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Almost three years into the a de facto autonomous Syrian Kurdish po- Syrian Kurdish Political Activism: litical entity was established (Hawar news). A Social Movement Theory It appears the conflict provided the with the opportunity to create an entity in Perspective which the dominant party was able to cre- ate transitional governments in the three Kurdish cantons, albeit without elections (“Flight of Icarus?” 1).

Rojava—the Kurdish name for the areas forming Syrian —became rele- vant not only within but for the whole Middle East as a potential regional politi- Wietse van den Berge cal actor and the second autonomous Kurdish area after the Kurdish Regional Syrian Kurdish politics is complex. While Keywords: Syria; Kurds; Political Parties; Government in (Gunter 1). This article the political parties appear rather similar PYD; KNC focuses on the dynamics between macro in terms of their goals, fierce inter-party and micro level occurring within Syrian rivalry exists, nonetheless. Shedding Introduction Kurdish politics. From both a scientific and some light on Syrian Kurdish politics us- During 2014 the Syrian conflict, which be- a societal perspective, future analysis ben- ing Social Movement Theory as a theo- gan in 2011, a new stage was reached as efits from better understanding regarding retical framework, this article deals with came under threat from the intentions and interests of the new en- how and why Syrian Kurds choose a spe- the Islamic State. The Syrian-Kurdish can- tity. The main research question in this cific political party. Interviews with Syrian ton of Kobanî became the focal point of study is why do Syrian Kurds choose to Kurdish political activists in Iraqi Kurdi­ global media reporting on the fight be- support specific political parties? stan provide the data. The interviews tween jihadists and Kurdish forces. The point out that a striking cleavage exists: shared threat presented by the Islamic Since Rojava declared autonomy, two ma- Respondents sympathizing with the dom- State appears to bring the politically jor blocs have dominated its politics: the inant political party preferred social fragmented Syrian Kurds closer together Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Partiya equality, while interviewees belonging to (Rudaw). Yekîtiya Demokrat; PYD) and the Kurdish other parties have a preference for non- National Council (Encûmena Niştimanîya violence. Kurdî li Sûriyê, KNC) (Hevian 46; Hokayem

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78-79). The self-description of both em- ever, these organizations do not exactly Theoretical Framework and Methodology phasizes their struggle for an autonomous match the western idea of political par- Social Movement Theory’s different and democratic Syrian Kurdistan in which ties—associated with electoral processes schools focus on collective action (Opp minority rights are guaranteed (KNC; PYD; (Allsopp 6). If the party narratives are rath- 47-48). Framing Theory assumes individu- Sinclair and Kajjo). But neither have yet er similar, then how and why do people als interpret situations according to an id- outlined what they mean by these key con- choose one specific political party and not iosyncratic reference, the frame, which in- cepts. (Savelsberg, “The Syrian-Kurdish another one? To answer this question, fluences their consequential behavior Movements” 102). Their resources differ which is essentially about political mobili- (Benford and Snow 614). Collective Iden- greatly: “Although the KNC is a coalition of zation, this study will use Social Movement tity Approach assumes that the more an more than a dozen Kurdish parties, it Theory to provide an explanatory model. individual feels a sense of belonging to a wields no real power in the region. It lacks, group, the greater the chance that the in- above all, the military force and other nec- Applying Social Movement Theory to po- dividual participates in politics on behalf essary means […] to counter the well-orga- litical mobilization among Syrian Kurds is of that group (Klandermans 889). Political nized PYD” (Hevian 47). Furthermore, it is not completely new. Jordi Tejel studied Opportunity Structure assumes “exoge- argued that both blocs are influenced by the Syrian Kurdish 2004 revolt nous factors enhance or inhibit prospects foreign actors. PYD is closely linked to the using an implicit Social Movement Theory for mobilization” (Meyer and Minkoff Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên model, focusing on the macro level. Ac- 1457). Finally, Resource Mobilization The- Kurdistan; PKK), originating in Turkish- cording to Karl-Dieter Opp political mobi- ory focuses on social support and assets Kurdistan. KNC’s parties have strong con- lization involves a reciprocal process in within society that need to be mobilized nections to different foreign parties like the which both the macro and micro level are (McCarthy and Zald 1213). These different Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya De- involved. It makes this research—that does approaches appear to complement or mokrata Kurdistanê, KDP) and the Patriotic include the macro-micro dynamics—a nec- overlap one another. They share Mancur Union of Kurdistan (Yekêtiy Niştîmaniy essary complement to Tejel’s to under- Olson’s Theory of Collective Action of an Kurdistan, PUK) from Iraqi-Kurdistan. In ad- stand political mobilization in Rojava. As individual being a rational actor, despite dition, some KNC-parties sympathize with far as the studies overlap, studying similar different interpretations of the concept of the PKK as well (Savelsberg, “The Syrian- phenomena in different times and circum- rationality (Opp 2-8). Kurdish Movements” 94-96). stances makes a comparative analysis pos- sible. Other research has applied Social Theoretical Framework: Structural-Cogni- Although exact numbers are lacking, it is Movement Theory in a Middle Eastern set- tive Model estimated that approximately ten percent ting but not to Syria (Munson; Wiktorowicz), Opp combines the schools of Social of Syria’s nearly two million Kurds are nor to the Syrian Kurds (Leenders and Movement Theory mentioned above into members of organizations that are labeled Heydemann). a comprehensive model. In it, he consid- political parties (Sinclair and Kajjo). How- ers these approaches as hypotheses. He

