other on numerous points, dis- structure has been the subject of much coverage and agreeing in some cases and agreeing in others. The two articles T debate in recent months as Pakistani government forces offer a valuable guide to analysts and policymakers navigating have stepped up their fight against insurgents. In this month’s a delicate topic that has enormous implications for regional and issue, two leading experts offer detailed analyses of the risks and global security. possible policy responses. Elsewhere in the issue, Hui Zhang addresses another thorny According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, growing extremism, an question in Asia as he looks at North Korea’s nuclear weapons expanding nuclear portfolio, and continuing instability chal- program and calls for more vigorous efforts by China to end it. lenge Pakistan’s ability to protect its nuclear arsenal. He warns He lays out a detailed road map for North Korea and other coun- in particular against the slow leak of nuclear expertise and ma- tries to follow. He argues that China could and should work with terials to nonstate actors. North Korea and the United States to pursue such a strategy. Feroz Hassan Khan also sees “insider-outsider collusion” as In his “Looking Back” article, Greg Thielmann reflects on a valid concern, but he emphasizes institutional changes that the National Missile Defense Act of 1999. He examines the Pakistan has made to respond to that threat. A potentially much circumstances leading up to it and the impact the legislation greater threat comes from flawed assumptions and rhetorical has had since its passage. As Eben Lindsey’s news article on the excesses, which could lead both Pakistan and the United States Missile Defense Agency’s recent testing of the Airborne Laser down the wrong path, he says. system indicates, the debates Thielmann describes resonate Neither of the two authors saw the piece the other was writ- today. —ELISABETH ERICKSON and DANIEL HORNER

Arms PUBLISHER and Executive Director BOARD OF DIRECTORS Arms Control Today (ISSN 0196-125X) Daryl G. Kimball is published monthly, except for two bi- Control John Steinbruner monthly issues appearing in January/Feb- Editor DEPUTY DIRECTOR Chairman ruary and July/August. Membership in the TODAY Daniel Horner Jeff Abramson Arms Control Association includes a one- year subscription to Arms Control Today Volume 39 Managing Editor Senior Fellow Avis Bohlen Number 6 Elisabeth Erickson Greg Thielmann Matthew Bunn at the following rates: $30 student, $65 individual, $80 international. Non-member July/August 2009 Anne H. Cahn Assistant Editor Research Analyst subscription rates are: $60 individual, $80 J. Bryan Hehir A Publication of the Brian Creamer Peter Crail institutional, with international rates of $75 Arms Control Association John Isaacs individual and $85 institutional. Letters to International CTBT Project Catherine Kelleher the Editor are welcome and can be sent 1313 L Street, NW Correspondent Associate Michael Klare via e-mail or postal mail. Letters should Suite 130 Oliver Meier Meri Lugo Kenneth N. Luongo be under 600 words and may be edited Washington, DC 20005 Jack Mendelsohn for space. Interpretations, opinions, or EDITORIAL ADVISeR Assistant to the Phone Janne E. Nolan conclusions in Arms Control Today should Wade Boese Executive Director 202-463-8270 Hazel R. O’Leary be understood to be solely those of the Eric Auner Fax John Rhinelander authors and should not be attributed to 202-463-8273 Finance Officer Jeremiah Sullivan the association, its board of directors, E-mail Merle Newkirk Jonathan Tucker officers or other staff members, or to orga- [email protected] Christine Wing nizations and individuals that support the Scoville Fellow Arms Control Association. Arms Control Website Cole Harvey Today encourages reprint of its articles www.armscontrol.org but permission must be granted by the InternS Emma Ensign editor. Advertising inquiries may be made to [email protected]. Postmaster: Send Eben Lindsey address changes to Arms Control Today, Rachel Weise 1313 L Street, NW, Suite 130, Washington,

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY D.C. 20005. Periodicals postage paid at Washington D.C., Suburban, MD and Merrifield, VA. ©July/August 2009, Arms Control Association.

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a nonprofit membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding and support for effective arms control policies. Through its media and public education programs and its magazine Arms Control Today,

ARMS CONTROL T ACA provides policymakers, journalists, educators, and the interested public with authoritative information and analyses on arms control, proliferation, and global security issues. 2 By Daryl G. Kimball FOCUS Executive Director Toward a Nuclear Freeze in South Asia

en years ago this month, tens of thousands of Indian they have no plans to join the United States and China as signato- and Pakistani soldiers faced off in a confrontation ries to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). T over the disputed Kashmir region. If not for intensive U.S.- Given the billions of dollars of U.S. military aid flowing into led crisis diplomacy, that standoff and another in 2002 could have Pakistan and India’s commitments made in the context of the led to war between the two nuclear-armed rivals. nuclear cooperation deal, the Obama administration can and Since then, Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile stockpiles should use its leverage to put the brakes on their nuclear arms have grown even larger, and the underlying conditions for con- race. As Clinton suggested in a June 20 speech, the nuclear deal flict still persist. Indian military planners foolishly believe they “can and should also serve as the foundation of a productive can engage in and win a limited conventional conflict without partnership on nonproliferation.” triggering a nuclear exchange even though the Pakistani army’s For his part, Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said strategy relies on nuclear weapons to offset India’s overwhelming June 3 that India would “welcome real action toward nuclear conventional superiority. disarmament” and “will work with our partners internationally Unfortunately, U.S. policy- towards that objective.” Now makers downplayed regional India and Pakistan must do that President Barack Obama nonproliferation and risk-reduc- has jump-started global disar- tion priorities in the pursuit their part by embracing rather mament efforts and pledged to of other objectives. Beginning engage other states in the effort, with Secretary of State Hillary than rejecting commonsense India and Pakistan must do Rodham Clinton’s visit to India their part by embracing rather this month, the United States arms control strategies. than rejecting commonsense should help to re-establish nu- nuclear arms control strategies. clear restraint and arms control as a top priority for the region. A good starting point would be for India to invite Pakistan Despite its struggle against extremists inside its own borders, the and China to halt fissile production for weapons pending the Pakistani army sees India as its main adversary. Pakistan is expand- conclusion of a global FMCT. India, which has more than enough ing its uranium-enrichment capabilities and building two new separated fissile material to maintain a large nuclear deterrent plutonium-production reactors for weapons purposes even though force, would win wide international acclaim for the proposal and it already possesses enough fissile material for 60-80 bombs. remove the rationale for Pakistan’s fissile buildup. One excuse for Pakistan’s ongoing buildup is the U.S.-Indian The Obama administration can nudge New Delhi along by nuclear cooperation initiative. Approved last year, the deal exempts strictly adhering to a key provision of the implementing legisla- New Delhi from long-standing restrictions on civil nuclear trade tion for the nuclear cooperation deal. That provision requires a in exchange for India’s promise to refrain from nuclear testing and report to Congress by the end of this year and each year thereaf- support a global ban on fissile material production for weapons, ter that assesses whether India has or has not increased unsafe- among other nonproliferation commitments. The deal gives India guarded fissile material production. access to global nuclear fuel markets, freeing up its limited domes- Clinton should not hesitate to put the CTBT back on the U.S.- ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 tic uranium supplies for use exclusively in weapons production. Indian bilateral agenda. She should urge her Indian counterparts India has enough fissile material for well more than 100 bombs. to reiterate Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 1998 commit- India and Pakistan each claim to want only a “minimal cred- ment that India would not be among the last states standing in ible deterrent,” but the end of their nuclear and missile buildup the way of the treaty’s entry into force. is not in sight. Indian and Pakistani support for negotiations on a New Delhi is clearly not yet ready to sign the CTBT, but it is global fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) is weak at best. not in its strategic interests to resume nuclear testing. As then- Ambassador Nirupama Rao said May 29 that New Delhi would Sen. Obama (D-Ill.) said on the floor of the Senate on November allow multilateral talks to begin but would “not accept obligations” 16, 2006, “[I]n the event of a future nuclear test by the Govern- that hinder India’s “strategic program” or research and development of India, nuclear power reactor fuel and equipment sales, ment or those that “place an undue burden on our military nonpro- and nuclear technology cooperation would terminate.” scribed activities.” That, of course, is the very purpose of an FMCT. It may be difficult for the Obama team to nudge India and Pak- Nor have the two states moved closer to a legally binding test istan toward greater nuclear restraint, but failure to bring about ban since Washington persuaded them to declare testing moratoria change risks the most severe nuclear proliferation consequences in 1999. In recent months, Pakistani and Indian officials have said in the years ahead. ACT 3

July/August 2009

TheBy Numbers

InBRIEF Trends in Military Expenditures* $1,464 Billion Notable Quotable Total world military expenditures in 2008 “Speaking before the Japanese Diet on November 11, $607 Billion 1983, President Ronald Reagan said, ‘The only value in Total U.S. military expenditures possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they can’t be in 2008 used ever. I know I speak for people everywhere when I say 67% our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be Increase in U.S. military banished from the face of the Earth.’… expenditures since 1998** As a nation, we have a number of important decisions $85 Billion in the coming months, including those related to a Total Chinese military follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with expenditures in 2008 Russia, the Administration’s planned resubmission of the 230% Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for ratification, and the Increase in Chinese military expenditures since 1998** need for a robust missile defense shield. As we move ahead with these and other decisions, let us $66 Billion keep in mind the dream of a nuclear free world enunciated Total French military expenditures in 2008 so eloquently by our 40th president…a dream that President Reagan pursued with great patience and depth of 4% Increase in French military conviction. We would be wise to follow his lead.” expenditures since 1998**

—Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.), statement on the floor of the Senate, June 3, 2009 $65 Billion Total British military expenditures in 2008

20% Increase in British military Ten Years Ago in ACT expenditures since 1998** Pakistan’s Road to a Minimum *Military expenditures include all current and capital Nuclear Deterrent expenditures on personnel, procurement, operations, maintenance, and research and development for armed “Pakistan again finds itself in a highly fluid situation whereby its forces, defense ministries, and military space activities. They do not include civil defense and current expenditures own nuclear weapons policies keep evolving on an ad hoc, reactive related to previous military activities, such as veterans

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY basis in response to Indian actions. India and Pakistan’s symbiotic benefits and demobilization.

nuclear relationship, which has now escalated to the dangerous **Calculations are based on the SIPRI Military Expendi- level of weaponization, will continue to shape the region’s security ture Database, in which values are adjusted for inflation, using 2005 as the base year. environment and to influence the international arms control agenda.” Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti- —Farah Zahra, July/August 1999 tute, “SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament,

ARMS CONTROL T and International Security,” 2009; SIPRI Military Expendi- ture Database, www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex. 4 Conventional Arming • In June, the United States delivered four Mi-17 helicop- and Disarming ters to Pakistan. The U.S.-owned, Russian-built, medium- weight helicopters were requested by the Pakistani govern- • Saudi Arabia took delivery of the first two of 72 Euro- ment and will be used to support operations against “mili- fighter Typhoon jets from the United Kingdom. The 2007 tant extremists” and to provide humanitarian assistance multibillion-dollar deal, which received U.S. approval to Pakistanis displaced by fighting, according to a June 11 last year, had been held up due to investigations of cor- article by the U.S. Department of Defense’s American Forc- ruption in an earlier Eurofighter agreement between the es Press Service. U.S. military operations and assistance in United Kingdom’s BAE Systems and Saudi Arabia. (See ACT, Pakistan have been controversial, but according to the ar- December 2008.) Saudi Arabia is the first country outside ticle, Defense Department leaders praised efforts, such as Europe to have the Typhoon, an aircraft that will represent the helicopter transfer, that are designed to aid Pakistan’s an upgrade for the Saudi air force from its current fleet of internal counterinsurgency efforts. Tornados and F-15s. • More than 55,000 firearms and 15,000 explosives were • Cyprus has successfully destroyed 324 expired man- collected in Angola over the past year, according to the An- portable air defense systems (MANPADS) SA-7s, according gola Press Agency. The collection initiative was led by the to the Cyprus News Agency. The destruction procedure, National Disarmament Commission, a body established to which took place June 12, destroyed the last 20 of the 324 oversee the collection and storage of weapons. Angolan MANPADS and was implemented with the support of the police began the process of systematically destroying the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and obsolete weapons in November 2008, a task that was car- the technical assistance of the United States and the Unit- ried out by the HALO Trust, a nongovernmental organization ed Kingdom. In 2007, Cyprus also completed the destruc- specializing in the removal of weapons and landmines. The tion of its 48,475 stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Angolan government has stated that firearm legislation on the trade, possession, and use of guns will soon be updated.

Treaty Update The Obama administration believes all cluster munitions. (See ACT, Decem- that discussions on the future of missile ber 2008.) In May, Jamaica and Nigeria Strategic Arms defense should be kept separate from signed the agreement, bringing the total the post-START negotiations, a spokes- number of signing states to 98. The Reduction Treaty man for the Department of State told re- treaty was opened for signature and rati- porters June 22. He added that although fication in December 2008. The Mine Ban ussian and U.S. officials continued the two teams were still negotiating over Treaty, which served as a model for the their talks on a successor to START, R specific numbers, the United States is CCM, was opened for signature and ratifi- meeting in Geneva June 22-24. Both sides looking for “a significant reduction” in cation in December 1997 and entered into are aiming for “significant” reductions in strategic weapons. force in March 1999. strategic offensive arms, but the issue of Andrei Nesterenko, a spokesman for missile defense remains contentious. the Russian Foreign Ministry, said in a Russian President Dmitry Medvedev June 18 press briefing that the two sides said June 20 Russia “cannot agree with hope to announce “interim results” dur- On the Calendar U.S. plans to develop a global missile ing President Barack Obama’s visit to defence.” Medvedev, speaking in Am- Aug. 3-Sept. 18 Conference on Moscow July 6-8. sterdam, said that “the reductions we are Disarmament, Third Session, START limits U.S. and Russian nuclear Geneva suggesting [in nuclear arms] are possible delivery systems and provides numerous only if the United States addresses Rus- Aug. 6 and 9 Anniversaries of the 1945 verification procedures that allow each ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 sian concerns.… [T]he problem of the atomic bombings of side to monitor compliance. The treaty, Hiroshima and Nagasaki relationship of strategic offensive and which was signed in 1991 and came into defensive weapons should be clearly laid Aug. 24-28 Biological Weapons force in 1994, expires Dec. 5. out in the treaty.” Convention Meeting of Experts, Geneva Medvedev said that if Russia’s concerns are met, Moscow is ready to reduce the Convention on Sept. 7-11 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of number of its “strategic delivery vehicles Cluster Munitions Governors meeting, Vienna by a significant factor” compared to the START provisions. START limits each lbania, Niger, and Spain ratified the Sept. 14-18 International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, country to no more than 1,600 deployed Convention on Cluster Munitions A Vienna ICBMS, submarine-launched ballistic mis- (CCM) in June, bringing the total number siles, and heavy bombers. Russia currently of ratifying states to 10. The treaty, which Sept. 23-25 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Article XIV fields 814 such delivery vehicles, accord- will enter into force six months after 30 Conference, New York ing to START data exchanges. countries ratify it, bans the use of nearly 5 By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen

Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism

oday’s frightening instability in Pakistan security, even in the United States.2 Despite such troubling developments, comes in a world in which global terrorists global security efforts until now have been good enough to avert a nuclear ca- are actively seeking nuclear weapons tastrophe. The bad news is that nuclear T threats are growing. and the materials and expertise needed to make According to former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan is the most dangerous them, a quest that has been underway for more country in today’s world.”3

than a decade. Rapid action is needed to keep Daunting Security Task Ensuring complete control over nuclear the Taliban’s advances in Pakistan from creating equipment, material, and technology is more difficult now than at any time in the new opportunities for these deadly adversaries. past. There is a burgeoning global interest in all things nuclear. More states are seeking nuclear technologies, power, and weapons. Production, transportation, and Yet, assessing nuclear security in Paki- material protection control and account- storage of nuclear materials will expand stan should not be viewed in isolation. ing procedures, and increased funding for throughout the 21st century. The presence The challenges faced by Pakistani authori- nuclear security-related initiatives. Despite of more material in more places increases ties must be seen in their broader context increases in the scope and sophistication of the odds of a security breach leading to to be properly understood and effectively security measures, much work remains to the loss of a bomb or the theft of materials countered. All countries in possession be done in order to lock down all nuclear to make a bomb. The anticipated global of nuclear weapons are concerned about materials to a Fort Knox standard. The renaissance in nuclear energy will pose the possibility of losing control over a fact remains that missing weapons-usable new challenges in this regard unless the bomb or weapons-related material. Conse- material turns up regularly on the nuclear associated proliferation risks are fully tak- quently, states must pay utmost attention black market.1 The most worrisome aspect en into account in decisions on materials to securing these means of mass destruc- of these recurring incidents is that facilities processing, transportation, and storage. In tion. Recent years have seen increased from which the materials originated did this light, it is essential to secure not only ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY international cooperation on nuclear not report them missing. In addition, there weapons-grade plutonium and uranium security, improvements in international have been some notable lapses in warhead from military programs, but also plutoni-

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Until January 2009, he

ARMS CONTROL T headed the U.S. Department of Energy’s intelligence and counterintelligence office and before that served as a CIA officer for 23 years in various domestic and international posts. 6 ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 7

- - 8 ------

7 In addition, substantial new investments investments new substantial addition, In In of such spite upgrades, serious securi a systematic approach assessingto the insecuritymaterials all nuclear of status required the It transit. in and facilities construction of a forensics database con taining all U.S. holdings. were made in upgrading security through theout U.S. nuclear establishment. that To Department the in planners security end, Regulatory Nuclear the and Energy of the about assumptions made Commission nuclear at insiders malicious that likelihood allow to outsiders with work would sites access facilities to and materials. The En dramatically FBI the and Department ergy increased intelligence and counterintel by posed threats mitigate to efforts ligence malicious insiders. Defense in depth—mul security—was of layers reinforcing tiple, strengthened catch to any leakage of ma terials or information that could enable an bomb. a of pursuit its in group outside occurrednuclear U.S. the have in tylapses establishment over the past several years. Others will surely happen in the future the Othersinwill happen surely because security no is perfect. Thus, con important is vigilance required;stant it is striveto continuously toward the elimi knowingthreats, that nuclear of nation this achieve to possible be never may it to fail is to way surest standard. The ideal - - - After the September attacks, 11 ex for ioned into a dirty bomb. Every country of source potential a as considered was the including crudeweapon, terrorist a directive The prescribed States. United curity measures materials for all at stages of their use, production, i.e., processing, transportation, and in storage, research reactorsaswell facilities. as weapons The bottom line is that is enough not it precludeterrorists to from getting their hands on a bomb. States must eliminate possibilityany thatterrorists will acquire sufficient materialsto build a bomb or successfully attack or take over a facility containingmaterials. or weapons level raised the States United the ample, and weapons security nuclear the of for this of centerpiece a As materials. nuclear signed Bush W. George President effort, Security National a Directive August in 2006government’s U.S. the establishing Nuclear Materials Information Program. Thisprogramdirected consolidation the pertaining information all allU.S. of to allin forms worldwide, materials nuclear included It enrichment. of all levels at and radioactive sources that could be fash threshold of nuclear-related threats, nuclear-related threshold states of ensure must thatterrorists acquire not do nuclearanymaterials. This risk increases the demands that mustbe placed on se - -

- 5 - -

4 In its efforts achieve to the stature of Thus, a zero tolerance standard must standardmust tolerance zero a Thus, a state, a terrorist group is most inter ested in producing a nuclear yield—a mushroom cloud. Consequently, a ter rorist group would improvise a nuclear device or essentially build a crude nuclear that one bomb, has yieldlow a and may be unpredictable, inefficient, and unsafe incomparison with thecomplicated systems weapons nationalin a nuclear this counter arsenal. qualitatively new To Pakistan’snuclear-capable Ghauri missile displayedis duringMarch a 2008, 23, military parade Islamabad.in In November 2001, added, he “I wish to America chemicalifor used declarethat may we then us, against weapons nuclear weapons. nuclear withchemicalor retort the have weaponsWe as deterrent.” um, highly enriched uranium, and other materials from civilian programs. Materi als that would not meet the standards the meet not would alsthat developed weapon nuclear a requiredfor terrorist’s a in usable be might state a by yield-producing bomb. be adopted the for loss of any nuclear weaponmaterials or of that may be fash that know Terrorists bomb. a into ioned vulnerability any their to canexploit they Osama DecemberIn1998, advantage. intent expressedQaeda’s alLaden bin when stated he in an interview, “Acquir the for destruction] mass [of weapons ing defense of Muslims is a religious duty.” Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images become complacent, to believe it cannot happen here. That is certainly true in Pakistan. Nev- ertheless, all signs indicate that the professional and disciplined Pakistani military establishment that maintains control over the nuclear arsenal understands the dangers of a breakdown in nuclear security. Senior Pakistani military officers have consistently expressed a high degree of confidence that they are prepared to counter a range of plausible threats in this regard. These officers have a lot to worry about, notwithstanding high-level reassurances from Pakistani authorities that everything is under control. Three worrisome trends are exerting mounting pressure on the Pak- istani military’s ability to secure its nuclear assets and prevent a nuclear catastrophe. First, growing extremism in Pakistan increases the odds of insiders in the nuclear establishment collaborating with outsiders to access weapons, materials, or facilities. Second, the rapid expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program will introduce new vulnerabilities into the security system. Finally, growing instability within the country could lead to unanticipated challenges to nuclear command and control procedures, resulting in a “loose nuke” scenario, a takeover of a facility by outsiders, or, in the worst case, a coup leading to Taliban control over the nuclear arsenal.

