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Regulatory Impact on the Bitcoin Price FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS Regulatory impact on the Bitcoin price BSc Economics & Business Author: R.L. de Jong Student Number: 10757503 Thesis Supervisor: G. Ciminelli Date of Publication: 14/07/2017 ABSTRACT This paper investigates the effects of regulations on the Bitcoin price using an event study multiple regression analysis. For official authorities such as central banks and governments it is of interest to stabilize the Bitcoin price in order for it to be a global reserve currency. Hence study the effect their regulations have on the Bitcoins price. For the regulations we make use of statements or jurisdictions made by central banks or governments and divide them in two variables namely positive and negative regulations. We find that positive regulations do not affect the Bitcoins price but that negative regulations increase the Bitcoins price. This result can be explained by the decrease in supply which increase the price at negative events and the result shows that the Bitcoins price is affected by regulations. For the analysis we used data from September 2011 till June 2017 and the regulations are taken from governments and centrals banks worldwide. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................. 3 SECTION 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................. 4 SECTION 2: Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 7 SECTION 3: Literature Review ................................................................................................... 14 SECTION 4: Data Sample ........................................................................................................... 17 SECTION 5: Methodology ......................................................................................................... 23 SECTION 6: Results and discussion ........................................................................................... 26 SECTION 7: Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 29 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 31 3 SECTION 1: Introduction Online payment systems are evolving quickly. Virtual currencies have been around for decades with David Chaum being one of the first to describe an anonymous electronic payment system that could be useable in the real economy (Chaum, 1983). Chaum was an American cryptographer who started DigiCash Inc. in Amsterdam. His corporation was established in 1990 and filed for bankruptcy in 1998; it failed. Ten years later in 2008Nakamoto released a paper about a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency called Bitcoin ( Nakamoto, 2008). The key difference between fiat currency and cryptocurrency is that a cryptocurrency does not rely on a third party like a bank. This currency relies solely on cryptographic technology and the peer-to-peer network, which later will be discussed. The Bitcoin enables users to make online payments while staying anonymous and has lower transaction costs compared to fiat currency (Reid & Harrigan, 2013). Its anonymity makes it attractive for illegal uses and therefore Bitcoin has widely been used on online black markets. The case of the online anonymous marketplace Silk Road which was used to sell controlled substances and narcotics confirms that the Bitcoin is being used for illegal activities (Christin, 2013). A milestone occurred on the 3th of May 2017 when the price of one single Bitcoin has exceeded the price of the gold standard for the first time. The market capitalization of the Bitcoin has exceeded 40 billion USD and it is the most widely used cryptocurrency with an average daily transaction volume exceeding 300 million USD in the first quarter of 2017 (blockchain.info 2017). The number of Bitcoin wallet users has increased by nearly 200% from January 2016 till January 2017 to 11 million (blockchain.info 2017). Nevertheless, the price of the Bitcoin is highly volatile and makes it not reliable as to store value at this moment (Yermack, 2013). The main driver of the Bitcoins success is the blockchain technology and has become interesting for financial institutions and central banks. This interest led the central banking system of the U.S., the Federal Reserve System, to develop their own centralized cryptocurrency called the FedCoin (Koning, 2016). In March 2009, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, underlined the presence of the Triffin dilemma and asked what kind of international reserve currency is necessary to secure global financial stability and facilitate world economic growth. Zhou stated that this international reserve currency should be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules concerning the supply. The Bitcoin is a kind of 4 international or supranational currency, it can be of use as international reserves held by the monetary authorities for conducting international transactions, intervention in foreign currency market as well as maintaining confidence in the exchange rate (IMF, 2013). One factor that disqualifies the Bitcoin is the fact that their prices have been highly unstable with volatility that is typically much higher than for national currency pairs and both prices and volatility appear to be unrelated to economic or financial factors, making them hard to hedge or forecast (Yermack, 2013). If regulations by central banks and governments are able to affect the Bitcoin price, then they can as well affect the volatility. This leads to the research question of this thesis. This thesis investigates whether regulations affect the Bitcoin price. Regulations are defined by statements or jurisdictions made by governments or central banks and that makes this research unique compared to existing literature on the topic of the Bitcoin. The relevance to research the Bitcoins price comes from the Triffin dilemma and Keynes International Clearing Union, which both proposed a supranational currency as global reserve currency. The methodology used to answer the research question is an event study done on two types of regulations, namely positive and negative regulations, where positive regulations improve further integration of the Bitcoin and negative regulations hinder the further integration of the Bitcoin .The data used ranges from the 18th of September 2011 till the 1th of June 2017. The multiple regression model used is derived from the Barro (1979) model which was used to analyse the gold price. My model takes supply and demand of the Bitcoin plus the regulations in account to estimate the Bitcoin price formation. The results show for the period of 7 years no significant impact of positive events but a significant positive impact of negative events on the Bitcoin price. This suggests that central banks and governments can affect the Bitcoin price with regulations to a certain extent. This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the theoretical framework is set up. Firstly, the Bretton Woods system and Triffin dilemma are discussed to outline the relevance of this research. Then the possible solutions to the Triffin dilemma like the ‘bancor’ and Special Drawing Rights are explained and at last the Bitcoin network is technically reviewed. In Section 3 a literature review is provided on the research done so far on the Bitcoin concerning Bitcoin price drivers. Section 4 describes the dataset used. The methodology is explained In Section 5. explained , Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Then in Section 7 5 conclusions are drawn to answer the research question, and the limitations of the analysis and suggestions for further research are discussed. 6 SECTION 2: Theoretical Framework In this paper I am interested in the store of value function of the Bitcoin. Cryptocurrencies as the Bitcoin are designed like a monetary system and therefore the field of monetary economics gives a theoretical framework to analyse the functions of currencies. First, this section describes the history of monetary systems starting from the Bretton Woods system and explaining the Triffin dilemma. Next, I will describe the Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) uses nowadays and the solution Keynes proposed to solve the Triffin dilemma. Then I will explain what Bitcoin is and how it operates. At last, I discuss how the Bitcoin can solve the Triffin dilemma in the way Keynes envisioned. 2.1 Bretton Woods system and the Triffin dilemma When the Second World War ended, there was a need to rebuild national economies and shape the global economy. As a result, the Bretton Woods system was established in 1944. The main features of the system were the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and fixed but adjustable exchange rates. In 1945 the IMF was founded to help operate a system of fixed exchange rates, in which all currencies were pegged to the dollar, in turn pegged to gold. Experts then considered this necessary to encourage international trade (Feldstein, 1998). Since the foreign currencies were pegged to
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