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assumes that micro-macro-level dynamics als (micro level) choose specific parties In the Ottoman Empire the Kurds experi- (between individuals and groups) are es- (macro level). enced autonomy as part of the millet-pol- sential in understanding political mobiliza- icy, providing a high level of self-rule to tion: Methodology: Literature Review and minorities within the Empire with Kurds Semi-Structured Interviews having their own principalities and king- The framing perspective deals with The study’s contextual base is a literature doms (Black 210). This history, together macro-to-micro relationships (ef- review of Syrian Kurdish politics. Apart with a culture distinctive from that of the fects of social movement activities on from Tejel’s, relatively few studies exist neighboring Arab, Persian and Turkish frame alignment) and […] with the re- about politics in Rojava (Allsopp 7; Tejel 1). people, lead to the inclusion of the Kurds lationships of framing and incentives. Developments in the Syrian conflict trig- in the 1920 Sèvres Treaty, intended to […] The resource mobilization and ger new research and publications on pol- achieve peace between the Ottoman Em- political opportunity structure per- itics in Rojava. For current affairs (social) pire and the Allies of World War I. Article spectives focus on the macro model media are important but unreliable 62 of the treaty promised “local autonomy and—implicitly—adumbrate macro- sources. In order not to rely completely on for the predominantly Kurdish areas” and to-micro relationships. The theory of secondary or tertiary sources, interviews Article 64 spoke of “an independent Kurd- collective action is the only one that were conducted in the region. The litera- ish state of the Kurds”. The Sèvres Treaty explicitly addresses micro and macro ture review provided the basis for the was never ratified and the 1923 Lausanne relationships, but the theory does semi-structured interviews. Treaty sealed its fate by granting Turkish not mention framing. The identity borders. Meanwhile, following the 1916 approach is mainly a micro model, Syrian Kurdish History and Present Situa- Sykes-Picot Agreement Iraq and Syria had although there are hints of effects of tion come under control of Great Britain and macro structures on identity forma- While the origin of the Kurdish people can France, respectively (Khidir 26), dissolving tion. The micro-to-macro relationship be traced back approximately 5,000 years, the creation of a Kurdish state. from individual to collective protest the traditional starting point of modern France acknowledged the sectarian diffi- is not addressed by any perspective. Middle Eastern history appears to begin culties of its inter-war Syrian mandatory (Opp 335, italics in original) with the First World War (1914-1918) and the area and divided it into several autono- consequential fall of the Ottoman Empire mous regions, although, the Syrian Kurds Opp’s is a cyclical model in which macro (Fisk; Tejel). Strictly speaking, this is correct did not receive an autonomous area aspects influence the individual, but in in the case of the Syrian Kurds, because (Dorin), and Syria gained independence which the individual’s shared preferences Syria as a modern political entity only came in 1946. A series of coups d’états occurred also affect the macro level. For this article into existence as a French mandate region during the first two decades of indepen- to focus on micro-macro-dynamics, it will after the First World War (Allsopp 20) be- dent Syria, until Baʿth Party seized power use Opp’s model to explain why individu- fore which only Kurds existed. in 1963. The Baʿth Party had a secular,