Collaboration Scenarios The greatest threat of a loose nuke scenario stems from insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders, people seeking a bomb or material to make a Images Qureshi/AFP/Getty Aamir bomb. Nowhere in the world is this threat greater than in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have a dismal track record in thwarting insider threats. For example, the network run by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, channeled sensitive nuclear technologies to Iran, Libya, and North Korea for years under the noses of A Pakistani man reads a newspaper on October 10, 2006, outside a replica of Chaghi the establishment before it was taken down Mountain, where Pakistan’s first nuclear test took place. in 2003, to the best of our knowledge.9 The Umma-Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), founded by Pakistani nuclear scientists with close ties consider that two of the founding fathers roshima bomb,” this was the first known to al Qaeda and the Taliban, was headed of Pakistan’s weapons program embarked case in which a “WMD for hire” network ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY by Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who independently on clandestine efforts to had been created specifically to provide had been in charge of Pakistan’s Khushab organize networks to sell their country’s weapons of mass destruction to terror- reactor.10 He discussed al Qaeda’s nuclear most precious secrets for profit. ist and extremist groups. In this context, aspirations with bin Laden. According to Although the UTN network apparently members of the UTN group represented Mahmood, bin Laden asked him how he was neutralized before it had a chance to the broad set of scientific- and engineering-

ARMS CONTROL T could construct a bomb if the group al- fulfill al Qaeda’s long-held aspirations to related capabilities necessary to construct ready had the material.11 It is stunning to obtain what bin Laden has called a “Hi- an improvised nuclear device. They had 8 an international reach. Most importantly, in areas under tight government control. integrated weapons system.17 Moreover, some prominent members of the group had Special nuclear material is reportedly stored although unpredictability in nuclear- once held positions in the Pakistani estab- apart from the weapons themselves. War- related movements and activity is good lishment and had connections to people on heads are reportedly stored separately from from the standpoint of frustrating would- the inside with access to nuclear materials. delivery systems.15 be attackers, it could conceivably increase It is not certain that this group had the Another precaution taken by the Paki- the chances of a dangerous miscalculation wherewithal to have succeeded in its desire stani military is to maintain strict secrecy of Pakistan’s actions by India, especially to enable al Qaeda’s quest for a bomb, but it over the location of storage sites and to in a crisis in which Pakistan’s archrival is encouraging that resolute Pakistani and transport and deploy weapons clandes- interpreted a nuclear terrorist incident as a U.S. follow-up action apparently nipped in tinely rather than in convoys that have threat against its security. the bud a potentially serious threat.12 a stronger, highly visible security profile. Another trend that militates against There are troubling indications that These security precautions produce fewer achieving perfect nuclear security is the these insider threats are not anomalies. visible signs of movements, thereby lower- rapid expansion of the Pakistani nuclear In the Khan and UTN cases, the rogue ing the risks associated with possible theft program. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal roughly senior officers and their cohorts in the of or attack on weapons at their most vul- doubled from 1998 to today’s total of a nuclear establishment were not caught nerable point, in transit.16 hundred weapons, in round numbers.18 In by Pakistan’s security establishment. It Paradoxically, this dependence on secre- the coming years, as new plutonium-pro- would be foolhardy to assume that such cy over physical security could backfire in duction capacity at the Khushab site comes lapses could not happen again. The Paki- the event a malicious insider gained access online, the total number of nuclear weap- stani military, intelligence, and nuclear to locations of weapons storage sites, trans- ons could increase dramatically.19 Using establishments are not immune to rising portation routes, and similar insider infor- plutonium as the nuclear-explosive material levels of extremism in the country. There mation, especially because more moving also would allow Pakistan to build smaller is a lethal proximity between terrorists, parts are involved in assembling weapons nuclear weapons. extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders. when they are being deployed. In such a The expansion of the nuclear weapons Insiders have facilitated terrorist attacks.13 case, there would be fewer barriers between program will mean more material, more Suicide bombings have occurred at air an outside group and the bomb. construction of facilities for processing force bases that reportedly serve as nuclear The emphasis on maintaining clandes- material and manufacturing weapons and weapons storage sites.14 It is difficult to ig- tinity and secrecy in nuclear activity may delivery systems, and more demands for nore such trends. Purely in actuarial terms, hold other unintended consequences. For waste storage and transportation. More of there is a strong possibility that bad apples instance, Pakistan’s development of indig- everything means more vulnerabilities, in the nuclear establishment are willing to enous weapons-use controls—permissive more places for something to go wrong. cooperate with outsiders for personal gain action links (PALs)—for partially disas- Finally, Pakistan’s expanding nuclear or out of sympathy for their cause. sembled weapons systems is more chal- program and the insider threat that accom- lenging than for PALs built into a fully panies it is taking place in the context of Relying on Secrecy Pakistani authorities certainly recognize the gravity of this problem. One of the ways they are coping is to emphasize secrecy and clandestinity over the more visible mani- festations of nuclear security. The U.S. and Russian model of nuclear security relies on redundant layers of high walls, gates, and guards at sites in order to produce a highly visible image of impenetrability that will deter those seeking to gain access to them. ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Essentially, Pakistan has sacrificed some of the advantages of the traditional approach to security in favor of reducing unique

vulnerabilities and threats arising from the Images Qureshi/AFP/Getty Aamir circumstances in which it finds itself. The thrust of the Pakistani military’s strategy is to reduce its vulnerability to a nuclear security incident by systematically denying outsiders opportunities to gain illicit access to nuclear weapons. Consequently, the nuclear establishment is distributed geographically: Materials processing and weapons production facili- A Pakistani farmer tends fields April 8 outside his country’s Khushab plutonium- ties are consolidated in sites near Islamabad production reactor. 9 the broader trend of increasing instability the Pakistani military, not the civilian lead- such scenarios would unfold precisely as in the country. In terms of assigning prob- ership. It is not obvious how effectively the anticipated. For example, how would the abilities to a potential nuclear meltdown, military might respond to unprecedented military be able to respond to a breakdown the most likely scenario that Pakistan may challenges to its nuclear command and of security involving a loose nuke, an am- confront is not a loss of control over one control procedures. The bifurcation of civil- bushed convoy, or a takeover of a nuclear of its nuclear weapons, although that risk ian and military roles seems to have been facility? Even if the military managed to certainly must be addressed. Rather, threats left deliberately ambiguous under the NCA; resolve any threats on the ground imme- are more likely to emerge from the increas- certain responsibilities that nominally have diately, there are questions concerning the

Threats are more likely to emerge from the increasing number of potential pathways to a bomb, specifically, the increasing threats posed by a slow hemorrhaging over time of technology, design, and construction knowledge and materials that might ultimately cross the threshold and produce a terrorist bomb.

ing number of potential pathways to a been given to the civilian leadership may military and civilian roles in the NCA that bomb, specifically, the increasing threats be carried out by the military. The poten- are not well understood outside Pakistan posed by a slow hemorrhaging over time tial discrepancy between constitutional or perhaps even within the country. It is of technology, design, and construction authorities and actual execution of those possible that, in extreme circumstances, knowledge and materials that might ulti- authorities raises the risks of uncertainty the Pakistani government would be hard- mately cross the threshold and produce a and confusion in a crisis. For example, the pressed to reassure the outside world, terrorist bomb. This phenomenon is more Pakistan civilian leadership, especially if a especially India, that all its nuclear assets complicated and subtle and more difficult more extreme government assumed power, are under the full and authoritative con- to counter than the scary, well-hyped sce- might issue orders or make statements control of the military. narios involving loose nukes stolen by ter- cerning the status and control of nuclear Fortunately, it appears that the odds of rorists from a storage site or in transit. forces contradicting those made by the such a security breakdown are very low, Pakistani military commander-in-chief.20 at least from an assessment based on the Rising Risks Confusing and chaotic conditions would current realities of the security situation Unfortunately, there is growing rationale likely accompany a deterioration of the in Pakistan. The authorities appear to be and shared motivation for insiders and general security situation in Pakistan. One serious about countering Taliban advances outsiders to cooperate out of shared hatred can only imagine how difficult it might be in the country. That is vital because ensur- toward the United States. This kind of for the military to respond effectively to ing continued stability and law and order externally directed hostility may not be an unanticipated challenge to command is the most important factor in averting readily recognized in its formative stages and control communications that results the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. As by those guarding the nuclear weapons from a surging Taliban offensive. Worse Pakistan moves forward to face an uncer- arsenal, because these threats are not being yet would be the potential uncertainties tain future, the government faces an ongo- directed against the Pakistani government. caused by an extremist bid to seize power. ing challenge to its authority and myriad Countering such insidious trends will re- In such cases, some elements of the mili- threats against which it must defend. With quire not only a strengthening of defenses, tary’s loyalties might be divided, even in the passage of time, the odds steadily in- but also a weakening of the threats, the the event that overall control over nuclear crease that Pakistan will face a serious test sources of anti-U.S. antipathy that contrib- forces continues to be assured. By way of of its nuclear security. utes to the possibility that al Qaeda will be example, if a colonel in charge of hundreds For its part, the United States must be able to convince an insider to help its cause. of troops decided to take over a nuclear fully prepared to respond to this eventual- ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY In terms of assessing any spike in these weapons site, would the military be able to ity. The United States should continue to risks, the overall direction of pro-Taliban resolve such a situation in a way that did do all it can to assist Pakistan in upgrading and anti-Taliban sentiment in the country not lead to catastrophe? its nuclear security. U.S. government as- should be closely watched. It is not likely that the Pakistani military sistance to Pakistan has been a wise invest- The National Command Authority and nuclear security establishment can ment, even without full transparency into

ARMS CONTROL T (NCA) that controls the use of nuclear fully consider all such challenges to its the expenditure of funds. The United States weapons remains under the tight reins of authority in advance or, even if it can, that should be satisfied that anything that helps 10 If US Uses N-arms It Will Get Same Response,” Dawn, November 10, 2001, www.dawn. com/2001/11/10/top1.htm. 7. Steven Aoki, “Testimony on H.R. 2631, the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act,” Washing- ton, D.C., October 10, 2007 (testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security). 8. “Tennessee: Plea Deal in Nuclear Case,” Associ- ated Press, January 27, 2009. 9. John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe; Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says,” The Washington Post, February 3,

Asif H Asif 2004, p. A13.

assan/AFP/Getty Images assan/AFP/Getty 10. Dennis Overbye and James Glanz, “Pakistani Atomic Expert, Arrested Last Week, Had Strong Pro-Taliban Views,” The New York Times, Novem- ber 2, 2001, www.nytimes.com/2001/11/02/ world/nation-challenged-nuclear-fears-pakistani-atomic-expert-arrested-last-week-had. html?pagewanted=all.

Pakistani soldiers guard nuclear-capable missiles displayed Nov. 25, 2008, at the 11. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My International Defence Exhibition in Karachi. Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), pp. 264, 268. 12. Steve Coll, “What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshi- upgrade Pakistan’s nuclear security is an senior officials in both countries should ma,” The Washington Post, February 6, 2005, p. B1. investment in its own security. No country, agree to pursue specific joint actions and 13. Omar Waraich, “Cricket Attack: Suspicions including Pakistan, can be expected to risk special communications mechanisms to be Grow That Ambush Was an ‘Inside Job,’” The exposing the details of its nuclear security activated during a crisis, such as responses Huffington Post, March 5, 2009, www.huffington- posture and readiness to another country. to a stolen or missing nuclear weapon or post.com/2009/03/05/cricket-attack-suspicions_ Most importantly, U.S. assistance has im- takeover of a nuclear facility. n_172281.html. proved bilateral nuclear ties between Wash- Finally, increasing the level of transpar- 14. Bill Roggio, “Suicide Attack at Pakistani Nu- ington and Islamabad, engendered trust, ency and predictability between India and clear Weapons Complex,” The Long War Journal, established more reliable lines of commu- Pakistan is absolutely vital. Neither party December 10, 2007, www.longwarjournal.org/ar- nication, and enhanced the possibility of can afford to make a miscalculation in the chives/2007/12/suicide_attack_at_pa.php. more effective consultation and coordina- heat of the moment that might escalate 15. Steven Mufson, “U.S. Worries About Pakistan 21 tion in a crisis. into a nuclear confrontation. ACT Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, November 4, Pakistan and the United States should 2001, p. A27.

be prepared to take cooperation one level ENDNOTES 16. Chaim Braun, Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries higher. Both countries should consider Beyond War, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle Bar- unprecedented ways to address the more 1. Council on Foreign Relations, “Loose Nukes,” racks, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army extreme contingencies on a coopera- Backgrounder, January 2006, www.cfr.org/publica- War College, 2008), pp. 261-262. tion/9549/#3. tive basis to the extent that such action 17. Gordon Correra, “How Secure Is Pakistan’s is feasible and realistic. In the interest of 2. Zachary Hosford, “Congress, Pentagon Probe Bomb?” BBC News, February 4, 2008, http:// bridging gaps in nuclear security planning, Nuke Overflight,”Arms Control Today, October news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7225175.stm. senior-level officials should use existing 2007, p. 48.

18. Heather Maher, “Expert Says Pakistan Im- ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 channels of communication to discuss, be- 3. John Barry, “How to Fight Al-Qaeda Now: An proving Quality of Nuclear Arsenal,” Radio Free hind closed doors, their specific concerns, Ex-CIA Analyst Talks About the Terrorists’ Power Liberty Radio Europe, www.rferl.org/content/Ex- including various security vulnerabilities and Their Vulnerabilities,” Newsweek, October 27, pert_Says_Pakistan_Improving_Quality_Of_Nu- that may emerge. Having such a dialogue 2008, www.newsweek.com/id/165952. clear_Arsenal/1736019.html. early on, before an incident occurs, might 4. Michael Levi, Testimony before the Senate 19. Ibid. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and help lower the risks of either side making 20. Mark Thompson, “Does Pakistan’s Taliban Homeland Security, July 27, 2006, www.cfr.org/ a serious misstep based on miscalculations Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat?” TIME, April publication/11160/prepared_testimony_before_ arising from inadequate information, mis- 24, 2009, www.time.com/time/world/arti- the_senate_subcommittee_on_terrorism_technol- placed assumptions, or the sensitivities that cle/0,8599,1893685,00.html. ogy_and_homeland_security.html. inevitably accompany nuclear-related deci- 21. Bryan Bender, “Pakistan, U.S. in Talks on 5. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Conversations With sion-making. In addition, Pakistan should Nuclear Security,” The Boston Globe, May 5, Terror,” TIME, January 11, 1999, www.time.com/ receive high-level reassurances concerning 2009, www.boston.com/news/nation/washing- time/world/article/0,8599,174550,00.html. U.S. nonintervention in a crisis, possible ton/articles/2009/05/05/pakistan_us_in_talks_ 6. Hamid Mir, “Osama Claims He Has Nukes: means of assistance, and so on. Moreover, on_nuclear_security. 11 By Feroz Hassan Khan

Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality

akistan is passing through an extremely weapons, and insider-outsider collaboration. The potential for terrorist infiltration delicate phase in its history. Recent insta- into the program is a concern for Western analysts and the Pakistani nuclear estab- bility in Pakistan, including the Taliban’s lishment. The bizarre fear involves the P allegation that Pakistani armed forces advance into settled areas, prompted the Paki- and intelligence agencies, who are the custodians and guardians of the nuclear stani military to undertake large-scale military arsenal, could be accomplices to such an act as Taliban sympathizers.3 An alternate operations in the Swat Valley. As military and scenario posits that the inability of the armed forces to defeat the Taliban ex- Taliban forces fight in the rugged tribal terrain, tremists would result in abdication of the Pakistani state to the Taliban.4 Gen. Tariq several Western analysts have raised concerns Majid, chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs 1 of Staff Committee, called such scenarios about the future of nuclear Pakistan. “plain mischievous” and said they “need to be contemptuously dismissed.”5 President Franklin D. Roosevelt famous- ly said, “The only thing we have to fear is The nightmare specter of nuclear weapons, country would be a greater mistake than fear itself.”6 His words aptly describe the nuclear material, or a whole country falling any made in Iraq. Fortunately, the current prevalent fears in regard to the situation in into al Qaeda or Taliban hands is invoked, top leadership in the United States can Pakistan today. Two main dangers emanate creating fear and mistrust between critical distinguish reality from myth.2 Neverthe- from the hype on nuclear insecurity in allies in the war against terrorism. The risk less, misperceptions about weapons of mass Pakistan. The first danger is that the grossly of a dangerous policy outcome in the Unit- destruction have influenced U.S. decisions exaggerated threat perception in the West ed States, based on flawed assumptions, too recently to be ignored in a discussion of may prompt the United States into policy is now far greater than the probability the current situation in Pakistan. choices it would later regret.7 The second either of nuclear weapons falling into the Western fears about Pakistani nuclear danger is that continuing media focus on hands of Taliban and other extremists or security range from valid to bizarre. The this issue stokes Pakistani paranoia about ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY of the disintegration of Pakistan itself. Any more valid concerns involve theft of mate- U.S. intentions. These fears and suspicions misstep against a nervous nuclear-armed rial, sabotage, unauthorized use of nuclear about U.S. intervention inside Pakistan

Retired Brig. Gen. Feroz Hassan Khan is a former director of arms control and disarmament affairs in the Strategic Plans Division of the

ARMS CONTROL T Joint Services Headquarters of Pakistan. He is currently on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The author is grateful to Paul Faris for his research and editing assistance. 12 could provoke that country to take defensive actions against foreign intervention rather than focusing on the possibility of reducing internal threats to nuclear security and could further fan anti-U.S. public sentiment. It is true that stability in Paki- stan is shaky, its fledgling democracy is in transition, and it is facing internal threats from extremists. Until recently, decision- makers in Pakistan were in a state of denial and reacted only when the Taliban threat exploded in their faces. Therefore, it is justified to worry and ask questions about the security of a nuclear-armed country undergoing such a traumatic experience. It would be equally correct to weigh the seriousness of the threat against the ability of the state’s security apparatus and its nuclear security measures to prevent the worst from happening. This article examines the nuclear security of Pakistan in light of recent developments: the increasing threat of the Taliban and reports of Pakistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal. The article will explore the backdrop of Pakistan’s nuclear development in relation to U.S. policy. It will then examine the perceptions of insecurity and explain how Pakistan’s threat priorities differ from U.S. concerns. Next, it will explain Pakistani efforts to establish a nuclear management system and the development of nuclear security culture. The article will conclude by examining the U.S. role in the evolving Pakistani nuclear security regime. Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images Qureshi/AFP/Getty Aamir

Backdrop: Regional Security The nuclear dimension of regional security in South Asia is essentially a deterrence construct between India and Pakistan.8 Although little has changed between India and Pakistan in the decade following their 1998 nuclear tests, the regional security landscape has been completely Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf attends his country’s first Defence altered. 9 The region now faces new forms Exhibition and Seminar in Karachi Nov. 15, 2000. ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 of asymmetric threat, the likes of which have never been experienced. The war in Afghanistan, now in its abandoned by its Western allies and to block, stymie, and dissuade Pakistan eighth year, has metastasized into a classic slapped with nuclear sanctions.10 Thus eventually failed to stop Pakistan in its insurgency and expanded into Pakistan. began a bitter history of distrust between quest to acquire a nuclear deterrent.12 The The impact of the Afghan war against the Pakistan and the United States.11 story of Pakistan’s clandestine means of Soviets in the 1980s, insurgency in In- Under these challenging and often acquisition is widely known,13 but less is dian-administered Kashmir, and domestic unhealthy circumstances, Pakistan’s known about the context, which involves changes brought about during the Zia ul- covert nuclear program incubated and domestic national politics, regional secu- Haq era have had a deleterious impact on matured into an operational deterrent. rity, and intense geopolitical engagement the social fabric of Pakistan. New forms The United States and Pakistan never with the United States.14 By the turn of of religious-based militancy and an ethos saw eye to eye with regard to the latter’s the century, the U.S. policy of rolling of jihad were introduced in Pakistan at nuclear ambitions. Since the mid-1970s, back Pakistan’s nuclear capability had be- a time when the country was politically every effort the United States undertook come an unrealistic objective. The United 13 Tariq M Tariq ahmood/AFP/Getty Images ahmood/AFP/Getty

Members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban gather July 21, 2008, at a camp in the Pakistani tribal district of Mohmand Agency.

States instead sought to restrict Pakistan’s physical invasion of the state by a hostile and have resulted in the displacement of nuclear capability to a minimum deter- neighbor. The third and probably the millions of people. The exact size of the rence posture and dampen the security most dangerous concern is insider-out- Taliban in Pakistan is not known, but es- competition with India. sider collaboration. Pakistan has lived timates range from 5,000 to 15,000. Gris- During the 1980s and 1990s, while Paki- with all three categories of threats since ly practices such as the public flogging of stan was building its nuclear program, is- the inception of its nuclear program. a young woman in April, against a back- sues of nuclear security and command and Like every state, Pakistan’s program drop of kidnapping, bombings of schools control were not the prime concern. That places great emphasis on secrecy and and mosques, and general killing of in- changed after Afghanistan-based terrorists compartmentalization. In the past, no nocent civilians, turned the Pakistani attacked the United States on September single office, organization, or authority public against any accommodation with 11, 2001, and news spread about a meeting held ultimate responsibility for supervi- the TTP or any other religious extremist in the summer of 2001 of two retired Paki- sion. For the past decade, there has been organization. The tipping point arrived stani scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mah- a National Command Authority (NCA) when the TTP exploited the “peace deal” mood and Abdul Majeed, with Osama bin with a dedicated secretariat (the Strategic and advanced further inland. The Paki- Laden. Until then, concerns about “loose Plans Division, or SPD), which is respon- stani public was shocked at the actions of nukes” and nuclear material smuggling sible for all nuclear-related activities.15 an elected government that abdicated to were focused on the former Soviet Union. Since these institutions were established, such a force by negotiating a deal.16 Three years later, the shocking revelations events, controversies, and deterioration Pakistan’s armed forces are a half-mil- about Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear smug- of the regional and domestic environ- lion strong, and the country has a mod- gling network made Pakistan’s nuclear pro- ment have forced Pakistan to tighten its erate Muslim populace with a history of gram even more controversial. oversight and control. repeatedly rejecting religious political The Taliban threat within Pakistan is parties.17 The country has reacted force- Perceptions of Insecurity a new phenomenon. The militant group fully against the Taliban, so the fear that ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY States managing a nuclear weapons pro- led by Baitullah Mehsud belonging to the Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall gram typically have three main types of tribal belt in Waziristan calls itself the into the hands of the Taliban is totally nuclear security concerns. First, every Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). The TTP is an ex- misplaced.18 As explained by Naeem Salik nuclear-capable state worries about the tremist fringe whose activities have now in a recent op-ed, there is “no causal rela- external threat of a preventive strike expanded from the tribal areas into the tionship between the military operations

ARMS CONTROL T by hostile powers against its nuclear fa- settled areas of Pakistan. This provoked against the Taliban and the security of cilities. Second, such states worry about military operations that continue today Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.”19 14 Nuclear security is a function of nuclear External and Internal Threats Therefore, generalized statements about management, which covers both the nu- Pakistan does not have an enviable nuclear weapons falling into the hands clear arsenal and peaceful nuclear energy. geography. It is surrounded by giant of the Taliban are disconnected from The force goals and the size of the nuclear nuclear-armed neighbors Russia, China, the reality on the ground. arsenal are determined by a comprehen- and India. Its elongated shape lacks Since the late 1970s, Pakistan’s per- sive examination of national threats and depth, making lines of communication ceptions of threats to its nuclear pro- responses to them. Meanwhile, nuclear vulnerable to India. Pakistan’s western gram were externally oriented. Preven-

Generalized statements about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban are disconnected from the reality on the ground.

energy requirements are based on long- provinces consist of territories that are tive strikes or sabotage of the program term national development planning. volatile because of border disputes (the were hypothetical considerations until Mixing the two together as a general ex- Durand Line with Afghanistan) or in- Israel successfully struck Iraq’s Osirak pansion of nuclear capacity confuses the ternal tribal unrest, leaving the security reactor in 1981. Pakistan quickly as- issue. Further, the terms “proliferation” managers of the state with extremely sessed that India would mimic Israel. and “nuclear security” are often used difficult choices. Pakistan’s strategic The proximity of Pakistan’s centrifuge interchangeably. For example, Pakistani planners are acutely aware of these uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta purchase of light-water power reactors un- structural vulnerabilities and account to the Indian border forced Pakistan to der International Atomic Energy Agency for them when selecting sites for sensi- secure it and other strategic sites with (IAEA) safeguards should not be a pro- tive nuclear and strategic organizations. air and ground defenses.21 In the mid- liferation concern.20 The security of this They balance external threats, inter- 1980s, Indian plans for a preventive expanding nuclear infrastructure requires nal volatility, technical requirements, strike were leaked to the press, confirm- an examination of the state’s nuclear se- resource availability, and the secrecy ing Pakistani fears. India later shelved curity regime, explained below. requirements of every sensitive site. the plan, but the notion never died in the minds of the Indian military. In the winter of 1986-1987, the Indian military planned Brass Tacks, a provocative military exercise designed to give India an excuse to strike at Kahuta.22 By then, the new mysterious site tucked in the foot- hills of Islamabad had become a source of curiosity to spies and diplomats. Lay- ers of security were added to protect the program not only from external attacks but also from spies and news reporters. Around this period, the Afghan jihad against the Soviets expanded, as did Pakistani nuclear infrastructure. ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 The nuclear security culture was originally designed to protect the autonomy of the scientists so that their work could

Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images Khan/AFP/Getty Saeed continue unhindered. Because of the significance of the cause, managers of the program had no authority to question the motives and practices of the scientists. This enabled Khan to take advantage of the lack of proper accountability. Another reason that Pakistan wanted to avoid publicizing the program was the risk of losing U.S. aid by trigger- The Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, located on the outskirts of Islamabad, is the scientific research and development institute of the Pakistan ing various U.S. laws designed to stop Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistani efforts.23 15 Physical Invasion of the Country Pakistan has existed under the threat of invasion throughout its existence. Sev- eral wars were fought with India, one of which resulted in Pakistani national dis- memberment. Even during the British Raj, the Indian subcontinent lived under the threat of physical invasion, especially from armies using historical routes such as the Khyber and Bolan Passes. New doctrines of wars to defeat and destroy Pakistan continue to be contemplated, practiced, and exercised in India.24 Since the mid- 1980s, six major military crises of varying degrees of intensity have forced Pakistan

to consider physical invasion from India Images STR/AFP/Getty an existential threat in perpetuity. This perception cannot be wished away unless India and Pakistan undertake a structured and sustained program of conflict resolution, in conjunction with conventional and nuclear arms control measures. The A Pakistani soldier patrols the Line of Control (LOC) Oct. 17, 2002. The LOC serves as a Pakistani armed forces must balance three de facto international border dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan. dimensions: India, Afghanistan’s threat to the western border, and internal extremist threats.25 When selecting strategic sites, that are under the influence of religious use as well. Pakistan’s 25-year plan calls for Pakistan carefully takes these threats into cults.29 These factors have made the man- an installed capacity of 8,800 megawatts of account. Material storage, missile silos, and agers of nuclear security more alert than nuclear energy.31 Nuclear force goals and movement of sensitive material and per- ever as details in the next section explain. nuclear energy will thus remain essential sonnel are being carefully and profession- national priorities. ally watched, and best practices are being Institutional Changes As the nuclear program expands, Paki- developed to prevent security breaches.26 After the nuclear tests in 1998, the Paki- stan’s nuclear security regime must meet Details of such procedures cannot be pub- stani nuclear program faced three major a higher qualitative and quantitative stan- licly shared for obvious security reasons. needs: to review national security policies, dard. The armed forces, widely acknowl- No state with nuclear weapons is likely to institutionalize the management of the edged to be Pakistan’s most stable institu- discuss its operational management; it is nuclear program, and develop a prudent tion, are responsible for the custody and always shrouded in secrecy.27 strategy for a robust strategic force.30 The development of Pakistan’s nuclear safety first challenge required Pakistan to have a regime. In fact, Pakistan’s nuclear man- Insider-Outsider Collusion national security apparatus capable of com- agement, including nuclear security and Insiders in the program could have one prehensively analyzing national security safety, has been more widely discussed and of several motives. Some could be driven policy in changing times. This challenge scrutinized than that of any other power. by economic incentives. Others may see an is being tackled nationally at the politi- The professional and technical ability of opportunity for political gain. Some may cal level. The remaining two challenges Pakistan ought to be encouraged rather be driven by revenge, grudges, jealousies, involve the NCA, which comprises the top than disparaged. psychiatric disorders, and so on. Also, civilian, military, and scientific decision- moles or spies could reveal nuclear secrets makers in the country. The SPD, formed in Evolution of Security Culture to outside powers, help sabotage or destroy 1999, provides institutional oversight on Nuclear security culture evolved in Paki- the program from within, or disclose a site’s nuclear decision-making. stan after the September 11 attacks.32 Paki- location to facilitate outside attacks. U.S. Pakistan’s strategic force goals are stan improved its supervisory procedure media reports and publications from au- designed to redress the vulnerabilities for military and scientific manpower. The thors widely known to base their writings described above and to restore strategic security division of the SPD established on U.S. government leaks have reinforced balance. Matching warhead to warhead a reporting system for monitoring the ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY perceptions in Pakistan that its nuclear or accumulating fissile stocks for military movements of all officials. Two identical infrastructure must be protected as much purposes is not the goal. The objective is to programs for employment security were from allies as from hostile groups.28 ensure deterrence stability by calculating a created: the Personnel Reliability Program Finally, there is the danger from religious minimum deterrence posture that is related (PRP) and the Human Reliability Program fanatics. In the case of Pakistan, it is not to the increasing capabilities of its adver- (HRP), for military and civilian personnel,

ARMS CONTROL T just the proximity of terrorist groups but sary, namely India. respectively. A security clearance system of also trends in some segments of society Next, nuclear technology is for civilian annual, semiannual, and quarterly review 16 was created. Counter Intelligence Teams specific discussion of management of nu- illicit trafficking have been put in place. were created to act as the daily eyes and clear arsenals, but a two-man rule and, in Rigorous inspections are one key element ears of the SPD. Weekly, monthly, and some cases, a three-man rule is followed, of the PNRA’s activities to strengthen quarterly reports for the security of all or- with physical safety and firewalls built controls. Another is the training of a wide ganizations are maintained by the SPD to into the weapon system to prevent any variety of personnel from all major orga- prevent theft, loss, or accident. unauthorized launch.34 nizations. The training involves nuclear Next, a system of sensitive material con- The inception of the Nuclear Security security, physical protection, emergency trol and accounting was introduced. The Action Plan (NSAP), organized by the preparedness, detection equipment, recov-

The recent hype and, at times, irresponsible writing by U.S. academics with serious credentials has created a sense of cynicism in Islamabad, reinforcing beliefs that the recent chatter is a prelude to aggressive counterproliferation measures by the United States.

system was derived from modern training, Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority ery operations, and border monitoring. possibly modeled on U.S. national labo- (PNRA), was a very important develop- The organizations involved in training are ratory procedures. The system involved ment in Pakistan’s nuclear security man- the Coast Guard, Frontier Corps, Pakistan regular and surprise inspections to tally agement. The PNRA is an independent Rangers, Customs, Emergency & Rescue material production and waste in order to body responsible for civilian programs, Services, National Disaster Management maintain transparency and accountability. but it coordinates closely with the SPD. Cell, intelligence services, law enforcement Under a careful, secret plan instituted The two organizations complement each agencies, and all strategic organizations by the SPD, professional guards at static other by sharing best practices. including offices from the SPD.35 sites and escorts with tight security proce- The main task of the NSAP is to manage A Nuclear Security Emergency Coor- dures are involved during transportation. all nuclear activities and radioactive sourc- dination Center has been established Special theft- and tamper-proof vehicles es that are under regulatory control and in Islamabad, which is the focal point and containers are used.33 In peacetime, to develop a sustainable national system. of coordination, by all the government nuclear weapons are not mated with their Nuclear security emergency centers and agencies mentioned above. In addition, delivery systems and are not operationally procedures to secure orphan radioactive regional offices in all major cities have deployed. Operational secrecy precludes sources and to secure borders against any been established, creating a network of six emergency-response mobile laboratories. The primary job of this network, which was completed in December 2008, is to track and respond to any threat of illicit nuclear material, a radioactive source, or a radiological dispersion device (“dirty bomb”). Finally, the NSAP has established border controls at major crossing points ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 with state-of-the-art screening procedures with the help of the IAEA and the U.S. Department of Energy.36

Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images Khan/AFP/Getty Saeed The U.S. Role The recent hype and, at times, irresponsible writing by U.S. academics with serious credentials has created a sense of cynicism in Islamabad, reinforcing beliefs that the recent chatter is a prelude to aggressive counterproliferation measures by the United States.37 A Pakistani soldier guards the outskirts of Pakistan’s underground nuclear test site in Many claims, such as those in a recent Chaghi June 29, 1998. Boston Globe article38 alleging the exis- 17 ence in producing, transferring, and stor- ing fissile stocks and weapons. Pakistani security managers have also learned to put in place detection equipment and security barriers, as well as set up checkpoints and customs posts. Such types of performance are easily measurable and can be improved with little assistance required. The effectiveness of the nuclear security culture is difficult to measure, which is true for all nuclear powers, including the

Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images Khan/AFP/Getty Saeed United States. It involves institutionaliza- tion of standing operating procedures and practices beyond individuals. No matter how good a system is, it will require con- stant improvement. Other countries cannot measure the effectiveness of Pakistan’s system, but generic training and the sharing of experience will help improve it. The efficacy of any system is tested only when a U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf participate in a joint press conference Oct. 16, 2001, in Islamabad. mishap or near-miss occurs. It is important for any organization to learn the ways by which a clever and determined criminal tence of a secret joint Pakistani-U.S. strat- tries that are not parties to the nuclear might overcome security. Only then can egy for U.S. access to Pakistan, are base- Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).42 Second, the physical and technical limitations less.39 Pakistan is very careful in seeking transferring PALs not only helps prevent of the system be evaluated. For example, assistance on nuclear technology from the unauthorized use, but also can encourage managers may have confidence in existing United States, especially if the assistance the recipient state to deploy and disperse detection sensors, but a clever criminal can is perceived to be of an intrusive nature. the weapons, thus facilitating nuclear use. manipulate them by rigging the system or Like other nuclear-capable states, Pakistan There are objections from the proposed discerning the alarm threshold and steal- jealously guards its locations and nuclear recipient as well. The recipient state would ing quantities below that threshold. best practices from any outside influence have to share details of its nuclear weap- The United States has produced sensitive or knowledge.40 However, it is always keen ons design for the technology transfer to sensors and software that can detect radia- to learn of other countries’ nuclear secu- work.43 No country shares such secrets. tion at an extremely low level. Pakistan is rity measures and to acquire detection In fact, alarmist stories in the U.S. me- unlikely to accept foreign-made sensors equipment at seaports, airports, and other dia actually undermine any possibility in any of its sensitive sites, but it can use border crossings. of positive U.S. assistance.44 U.S. specula- these devices at major geographical choke- In 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin tion about contingency plans and pre- points. By utilizing its elaborate network Powell offered nuclear security assistance emptive weapons seizure leads to greater of river systems and canals, which restrict to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Mush- Pakistani distrust of the United States. movement, Pakistan can make broader arraf. The SPD carefully examined the Referring to conjecture on U.S. plans to security improvements. The United States offer and accepted training but declined seize nuclear sites, Michael Krepon accu- can help Pakistan modernize its NSAP technology transfers, which they per- rately summed up Pakistani anxieties: “I by installing modern sensors and radia- ceived as intrusive or likely to compromise think these plans—if they exist and I’m tion monitors for portal monitoring at program secrecy. Since then, Pakistan has not sure that they do—[are] unlikely to locations acceptable to Pakistan. This benefited from advanced-level training be successfully executed and would result would help prevent terrorist transport of from U.S. national laboratories and has in multiple mushroom clouds. So I think conventional explosives as well as illicit improved its best practices in accordance this is a bad idea, and it’s a bad idea even radiological material. Modern sensors at with its own security culture.41 There has to talk about it.”45 key bridges on Indus River systems, for been no further acceptance by Pakistan What the United States can do is ex- example, will help nuclear security and of any assistance from the United States, plain to Pakistan its own experience internal security against suicide bombers. especially permissive action links (PALs), with nuclear security management. The The most difficult aspect of measuring ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY the coded mechanical or electrical locks United States cannot boast of a perfect effectiveness comes from the unpredict- designed to prevent unauthorized arming security record itself.46 Nevertheless, as ability of human motivations. Motivated or detonation of a nuclear weapon. the most experienced nuclear power, the individuals can always elude effective There are two issues regarding coopera- United States can share its nuclear securi- barriers. Therefore, Pakistan must con- tion on PALs. First, the U.S. export control ty practices, performances of the system, stantly maintain a very close watch over

ARMS CONTROL T laws restrict sharing PAL technology with and the likelihood of mishaps. the system, in addition to upgrading and other countries, especially with coun- Pakistan has three decades of experi- improving the PRP and HRP. Simply add- 18 ing more guards and security personnel the United States. Pakistan has refused to guarded. Any attempt to undermine our will not suffice; Pakistan must constantly be coerced on the nuclear question and core capability will be strongly resisted evaluate its system to detect potential views U.S. concern over nuclear security and defeated.”48 ACT failures. The security divisions of the as “deliberate misinformation” and a “vi- SPD and intelligence services have lay- cious campaign unleashed to malign and ENDNOTES ers of security and counterintelligence discredit” its achievement.47 mechanisms for all sensitive sites. They Despite widely known limitations, 1. See Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and the Bomb,” are highly active and alert in updating, Pakistan has done remarkably well in es- The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009; Bryan monitoring, and keeping a vigilant watch tablishing a nuclear security regime and Bender, “Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Securi- ty,” Boston Globe, May 5, 2009, www.boston.com/ to detect and respond to any undesirable an evolving nuclear security culture that news/nation/washington/articles/2009/05/05/ proclivities within the system. Western requires encouragement and support. pakistan_us_in_talks_on_nuclear_security/; countries can share their experience with It has been quite liberal in briefing U.S. Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. Lawmaker Worried Pakistan to help improve the screening officials, academics, and even journal- by Sag in Support for Defense,” Reuters, June and certification procedures of its PRP ists about its nuclear management. Over 24, 2009 (quoting Representative John Murtha and HRP. The implementation of UN several years, Pakistan has sent officials, [D-Pa.] about U.S. airstrikes against Pakistani Security Council Resolution 1540, which technicians, and administrators to re- nuclear targets). establishes a requirement for countries to ceive training on modern technical solu- 2. Statements from President Barack Obama and take measures to prevent proliferation of tions and management under the aegis of senior U.S. political and military leaders have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons mutually acceptable arrangements that provided assurances on the security of the Paki- and their delivery systems, is extremely cater to each side’s sensitivities. stani nuclear program, even though they have important, and Pakistan is believed to Veiled threats and unsubstantiated recognized the internal instability and weak have taken serious steps to enforce in- criticism of its efforts can push an im- governance. See http://edition.cnn.com/2009/ ternational standards. National security portant nuclear-armed country in dis- POLITICS/04/29/obama.transcript/ (Obama’s statement on the occasion of 100 days in office). considerations, however, prevent the SPD tress into directions highly undesirable from publishing its results. Notably, Paki- for Pakistan and the United States. As 3. See Leonard Spector, “Pakistan, Taliban and stani safeguards have always been in good critical allies in the war against violent Global Security – Part I,” YaleGlobal, May 8, 2009; Riedel, “Pakistan and the Bomb”; David standing with the IAEA, and Pakistan is a extremism, the two countries have more Albright, Paul Brannan, and Robert Kelley, “Paki- member of almost all international safety pressing issues to tackle. Majid sums up stan Expanding Dera Ghazi Khan Nuclear Site: and security conventions. the Pakistani perceptions of external or Time for U.S. to Call for Limits,” ISIS Imagery internal threats and the country’s likely Brief, May 19, 2009, p. 4. Conclusion response: “Let it be known that Pakistan 4. Bender, “Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear Pakistan lives in a security-intensive en- is confident but not complacent. Our Security.” vironment, with internal and external security apparatus prepares and practices 5. See “No Compromise on Nukes: Pakistan,” threats. Nuclear weapons form an es- contingencies to meet all such eventu- Indo-Asian News Service, June 18, 2009, http:// sential ingredient of its national security. alities and would not be deterred from in.news.yahoo.com/43/20090618/876/twl-no- Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear capability taking any action whatsoever in ensuring compromise-on-nukes-pakistan.html. is fraught with a history of friction with that our strategic assets are jealously safe- 6. Franklin D. Roosevelt, first inaugural address, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1933, http://bar- telby.org/124/pres49.html. 7. See Simon Tisdall, “Pakistan Nuclear Projects Raise US Fears,” The Guardian, May 3, 2009 (quoting Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani). 8. For details, see Feroz Hassan Khan, “The Inde-

pendence/Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilem- ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 mas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today, October 2003, pp. 15-19. 9. India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their conflict, and the United States continues to inter- Jewel Samad/AFP/Getty Images Samad/AFP/Getty Jewel vene to defuse crises but shies away from media- tion because of Indian sensitivity. 10. For Zia ul-Haq’s policy, see Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 1977-1988 (London: MacMillan, 1991). For the ethos of jihad, see Za- hid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 12-32.