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strong Arab-nationalist agenda. They key threatened war and to cut off water the Kurdish movement and the re- changed the country’s name from Syrian supplies to Syria the regime forced Öcalan gime. The former has gained a certain Republic into Syrian Arab Republic when to leave, which eventually led to his arrest. freedom of action to create space for they assumed power (Allsopp 22), exclud- It shows how the Syrian regime used the protest where Kurdish ethnicity can be ing people considering themselves non- Kurds in its regional power play (Hokayem openly displayed. The latter seems to Arabs, like the Kurds. They enforced pro- 79), bringing Tejel to label the rule under confirm the selective withdrawal of the grams of Arabization upon non-Arabs Baʿth Party leader Hafez al-Asad (1970- state. […] Bashar al-As‘ad [sic] seems whom the Baʿth considered a threat. Harsh 2000) “the years of exploitation” (Tejel 62). prepared to tolerate the consolidation repression of Kurds occurred: they erased The death of Hafez al-Asad and succes- of a Kurdish space (cultural and sym- Kurdish references from culture, enforced sion by his western educated son Bashar bolic), at least for the time being. (Tejel relocations (Tejel 65) and took Syrian na- in 2000 led to expectations and hope of 136-37) tionality from between 120,000 (Tejel 51) modernization and democratization with- and 300,000 (Allsopp 148-75; Hokayem in Syria. However, disappointment in- Nevertheless, dissatisfaction among the 78) Kurds. The Arabization policy also frus- creased among Syria’s population, includ- whole Syrian population remained, espe- trated Kurdish political ambitions to unite ing its Kurds, when these expectations cially when the regime proved incapable the different Kurdish areas and create a were not fulfilled (Hokayem 21-38).The of coping with a drought that greatly af- Kurdish state. With this ambition in mind combination of disappointment and the fected Syrian agriculture. In the wake of the first Syrian Kurdish political party was repressive measures ignited the 2004 Qa- uprisings in other Arab countries small established in 1957. Together with its off- mishli revolt among Kurds in Rojava. It was scale protests occurred in Damascus in spring it aimed at political, cultural and named after the city where the main pro- February 2011, without any follow-up. Only socio-economic emancipation of the tests occurred. Eventually the uprising when regime forces cracked down hard Kurds and the democratization of all of stopped after Kurdish parties urged for on protests by schoolchildren in the south- Syria (Allsopp 28). cessation of violence. It made the Syrian ern city of Derʿā in March 2011, a process Under Baʿth Party rule, Syrian Kurdish po- regime aware of the Kurdish capacity for of escalation ignited that eventually lead litical parties went underground (Allsopp collective action. Since then, as there was to the Syrian Civil War (Hokayem 9-20). 31-34). This appears in sharp contrast with no active civil society among the Kurds, Syria’s Kurds initially kept a low profile in Baʿth Party’s aid to PKK during the 1980s the regime allowed Kurdish parties a piv- the conflict. Only when regime forces with- and 1990s: ”[I]ts [Baʿth Party] support was otal role between authorities and the drew from Rojava mid-July 2012 did the not due to its love for in ; but rather Kurdish people. Kurdish militias fill the power vacuum and was the result of its adversarial policies hence became a prominent actor within with Turkey” (Hevian 46). The PKK-leader [T]he pacification of the protests led Syria (Crisis Group “Syria’s Kurds” 2-4). Abdullah Öcalan lived in the Syrian capi- by the Kurdish parties themselves was tal, Damascus, until 1998. Only when Tur- a prelude to a new balance between