A Pakistani vendor displays tie-pins in the shape of his country’s nuclear-capable Ghauri 11. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: missile Aug. 12, 2004. Penguin, 2004). 19 12. Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Prolifera- 25. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?” pp. clear Terrorism in Pakistan,” pp. 30-31. tion Motivations: Lessons From Pakistan,” in 158-190; S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s 34. For further details, see Kenneth N. Luongo Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Next Decade, Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not and Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in ed. Peter Lavoy (New York: Routledge, 2008), Like Cold War Europe,” International Security, Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control pp. 69-85. Fall 2005, pp. 138-139. Today, December 2007, www.armscontrol.org/ 13. See Mark Fitzpatrick, ed., “Nuclear Black 26. See Zafar Ali, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets act/2007_12/Luongo. Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of and Threats of Terrorism: How Grave Is the 35. Hashmi presentation. Proliferation Networks,” IISS Strategic Dossier, Danger?” Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2007, 36. Luongo and Salik, “Building Confidence in May 2007. www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/Pakistan- Pakistan’s Nuclear Security.” 14. See Peter Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation NuclearAssets-070607-ZafarAli-FINAL.pdf; 37. For example, assertions in The Wall Street Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Journal by former CIA official Bruce Riedel, and Policy Responses,” The Nonproliferation Re- in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a who is also one of the senior advisers on view (November 2006), pp. 441-442; Feroz Has- Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport,” Obama’s “AfPak” policy, are not viewed in san Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2007, www. Pakistan as academic but rather quasi-official Lessons From Pakistan,” The Nonproliferation stimson.org/southasia/pdf/VFMannan.pdf. U.S. views. See Salik, “Comment”; S.M. Hali, Review (November 2006), pp. 501-517. 27. See Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, “Why Bruce Riedel Has Lost My Respect,” The and Charles A Zraket, Managing Nuclear Opera- 15. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, lecture at the Naval Nation (Pakistan), June 3, 2009. Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Oc- tions (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 38. Bender, “Pakistan, US in Talks on Nuclear tober 27, 2006 (hereinafter Kidwai lecture). See 1987), p. 1. Security.” Fitzpatrick, “Nuclear Black Markets.” 28. Seymour Hersh, “Watching the Warheads: 39. Air Cmdr. Khalid Banuri, communication 16. The term “abdication” to the terrorists was The Risk to Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The with author, June 5, 2009 and June 29, 2009. used by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham New Yorker Magazine, November 5, 2001, pp. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Clinton, whose view was echoed by Obama in 48-54. Hersh alleges that “an elite Pentagon a media briefing on May 7, 2009, and said there the April 29, 2009, speech marking his 100th undercover unit [has been] trained to slip into was no truth to the Boston Globe assertions. day in office. For the transcript, see http://edi- foreign countries and find suspected nuclear tion.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/29/obama. weapons, and disarm them if necessary.… 40. Kidwai lecture; Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, transcript/. [The unit] has explored plans for an operation interview with author, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in Pakistan.” See David Albright, “Securing April 19, 2009. 17. The only exception was in the 2002 elec- Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Complex” (paper tions, when a coalition of religious parties won 41. Strategic Plans Division, briefing to Naval for the 42nd Strategy for Peace Conference, a plurality in the North West Frontier Province Postgraduate School team, Islamabad, February Warrenton, Virginia, October 25-27, 2001), to form a provincial government. The coalition 25, 2007. The briefing was part of the U.S.-Pak- www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/ was routed in the 2008 elections. istan Track II Strategic Dialogue for Long-Term stanleypaper.html; Nigel Hawkes, “The Nuclear Partnership. 18. See Tisdall, “Pakistan Nuclear Projects Threat: Pakistan Could Lose Control of Its Ar- 42. U.S. laws make an exception for sharing Raise US Fears.” senal,” Times Online, September 20, 2001. such technology only with NPT nuclear-weap- 19. Naeem Salik,“Comment: Riedel and the 29. See Hasan-Askari Rizvi “Re-socialising on states. Pakistan is not a party to the NPT. Pakistani Bomb,” Daily Times, June 18, 2009, Pakistan,” Daily Times, June 7, 2009, www. 43. Garima Singh, “Interview With Brig Feroz www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=200 dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009%5C Hassan Khan,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 7 9%5C06%5C18%5Cstory_18-6-2009_pg3_2. 06%5C07%5Cstory_7-6-2009_pg3_2. (July 2005), www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/ 20. Ibid. 30. Kidwai lecture. Jul/khanJul05.asp. 21. Feroz Hassan Khan and Peter Lavoy, “Paki- 31. Pakistan’s energy requirement for the next 44. For a perfect example of reinforcing stan: The Dilemma of Nuclear Deterrence,” in 25 years is about 163,000 megawatts. Nuclear Islamabad’s concerns, see Riedel, “Pakistan The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security energy’s share will be 8,800 megawatts, neces- and the Bomb.” His selective historical account in 21st Century Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa sitating a twenty-fold increase in its current and characterization of the security of nuclear (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. civilian nuclear capacity. For a description arsenals is shaky and a sad example of deliber- 220-221. of Pakistan’s Vision 2030 project, see Zafar ate alarmism. 22. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Bhutta, “Nuclear Power Plants of 1280MW: 45. Elaine M. Grossman, “Talk of U.S. Plans Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed Pakistan to Seek Financing From China,” Daily to Secure Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Called (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 93-95. See Times, September 4, 2008, www.dailytimes. ‘Wildly Hypothetical,’” Global Security News- Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” in com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\04\09\story_ wire, June 10, 2009. South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and 9-4-2008_pg5_1. 46. In October 2006, classified documents Alliances, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle, 32. Pakistan’s definition of nuclear security were stolen from Los Alamos National Labora- Pa.: Strategic Studies War College, 2002), pp. is “[t]he prevention and detection of, and tory and found in a trailer park. This led to 198-199. response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized ac- the resignation of National Nuclear Security 23. See the 1977 Glenn and Symington cess, illegal transfer or other malicious acts ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY Administration head Linton Brooks. See Adam Amendments and the 1985 Pakistan-specific involving nuclear material, other radioactive Zagorin, “A Breach in Nuclear Security,” TIME, Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance substances or their associated facilities.” Jam- April 19, 2007. In August 2007, a U.S. Air Force Act of 1961. shed Hashmi, presentation at a workshop by B-52 mistakenly carried nuclear warheads the Partnership for Global Security, Washing- 24. See, for example, Walter Carl Ladwig III, across the country. ton, D.C., February 21-22, 2008 (hereinafter “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s Hashmi presentation). 47. “No Compromise on Nukes: Pakistan.”

ARMS CONTROL T New Limited War Doctrine,” International Secu- rity, Winter 2007/08, pp. 158-190. 33. Kidwai lecture; Mannan, “Preventing Nu- 48. Ibid. 20 By Hui Zhang

Ending North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Need for Stronger Chinese Action

orth Korea has recently taken a series of less, China can and should do more to press its neighbor. North Korea’s recent series of provocative steps to challenge the inter- actions threatens China’s national interests as well as those of the United States and national community. These steps include countries in Northeast Asia. N It is important to have realistic expecta- test-launching a long-range rocket, walking away tions for changes in China’s approach. Beijing can be expected to support mod- from the six-party talks and all disarmament agree- est UN sanctions against North Korea, as it did in response to the first nuclear test, ments, kicking out international inspectors from its but it probably will respond less strongly than the United States, Japan, and South nuclear facilities, conducting an underground nuclear Korea would hope. Beijing probably will maintain that any harsh measures should test May 25—a more powerful blast than the one be directed toward facilitating talks over denuclearization but should not destabilize conducted in 2006—testing a half-dozen short-range the North Korean regime. On the other hand, Beijing must recog- missiles, and announcing it had resumed plutonium nize that its modest approach, as the past several years have demonstrated, has not production and started a program to enrich uranium. successfully constrained Pyongyang’s nuclear development. Pyongyang proceeded with its two nuclear tests and has again ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Pyongyang reportedly also is preparing a more difficult it will be to roll back Pyong- boycotted the six-party talks. The May test long-range missile test and a third nuclear yang’s nuclear ambitions. has exacerbated the tense situation on the test. If unchecked, North Korea will surely China, North Korea’s most important Korean peninsula and has destroyed re- increase the quantity and quality of its ally and trade partner, has joined the rest of gional stability. These results do not serve arsenal. Even worse, once Pyongyang has the international community in respond- Beijing’s major interest: a nuclear-free and more than enough weapons for its deter- ing to the North Korean actions. Beijing stable Korean peninsula. If Beijing contin- rent, it might be tempted to sell the surplus. has indicated, however, that it wants a ues to allow Pyongyang’s nuclear ambi- The longer the crisis lasts, the more nuclear balanced approach and does not want to tions to go unchecked, Pyongyang will capable North Korea will become and the push Pyongyang much harder. Neverthe- put Beijing in an embarrassing position,

Hui Zhang is leading a research initiative on China’s nuclear policies for Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is a physicist and a specialist in nuclear arms control and Chinese nuclear policy issues. 21 open it to more international pressure, Beijing issued a similar statement in accelerate deployment of a joint U.S.-Japa- and ultimately pose great risks to China’s response to Pyongyang’s first nuclear test nese missile defense shield, which could national interests. in 2006, condemning the blast as brazen. mitigate China’s nuclear deterrent. More- China’s response this time was even stron- over, a worsening crisis would generate China’s Interests ger. According to media reports, Beijing was a massive flow of North Korean refugees Hours after North Korea’s most recent informed by Pyongyang less than half an headed for China. nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry hour in advance of the explosion and was To bolster its image as a responsible issued a statement strongly denouncing it: greatly angered and offended by the test be- stakeholder in the international commu- cause it blatantly disregarded China’s calls nity, China should show its willingness to On 25 May 2009, the DPRK [Demo- for denuclearization. Even cautious high- contribute to international nonprolifera- cratic People’s Republic of Korea] level Chinese officials, including Vice Presi- tion efforts. Accepting a nuclear North conducted another nuclear test in dent Xi Jinping and Minister of National Korea would set a bad precedent both disregard for the common opposi- Defense Liang Guanglie, have made harsh for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty tion of the international community. statements in opposition to Pyongyang’s (NPT) regime—from which North Korea The Chinese Government is firmly nuclear test. Moreover, Beijing has report- has withdrawn—and other countries with opposed to this act.… To bring about edly canceled some previously scheduled nuclear ambitions. denuclearization of the Korean pen- high-level visits to Pyongyang. North Korea has long been a thorn in insula, oppose nuclear proliferation China’s strategic plan through 2020 is China’s side. Pyongyang played a game and safeguard peace and stability in focused on economic development and of brinkmanship between Beijing and Northeast Asia is the firm and con- “building a well-off society in an all- Moscow for several decades during the sistent stand of the Chinese Govern- round way,”2 which requires a stable inter- Cold War. Further nuclear and missile ment. China strongly urges the DPRK national environment, particularly among development would add a dangerous new to honor its commitment to denucle- neighboring countries. A nuclear North element, allowing North Korea’s strategic arization, stop relevant moves that Korea would stimulate a regional nuclear nuclear-strike capability to cover all of may further worsen the situation and arms race and undermine regional stabil- China. Thus, China, in the long term if return to the Six-Party Talks.1 ity. North Korea’s nuclear and missile de- not the near term, faces huge risks from a velopment provides a pretext for Japan to nuclear North Korea. Elizabeth Dalziel-Pool/Getty Images Dalziel-Pool/Getty Elizabeth ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY

ARMS CONTROL T North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan greets Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi during the Dec. 11, 2008, session of six- party talks in Beijing. 22 Beijing’s Leverage Among the interested players in the North Korean nuclear issue, China has the most significant economic and political leverage over the North Korean regime. China has been a close ally of North Korea over the past 50 years, with a friendship cemented in blood during the Korean War. Also, Chi- na is North Korea’s largest trading partner, reportedly supplying North Korea with up to 90 percent of its oil imports and about

45 percent of its subsistence-level food sup- Images Brown/AFP/Getty J. Frederic plies. Moreover, cross-border trade in 2008 was reportedly about $2.7 billion, an increase of about 40 percent from 2007.3 Since April 2003, China has hosted one trilateral negotiation and six rounds of the six-party talks. During these negotiations, China has acted not only as a host, but also as a mediator and constructive partici- pant. China’s major role in negotiations, Trucks carrying goods from North Korea into China via the Sino-Korean Friendship as former Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Bridge pass through a security checkpoint before entering the Chinese city of the head of the Chinese delegation to the Dandong April 7. first three rounds of the six-party talks, emphasized, “is contributing to peace and talks” (quan he cu tan).4 China, according called on “all parties concerned to respond be dragged into another Korean war by to official statements, hopes the parties to in a cool-headed and appropriate manner Pyongyang’s rash actions. the talks will take actions to build trust, and persist in seeking a peaceful solution According to some recent surveys in reduce suspicions, enhance consensus, and through consultation and dialogue.”6 China, more than two-thirds of respon- promote cooperation in order to create a Yet, Beijing’s relatively passive, noninter- dents believe Beijing should take stronger win-win situation.5 ventionist diplomacy has not helped with actions to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear In particular, China’s role became even its top priority: regional stability, to which ambitions, including cutting economic aid more proactive in the fourth round of the the continuing North Korean nuclear crisis and applying UN sanctions. They consider talks, leading to the breakthrough agree- poses a huge threat. North Korea a liability that, if unchecked, ment on a joint statement of principles. will create trouble for China’s economic During the fourth round, China not only More Pressure Needed and security interests. Many Chinese tabled five drafts of the joint statement Because Beijing has the most leverage on believe that the concepts of North Korea but also took a “reject/accept” approach to Pyongyang, Beijing is facing great pres- as a buffer zone and the “lips to China’s push the United States to accept the joint sure from the international community, teeth” are no longer relevant or salient. statement. Beijing also reportedly has lured particularly Washington and Tokyo. Some Beyond concerns about a nuclear North Pyongyang to each round of the six-party Western officials and scholars complain Korea’s impact on the stability of China’s talks with tens of millions of dollars in in- that Beijing’s cautious approach to Pyong- security environment, they also worry that centives. U.S. officials have praised China’s yang has not constrained North Korea’s a nuclear North Korea would pose a huge active role in the talks, saying it has helped nuclear development. North Korea has environmental threat to China’s northeast- U.S.-Chinese relations. proceeded with its nuclear tests and, since ern provinces. Much of the Chinese public ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Although Beijing is shifting from its tra- April 14, has boycotted the six-party talks fears that an accident from a nuclear test ditional low-profile role in the affairs of the hosted by Beijing since 2003. These ac- or weapon would cause heavy radioactive Korean peninsula toward a more active and tions have called into question Chinese contamination in that region. constructive role in defusing the nuclear leadership in the region. Recently, the Chinese media have be- crisis, Beijing’s leverage on Pyongyang is Beijing is also facing great pressure on gun to criticize Pyongyang openly for constrained by two main factors. First, Bei- the domestic front. The nuclear test has its nuclear program. For instance, Global jing believes the nuclear crisis is mainly the prompted a strong reaction from the Chi- Times, published by the government-run business of Washington and Pyongyang nese public. More and more Chinese citi- People’s Daily newspaper, ran a June 3 edi- and, as such, is dependent on the political zens are angered by North Korea’s repeated torial entitled “North Korea Should Not will of those two players. Second, to main- escalation of the crisis and its impervious- Offend the Chinese People.” The editorial tain regional stability, Beijing’s bottom line ness to Beijing’s demands for denucleariza- said, “The Chinese people’s impression of is that war on the Korean peninsula and an tion. They believe that North Korea is do- North Korea is at the lowest level in histo- abrupt collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime ing great damage to the peace of Northeast ry.… North Korea should understand that must be avoided at all costs. Beijing has Asia, and many worry that Beijing could offending the Chinese people is shaking 23 and destroying the foundation of the bi- are not in North Korea’s long-term na- U.S.-Chinese Coordination lateral relationship. The changing attitude tional security interest. Nuclear weapons Given that Washington holds what Pyong- of the Chinese people toward North Korea will generate increasing international yang covets most—diplomatic normaliza- will surely affect the government’s policy pressure and economic sanctions that will tion and security guarantees—Beijing toward North Korea.”7 further devastate the already poor North should privately persuade Washington to A majority of the public and many ex- Korean economy. engage in bilateral dialogue with Pyong- perts in China have called on Beijing to Beijing’s control of energy aid to yang under the auspices of the six-party adjust its policy on North Korea. Although Pyongyang could be crucial in pushing talks and put on the bargaining table a rea- it may be difficult for Beijing to disregard Pyongyang to denuclearize. Recent history sonable offer in exchange for Pyongyang’s

China should deliver a clear message to Pyongyang: nuclear weapons are not in North Korea’s long- term national security interest. Nuclear weapons will generate increasing international pressure and economic sanctions that will further devastate the already poor North Korean economy.

this appeal, it can be expected that Beijing’s suggests that such an approach could be denuclearization. Such an offer should position toward Pyongyang will not change effective. China reportedly shut off an oil include robust security guarantees, nor- significantly in the near future. If Beijing pipeline to North Korea for three days in malization of relations, and economic aid. were to make any changes, it would take March 2003 due to “technical difficulties.” Any resolution of the nuclear impasse has cautious and gradual steps. Beijing may China’s move was widely interpreted as an to address the reasonable security concerns wish to retain close ties to Pyongyang in exercise of its economic leverage to pressure of North Korea. Pyongyang has often said order to gain more leverage over it. Also, Pyongyang to attend a trilateral meeting that its nuclear ambitions are driven solely although Beijing would be willing to held in Beijing in April 2003. by the U.S. military threat. Thus, Pyong- strengthen its relationship with other par- As it pushes Pyongyang, Beijing should yang would most likely give up its nuclear ties in negotiations over the nuclear issue, it maintain its bottom line, which is to avoid program if it could get reliable security is not willing to take sides between Pyong- war on the Korean peninsula and an abrupt assurances in addition to economic and yang and Washington. collapse of the Kim regime. One concern is political benefits. Without Washington’s China supports new, tightened UN sanc- that a U.S. military strike on North Korea cooperation, Pyongyang will undoubt- tions on North Korea for its nuclear test, but could spark a full-scale war that would edly continue to escalate the crisis, and it has had to figure out its own appropriate inevitably harm China’s economic develop- Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang could be response to Pyongyang. Whether it acts ment. A U.S. strike could also force Beijing expected to produce only limited success. through the United Nations or on its own, into an embarrassing position because the Eventually, regardless of Pyongyang’s in- Beijing has to strike a balance between be- 1961 Sino-Korean Treaty on Friendship, tentions, if Beijing and Washington can- ing tough enough to teach Pyongyang a les- Cooperation and Mutual Assistance obliges not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, son and not pushing Pyongyang toward an China to provide military aid to North Washington must make a serious offer extreme reaction or even regime collapse. Korea in the event of war. Furthermore, the to the North Koreans. Then, Beijing can At the same time, Beijing must also meet fall of the Kim government could lead to press Pyongyang to accept such an offer the demands of Washington, Tokyo, and sudden Korean unification and an uncer- by maximizing its leverage. This would be Seoul in pushing toward a denuclearized tain geopolitical realignment, including the the most feasible way toward denuclear- and stable peninsula. This overall effort prospect of U.S. troops at China’s border. ization of the Korean peninsula. would be a big challenge to China’s diplo- Beijing should be able to adjust its pres- It should be not difficult for Washing- matic acuity and wisdom. sure on Pyongyang with a wide range ton to satisfy Pyongyang’s needs. Wash- ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY South Korea and Japan have affirmed of approaches, broadening its current ington should recognize the importance that they would not tolerate a nuclear “pure carrot” approach to include curbs of regime survival and the need for eco- North Korea. Thus, a similar affirmation on oil supplies and other exports. It is in nomic reform in North Korea. Given the by China would push North Korea to Beijing’s interests, however, to ensure that long history of mutual mistrust, Washing- think twice before continuing its nuclear the pressure it applies on North Korea is ton may not be sure about Pyongyang’s