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Current Syrian Kurdish Politics: The PYD The PYD’s image suffers from its link with Interviews and the KNC the PKK, designated by both the Europe- In the complex Syrian Kurdish politics—as Kurdish militias of the People’s Defense an Union and the United States as a terror- sketched above—people decide on which Corps (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) af- ist organization. Alliances between the political parties to support. How and why filiated to the PYD replacing regime forces KNC and the PYD eventually failed (Tanir, they choose these parties, as well as which in Rojava raised suspicions of cooperation Wilgenburg and Hossino 9-10), even specific bloc they support, is an important between the PYD and the Syrian regime. though they share the same implicit ideal question. The two camps are assumed to PYD demonstrations are characteristically of an independent Kurdish entity be quite similar with respect to ethnic more pro-PYD than anti-regime. (Hokayem 78-79) and both can benefit composition, their overall goals, and the from cooperation. The KNC has “interna- level of repression they have experienced. Rival Kurdish groups argue the YPG be- tional partners and legitimacy, it is increas- longs to Syria’s branch of the PKK—which ingly divided internally and lacks a genu- Between March 1 and 10, 2014, twelve the regime hosted for so long—, sharing ine presence on the ground; conversely, semi-structured interviews were conduct- the same organizational principles and the PYD’s strong domestic support is not ed among politically active Syrian Kurds in Marxist ideology. Further, the YPG-militias matched by its international standing” in the cities of and Su- are trained by the PKK (Crisis Group “Syr- (Crisis Group “Syria’s Kurds” iii). Violent laymaniyah and a refugee camp. Contacts ia’s Kurds” 11). The YPG provides the PYD clashes between KNC and PYD support- with political activists were established with the necessary military means to con- ers have been reported (Wilgenburg) and through academic and Syrian Kurdish po- trol Rojava in order to administer political the PYD is accused of assassinations, ha- litical networks. Respondents proved power as its best-organized political party rassments and kidnappings of KNC mem- helpful in introducing new interviewees, (Hevian 46-47). bers (Savelsberg, “The Kurdish Factor”). often from other parties, and sometimes These might reflect a regional rivalry on even from rival parties. The KNC which formed in October 2011 is which an organization represents the wid- a coalition of around twelve minor parties.1 er Kurdish community (Crisis Group Interviewees’ Backgrounds Most of these have their roots in the first “Syria’s Kurds” 18). Arguably, only after a The interviews were conducted with peo- Syrian Kurdish party, the Kurdish Demo- new external threat appeared in the shape ple from seven different parties, as well as cratic Party in Syria (Partîya Dêmokrat a of the Islamic State, Kurdish parties in Ro- two independent activists (both, however, Kurd li Sûriye, KDPS) (Allsopp 17). Political java agreed to form a new alliance, known with clear sympathies). Eight interviewees and personal rivalries make the KNC vul- as the Duhok Agreement (Rudaw). Spring including the two independent activists, nerable to internal struggles, which can 2015 the Duhok Agreement seems to have are active on a national (that is Rojava) lev- lead to a lack of effective political power failed as well. el, three on a regional level, and one on (Hevian 47). village level. In total ten men and two women were interviewed, of whom nine

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were middle aged and three were in their inated against Kurdish farmers), the fight those interviewed. One KNC activist twenties and thirties. Of the seven people for women’s rights and the emergence summed up his feelings by reciting a self- talking about their origins, two originate among individuals of a feeling of Kurdish written poem. Singing and dancing and from peasant families, four from a village nationalism. the Kurdish New Year celebration of and one from a major city. Three villagers The interviewees all share awareness of Nowruz are also important points of refer- and one of peasant background moved to the regime’s repressive measures towards ence. Finally, Marxist revolutions inspired a big city during childhood, usually as a the Syrian Kurdish population and indicat- solely the PYD supporters have been im- consequence of regime policy. Four re- ed that this was a key element in becom- portant. They see Angola, Cuba and Viet- spondents originate from contested areas ing politically active. For both female re- nam as examples of peoples who freed within the Syrian Conflict, such as Damas- spondents women’s emancipation was an themselves from oppression as they con- cus or the in northwest Syria. additional aspect. In a broader context, sider the Arabs the oppressors in Rojava. Of the eight respondents who mentioned four interviewees emphasize their activism One independent respondent also used their education, one had finished elemen- is for Kurdish rights in particular, but for these revolutions as an example, howev- tary school and six completed secondary Syrian rights in general as they recognize er, he did so in order to emphasize that school. One respondent has a doctor’s de- the Syrian regime discriminates other eth- violent revolutions eventually lead to less gree. nic groups as well. than good outcomes.