ARMS CONTROL T program. China should deliver a clear just a means toward denuclearization and real strategic intentions, but the United message to Pyongyang: nuclear weapons not regime change or collapse. States should take a chance by starting 24 serious talks with North Korea. Washing- resolved, Washington will focus its efforts Korea have had very different timelines, ton’s offer should include normalization on containing China. In addition, some however, and the sequencing of actions and economic aid, including energy, fol- suspect that Washington really has no for the denuclearization process has not lowing a principle of quid pro quo. desire for North Korean denuclearization been well coordinated. North Korea and In practice, what North Korea could po- and merely cares about the issue of nuclear the United States are wary of giving the tentially offer in a negotiation are pledges transfer from North Korea. They think a other side something valuable at an early that, once implemented, are difficult to re- nuclear North Korea could provide a pre- stage in the process. verse because they involve physical hard- text for Washington to strengthen its mili- To address that obstacle, China should ware or infrastructure. Such steps include tary ties with allies in the region, thereby act as a mediator and play a more proac- dismantling known facilities for pluto- constraining China. tive and constructive role by offering its nium production and other processes rel- own road map for North Korean denucle- evant to a nuclear weapons program, sur- A Denuclearization Road Map arization. That detailed road map should rendering all plutonium produced in the Given the long history of mistrust and include a timetable and delineate the re- past, and ending its uranium-enrichment animosity between Washington and ciprocal actions each side should carry out and long-range missile programs. Offers Pyongyang, North Korean denucleariza- at certain stages. For each stage, the road the United States could make, including tion will not be achieved in one step. map should clearly establish what North normalization and pledges of nonaggres- A road map is needed that links North Korea should pledge to do, what inspec- sion and nonintervention, would be easier Korean denuclearization with the gradual tion and verification provisions should to reverse if North Korea did not follow delivery of concrete benefits, including be taken, and what benefits North Korea its commitment to nuclear disarmament. security assurances, diplomatic normal- would receive regarding security assur- Thus, any breakthroughs in the negotia- ization, economic reform, and Northeast ances and economic aid. To promote North tions over North Korea’s nuclear program Asian security cooperation. In practice, Korean denuclearization, China could would likely have to start with Washing- the joint statement of September 19, 2005, play a number of active roles. For example, ton taking the first step. already provided the foundation for a China, alone or together with Russia, could It is possible that, as Pyongyang has re- “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean provide North Korea with some kind of cently said, it will not accept any deal that Peninsula in a peaceful manner,”9 in security guarantee to reduce its security requires it to give up its nuclear program. which North Korea committed to denucle- concerns. China could also help settle If so, Beijing’s control of aid to Pyongyang arization in return for a set of security some of the disputes between Pyongyang could be crucial in pushing Pyongyang and economic benefits. The six parties and Washington during the verification to make its final decision on denuclear- agreed to take coordinated steps to imple- stages. In addition, China could monitor ization. Because North Korea has very ment the statement in a phased manner, and press both parties to implement faith- limited energy resources, long-term sus- “commitment for commitment, action fully their pledges at each stage. tainable economic advancement depends for action.”10 The United States and North The following is a road map describing on Pyongyang opening its doors to the international community, especially to foreign investment, trade, and aid from China, South Korea, and Japan. South Korea and Japan have affirmed that they would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Thus, an affirmation that Beijing would give no support to a nuclear North Korea would force Pyongyang to think seriously about its nuclear ambitions. Finally, Beijing may show a greater willingness to press Pyongyang if Washington ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 also addresses China’s concerns, including U.S. missile defense and space weapons programs,8 U.S.-Japanese missile defense Images Dalziel/AFP/Getty Elizabeth cooperation, U.S. missile defense sales to Taiwan, and the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Korean peninsula if the North Korean regime collapses. Ultimately, if Washington can clearly demonstrate to Beijing that its long-term strategic intentions in the region would not constrain China, it could receive greater support from Beijing in negotiating with Pyong- U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg (left), Chinese Vice Foreign Minister yang. Some in China are concerned that and envoy for North Korea Wu Dawei (center), and U.S. special envoy to North once the North Korean nuclear issue is Korea Stephen Bosworth pose for photographers June 5 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. 25 three stages toward North Korean denuclearization: the first stage would focus on refreezing and disabling plutonium production; the second stage would involve dismantlement and decommissioning of all plutonium programs; and the third stage would entail the dismantlement of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. Each stage should be completed with adequate transparency and verification measures. At the outset, the six parties would agree to a joint statement of specific

commitments under the road map. For Images Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Jung example, North Korea would commit to abandon all of its nuclear programs (plutonium and HEU programs) and return to the NPT and to International Atomic Ener- gy Agency safeguards. North Korea would also pledge not to transfer any nuclear weapons, fissile material, or knowledge during the implementation of the three stages. The United States and others would A tourist walks past a diagram of North Korean missiles displayed May 26 at an observation post in Paju, South Korea near the Demilitarized Zone separating pledge to respect Pyongyang’s sovereignty, the two Koreas. normalize their diplomatic relations with North Korea, negotiate a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula, and pursue a At that point in the road map, the established normalized relations, Pyong- mechanism for Northeast Asian security United States would begin to take steps to yang would move quickly to the second cooperation. The United States and other lift economic sanctions, establish a liaison phase: dismantling its plutonium weap- countries should also commit to provide office, and assure economic cooperation ons and all facilities associated with the North Korea with economic cooperation between North and South Korea, as well weaponization program, as well as surren- and energy assistance, adding specific as between North Korea and Japan. All dering all of its plutonium. pledges to the general principles articulated relevant parties would resume energy aid It should be noted that the key to de- in the 2005 joint statement. to North Korea at the earliest possible nuclearizing North Korea is the timing First Stage: As a first step to revive the time. To jump-start a new round of the of normalization. Although Washington six-party talks quickly, the United States six-party talks, Washington would send a made an offer of normalization in the 2005 should commit to having direct bilateral prominent figure—a former president or joint statement, it made the offer subject talks with North Korea for diplomatic other high-level official—to visit Pyong- to the two countries’ “respective bilateral normalization at an early stage under the yang to help break the ice. policies.” According to Washington, there six-party talks. Meanwhile, China should Second Stage: The second stage would will be a long road to normalizing relations press North Korea to return to the six-party include two phases to dismantle North with Pyongyang. That road will include not talks. All parties should reaffirm their com- Korea’s plutonium program. In the first only denuclearization, but also discussions mitment to the 2005 joint statement and phase, North Korea would dismantle all on human rights, biological and chemi- the 2007 agreement on disablement. While of its plutonium-production facilities as a cal weapons, ballistic missile programs, North Korea is disabling its plutonium- step toward a long-term decommissioning conventional weapons proliferation, and production facilities and freezing its HEU program. To reciprocate Pyongyang’s coop- terrorism and other illicit activities. Pyong- program, the United States and other par- eration in this phase, the United States and yang, however, wants normalization at a ties should take reciprocal actions, includ- others would provide further security and much earlier stage, before dismantling its ing security assurances and energy aid. The economic benefits, including the replace- nuclear program. United States should affirm its commitment of U.S. liaison offices with an embas- North Korea will not dismantle its ment of security assurances to North Korea sy and the establishment of full diplomatic nuclear program before receiving tangible by respecting Pyongyang’s sovereignty, not relations. Meanwhile, Japan would nor- security assurances, in particular, normal- seeking a regime change, and formally stat- malize its relations with North Korea after ized relations with Washington. The only ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY ing it had no intention to attack or invade. resolving the remaining abductee issues.11 leverage that Kim Jong Il possesses is his North Korea, South Korea, and the United Finally, in order to get to full normaliza- threat to go nuclear. Therefore, Pyongyang States should negotiate a trilateral peace tion with Washington, Pyongyang would fears that once it dismantles its nuclear treaty. The need for such a treaty is now agree to a treaty ending its development of weapons, there will be no deterrent particularly urgent because North Korea long-range missiles and halting all exports against a U.S. military strike. Washington,

ARMS CONTROL T has withdrawn from the 1953 armistice of missiles and missile technology. however, as the world’s pre-eminent mili- treaty that ended the Korean War. After Pyongyang and Washington tary superpower, would have considerable 26 strategic flexibility. If the United States Conclusion The three-stage road map detailed provided North Korea with security as- A nuclear North Korea would put China’s above should fill this gap and satisfy the surances in return for denuclearization national interests at great risk. Beijing principal goals of all the parties involved. and North Korea then reneged on its can increase pressure on Pyongyang, us- Pressing for a road map is a step that holds commitment, the United States would ing positive inducements and punitive few risks for China and could contribute not have lost much. Such a scenario could measures. The chances are low, however, greatly to resolving the long-standing be frustrating and embarrassing for the that Beijing will radically adjust its North international stalemate with North Korea. United States, but that country’s security Korea policy, at least for the near future. That success, in turn, would help China would not be at risk. In contrast, if North Beijing will continue to maintain its bot- achieve its chief priority: a stable and a Korea gave up its nuclear program and the tom-line approach, avoiding war on the denuclearized Korean peninsula. ACT United States later reneged on its security Korean peninsula and an abrupt collapse assurances, perhaps even by supporting of the Kim regime. From China’s perspec- ENDNOTES or participating in an invasion, North tive, these scenarios must be avoided at all Korea’s very existence could be seen as costs because they are contrary to China’s 1. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement being put at risk. primary interest in a stable environment. of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” May 25, Third Stage: In the last stage, North Given that Washington holds what 2009, www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/1179/ t564332.htm (in Chinese). The other participants Korea would complete dismantlement of Pyongyang desires most (security guaran- in the six-party talks are Japan, Russia, South its HEU program. The level of verification tees), Beijing should persuade Washing- Korea, and the United States. required for the HEU program depends on ton to engage in bilateral dialogue with 2. “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16th Party the status of the program, such as whether Pyongyang. China should push the Unit- Congress,” November 17, 2002, www.china.org. or not it has produced HEU. Its status could ed States to put reasonable offers on the cn/english/features/49007.htm. be somewhere between the research and bargaining table, including robust securi- 3. See, for example, AFP, “China, NKorea development level and pursuit of the ca- ty guarantees, normalization of relations, Trade Boom Despite Rocket Tensions,” pability to construct a pilot experimental and economic aid. At that point, China channelnewsasia.com, April 6, 2009, http://www. facility. If Pyongyang is only at the begin- could maximize its leverage and press channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_ ning of a uranium-enrichment program, as North Korea to accept the terms offered. business/view/420413/1/.html. it indicated June 13, North Korea could be This strategy may be the only way to roll 4. Wang Yi, statement at a press conference on years away from producing enough HEU back Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. the first round of the six-party talks in Beijing, for one bomb. This strategy may not work. Pyong- August 29, 2003 (in Chinese). Beyond denuclearization, North Korea yang may decide not to give up its 5. See, for example, the declaration by Vice Foreign would also sign and implement the Chemi- nuclear program for any sort of deal. Yet, Minister Wu Dawei, who served as chairman of the cal Weapons Convention and the Biologi- if all of North Korea’s neighbors, includ- fourth round of the talks and head of the Chinese cal Weapons Convention. Furthermore, the ing China and the United States, make it delegation, on the adoption of the joint statement United States, China, and other relevant clear that they will never tolerate a nucle- at the fourth round six-party talks, held in Beijing parties would negotiate a permanent peace ar-armed North Korea and that interna- on September 19, 2005. regime in Northeast Asia. Such an agree- tional isolation therefore will inexorably 6. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement ment would play a major role in liberating continue, Pyongyang may decide to give of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” the Korean peninsula from its Cold War up its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang will 7. “North Korea Should Not Offend the Chinese quagmire and going to the root of the not yield to a purely “stick” approach, People,” Global Times, June 3, 2008. See http:// North Korean nuclear issue. however, and eventually a desperate and blog.huanqiu.com/?uid-94539-action-viewspace- Pyongyang would need to cut its con- nuclear North Korea may take actions itemid-204519 (in Chinese). ventional forces gradually to achieve that are in no one’s interests. 8. Hui Zhang, “Action/Reaction: U.S. Space parity with South Korean and U.S. forces. To achieve a stable and denuclearized Weaponization and China,” Arms Control Today, That step would facilitate North Korean Korean peninsula, all parties concerned December 2005, pp. 7-9. economic reform by significantly reduc- must come back to the negotiating table.

9. U.S Department of State, “Joint Statement ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 ing the economic burden on the country In particular, Beijing must press Pyong- of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” of maintaining such a large military. yang to return to the six-party talks as September 19, 2005, http://merln.ndu.edu/ Particularly valuable encouragement for soon as possible. Given that Washington archivepdf/northkorea/state/53490.pdf. North Korean force reductions would come and Pyongyang deeply mistrust each 10. Ibid. from the removal of U.S. troops from the other and neither side wants to go first, 11. Just before the second nuclear crisis in South. Furthermore, all other interested China, as a mediator, should play a more October 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro and involved parties would help the two proactive and constructive role by offer- Koizumi visited Pyongyang in September 2002 Koreas pursue gradual integration toward ing its own road map for North Korean in an effort to speed up Japanese-North Korean unification. During this third stage, other denuclearization. The six-party talks diplomatic normalization. Kim Jong Il made a countries would continue to aid North espoused a general principle of “commit- surprise admission during this trip that North Korea’s economic reform, help North Korea ment for commitment, action for action” Korea had abducted Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, the abductee issue improve human rights, and provide funds as a means to denuclearization, but there has been a key obstacle to normalized relations and technologies for the modernization of were no specific timelines or sequencing between the two countries. its economic infrastructure. of actions in the denuclearization process. 27 InThe 28 The World 39 The Middle East and Africa 31 Asia and Australia 43 Europe and the 35 The United States Former Soviet Union NEWS and the Americas July/August 2009

Russia, U.S. Lag on Chemical Arms Deadline

he likely failure of Russia and the United States, the holders of the world’s largest stockpiles of chemical T weapons, to meet a key treaty deadline for destroying their stocks is prompting varying responses from experts. In recent public statements and interviews, officials involved in the process emphasized the progress and commitment of the two countries, while independent experts expressed concern about the effect of the missed deadline on the nonproliferation regime. Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) must irreversibly destroy their stockpiles of chemical weapons by April 29, 2012. As of June 24, 188 countries were parties to the convention, and two more countries had signed but not yet ratified it. The CWC is testimony to how “successful and fruitful” the cooperation between Russia and the United States can be, Rogelio Pfirter, director-general of the treaty secretariat, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Hague, said June 16. In a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, Pfirter, whose term as OPCW director-general ends next year, declined to speculate whether the two countries would Alex Wong/Getty Images Wong/Getty Alex meet the CWC destruction deadline. He acknowledged that “time is short” because so many weapons remain to be destroyed by 2012. But he also said it is important not to “trump up” possible scenarios. Other CWC member states should wait to see how Russia and the United States progress as the deadline approaches, he said. When his successor and the representatives of the CWC’s member states wake up on the morning of April 30, 2012, they will need to reassess the status of the chemical weapons destruction effort and A soldier patrols the perimeter of the Deseret Chemical Depot in Tooele, Utah March 9, 2005. The depot is the largest determine if the possessor states were negligent in meeting their chemical weapons disposal facility in the world. commitments, he said. In his remarks, Pfirter emphasized the progress made by Russia and the United States toward meeting the treaty’s requirements. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, “I applaud the Russian government’s commitment” to chemi- said he was highly skeptical that Russia will meet the treaty dead- cal demilitarization, he said. He also said he has “no doubt” line. Although not disputing that assessment, the U.S. official said about the U.S. commitment to the CWC, although estimates for the United States believes that Russia has “demonstrated complete when the United States will complete destruction of its chemi- commitment” to its CWC obligations. cal weapons stockpile have varied. In November 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that destruction would not Russian Destruction Process be complete until 2020 and 2023 at the chemical weapons de- In addition to the challenge presented by the approximately 28,000 pots in Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, respectively. metric tons of chemical weapons in Russia that remain to be de- ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY Increased funding may hasten the demilitarization process, a stroyed, some observers are concerned about the demilitarization knowledgeable U.S. official said. process that Russia is using. At certain facilities, Russia has carried Russia’s progress is expected to be slower. Although the May out the first part of the chemical weapons destruction process but 2009 formal opening of the Shchuchye chemical agent destruction has not taken the subsequent steps needed for complete destruction facility brings Russia one step closer to fulfilling its CWC obliga- as specified in the CWC. For example, at the Leonidovka destruc-

ARMS CONTROL T tions, there is still a sizable stockpile of Russian chemical weapons tion site, Russia has drained the toxic fill from many munitions and awaiting destruction. Jonathan B. Tucker, a senior fellow at the used a chemical process to neutralize the warfare agents, but it has 28 just started incinerating the delivery vehicles and the neutralized tenko said that Russia is on schedule to meet the CWC deadline liquids, Pfirter explained in a speech to the OPCW executive coun- and that it will have destroyed 45 percent of its arsenal by the cil in April. For that reason, the OPCW has not yet formally rec- end of this year. ognized any chemical weapons destruction at Leonidovka despite To date, the United States has destroyed about 60 percent of its much activity there. stockpile. The United States “is very committed to finishing the Failure to destroy all chemical weapons components irreversibly job,” the U.S. official said. In recent years, the Defense Depart- can have serious repercussions for the nonproliferation regime, ment has sped up demilitarization by allocating more funds and Tucker said. It would be relatively easy for someone to refill an building new destruction facilities, he said. In 2006 the United empty munition with a chemical agent to reconstitute a chemical States was projected to have destroyed only about two-thirds of weapon, said Paul Walker, director of security and sustainability its stockpile by 2012; the current estimate of 90 percent destroyed at Global Green USA. Security has improved at many of Russia’s by 2012 reflects the increased pace, he said. chemical weapons storage sites, he added, but the risk of refilling bomb or shell casings will remain as long as the munitions exist. Potential Repercussions Walker further cautioned that Russia’s partial demilitarization Although the CWC does not impose automatic sanctions in cases of process could set a “dangerous precedent” if the OPCW grants Rus- noncompliance, there could be serious political fallout if Russia and sia destruction credit for separating chemical weapons into their the United States have not completely destroyed their stockpiles by various components before it has irreversibly destroyed them. The the 2012 deadline, Tucker and Walker said. danger is that a CWC nonsignatory, such as Syria, might later ac- Some CWC member states have voiced concern at the slow pace cede to the CWC, demilitarize in a manner similar to Russia, receive of U.S. disarmament. During the CWC’s second review conference credit for destruction prematurely, and then secretly recover the in April 2008, Iran rebuked “major possessor states” for insufficient chemical warfare agent from the neutralized reaction mass or refill progress toward the 2012 deadline, adding that the destruction empty munitions with new agents, he said. According to the U.S. delay “is a matter of serious concern” because it indicates a state’s official, Moscow and the OPCW negotiated modified procedures intention to retain certain stockpiles for military purposes. Walker specifically for Russia, granting it demilitarization credit earlier in noted that a U.S. failure to meet the CWC destruction deadline the destruction process to help it meet the 2012 deadline. Walker would weaken its negotiating position with Iran, North Korea (a said that Russia received destruction credit for neutralizing nerve nonsignatory of the CWC), and other countries that Washington agents at the Maradykovsky destruction site even though it has not has criticized for breaking international law. destroyed the associated bomb casings. In another instance, the Amending the CWC to extend the destruction deadline seems OPCW granted Russia destruction credit after it neutralized chemi- very unlikely, in large part because of the difficult process that the cal agents but before it incinerated the reaction mass, Walker said. treaty has established for making amendments, Walker said. Although the OPCW has been fairly lenient to date on this issue, Russia and the United States are inclined to oppose that approach it might become stricter as the 2012 deadline approaches because anyway because opening the CWC to amendment could bring Iran, which is a party to the treaty, has expressed concern about about unwanted changes, Walker and the U.S. official said. Two ex- Russia’s receiving credit for destruction prior to reaching an irre- amples are Iran’s call for the abolition of export controls on certain versible end point, Walker said. (See ACT, May 2008.) chemical agents and other states’ desire to reduce the monitoring of At the opening ceremony for the Shchuchye chemical weap- industrial plants that produce dual-use chemicals, the official said. ons destruction facility, Russian Industry Minister Viktor Khris- —RACHEL A. WEISE