Interviewee Motivation: Why Become Po- The political ideas of Mustafa Barzani are The Interviewees and Leverage: Becom- litically Active? also important for the KNC affiliated activ- ing Politically Active Education proved to be one of the fields ists and Abdullah Öcalan for the PYD and How, then, do people become politically where interviewees experienced repres- their affiliates. These names were men- active? Six respondents answered that sion by the Syrian regime: not being al- tioned nine times in total, but respondents family members were politically involved; lowed to attend university, being forced to also mentioned other political thinkers. five in the same party as their family mem- study literature, or not being al- Among the PYD, left wing writers are pop- bers, one was independent. Three inter- lowed to discuss Kurdistan or Kurdish ular, such as Marx, Lenin, Gorki and viewees became acquainted with political identity. On the other side of the spec- Chekhov, while Nietzsche and Rousseau ideas through the media, especially radio trum, one interviewee became politically were also named. A number of interview- broadcasts. Here education also played an active following the receipt of a grant from ees—both PYD—named the Kurdish nation- important role because it created aware- his father’s Kurdish political party. Six peo- alist poet Cigerxwin among others as a ness among the respondents regarding ple became politically active during their main source of inspiration. the regime’s repression. Some undertook secondary schooling. Other factors that further research independently and then made people politically active include the Poems and other cultural expressions play volunteered for political action, as one of regime’s agricultural policies (that discrim- an important role in the lives of many of

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the female activists tells about her joining the armed rebellion:

In 1996 comrade Zilan committed a sui- cide attack in Turkey. I named my name after her. At that age, the comrades re- fused to accept me in the armed revo- lution. I was allowed to do only political activism […]. [W]hen Öcalan was ar- rested, my sympathy grew so strong— due to my own research and since I knew about the Kurdish situation in the Middle East—, that I insisted on joining.2

In one case the , the Kurdish fighting force, triggered political activism Figure 1: Respondents indicating why they support a specific party, categorized according to party by passing through villages and recount- affiliation and answers given. Scores in absolute numbers, n=12. Respondents usually give multiple ing their stories. answers for why supporting a political party.

The Interviewees and Choice: Why Be- they are willing to use it in the case of self- spondents referred to either Mustafa come Member of a Specific Party? defense. In four cases, choice was a matter Barzani or Abdullah Öcalan on nine out of As most of the respondents were of mid- of lacking other alternatives, either be- twelve occasions as an inspiration in be- dle age, most answered that the choice cause only one party was active in the vil- coming politically active. It appears, there- was limited when they became politically lage of origin, or that other parties were fore, that these leaders and their thinking active. One interviewee said the he re- deemed to be worse. Five people joined have exerted great influence on Kurdish mains loyal to his party. Four PYD mem- the parties in which relatives were already political life, even though Barzani is dead— bers emphasized the focus on the whole active. Figure 1 summarizes these respons- his son Massoud has succeeded him—and of society—in case of the female activists es. Öcalan is imprisoned in Turkey. An inter- including women’s rights. Five non-PYD esting development, then, is the ostensi- respondents claim the choice of their par- Overall Findings ble approach by Öcalan towards Barzani, ty depended on its non-violent nature. Although twelve respondents is a small claiming the latter to be the leader of all When asked about the use of violence for number, the observations are interesting Kurds (Kurdpress).Another important fac- political ends PYD members commented and point the way to further research. Re- tor is family, which appears to be of great