Accord on New Rules Eludes Nuclear Suppliers

uclear supplier countries last The current NSG guidelines contain ACT, December 2008.) Canada’s objec- month ended their annual plenary only a general instruction to exercise “re- tions to more stringent rules had been one ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 N meeting without agreeing on straint” in sensitive exports. The suppli- of the main obstacles to an accord. new rules for exports related to uranium ers have been working for years to adopt But since then, current and former dip- enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. a more rigorous standard. They have lomats said, other countries have raised In a June 12 statement issued at the agreed to use a so-called criteria-based objections to various parts of the proposal. close of a meeting in Budapest, the 46-na- approach, under which recipients of sen- Two sources mentioned Turkey as a country tion Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) said sitive exports would have to meet a list of voicing objections. Other countries previ- its members had “agreed to continue to preset requirements. However, the NSG ously mentioned as having concerns in- work to strengthen” the group’s guide- members have not been able to agree on clude Brazil, South Africa, and South Korea. lines in that area. Equipment and tech- the specific list of criteria. According to sources familiar with the nology related to enrichment and repro- At the end of last year, the suppliers ap- proposal, the criteria fall into two groups, cessing are considered to be particularly peared to be closing in on an agreement, “objective” and “subjective.” The objective sensitive types of nuclear exports because in large part because the United States and criteria would cover issues such as whether those processes can produce material that Canada had reached a compromise on the country is a party to the nuclear Non- is usable in a nuclear weapon. rules for enrichment-related exports. (See proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has agreed 29 to an additional protocol to its Interna- that efforts to reach consensus should issue and put it behind them. But when tional Atomic Energy Agency safeguards continue over the summer and prior to asked if he thought they were near agree- agreement. Such protocols give the agency the next regular meeting of the NSG ment, he replied, “I wouldn’t say that.” inspectors more latitude than they have Consultative Group this fall,” the official Last September, during final negotiations under standard safeguards agreements. said. According to the NSG’s Web site, the between the U.S. Congress and the Bush

THE WORLD Subjective criteria would require po- consultative group is the NSG’s “standing administration over the U.S.-Indian civil- tential exporters to consider issues such intersessional working body.” The consul- ian nuclear cooperation agreement, Sec- as whether the export would undermine tative group typically meets several times retary of State Condoleezza Rice promised regional stability and if the recipient a year and, like the NSG as a whole, makes Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.) that the country was in a volatile region. Turkey decisions by consensus. United States would press for an agreement is concerned that its access to sensitive As it generally does, the consultative on new NSG guidelines for enrichment and exports could be restricted if it were group met during the days just before the reprocessing. (See ACT, October 2008.) considered part of the Middle East, the plenary in Budapest. There was no con- In a Sept. 26 statement, Berman, chair- diplomatic sources said. sensus on the export criteria, a diplomat man of the House Foreign Affairs Com- According to a former U.S. diplomat, from a key NSG country said. Sometimes, mittee, said Rice had pledged that the some European countries expressed con- if there is only one country standing in “highest priority” of the United States at cern that the arrangement would impose the way of consensus, an issue will be for- a November 2008 NSG meeting would be additional restrictions on their access to warded to the plenary, where higher-level to reach an agreement to ban enrichment enrichment technology if they one day officials might be able to break the dead- and reprocessing exports to countries joined Urenco, the British-Dutch-German lock, he said. But pushing an issue to the that are not parties to the NPT. India is enrichment consortium. plenary when there is broader disagree- not an NPT party. ment could “ruin it,” he said. In the June 25 e-mail, the State Depart- U.S. Sees Progress He said some of his fellow diplomats ment official said, “The United States con- The NSG “made progress” in Budapest to- believed the June meeting was “a decisive tinues to believe that strengthening the ward reaching agreement on new rules for moment” and that the failure to reach an NSG Guidelines as they apply to transfers enrichment and reprocessing exports, an agreement there could be a “bad indicator.” of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing official from the U.S. Department of State According to the former U.S. diplomat, equipment and technologies is a major said in a June 25 e-mail. The NSG “agreed many NSG countries want to resolve the priority.” —DANIEL HORNER

New from Stanford University Press

Preventing Catastrophe Inside Nuclear South Asia Confronting the Bomb The Use and Misuse of Edited by A Short History of the World Intelligence in Efforts SCOTT D. SAGAN Nuclear Disarmament to Halt the Proliferation This book presents an analytical Movement of Weapons of Mass account of the causes and danger- Destruction LAWRENCE S. WITTNER ous consequences of nuclear prolif- Confronting the THOMAS GRAHAM JR. eration in South Asia. Bomb tells the and “This is an excellent volume that dramatic, inspir- KEITH A. HANSEN brings together a wide array of per- ing story of how “In this excellent presentation, the spectives on India and Pakistan's citizen activism authors establish that the threat complex nuclear trajectories. The helped curb the posed by terrorists acquiring contributors, all prominent scholars nuclear arms weapons of mass destruction is not of regional security, offer com- race and prevent a cohesive problem calling for a sin- pelling arguments that nuclear nuclear war. gle defensive strategy, but a series of weapon decisions in South Asia “The saga of the discrete challenges requiring diverse have been driven by calculations world disarmament movement. . . . responses. This is recommended beyond simple security concerns deserves the widest possible reader- reading based on the authors' per- emanating from the military rivalry ship.” sonal experiences and years of par- between the two states.” —Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ticipation in international arms con- —T.V. Paul, Stanford Nuclear Age Series

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY trol negotiations.” McGill University $21.95 paper $55.00 cloth —Robert Huffstutler, $27.95 paper $75.00 cloth Executive Director (Retired), Central Intelligence Agency $35.00 cloth Stanford University Press

ARMS CONTROL T 800.621.2736 www.sup.org

30 ASIA AND AUSTRALIA AND ASIA UN Tightens North Korea Sanctions

he UN Security Council last month broadly expanded sanctions and counterproliferation measures against North T Korea in response to that country’s May 25 nuclear test. Resolution 1874, which the council unanimously adopted June 12, builds on the measures the council took in 2006 when it adopted Resolution 1718 in response to North Korea’s first nuclear test. U.S. officials said that there is greater focus on enforcing sanctions this time around. The international community did not use all of the measures available under Resolution 1718 because North Korea re-entered denuclearization talks shortly after that resolution was adopted. Stephen Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 11 that “as we move forward, we are going to continue to be very concerned about implementation [of the renewed sanctions],

and I would expect that other countries will be as well.” Images Loeb/AFP/Getty Saul The 34-paragraph resolution features an intensified inspection regime to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea, calls for enhanced financial restrictions against North Korea and North Korean firms, a nearly comprehensive arms embargo on the country, and strengthened council oversight over the implementation of the resolution (see sidebar). The council also reiterated demands that Pyongyang not conduct any further nuclear or missile tests, return to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice addresses verifiably abandon all nuclear programs. the press June 12 after the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1874, which broadly expanded sanctions The council agreed on a number of provisions intended to and counterproliferation measures against North Korea in strengthen the implementation of sanctions against North response to that country’s May 25 nuclear test. Korea. But, at the urging of China and Russia, some of those provisions were turned from requirements into recommendations, diplomatic sources said in June. In particular, the generally do business with North Korea, but may have an im- resolution “calls on” states to enact a number of financial re- pact if banks in Asia and Europe move to follow suit. strictions against North Korea as well as carry out inspections The new resolution also calls for “adjustments” to the items and of suspected shipments that violate the sanctions, rather than North Korean entities falling under the sanctions. Baki Ilkin, Turk- making such steps mandatory. ish permanent representative to the United Nations and chair of The resolution also calls on states to take more extensive the Security Council’s 1718 Committee, told reporters June 19 that measures to limit financial dealings with North Korea and he received lists from some countries regarding additional North North Korean entities. Although Resolution 1718 required that Korean entities to blacklist. states freeze the assets of North Korean entities blacklisted by Resolution 1718 called for the council to designate entities sus- the council, Resolution 1874 recommended similar actions pected of involvement with North Korea’s nonconventional weap- against any North Korean assets within their jurisdiction if ons programs. However, no entities were placed on the committee’s those assets could contribute to Pyongyang’s nonconventional blacklist until last April, when the council responded to a North Ko- ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 weapons programs. The council also called for states to with- rean rocket launch. (See ACT, May 2009.) At that time, the council hold public financial support for trade with North Korea that sanctioned three North Korean firms from lists of 11 firms provided could aid such programs. by Washington and 14 by Tokyo. In support of these financial restrictions, the U.S. Depart- Addressing the issue of enforcement, the council called on ment of the Treasury issued an advisory June 18 recommend- states to take additional steps to inspect shipments suspected of ing that U.S. financial institutions take “commensurate risk violating the sanctions on North Korea. Such steps include the mitigation measures,” in light of the financial restrictions potential for inspecting vessels on the high seas with the consent called for by Resolutions 1718 and 1874. The Treasury Depart- of the flag state of the ship in question and providing the legal ment stated that there is an “increased likelihood” that North authority to seize and dispose of any materials or weapons found. Korean financial institutions will use deceptive practices to cir- Resolution 1874 also requires that states not provide “bunkering cumvent sanctions and urged “enhanced scrutiny” over North services,” such as fuel or other supplies, to North Korean vessels Korean accounts and transactions. suspected of violating sanctions. Diplomatic sources said in June that such recommendations William Newcomb, a former senior economic adviser to the had little relevance for U.S. financial institutions, which do not Intelligence and Analysis Office at the Treasury Department, told a 31 United States Institute of Peace audience June 10 that North Korean that, in spite of the prospect of high-seas interdiction raised in Reso- ships are fairly small and cannot travel far without refueling. lution 1874, U.S. enforcement of the sanctions will still rely primar- Although the resolution raises the possibility of stranding ily on cooperation from states in the region to carry out inspections. suspect North Korean vessels, it does not provide for the forcible Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell appeared to hint at this co- boarding of ships that refuse inspections. China in particular in- operation during a June 24 press briefing, stating that the United sisted that such forcible boarding not be permitted. Following the States would not make a decision to confront suspicious ships adoption of Resolution 1874, Chinese Permanent Representative to alone. “[T]hat is a decision I think we will likely take collectively the UN Zhang Yesui told reporters that states must “act prudently with our allies and partners out there,” he said. and with sufficient grounds” with regard to cargo inspections and Morrell was responding to questions regarding a North Korean “under no circumstances should there be the use of force, or the ship, the Kang Nam, that the United States had been tracking. He ASIA AND AUSTRALIA threat of the use of force.” said the ship “has a particular history that makes it more of inter- North Korea has said that it would view attempts to board its est” but stressed that the United States has been “interested in ships as an act of war. North Korean ships for some time.” Morrell appeared to be refer- It appears that the United States intends to refrain from forcing ring to past suspicions that the Kang Nam was involved in prolif- such inspections. Diplomatic sources told Arms Control Today in June eration from North Korea.

UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea

The UN Security Council last month unanimously adopted Resolution 1874 condemning North Korea’s second nuclear test. The June 12 resolution expands on the sanctions and inspection provisions contained in Resolution 1718, which the council adopted in 2006 in response to Pyongyang’s first nuclear test. Both resolutions were adopted under Article 41 of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to take nonmilitary punitive actions against a state. The following is a summary of the key additions in Resolution 1874, in which the Security Council:

• Prohibits North Korea from exporting: • Requires states to report to the 1718 Committee any inspections, seizures, and disposals of cargo that are conducted as 1) any arms or related materiel, or providing financial trans- part of the resolution’s implementation. actions, technical training, services, or assistance related to such arms; and • Requires states to prohibit the provision of bunkering services, including fuel, supplies, or any other servicing of vessels, 2) all items on an expanded Nuclear Suppliers Group trig- to North Korean vessels if the states “have information that ger list and dual-use materials and technologies list, as well provides reasonable grounds to believe” the vessels are trans- as any technical training, advice, or other services related porting items prohibited by Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Ser- to them. vices that are necessary on humanitarian grounds are exempt • Prohibits states from procuring the above items or related from this requirement. assistance from North Korea. • Calls on states not to provide financial services or allow the • Decides that states shall not supply, directly or indirectly, any transfer to, through, or from their jurisdiction any assets or of the above arms or items or relevant services to North Korea, resources that could contribute to North Korea’s nonconven- with the exception of small arms and light weapons. tional weapons programs. Such steps may include freezing assets within their jurisdiction associated with such programs • Calls on states to “exercise vigilance” over the supply of and “applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transac- small arms and light weapons to North Korea and requires tions,” consistent with the countries’ national laws. Also calls states to notify the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions on states not to provide public financial support for trade with committee (the 1718 Committee) at least five days prior to any North Korea that could contribute to such programs, including such sale or transfer. granting export credits, guarantees, or insurance. • Calls on states to inspect all cargo to and from North Korea • Calls on states and international financial and credit institu- in their territory, including seaports and airports, as well as tions “not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial ships on the high seas, with the consent of the flag state, if assistance, or concessional loans” to North Korea “except for the state “has information that provides reasonable grounds humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing to believe” that the cargo contains items prohibited by Resolu- the needs of the civilian population.” tions 1718 and 1874. • Calls on states to report to the council within 45 days on • Calls on states to cooperate with inspections and, if the

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY steps taken to implement the sanctions in Resolutions 1718 flag state does not consent to inspection on the high seas, to and 1874. require the flag state to direct the vessel to the nearest port for required inspection by local authorities. • Requests that the UN secretary-general create a panel of up to seven experts to assist in the work of the 1718 Committee, • Authorizes states to seize and dispose of items prohibited including by analyzing information provided by states and pro- under Resolutions 1718 and 1874 that are identified in any

ARMS CONTROL T viding recommendations on actions the council or states may inspections. consider to improve implementation. 32 developing this capability and that “enough success has been made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel” for such reactors. The other steps Pyongyang said it would take in response to the UN measure included weaponizing all newly separated plutonium and meeting “an attempted blockade of any kind” with “a decisive military response.” Following the Security Council’s condem- nation of North Korea’s rocket launch in April, Pyongyang stated that it would reprocess the spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor, estimated to contain enough plutonium for KNS/AFP/Getty Images KNS/AFP/Getty one or two additional nuclear weapons. (See ACT, May 2009.) North Korea shut down that reactor as part of a February 2007 aid-for-denuclearization agreement. (See ACT, March 2007.) The June 13 statement said that North Korea has reprocessed “more than one third” North Korean military officers celebrate their country’s May 25 nuclear test at the of this material. Pyongyang Indoor Stadium May 26. Moreover, Pyongyang also sought to dis- pel the notion that it would denuclearize, stating that “[i]t has become an absolutely North Korea Rejects Resolution impossible option” for North Korea “to even think about giving North Korea reacted to Resolution 1874 by issuing a Foreign Min- up its nuclear weapons.” istry statement June 13 condemning the UN action and outlining Following through on a pledge made earlier this year, Pyongyang “countermeasures” Pyongyang would take, including the develop- also appears to be readying a test of a long-range ballistic missile. ment of a uranium-enrichment program. The Japanese newspaper Daily Yomiuri reported July 18 that North The statement was the first time that North Korea has pub- Korea is preparing a launch of its longest-ranged missile, the Taepo licly admitted to pursuing a uranium-enrichment program. The Dong-2, in the direction of Hawaii. United States has long suspected North Korea of maintaining U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters June such an effort as a second route to nuclear weapons, and the issue 18 that the United States has deployed certain missile defense was critical in the 2002 collapse of a 1994 denuclearization agree- assets in response to a potential missile test. “We do have some ment between Washington and Pyongyang. (See ACT, November concerns if [North Korea] were to launch a missile in the direc- 2002.) Pyongyang reportedly agreed to address those suspicions tion of Hawaii,” he said. last year in six-way negotiations as part of a secret side document. The deployments include transferring additional Terminal High (See ACT, May 2008.) Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles to Hawaii and sending Uranium enrichment can be used to produce low-enriched fuel the sea-based X-band radar, which has been docked at Pearl Harbor for nuclear power plants or high-enriched material that can serve as since 2007 for maintenance and upgrades, into the Pacific Ocean. the explosive core in nuclear weapons. THAAD missiles are designed to shoot down incoming ballistic The June 13 statement claimed that North Korea would be pursu- missiles during their final flight phase while the X-band radar is ing uranium enrichment to provide fuel for a light-water reactor intended to track incoming warheads and single them out from it intended to construct. North Korea said it has been working on decoys. —PETER CRAIL ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 S. Korean Pyroprocessing Awaits U.S. Decision

he Obama administration ap- ing, a decision that could place certain remains mixed with other elements. pears likely to make a decision restrictions on South Korea’s develop- Advocates of pyroprocessing say the dif- T that could complicate potential ment of the process. ference makes the process significantly South Korean pursuit of a controversial Pyroprocessing differs from PUREX less proliferation-prone than PUREX and spent fuel treatment process known as (plutonium-uranium extraction) repro- that pyroprocessing therefore should pyroprocessing, according to comments cessing, which has been used in nuclear not be considered reprocessing. Many by current and former U.S. officials. energy and weapons programs around nonproliferation advocates say the dif- They say the administration probably the world, because the plutonium sepa- ferences are not very significant from a will classify pyroprocessing as reprocess- rated from spent fuel by pyroprocessing nonproliferation standpoint. 33 Questions about pyroprocessing have Frank von Hippel, a Princeton Univer- mation on that point when he posed a gained prominence as South Korea and sity professor who served as a nonprolif- written question to Rep. Ellen Tauscher the United States renegotiate their agree- eration official in the Clinton adminis- (D-Calif.), as part of her confirmation ment for civil nuclear cooperation, which tration, said in a June 15 e-mail that he process to be undersecretary of state expires in 2014. Under the agreement, for arms control and international the United States can restrict South Kore- security (see page 37). Lugar asked if an research in areas such as reprocessing. an agreement that “allowed any form The U.S. government has been di- of reprocessing” to take place in South vided on whether pyroprocessing is Korea would violate the 1992 Joint reprocessing. In a rare public statement Declaration of the Denuclearization of ASIA AND AUSTRALIA on the issue in May 2008 at the Carn- the Korean Peninsula. One provision egie Endowment for International Peace in the declaration states that North in Washington, Carter “Buzz” Savage, Korea and South Korea “shall not pos- director of fuel cycle research and devel- sess nuclear reprocessing and uranium opment in the Department of Energy, enrichment facilities.” said pyroprocessing “obviously” is re- Tauscher replied, “I believe that the processing if one carries out “the full existence of a reprocessing plant in flow sheet,” the sequence of activities [South Korea] would be inconsistent U.S. Senate U.S. followed in the process. with the commitments made in the In an interview last month, Savage 1992 joint declaration.” She did not said the Obama administration was still repeat Lugar’s “any form of reprocess- in the process of developing a broader Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) ing” formulation. policy statement that would encompass Although Tauscher was not an ad- that issue. But he referred back to his believes the Obama administration has ministration official when she provid- Carnegie statement and suggested that defined pyroprocessing as reprocessing. ed the answer, such responses generally the new policy was likely to be consis- Von Hippel is a leading advocate of the can be assumed to reflect an adminis- tent with that. As he had in his Carnegie view that pyroprocessing is reprocessing. tration’s position. remarks, he emphasized that the pyro- Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the For- The Department of State did not processing issue was only one element of eign Relations Committee’s ranking respond to requests for elaboration on South Korean-U.S. cooperation. member, appeared to be seeking infor- Tauscher’s answer.—DANIEL HORNER

Memo: An Historic Opportunity for Nuclear Disarmament From: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Action: Support U.S.-Russia Talks Now

This is the ofﬁcial policy of President Barack Obama and his administration:

• Seek deep, veriﬁable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons and work with other nuclear powers to reduce global stockpiles dramatically.

• Work with Russia to end dangerous Cold War policies like keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment’s notice, in a mutual and veriﬁable manner.

• Show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. (source: www.whitehouse.gov)

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY Take action now on this and other issues. Join the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Turn the Tide action alert network at

http://capwiz.com/wagingpeace. PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road Suite 1 • Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794 ARMS CONTROL T (805) 965-3443 • www.wagingpeace.org 34 THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAS THE STATES AND UNITED THE GAO Finds Gap in U.S. Export Controls

ensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily and legally purchased within the United States and ille- S gally exported without detection, according to a report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) last month. Using a fictitious front company and false identities, the GAO was able to purchase dual-use technology such as electronic sensors often used in improvised explosive devices, accelerometers used in “smart” bombs, and gyro chips used for guiding missiles and military aircraft. The GAO was also able to export the technology without detection to a country that it identified only as “a known trans- Chris Graythen/Getty Images Graythen/Getty Chris shipment point for terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire sensitive technology,” the GAO’s Gregory Kutz said in congressional testimony June 4. Kutz, managing director for forensic audits and investigations, was a witness at a hearing of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which had requested the GAO probe. Although items such as the ones the GAO purchased are often subject to export restrictions under the Commerce Control List or Gregory Kutz of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) the Department of State’s U.S. Munitions List, they can be legally speaks at a hearing in New Orleans Jan. 29, 2007. Testifying obtained from manufacturers and distributors within the United before Congress last month, Kutz said a fictitious front company States, often with only a name and a credit card, the report said. created by the GAO was able to export sensitive dual-use technology without detection to a country identified as “a known According to the report, the items have been and continue to be transshipment point for terrorist organizations and foreign used against U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Access to that governments attempting to acquire sensitive technology.” type of sensitive military technology could give terrorists or foreign governments an advantage in a combat situation against the United States, the report said. The report suggests that restricting domestic sales of dual-use Dual-use technology refers to technology that has both con- and military items could be key to preventing the illegal export ventional and military or proliferation uses. Machinery such as of such technology. a triggered spark gap, for example, can be used as a high-voltage switch for medical applications and a detonator for a nuclear Seeking a Balance weapon, the report said. Many U.S. companies balk at the prospect of more export con- The report cited officials from several government agencies as trols, arguing that they are obstacles to success in the global mar- saying there is no practical way to prevent such products from ket. At the confirmation hearing of Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), leaving the country after they have been purchased by a domestic whose nomination to be undersecretary of state for arms control buyer. The report noted that although regulations are in place to and international security was approved by the Senate June 25, prevent improper use of dual-use and military technology, these Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) expressed such concerns. regulations focus on controlling exports rather than on securing Because “a lot of technological growth is international,” com- domestic sales. Currently, there are no legal requirements for the panies would suffer if they “are prohibited from being engaged sellers of dual-use or military technology to conduct background internationally,” he said. Their viability and their “ability to cre- checks on prospective domestic customers. ate new technologies to make us safe” would be “compromised The GAO report highlights “an enormous loophole in the if those companies were to relocate in other countries that don’t law,” Rep. Bart Stupak (D-Mich.), chairman of the oversight have the same restrictions [as the United States] because they have ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 subcommittee, said in a statement at the hearing. ”The stakes modernized their national security assessments” that are the basis cannot be higher.” for export controls, he said at the June 9 Senate Foreign Relations According to the report, seven of the 12 types of sensitive dual- Committee hearing. He asked Tauscher to “review these programs use and military items obtained during the investigation have to make sure that we’re not disadvantaging American companies” previously been the focus of criminal indictments and convictions but also to avoid any action that would be “inconsistent with our for violations of export control laws. Additionally, a 2008 report by national security interests, which obviously comes first.” the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute revealed at- Tauscher said she planned to review U.S. export control poli- tempts by North Korea to procure dual-use technology from foreign cies. She stressed her commitment to protecting dual-use technol- sources for use in that country’s guided missile program. ogy on national security grounds, a stance echoed by the GAO Although there are programs in place to educate manufactur- report, which stated that “ensuring the effective protection of ers and distributors on common risks associated with the sale of technologies critical to U.S. national security” was now consid- military or dual-use technology, the lack of controls in place to ered a “high-risk area.” However, like Cardin, she noted the need regulate domestic sales limits the effectiveness of such programs, for a balance between commercial and security interests. U.S. the GAO report said. policy, she said, has to find the “sweet spot,” at which “we are 35 absolutely protecting the national security items, but at the same The issue of illegal retransfers resurfaced later in the month time, we’re cognizant that there’s a war of markets for things that with the June 11 sentencing of Traian Bujduveanu, a naturalized can be taken off the list.” U.S. citizen, who had been convicted for his role in a conspiracy The United States, which currently is the leading producer of to export dual-use aircraft parts illegally to Iran. Bujduveanu, the advanced military and dual-use technology, has become a pri- owner of Orion Aviation, was sentenced to 35 months in prison mary target for illegal procurement efforts launched by terrorists for helping to smuggle parts of F-14 fighter jets, Cobra AH-1 at- and foreign governments, the GAO report said. tack helicopters, and CH-53A military helicopters. Speaking at the June 4 hearing, Stupak addressed such con- The Department of Justice has publicly stated that roughly 43 cerns, saying he hoped to “discuss ways in which government percent of the more than 145 defendants charged in 2008 for and business can work together to ensure that our technological violating export controls of restricted military and dual-use tech- advantage is not used to jeopardize the safety of our troops, our nology were attempting to export munitions and other restricted allies, and our communities here at home.” technology to Iran or China. —EMMA ENSIGN

MDA Tests Laser Amid Budget Cutbacks THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS he Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) last month suc- T cessfully tested the tracking components of the Airborne Laser (ABL) system, the agency announced June 15. The Defense of Department tests, which took place June 6 and June 13, mark the first time the ABL system successfully detected and tracked a missile in the boost phase. These tests come amid a series of decisions reducing or eliminating the funding for some missile defense programs. The Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser system successfully detected and The ABL is a modified Boeing 747- tracked a missile in the boost phase for the first time during tests June 6 and 400F jumbo jet designed to detect, track, June 13. and ultimately destroy ballistic missiles during their boost phase, before they funding. The fiscal year 2010 request for close orbit of a country suspected of prepar- have exited Earth’s atmosphere. The ABL the ABL system was $186.7 million, down ing a missile launch, he said. system was designed to patrol in pairs, $214.1 million from the fiscal year 2009 With funding for the KEI canceled and utilizing infrared sensors to detect a mis- appropriation. (See ACT, June 2009.) The the ABL project relegated to the role of sile’s plume. Once the missile is detected, Defense Department plans to use the ABL technology demonstrator, the MDA has no two low-power, solid-state lasers track the currently being tested as a “technology active programs focused on intercepting missile and compensate for atmospheric demonstrator” and eliminate funding for ballistic missiles in their boost phase. Cur- disturbances; a high-power chemical a second ABL prototype, Secretary of De- rent programs focus on better-understood oxygen iodine laser (COIL) then destroys fense Robert Gates told the Senate Armed technology, such as the AEGIS ballistic the missile before it exits the atmosphere. Services Committee May 14. Funding that missile defense system, a sea-based system According to the press release, the MDA had been designated for the second air- that targets missiles during the ascent and plans to continue testing the tracking craft now will be used for the technology descent portions of the midcourse phase, system against progressively more dif- demonstration, he said. and the land-based Terminal High Altitude ficult targets before carrying out a com- The MDA press release uses the term Area Defense system, which can intercept plete demonstration later this year, when “prototype” to refer to the existing air- missiles in their terminal phase as they the ABL system will track and destroy a craft, but an MDA spokesperson said re-enter the atmosphere. ballistic missile in boost phase. nothing should be read into that termi- In total, $9.3 billion has been requested The ABL system is one of two boost- nology. The ABL that was tested is a tech- for missile defense programs in President phase missile defense systems originally nology demonstrator, “and no additional Barack Obama’s fiscal year 2010 budget, a ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY planned by the MDA. The other is the aircraft are proposed or planned,” he said reduction of $1.2 billion from the previ- ground-based Kinetic Energy Interceptor in a June 25 e-mail. ous year. Gates has said he is reorganizing (KEI). The Department of Defense’s fiscal The limited range of the ABL’s laser the missile defense effort to focus more on year 2010 budget request does not include components makes their use in the field terminal-phase defenses, which are de- funding for the KEI, which was originally tactically unrealistic, Gates said in his tes- signed to intercept a missile after it re-en-

ARMS CONTROL T developed by the Northrop Grumman timony. To make proper use of the ABL in ters the atmosphere. (See ACT, May 2009.) Corp. and has received $1.2 billion in the field, 20 of them would have to fly in —EBEN W. LINDSEY 36 Obama Arms Control Team Fills Out

our months after Inauguration Day, President Barack (NPR). In her response, Tauscher said the U.S. government has “the Obama’s arms control and nonproliferation team is ability to multitask.” While the NPR, which is due to be completed F taking shape. around the end of the year, is in process, there will be ongoing One important position was filled late last month when the guidance from the Pentagon on “the military requirements for the Senate approved the nomination of Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) stockpile and a number of other issues that are informing the ne- as undersecretary of state for arms control and international secu- gotiations and our negotiator,” she said. In her testimony, she also rity. Tauscher, whose congressional district contains two national emphasized the importance of concluding a follow-on agreement laboratories, has focused on arms control and nonproliferation before the December 5, 2009, expiration of START. issues throughout her career. As chair of the House Armed The question of conducting START follow-on talks before the Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, she has worked in completion of the NPR became a key issue delaying Tauscher’s con- Congress to strengthen nonproliferation programs and pushed firmation. After the committee unanimously approved Tauscher’s for greater oversight of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. At nomination, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) placed a hold on it. Kyl’s hold her June 9 confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Rela- on Tauscher’s nomination was reportedly related to the START fol- tions Committee, she expressed her commitment to Obama’s low-on talks. Following a briefing by the State Department on the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and indicated that START talks, Kyl dropped the hold June 25, and the full Senate con- arms reductions by the United States would help the U.S. firmed Tauscher that night under a unanimous consent motion. government promote its nonproliferation goals. Working under Tauscher is Rose Gottemoeller, who has already “By reducing our nuclear arsenal, the United States, in my view, been confirmed as the assistant secretary of state for verifica- will be in a better position to prevent the spread of nuclear as well tion, compliance, and implementation. She is leading the U.S. as chemical and biological weapons,” said Tauscher. delegation to the START follow-on talks with Russia. During the The committee’s ranking Republican, Sen. Richard Lugar (Ind.), Clinton administration, Gottemoeller served as deputy under- asked her to “answer critics” in the Senate who believe it is inap- secretary of energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation and was propriate to conduct negotiations with Russia for a START follow-on director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian affairs in the National agreement before the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review Security Council (NSC). ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Nicholas Kamm/AFP/Getty Images Kamm/AFP/Getty Nicholas

Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.) greets President Barack Obama May 22 in Washington. Late last month the Senate approved Tauscher’s nomination as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security. 37 Also reporting to Tauscher is Andrew Shapiro, who was George Look, who is responsible for treaty-based nonproliferation confirmed June 19 as assistant secretary for political and military efforts for the White House, including the 2010 NPT Review affairs. From 2001 to 2009, he served as senior defense and for- Conference. Look, a longtime civil servant, formerly was execu- eign policy adviser to Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), who tive director of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory is now secretary of state. Board at the State Department. In another State Department appointment, the White House In the Department of Defense, Andrew C. Weber has been announced June 1 that Robert Einhorn had been appointed special confirmed as assistant to the secretary of defense for nuclear, adviser to Clinton for nonproliferation and arms control. His office chemical, and biological defense programs. Weber, whose will be located within the Bureau of International Security. Einhorn nomination was confirmed May 18, most recently served as the served as assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation during the Defense Department adviser for threat reduction policy and is Clinton administration. James Timbie will continue in his long- responsible for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction standing role as senior adviser to the undersecretary for interna- program, which focuses on weapons of mass destruction and tional security and nonproliferation. their materials, particularly in the former Soviet Union. Also in the State Department, Susan Burk, who led U.S. Marcel Lettre II, former national security adviser to Senate preparations for the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), has been appointed (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, was confirmed June principal director for countering weapons of mass destruction. He 2 as special representative of the president for nuclear nonpro- works for Rebecca Hersman, deputy assistant secretary of defense liferation. She will lead the U.S. delegation at the 2010 NPT for countering weapons of mass destruction. Review Conference. Bonnie Jenkins has been confirmed as the Edward L. “Ted” Warner, formerly assistant defense secretary THE UNITED AND STATES THE AMERICAS State Department coordinator for threat reduction programs. for strategy and threat reduction, is working with Gottemoeller In addition to serving as a program officer for U.S. foreign and as the official representative of the Defense Department to the security policy at the Ford Foundation and a research fellow START follow-on talks with Moscow. at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Obama has yet to announce his pick for director of the Harvard University, Jenkins was on the staff of the National Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The acting director is Maj. Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also Gen. Randy E. Manner. known as the 9/11 Commission. In May, the Senate also approved the nomination of Daniel Pone- At the White House, Gary Samore is coordinator for arms con- man to become deputy secretary of energy. Poneman served from trol and WMD (weapons of mass destruction) terrorism. Samore 1993 to 1996 as special assistant to the president and senior director is a former vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations and for nonproliferation and export controls at the NSC. Before that, he previously worked in the Clinton NSC as the senior director for served as White House fellow in the Energy Department under the nonproliferation and export controls. Working with Samore is George H.W. Bush administration. — EBEN W. LINDSEY

The Robert Bosch Foundation Fellowship Program

Fostering a Community of Transatlantic Leaders

The Robert Bosch Stiftung and CDS International, Inc. invite U.S. Applications must be received professionals to apply for the 2010-2011 Robert Bosch Foundation no later than October 15, 2009 for the program year beginning in Fellowship Program. Twenty Fellows will complete a nine-month September 2010. program consisting of two high-level work phases in major German institutions and three Europe-wide seminars. Bosch Fellows meet Program information and the online application can be found on the CDS with key decision makers in the public and private sectors, and website: www.cdsintl.org/bosch deepen their understanding of issues facing Germany, the EU, and the transatlantic relationship today.

German language skills are not required at the time of application. For more information, please contact: Intensive language training is provided as needed in the U.S. and

ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY Germany prior to the program year. Fellows receive a generous The Robert Bosch Foundation compensation package including a monthly stipend, health Fellowship Program insurance, and all program-related travel expenses. Candidates CDS International, Inc 440 Park Avenue South, 2nd Floor must be U.S. citizens between the ages of 23 and 34 with New York, NY 10016 professional experience in one of the following fields: Business Tel: (212) 497-3518 Fax: (212) 497-3586

ARMS CONTROL T Administration, Economics, Law, Political Science, Public Policy, or Email: [email protected] Journalism/Mass Communications. 38 IAEA Finds Uranium at Second Syrian Site AFRICA AND EAST MIDDLE THE

nspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency site “could be consistent with ura- (IAEA) have discovered traces of an undeclared form of nium used in a nuclear reactor.” (See I uranium at a second Syrian site, according to a June 5 IAEA ACT, March 2009.) report. The find adds further questions to a year-long IAEA inquiry A diplomatic source said June 18 into allegations that Syria had secretly pursued nuclear weapons. that the IAEA is still analyzing the The newly discovered uranium traces come from annual uranium from Dair al Zour. environmental samples the agency took in August 2008 from During a June 15-19 IAEA Board “hot cells,” containments that are shielded to allow safe han- of Governors meeting, Syrian of-

dling of radioactive material. The hot cells are in a facility ficials sought to downplay the pres- IAEA that also houses Syria’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor, a ence of the particles discovered in 30-kilowatt miniature reactor that Syria bought from China the hot cells. Ibrahim Othman, in 1991. Such reactors typically are used for training and The diplomatic source said that director-general of radioisotope production. Syria claimed during the board meet- Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission The IAEA described the detected particles as being “of a type ing that Damascus only recently be- not declared at the facility.” gan using the hot cells once again for The agency indicated that Syria has failed to explain the ori- student research. According to the source, Syria said the IAEA gin of the chemically processed uranium and that further anal- would be expected to pick up activity from such renewed use. ysis is needed to determine if there is a connection to similar The Associated Press also quoted Ibrahim Othman, director- traces found at a facility Israel destroyed in 2007 at a site called general of Syria’s Atomic Energy Commission, describing the Dair al Zour. Washington claims that the destroyed facility was finding as only “one particle or two particles.” Another diplo- a nuclear reactor that Damascus was building with North Ko- matic source disputed Othman’s claim, telling Arms Control To- rean assistance to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. (See day June 22 that the agency discovered “a significant number of ACT, May 2008.) A senior UN official said in February that the particles, close to the number found at Dair al Zour.” chemical composition of the uranium particles found at that The United States has called on Syria to cooperate with the ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Dieter Nagl/AFP/Getty Images Nagl/AFP/Getty Dieter

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors meets on June 15 in Vienna. During the June 15-19 meeting, the board discussed the presence of uranium traces found by IAEA inspectors taking routine environmental samples at Syria’s Miniature Neutron Source Reactor located near Damascus in August 2008. 39 IAEA to resolve all unanswered issues raised by the agency. neutrons in its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Barium sulfate can be Geoffrey Pyatt, U.S. deputy chief of mission to the IAEA, told used as a shielding material in similar reactors. the 35-member board that there needed to be an understanding According to the June 5 report, Damascus told the IAEA that why “material that was not previously declared to the IAEA was the pumping station was used for civil water purification. Syria detected at two facilities in Syria, one of which was being con- also claimed that the graphite was intended for its steel industry structed clandestinely,” Agence France-Presse reported June 18. and the barium sulfate for shielding radiation therapy centers, In addition to seeking answers regarding the uranium par- the report said. ticles, the agency has sought an explanation of Syria’s efforts The IAEA said that it could not yet confirm these explana- to obtain items that could be used in constructing a nuclear tions and that a May 24 letter Damascus sent to the agency did reactor. In particular, the IAEA sought to clarify the role of the not contain any of the requested supporting documentation for pumping station on the Euphrates River associated with the de- Syria’s claims. stroyed Dair al Zour facility and the purpose of the large quanti- The agency is also still assessing Syria’s denial of alleged coop- ties of graphite and barium sulfate sought by Syrian entities. eration between Syrian and North Korean nuclear scientists and North Korea used graphite as a moderating material to absorb with a North Korean import/export firm. —PETER CRAIL THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

U.S. Still Committed to Engaging Iran

esponding to postelection tur- ton said during a June 17 press conference ning discussions with Iran on its nuclear moil in Iran and accusations of with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor program following the June 12 elections. R voting fraud in favor of Iranian Lieberman that the United States is “obvi- (See ACT, June 2009.) President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Wash- ously waiting to see the outcome of the Since then, U.S. officials have cautiously ington has reaffirmed its intention to pur- internal Iranian process, but our intent is tried to avoid drawing conclusions regard- sue a dialogue with Tehran regarding its to pursue whatever opportunities might ing the results of the Iranian elections, nuclear program. exist in the future with Iran.” Washington held on June 12, as the results are still in Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clin- previously expressed an interest in begin- dispute. However, Obama said during a ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY Getty Images Getty ARMS CONTROL T Iranian supporters of presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi protest disputed election results June 16 in Tehran. 40 Table 1: Natanz Operations as of May 31, 2009 Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant is intended to house two production halls, A and B, with each hall comprising eight units of 18 centrifuge cascades each. Each cascade contains 164 individual centrifuges. Iran has completed one 18-cascade unit and is currently expanding or preparing to work on four additional units simultaneously. This chart shows where such operations are currently ongoing. The operating cascades are those running with the uranium hexafluoride feedstock used to produce enriched uranium.

Unit Cascades Operating Total Cascades Installed Total Centrifuges

A24 18 18 2,952

A25 Pre-installation work —

A26 12 18 2,952

A27 — 8 (plus 5 centrifuges) 1,317

A28 Pre-installation work — TOTAL 7,221

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency

June 16 CNBC interview that concerns low-enriched uranium, the IAEA indi- June 5 report said the agency has held regarding Iran’s nuclear efforts, as well as cated that “improvements to the contain- discussions with Iran for that purpose. its support for U.S.-designated terrorist ment and surveillance measures” at the During a June 15-19 IAEA Board of groups, “would be true whoever came out facility are needed for the agency to “ful- Governors meeting, agency Director- on top in this election.” ly meet its safeguards objectives.” The General Mohamed ElBaradei questioned “Either way, it’s important for the Unit- ed States to engage in the tough diplomacy around those permanent security concerns that we have—nuclear weapons, funding of terrorism,” he said.