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influence in the way in which someone be- share common experiences leading to proach. Perhaps the issue of family might comes politically active and with which similar political preferences (Barner-Barry fit here as well. party they ultimately become involved. and Rosenwein 94). Family as phenome- Furthermore, one of the primary reasons non in Social Movement Theory can be In all twelve interviews the respondents given for why people join a specific party situated among all main sub-theories of mention repression of Kurds as a key fac- is the preference—emphasized by PYD the Structural-Cognitive Model. How to lo- tor in becoming politically active. Some members—for a party to be based upon cate family within the model needs further scholars use Political Opportunity Struc- social equality and accepting violence exploration. ture as an explanatory model for the Kurds only on the basis of self-defense—all of political activism during the Syrian Con- which are reminiscent of Rousseau (Rus- From a Framing Theory perspective the flict: “The weakening of a state that proved sell 695). It is also revealing that Rousseau choice for either the KNC or the PYD is a oppressive, manipulative, and oblivious to is mentioned directly by one of the re- dynamic process in which the macro level their needs presented new political op- spondents as having influenced his politi- influences the individual. This explains the tions for them” (Hokayem 78). As obvious cal thought. KNC-members emphasize importance of family members as the cul- as this might seem, it does not explain the they choose non-violent politics, and while tural expressions emphasizing Kurdish macro level reluctance of the Kurds to join other factors appear to be evenly distrib- identity and focusing on collective repres- the opposition in initial years of the Syrian uted between both sides, the preference sion. In case of the PYD, this feeling is en- Conflict. Following Tejel, the coming to for social equality versus non-violence forced by class awareness (itself influ- power of Bashar al-Asad and his tolerance seems to be mutually exclusive among the enced by left wing literature), creating an of some form of Kurdish entity after the respondents. The related observation that image of the colonized people whom Qamishli-revolt explains why the Kurds are only PYD-members regard Marxist revolu- must free themselves from repression. An- reluctant to give up this position. Only af- tions abroad as positive examples seems other aspect is that each respondent ter the regime withdrew from Rojava did to confirm this cleavage within Syrian seems to present their answers in corre- they participate in the conflict. This implies Kurdish politics. spondence with the framing of the respec- that the political opportunity is not primar- tive parties when it comes to the accep- ily the Syrian Conflict, but al-Asad’s chang- Structural-Cognitive Model and Syria’s tance of violence. ing attitude towards the Kurds. Kurds Incorporating the results into the Structur- Cultural expressions—and, for the female Resources cohere with opportunities and al-Cognitive Model leads to somewhat respondents, their gender—that empha- both are recognized within a specific ambivalent outcomes, especially in rela- size the group’s uniqueness and offer the frame of reference. Hence, Resource Mo- tion to the impact of relatives on political individual a feeling of belonging can pro- bilization Theory interprets the framing el- participation. Research suggests that voke political activism, an argument which ements as necessary instrumental assets members of the same group—family— is supported by Collective Identity Ap- for creating popular support. Political op-

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portunities are only considered as such if addition to having experienced repres- the choice of party: KNC respondents Wietse van den Berge there are enough assets to actually regard sion, leadership inspired respondents to were clearly motivated by the narrative of them as a viable option. In their reciprocal become politically active. Half of the re- non-violence, while PYD respondents is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for relationship, Resource Mobilization Theo- spondents became involved through rela- chose social equality while accepting vio- Terrorism and Counter-terrorism of ry and Political Opportunity Structure tives, while others were influenced by the lence in cases of self-defense. Leiden University in The Netherlands. identify the same important factors, such media. Why they choose their specific par- His subject concerns political violence in attractive leadership and organization, ty is mainly due to individual perceptions contemporary Middle East, focusing on both of which were mentioned by KNC regarding the weaknesses of other par- minorities such as Syria’s Kurds. and PYD supporters. ties, although in some cases there were email: [email protected] simply no alternatives. Both sides dis- Further research is necessary to gain played fairly similar opinions on these is- greater insight into the processes of po- sues. The major difference which emerged litical mobilization among Syria’s Kurds. In concerns other reasons that underpinned

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