IAEA Reports Enrichment Buildup Against the backdrop of leadership questions in Tehran, Iran has continued to expand its uranium-enrichment activities at its commercial-scale Natanz plant. A June 5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report indicated that, as of the end of May, Iran had installed a total of about 7,000 centrifuges at that facility. Of those, about 5,000 are running with uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock used to produce enriched uranium, the IAEA said. Enriched uranium can be used at low concentrations of the uranium-235 iso- ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 tope to power most nuclear plants; at high concentrations, it can be used in nuclear weapons. Since enrichment operations began in February 2007, Iran has

produced about 1,300 kilograms of low- Iran of Government enriched uranium hexafluoride. The centrifuge expansion at Natanz has now started to take place in the third of five 3,000-centrifuge “units” that Iran has prepared for such installation Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tours his country’s commercial-scale uranium- (see Table 1). enrichment plant at Natanz April 8, 2008. An International Atomic Energy Agency In response to this expansion of the report indicated last month that, as of the end of May, Iran had installed a total of about number of centrifuges being installed 7,000 centrifuges at the Natanz facility. Of those, about 5,000 are running with uranium and the increased production rate for hexafluoride, the feedstock used to produce enriched uranium. 41 the need for the continued expansion of Iran’s enrichment plant. “Why is there a rush now for Iran to build its enrichment capability in terms of industrial capacity?” he asked, adding, “There is no commercial need for it right now.” ElBaradei made the comments as part of a reiterated call for a “freeze for freeze,” in which Iran halts the additional installation of centrifuges while the UN Security Council agrees not to pursue additional sanctions. Since 2006, the council has demanded that Iran sus-

pend all enrichment operations and has Images Bleier/AFP/Getty Karen

THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA adopted three sanctions resolutions in response to Iran’s refusal to comply. The freeze-for-freeze concept was part of a revamped proposal for negotiations offered by the permanent members of the council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany to Iran last year. (See ACT, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor July/August 2008.) Iran’s response to this Lieberman address the press June 17 at the State Department. parallel freeze proposal is also reportedly being considered as a potential “bench- mark” by the six countries to denote States would review progress in any nego- mission to the IAEA, told the agency’s progress in negotiations with Tehran on tiations by the year’s end. board during the June meeting that the nuclear issue. (See ACT, June 2009.) The Associated Press reported June 17 Washington was still open to the freeze- Obama said in May that the United that Geoffrey Pyatt, U.S. deputy chief of for-freeze idea. —PETER CRAIL ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY ARMS CONTROL T

42 EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION SOVIET FORMER THE AND EUROPE Russia Vetoes UN Mission in Georgia

ussia voted against extending the mandate of the integrity of Georgia. Russia’s am- United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) bassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin R in the Security Council June 15, scuttling a last-min- said there was no sense in extend- ute effort to renew the mission’s mandate and dealing anoth- ing the original mandate “since it’s er blow to the already strained Conventional Armed Forces in built on old realities.” Ten states in Europe (CFE) Treaty. the Security Council voted in favor The vote ended the nearly 16-year-old mission to help keep of the extension, with four absten- the peace between Georgia and its breakaway territory of Ab- tions. Russia was the only country to UN Photo UN khazia. In a press release following the vote, the Russian For- vote against the resolution, but, as a eign Ministry called the proposed extension of the mandate permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has veto power. “useless in the present situation” because it does not refer to Russian Ambassador Abkhazia as an independent state. Moscow recognized the Russia signed treaties of friendship to the UN Vitaly Churkin independence of Abkhazia and nearby South Ossetia follow- with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in ing Russia’s conflict with Georgia in August 2008. September 2008 and pledged to guarantee the security of the two UNOMIG was established in 1994 to monitor a ceasefire territories. Under the mutual assistance pacts, Russia is setting up between Georgia and separatists in Abkhazia following a se- one military base in each territory and has taken responsibility ries of conflicts after the fall of the Soviet Union. The mission for guarding the Abkhazian and South Ossetian borders. set up a demilitarized zone along the Abkhazian border and a Moscow’s decision to recognize the independence of the two broader region where heavy weapons were not permitted. As territories and to commit military forces to their defense further of February, UNOMIG was staffed by 151 international uni- clouds the future of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The treaty, which gov- formed personnel. erns military force levels in Europe, was adapted by its parties British, French, and U.S. diplomats wanted to extend the in 1999 to take into account the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact UNOMIG mandate with a reference to Security Council Reso- and the expansion of NATO. The adapted treaty has not come lution 1808, in which the council reaffirmed the territorial into force, pending ratification by the NATO states. ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 Ibragim Chkadua/AFP/Getty Images Chkadua/AFP/Getty Ibragim

Members of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) arrive for a meeting with Sergey Bagapsh, the president of Georgia’s breakaway territory of Abkhazia, June 19 in Sukhumi. During a June 15 meeting of the Security Council, Russia voted against extending the mandate of UNOMIG. The vote ended the nearly 16-year-old mission to help keep the peace between Georgia and Abkhazia. 43 At the 1999 Istanbul summit that produced the Adapted CFE, Russia made a nonbinding “political” commitment to shutter its military bases in Georgia and to reduce its military presence there. Russia continued to maintain a small “peacekeeping” garrison in Abkhazia after Ibragim Chkadua/AFP/Getty Images Chkadua/AFP/Getty Ibragim the 1999 summit, and NATO countries refused to ratify the adapted treaty while those forces remained in Georgia. (See ACT, January/February 2007.) Frustrated by the NATO refusal to ratify the Adapted CFE, President Vladimir Putin suspended Russia’s implementation of the original treaty Dec. 12, 2007. (See ACT, January/ February 2008.) Addressing the Security Council after A Russian soldier allows a United Nations van to cross the border of Abkhazia and the vote last month, Rosemary DiCarlo, Georgia Oct. 28, 2008. The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia was established the U.S. alternative representative for in 1994 to monitor a ceasefire between Georgia and separatists in Abkhazia following a EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION series of conflicts after the fall of the Soviet Union. special political affairs at the UN, said the United States “deeply regrets” the failure to extend the UNOMIG mandate and stressed the importance of called these observers a “considerable restraining factor” on ten- a UN presence in Georgia. sions in the region and said that Russia is “ready to continue and An EU observer mission is now operating in Georgia, but it strengthen our cooperation with the European Union in this will end Oct. 1 unless its mandate is extended by the EU mem- area.” Unlike the UN monitors, however, the EU observers do not ber states. In a June 15 statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry have free access to territory inside Abkhazia. —COLE HARVEY ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY ARMS CONTROL T

44 By Greg Thielmann LOOKING BACK: The National Missile Defense Act of 1999

The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 was described by its chief for the U.S. decision in 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which had been a sponsor, Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), as “the necessary first step keystone in the management of the U.S.- Russian strategic relationship. The Russians to protecting the United States from long-range ballistic missile abandoned START II on the day after U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In ratify- attack.”1 Indeed, the act constituted an important milestone on the ing START II, the Russian Duma had con- ditioned its approval on continuing U.S. road to U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty adherence to the ABM Treaty. The Russian abandonment of START II, in 2002, a step that the sponsors of the act advocated. Although which the United States had never ratified, removed any chance of reducing Rus- the act itself neither authorized any programs nor appropriated sian strategic offensive forces under the stabilizing terms of that treaty. Although any funds, it was misrepresented then and has been misrepresented Russian missile and warhead numbers continued to decline even without START since as proof of strong congressional support for the urgent and II, the Russians were able to retain “heavy ICBMs” and other land-based ballistic unqualified pursuit of strategic missile defenses. missiles with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles. In short, China and Russia have increased the quality and, in the case of China, the quantity, of their strategic The National Missile Defense Act gave Ironically, the threat assessments on ballistic missile forces in response to U.S. the United States a clearly stated policy goal: which the act was based have proven missile defense programs. However, there to “deploy as soon as is technologically pos- unrealistic with regard to Iran, Iraq, and is no evidence that the U.S. programs sible an effective National Missile Defense North Korea. None of these countries and have dissuaded the states of proliferation system capable of defending the territory no other proliferant states have deployed concern from developing or deploying of the United States against limited ballistic long-range ballistic missiles in the decade ballistic missiles. missile attack (whether accidental, unau- following the act. thorized, or deliberate)....” These simple The sponsors of the act also identified Cold War Origins words essentially became executive branch growing Chinese missile deployments as The United States and the Soviet Union policy following the election of 2000. They a source of concern, “perhaps [the] most deployed limited numbers of strategic were adopted as a charter for the Missile troubling”2 in the words of Sen. Jesse missile defense interceptors and radars in Defense Agency, appearing prominently to- Helms (R-N.C.), the chairman of the Sen- the middle years of the Cold War. These ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009 day on the home page of the agency’s Web ate Foreign Relations Committee. Yet, the defenses were designed to cope with the site. Although the meaning of “effective” U.S. strategic ballistic missile defenses de- intercontinental-range (greater than has been subject to debate and the elections ployed after passage of the act were never 5,500 kilometers) and intermediate-range of 2006 and 2008 have affected the imple- intended to defend against a deliberate (3,000-5,500 kilometers) ballistic missiles, mentation of that policy, the act represents Chinese attack. with which the two sides could threaten an enduring symbol of the potent backing Those missile defense deployments were each other’s homeland. The U.S.S.R. went strategic missile defense has received from also not directed at a deliberate Russian first, deploying nearly 100 nuclear-armed Congress during the last 10 years. attack, although the act prepared the way ABM interceptors around Moscow in the

Greg Thielmann is a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, where he directs the Realistic Threat Assessments and Responses Project. He previously served as a senior professional staffer on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and was a U.S. Foreign Service Officer for 25 years. 45 1960s. The United States began deploying survive even to the present day. Report Spurs Action a comparable number of nuclear-armed The United States was susceptible to The second and most important substan- ABM interceptors at Grand Forks, North the no-less-potent illusion that it could tive development was the July 1998 release Dakota, in 1974. The 1972 ABM Treaty use technology to replace the defensive of the Report of the Commission to Assess had banned the United States and U.S.S.R. shield two oceans had historically provid- the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United from developing nationwide defenses as ed for keeping enemies at bay. Nurtured States, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, who well as systems or components for sea- by an almost unlimited faith in techno- had been President Gerald Ford’s secretary based, air-based, space-based, or mobile logical solutions and feeling the same of defense. The report’s executive sum-

Nurtured by an almost unlimited faith in technological solutions and feeling the same natural reluctance as the Soviets to accept vulnerability, Washington plowed ahead until the inevitable logic of cost effectiveness caught up with strategic defenses in the mid-1970s when the Safeguard ABM system was canceled and dismantled.

land-based ABM deployments. The treaty natural reluctance as the Soviets to accept mary warned that North Korea and Iran permitted each side to build ABM systems vulnerability, Washington plowed ahead would be able to inflict major destruction at two fixed locations for defense of each until the inevitable logic of cost effective- on the United States within about five national capital area and a land-based ness caught up with strategic defenses in years of a decision to acquire such a capa- missile base, with up to 100 interceptors the mid-1970s when the Safeguard ABM bility and that both placed “a high prior- at each site. A 1974 protocol to the treaty system was canceled and dismantled. ity on threatening U.S. territory” and were reduced that allowance, limiting each Although a new vision of a defensive even then “pursuing advanced ballistic side to only one site. The Soviets opted to umbrella that would render nuclear missile capabilities to pose a direct threat maintain their system around Moscow weapons “impotent and obsolete” was to U.S. territory.”4 The report claimed that while the United States elected to protect articulated by President Ronald Reagan in any other nation with a well-developed, a missile field in North Dakota, until 1983, the Strategic Defense Initiative he Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure Congress cut off funding in 1975. A 1997 launched two years later eventually fell could be within five years of an ICBM agreement on confidence-building mea- victim to the “cost effectiveness at the capability. Finally, the report warned that sures, negotiated in the ABM Treaty’s Spe- margin” criterion advocated by his own the United States “might have little or no cial Consultative Commission, precisely special adviser, Paul Nitze. Strategic mis- warning before operational deployment” demarcated strategic missile defense in- sile defense planning changed direction of these systems.5 terceptors from those that were designed successively under Presidents George H.W. The dire warnings of the Rumsfeld to intercept tactical and theater ballistic Bush and Bill Clinton, but research and Commission were subject to considerable missiles. The latter systems were deemed development funding remained robust criticism and controversy among experts. incapable of overcoming the technical throughout both presidencies, and neither Senate Democrats were still confident going challenge of coping with the much faster administration made any decision to de- into the August recess that year that they re-entry of ICBM and sea-launched ballistic ploy strategic defenses. could sustain efforts by the Clinton admin- missile warheads. Three events were key in creating the istration to avoid congressional passage of Although the Soviets sought to be able political environment for passage of the an unqualified endorsement of strategic to defend their capital and national lead- National Missile Defense Act. First was the missile defense in reaction to the report. ership against the new U.S. missile threat 1994 U.S. congressional elections, which The public, however, which had already that emerged in the 1960s, they never gave the Republicans a majority in the been spooked by Rumsfeld’s depiction of succeeded. U.S. warheads and the options House and Senate. The new speaker of the a potential near-term threat from “rogue ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY for countermeasures were too numerous House, Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), included state” ballistic missiles, was about to receive and the radars on which the Moscow “a renewed commitment to a National a further jolt. North Korea surprised the system relied too vulnerable. Yet, bureau- Missile Defense” in his “Contract With world with its August 31, 1998, attempt to cratic inertia, vested interests, and the America.”3 Republicans in both houses place a satellite in space using a three-stage psychological desire to have some de- consistently and relentlessly pursued this Taepo Dong-1 rocket. Although the at-

ARMS CONTROL T fense, however inadequate, have allowed goal as part of the GOP’s political agenda, tempt was unsuccessful, no missile re-entry vestiges of the Soviet/Russian system to culminating in passage of the 1999 act. vehicle was tested, and the system’s throw 46 weight was inadequate to deliver a nuclear- House bill passed the next day, 317-105. the ABM Treaty in late 2001 and a commit- sized payload to the United States, the Clinton announced in 2000 that strate- ment to deploy strategic defense intercep- political impact of the event was enormous. gic missile defenses, then under the rubric tors by 2004. The U.S.-based deployments Proponents of strategic missile defenses of the National Missile Defense program, and their “operational” designation were skillfully used the North Korean launch as were sufficiently promising and affordable accomplished only after Rumsfeld, whom vindication of the Rumsfeld Commission’s to justify continued development and test- Bush had appointed secretary of defense, warnings and accompanying allegations ing but that there was not sufficient infor- suspended traditional acquisition rules and that previous U.S. intelligence assessments mation about the technical and operational operational testing criteria, introducing an had been overly sanguine. effectiveness of the entire system to move unconventional and controversial “spiral” Most Democratic senators became forward with deployment. He noted that development process. By the end of two unwilling to stand behind White House critical elements, such as the booster rocket terms, the Bush administration was able to threats to veto the strategic missile defense for the interceptor, had not been tested and deploy a set of 20 ground-based missile de- resolution being pushed by the Republi- that there were questions about the sys- fense (GMD) interceptors at sites in Alaska can majority. The alternative strategy the tem’s ability to deal with countermeasures.6 and California and to plan for deploying Democrats chose was to make the issue go At the outset of the Bush administration another 24 there and 10 more in Poland. away by adding language to make the bill in 2001, the programmatic course of strate- The ABM Treaty constituted a tacit ac- uncontroversial. Amendments to the policy gic ballistic missile defense and the future knowledgment by both sides that unlim- bill provided reminders that any national of the ABM Treaty were still up in the air. ited strategic defenses constituted a threat missile defense program funding would That summer, a bipartisan majority of the to the stability of the balance in offensive have to be subject to annual authorization Senate Armed Services Committee even forces. Each side further demonstrated by and appropriation measures and that it was voted to reduce missile defense funding. its subsequent actions, albeit at different still U.S. policy to seek negotiated reduc- The September 11 attacks on the World times, that offenses and defenses were in- tions in Russian strategic forces. Clinton Trade Center and the Pentagon created an extricably connected. In 1988 the United stressed that the amendments made clear entirely different atmosphere for continu- States demanded that the Soviet Union that no deployment decision had been ing the debate. In the fearful wake of those dismantle the large phased-array radar made, but the simple language of the bill attacks, President George W. Bush was suc- Moscow was constructing at Krasnoyarsk implied strongly that Congress recognized cessful in supercharging strategic missile de- before Washington would agree to any new U.S. technological obstacles as the only ac- fense procurement and deployment. In spite offensive arms control limits.7 ceptable justification for delay. The Senate of virtually unanimous international oppo- In response to U.S. withdrawal from bill passed 97-3 on March 17, 1999. The sition, he announced U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002, Russia Scott J. Ferrell/Congressional Quarterly/Getty Images Quarterly/Getty Ferrell/Congressional J. Scott ARMS CONTROL TODAY July/August 2009

Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss., left), Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa., center), and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) watch as staffers carry a chart displaying the estimated range of North Korean missiles during a June 29, 1999, enrollment ceremony for the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 in Washington. Cochran, the legislation’s chief sponsor, described the act as “the necessary first step to protecting the United States from long-range ballistic missile attack.” 47 announced one day later that it would no longer consider itself bound by START II, consistent with the Duma’s ratification terms in 2000, which were contingent on continuation of the ABM Treaty. Thus, not for the first or last time, U.S. determination

to escape from strategic missile defense Images Samad/AFP/Getty Jewel strictures led to the loss of an opportunity to secure lower limits and stabilizing measures in strategic offensive forces. In 2004 the Bush administration began talks with eastern European states to explore the potential use of their territory for deployment of U.S. GMD interceptors and a sophisticated midcourse X-band radar. By Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifies before the end of his administration, Bush had se- the Senate Armed Services Committee June 16. Although a North Korean ICBM cured agreements with the Czech Republic capability was seen as imminent when the National Missile Defense Act was passed for hosting the radar and Poland for host- in 1999, Cartwright estimated that North Korea is still at least three to five years ing the missile interceptors, but the agree- away from such a capability. ments remain to be ratified by the host governments. Meanwhile, on the U.S. side, tion of the Soviet Union. That pursuit did, ceptual framework of the treaty. Moreover, the pendulum again seems to be swinging however, derail START II, the next step of the United States rushed to deploy defenses away from the urgent priority assigned to negotiated reductions in U.S. and Russian against the rogue-state ICBM missile threat strategic missile defense by the Bush ad- strategic forces. In order to satisfy the before that threat materialized and before ministration. President Barack Obama said requirements of START II, Moscow would U.S. defensive systems had been adequately in his April 5, 2009, Prague speech that he have had to deploy only single-warhead tested. These actions cost the United States would only go forward with a missile de- ICBMs, leading to a force structure with dearly in terms of treasure spent and op- fense system in Europe that was “cost effec- greater crisis stability and possibly with portunities lost to reduce the threat from its tive and proven.” His revised request for the fewer overall warheads than it currently potential adversaries with the most lethal Missile Defense Agency in the fiscal year has. U.S. strategic missile defense deploy- capabilities, against which U.S. strategic 2010 budget was $7.8 billion, a $1.2 billion ments also provided additional incen- forces are still principally directed. ACT funding cut in missile defense.8 tives for the modernization of Chinese strategic forces that so troubled Helms at ENDNOTES Conclusion the time the act was debated. Using for- In this tenth anniversary year of the Na- mulas familiar to U.S. and Russian strate- 1. “Senate Backs Missile Defense System,” tional Missile Defense Act, it is worth not- gic planners countering strategic defenses CNN.com, March 17, 1999, www.cnn.com/ ing that the North Korean ICBM seen as in the past, the Chinese have increased ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/17/missile.defense/. imminent when the act was passed has still the mobility and number of their deter- 2. Congressional Record, March 15, 1999, p. S2632. not been successfully flight-tested. Deploy- rent forces while improving the surviv- 3. Republican Contract with America, http://www. ment is down the road, “probably another ability of their re-entry vehicles. house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html. three to five years minimum,” according Actual threat history aside, the National 4. Greg Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise? The to Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman Missile Defense Act became an important Missile Report That Foretold the Iraq Intelligence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 9 Helms worried argument in the continuing policy debate Controversy,” Arms Control Today, July/August during the 1999 debate over the act that over the direction and pace of the strategic 2003, p. 3. “Iran may very well be able to deploy an missile defense program. After 1999, when- 5. Ibid. ICBM before America has a missile defense ever skeptics of missile defense raised pro- 6. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, to counter it, even if the United States grammatic issues, the act was cited as proof “White House Fact Sheet on National Missile breaks ground on construction tomorrow that an overwhelming and bipartisan ma- Defense,” September 1, 2000. 10 morning.” In fact, neither Iran nor any of jority in Congress had already established 7. Paul Lewis, “U.S. Ties Arms Deal to a Soviet the other emerging ballistic missile states a policy of rapid deployment, relegating Radar,” New York Times, September 1, 1988, the Rumsfeld Commission said could have other issues to a subordinate position. The http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/01/world/us- ICBMs by 2003 has them today. act prodded the executive branch to move ties-arms-deal-to-a-soviet-radar.html. ODAY July/August 2009 July/August ODAY The sponsors of the National Missile forward with little consideration of the full 8.“David Morgan, “Pentagon Seeks $1.2 Billion Defense Act were correct in predicting that repercussions. Following the superficial log- Cut for Missile Defense,” Reuters, May 7, 2009, the pursuit of strategic missile defenses out- ic of the act, the United States discarded the http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/ side the ABM Treaty would not necessarily ABM Treaty even though most of the U.S. idUSTRE5465CJ20090507. forestall additional reductions in the num- missile defense activities that have taken 9. Gen. James Cartwright, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 16, 2009. ARMS CONTROL T ber of Russian strategic missiles given the place between then and now could have state of Russia’s economy after the dissolu- been accommodated under the broad con- 10. Congressional Record, March 15, 1999, p. S2632. 48 James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies cns.miis.edu

NUCLEAR WAR COULD KILL MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. BE THE ONE WHO LEARNS HOW TO PREVENT IT.

Apply now to earn your Master’s Degree in International Policy Studies from the only graduate school in the world to offer a certiﬁcate in nonproliferation studies.

WWW.MIIS.EDU Acts of terror. Failed states. Border disputes. Crimes against humanity.

Has the world’s need for international security ever been greater?

For more than 35 years, the International Security Studies Program (ISSP) at The Fletcher School has prepared the world’s leaders to address security, defense, conﬂ ict and strategic issues through a multidisciplinary, global lens. Led by world-recognized faculty, the ISSP program features unique simulation exercises, a lecture series, world- recognized research and conferences, which combine with Fletcher’s curriculum to provide the optimal environment to address the 21st century’s most complex issues.

Experience the world at Fletcher. Contribute to the world with Fletcher.

Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Master of International Business (MIB) Master of Arts (MA) Global Master of Arts Program (GMAP) Executive Education (non-degreed) Master of Laws in International Law (LLM) Summer School (non-degreed)

Visit ﬂ etcher.tufts.edu or call 617.627.3040.